Nervi rei publicae: local governments as economic populists?

Abstract

This article introduces a novel Mixed Populism Indication approach to the study of economic populism in the democratic polity to examine populism at the level of local government in the Czech Republic. In particular, we apply quantitative methods to a financial data of 5804 local government units sample to assess economic populism. This quantitative selection is developed on the principles of financial analysis, which form the basis of the algorithm we propose to process financial data. This is followed by an in-depth, qualitative evaluation of election results and the spatial context of suspected cases. From the results for the municipal environment, we identify populism as strategy used by some local governments. As a part of this strategy, local authorities target outsiders (non-residents) who own property. Although this policy of hostility to outsiders goes against the rational economic interests of the residents, they support this policy in local elections. Finally, this article argues that local political leaders in small municipalities act as populists in shaping tax policy.