Show simple item record
dc.contributor.author |
Cordner, Christopher
|
cze |
dc.date.accessioned |
2019-05-22T08:38:54Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2019-05-22T08:38:54Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2018 |
eng |
dc.identifier.issn |
0190-0536 |
eng |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10195/72797 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
Renewing an old theme, Tony Lynch and Nishanathe Dahanayake have argued that morality is founded in the assumption of an absolute God. They claim that guilt is integral to morality, and that guilt involves the internalisation of a God-figure. Echoing Nietzsche, they argue that in a world without God, morality is in collapse; and that the New Atheism is complacent and mistaken in asserting a simple transition to an objective secular moral standard. I agree that morality has roots widely unappreciated by contemporary secular ethics, but I argue that what they call guilt is a partial distortion of the more fundamental phenomenon of remorse, whose importance to morality need not implicate religion. I explain why. |
eng |
dc.format |
p. 94-103 |
eng |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartof |
Philosophical Investigations, volume 41, issue: 1 |
eng |
dc.rights |
pouze v rámci univerzity |
eng |
dc.subject |
morality |
eng |
dc.subject |
God |
eng |
dc.subject |
religion |
eng |
dc.subject |
guilt |
eng |
dc.subject |
remorse |
eng |
dc.subject |
morálka |
cze |
dc.subject |
Bůh |
cze |
dc.subject |
náboženství |
cze |
dc.subject |
vina |
cze |
dc.subject |
lítost |
cze |
dc.title |
Guilt, Remorse and God: Response to Lynch and Dahanayake |
eng |
dc.title.alternative |
Guilt, Remorse and God: Response to Lynch and Dahanayake |
cze |
dc.type |
article |
eng |
dc.description.abstract-translated |
Renewing an old theme, Tony Lynch and Nishanathe Dahanayake have argued that morality is founded in the assumption of an absolute God. They claim that guilt is integral to morality, and that guilt involves the internalisation of a God-figure. Echoing Nietzsche, they argue that in a world without God, morality is in collapse; and that the New Atheism is complacent and mistaken in asserting a simple transition to an objective secular moral standard. I agree that morality has roots widely unappreciated by contemporary secular ethics, but I argue that what they call guilt is a partial distortion of the more fundamental phenomenon of remorse, whose importance to morality need not implicate religion. I explain why. |
cze |
dc.peerreviewed |
yes |
eng |
dc.publicationstatus |
published |
eng |
dc.identifier.doi |
10.1111/phin.12175 |
eng |
dc.project.ID |
EF15_003/0000425/Centrum pro etiku jako studium hodnoty člověka |
eng |
dc.identifier.wos |
000418416900005 |
|
dc.identifier.scopus |
2-s2.0-85029446092 |
|
dc.identifier.obd |
39882223 |
eng |
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
Show simple item record
|
Search DSpace
Browse
-
All of DSpace
-
This Collection
My Account
|