This work cultivates further the path opened by Levinasian scholars trying to explore if the ethics of the face of Levinas, considered by many philosophers as an original vision that is a turning point in the history of ethics, and putting at the forefront the holocaust as a major paradigm for all kinds of societal discrimination, as a possible philosophical path for giving
moral consideration and dignity to the plight of the nonhuman animal.
My particular thesis problem is stated as thus: could Levinas's ethics serve the interests of animal ethics? I approached the problem by: first, exonerating Levinas from the charges of anthropocentrism as defined scholarly in the field of animal ethics; second, by identifying two
guiding principles that serve as standard if my application of Levinasian ethical concepts would keep fidelity with Levinas's ethical agenda; third, by applying Levinas's concepts of il ya and nausea, face and other, eros and filiation to the central problems in animal ethics; and fourth, by concluding in what ways Levinas makes a contribution to the discourse of animal
ethics which confirms that Levinasian ethics does advance the interest of animal ethics to uphold the dignity of animals.
