dc.contributor.author |
Hämäläinen, Nora Fiona Karolina
|
cze |
dc.date.accessioned |
2021-05-15T18:32:20Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2021-05-15T18:32:20Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2020 |
|
dc.identifier.issn |
0190-0536 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10195/77195 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
In this paper, I raise the question of how the tradition of ethics afterWittgenstein tends to neglect the historicity of morality, in a way whichis not representative of the complexity of Wittgenstein’s own thinking. Ianalyse a tendency towards one-sidedness in the preferred diet ofphilosophical examples, where focus lies on recognition of, and ethicalattentiveness to, a fellow person or creature. Although these examplesplay an important role in their own right, the overuse of such examples,along with a certain notion of “philosophical grammar”, detracts from ahistorically sensitive investigation of our ethical forms of life. |
eng |
dc.format |
p. 363-381 |
|
dc.language.iso |
eng |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartof |
Philosophical Investigations, volume 43, issue: 4 |
eng |
dc.rights |
pouze v rámci univerzity |
cze |
dc.subject |
Wittgenstein |
eng |
dc.subject |
ethics |
eng |
dc.subject |
history |
eng |
dc.subject |
Cora Diamond |
eng |
dc.subject |
Stanley Cavell |
eng |
dc.subject |
Raimond Gaita |
eng |
dc.subject |
Peter Winch |
eng |
dc.subject |
Wittgenstein |
cze |
dc.subject |
etika |
cze |
dc.subject |
historie |
cze |
dc.subject |
Cora Diamond |
cze |
dc.subject |
Stanley Cavell |
cze |
dc.subject |
Raimond Gaita |
cze |
dc.subject |
Peter Winch |
cze |
dc.title |
A Case for Moral History – Universality and Change in Ethics after Wittgenstein |
eng |
dc.title.alternative |
A Case for Moral History – Universality and Change in Ethics after Wittgenstein |
cze |
dc.type |
article |
eng |
dc.description.abstract-translated |
In this paper, I raise the question of how the tradition of ethics afterWittgenstein tends to neglect the historicity of morality, in a way whichis not representative of the complexity of Wittgenstein’s own thinking. Ianalyse a tendency towards one-sidedness in the preferred diet ofphilosophical examples, where focus lies on recognition of, and ethicalattentiveness to, a fellow person or creature. Although these examplesplay an important role in their own right, the overuse of such examples,along with a certain notion of “philosophical grammar”, detracts from ahistorically sensitive investigation of our ethical forms of life. |
cze |
dc.peerreviewed |
yes |
eng |
dc.publicationstatus |
published version |
eng |
dc.identifier.doi |
10.1111/phin.12270 |
|
dc.relation.publisherversion |
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phin.12270 |
eng |
dc.project.ID |
EF15_003/0000425/Centrum pro etiku jako studium hodnoty člověka |
eng |
dc.identifier.wos |
000571956300004 |
|
dc.identifier.scopus |
2-s2.0-85078019736 |
|
dc.identifier.obd |
39884094 |
|