Collingwood, Winch and Wittgenstein on the Status of Logic
Příspěvek ve sborníkupeer-reviewedpostprint (accepted version)Datum publikování
2022
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Oponent
Název časopisu
Název svazku
Vydavatel
Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
De Gruyter
De Gruyter
Abstrakt
This paper compares R. G. Collingwood and Peter Winch, with Wittgenstein as an important background figure. Their shared philosophical concerns were (1) resistance to ontology, especially metaphysical realism, in favour of a view on philosophy as cultural self-understanding; and (2) critique of the idea of logic as a formal science, labelled “Aristotelian Logic”. Instead, they advanced a conception of logic as the contextually sensitive analysis of actual reasoning. The connection between these two concerns was particularly explicit in Collingwood’s work. We bring out the connection via their reactions to Moore’s “Proof of an External World”. The meaning of what Moore says is indeterminate, because he has not specified the doubt to which his “Proof” is an answer. We see the logical status of a statement when we understand how it constitutes an answer to a question that has arisen. As Collingwood would put it, the logical analysis of a concrete piece of reasoning is an ‘historical’ exercise.
Rozsah stran
ISSN
2191-8449
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Projekt
EC/H2020/101026669/EU/Marie Sklodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship/Philosophy as Cultural Self-Knowledge
Zdrojový dokument
Proceedings of the 43rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium
Vydavatelská verze
Přístup k e-verzi
The accepted version of this article will be available at 01-09-2023.
Název akce
43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium 2022, Platonism, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, August 7–13, 2022