Trojí pojetí svobody

Abstract

Berlin's division of liberty into its positive and negative variants is usually mentioned as a point of reference in the debates about freedom. However, I consider as more fundamental the difference between liberal freedom and freedom based on responsible relations with other people and the surrounding world. In other words, I question the meaning of freedom, which - with a reference to the conception of Ladislav Hejclanek, proponent of the Czech practical philosophy I do not consider to be an elimination of various life bonds, but instead their acceptance, fulfilment, or improvement. However, such binding freedom can also find its ""allies"" in liberalism namely in the so-called liberalism of fear (B. Williams, J. Shklar), which is surprisingly close to Hejdanek's conception and represents at least one of the contemporary currents of liberalism, able to unite with a seemingly opposing tradition. In addition to introducing Hejdanek's conception of freedom, the aim of the paper is also to outline this connection.