Theoretical background for competitive merger analysis

dc.contributor.author	Černohorský, Jan
dc.contributor.author	Serdarević, Goran
dc.contributor.author	Teplý, Petr
dc.date.accessioned	2010-12-22T09:45:28Z
dc.date.available	2010-12-22T09:45:28Z
dc.date.issued	2010
dc.identifier.issn	1211 – 555X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10195/38065
dc.description.abstract	The aim of this paper is to provide theoretical background for the assessment of merger policies. We discuss two standard models: Cournot Oligopoly with Homogeneous Goods model and Bertrand Competition with Product Differentiation model – to derive simple method how to evaluate competitive effect of a horizontal merger. We found out a unique correspondence between change in consumer surplus and change in competitors’ profits generated by the level of efficiency created in the merger.	eng
dc.format	p. 50-57	cze
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Univerzita Pardubice	cze
dc.relation.ispartof	Scientific papers of the University of Pardubice. Series D, Faculty of Economics and Administration. 16 (1/2010)	eng
dc.subject	oligopoly	eng
dc.subject	Cournout oligopoly model	eng
dc.subject	Bertrand oligopoly model	eng
dc.subject	horizontal mergers	eng
dc.title	Theoretical background for competitive merger analysis	eng
dc.type	Article	eng
dc.peerreviewed	yes	eng
dc.publicationstatus	published	eng