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CONFLICTS WITH NOVELTY: INTELLIGIBILITY CRISIS AND THE CASE OF THE YUGOSLAV NARRATIVE

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ABSTRACT. This paper deals with the notion of intelligibility crisis in terms of conflict and harmony. Namely, we will analyze the notion of intelligibility from MacIntyre's philosophical opus and apply it to the historical case. Intelligibility, according to MacIntyre, is the notion which provides us with contextual meaning and embeds our actions with sense within the specific tradition. Intelligibility crisis is the term that is coined to provide a descriptive account of the phenomenon when we cannot connect ourselves with a new social context in which we find ourselves in. To further elaborate on this and apply it onto an example, we shall use the historical case of the Yugoslavian nation. We will provide analysis between three different contextual narratives – pre-Yugoslav narrative, Yugoslav narrative, and post-Yugoslav narrative. After applying the notion of intelligibility crisis onto this historical case study, we will notice how people of one social narrative lose intelligibility by going into another social narrative. Furthermore, we shall consider the notions of conflicts and harmony as those that are connected to intelligibility. The main argument from the descriptive state of things which was offered would be the following – conflicting sentiments arise when we are not in harmony with the narrative within which we have attained intelligibility.

Keywords: intelligibility crisis, Yugoslavia, social narratives, meaning, conflicts, harmony

1.0. Setting up the Stage: Social Narratives, Narratives of the Self, and Intelligibility

The main purpose of this paper is to expand on the theory of intelligibility that is derived from MacIntyre's philosophical opus and apply it in a specific context.

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By doing this, we will look at the notions such as conflict and harmony in a specific light. However, before doing that, a conceptual stage needs to be set; the one which will provide the necessary premises upon which this claim stands upon. The two biggest premises are the social narrativity thesis and the psychological narrativity thesis (or the thesis of narrative self-constitution).

Generally, the narrativity approach is relatively novel in the philosophical investigation of the social and psychological phenomena. Anthony Rudd, for example, notes the following:

> Over the last two or three decades, various philosophers, including MacIntyre, Taylor and Ricoeur (as well as psychologists, sociologists, theologians, and others) have argued that the notion of narrative has a central role to play in our thinking about personal identity and about ethics.[2]

Firstly, the social narrativity thesis states that the data that we operate with, our beliefs, values, attitudes come from the complex infrastructure of context which is embedded within one society. It holds a claim that our social lives are a part of an overall narrative and that this narrative is an ontological condition of our social lives.[3] This infrastructure is exhibited in the form of a narrative in which the members of that society are a part of. Therefore, one of the central claims of the social narrativity thesis is that the meaning is exclusively derived from the narrative context which we are a part of. This derivation theory is called narrative hermeneutics. In short, a view of narrative hermeneutics states that the narratives are necessarily politically and socially induced and that, in accordance with that, individuals find themselves deciphering meaning within that world.[4]

The second premise is that of the narrativity self-constitution thesis. The claim of this thesis is that the conception of the self is inherently narrative.[5] That is to say – when we think about the question of "who am I?", we initially find an answer in a story of our lives in relational terms. Our social identity is constituted by us being a member of a specific group of people that share the same narrative within the given context[6], and our personal identity as the bearers of experience.

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[2] A. Rudd, *Kierkegaard, MacIntyre and Narrative Unity—Reply to Lippitt* in *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, vol.50, no.5, 2007., p. 541.

[3] M. R. Sommers, G. D. Gibson, *Reclaiming the Epistemological Other: Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity* in *Social Theory and Politics of Identity*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993., p. 38.

[4] H. Meretoja, *The Ethics of Storytelling: Narrative Hermeneutics, History and the Possible*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2018., p. 50.

[5] M. Schechtman, *The Narrative Self* in *The Oxford Handbook of the Self*, 2011, p. 395.

[6] M. R. Sommers, *The Narrative Constitution of Identity: Relational and Network Approach* in *Theory and Society vol. 24, no. 5*, 1994., p. 606.

The philosopher who championed this view is surely Paul Ricoeur, however, it expands to the more recent debates led by Maria Schechtman, Alasdair MacIntyre, Daniel Dennett, and Charles Taylor. Despite the differences in their approaches, all these philosophers share the view that our sense of self is not static or fixed, but rather is continually shaped and re-shaped through our ongoing interactions with others and the larger social context. This view has important implications for understanding how we come to understand ourselves and our place in the world, as well as how we relate to others and engage in ethical decision-making. For example, a person X is a child of parents X1 and X2, a friend of X3 and X4, a musician, a footballer, a person who went through experience Z1, Z2, Z3 etc. All these factors constitute a narrative identity of a person X.

This would be the roughest sketch of the two premises that were offered. The stage is set for the notion of intelligibility to enter the picture. In MacIntyre's terms, intelligibility refers to the idea that our actions and practices are only meaningful within a certain tradition or narrative.[7] According to MacIntyre's concept of intelligibility, practices and their significance are closely tied to the traditions in which they are executed. The job of a phrenologist, for example, was once considered important as it studied the size and shape of skulls to determine personality traits and intellectual capabilities. However, as science progressed, the practice of phrenology lost its importance and would now be considered irrational. Similarly, the job of a scribe, such as a sofer copying the Bible, was once essential before the invention of the printing press but is now meaningless in our technologically advanced world. Our actions and tendencies are only intelligible within the context of the social tradition or narrative in which we are situated. This idea is foreshadowed in the beginning of MacIntyre's "After Virtue" and is further developed in the second part of the book. In short, according to MacIntyre, our beliefs, intentions, actions, strivings, goals, values etc. are shaped by the social narrative and they only make sense within the borders of that social narrative.[8] This is what he believes that intelligibility is – the dependence of our self-constitution on the social narrative that embeds us.

Thus, the framework that is needed has been established. Social narrativity thesis is used as the external source of our embeddedness; psychological narrativity thesis states that we form our conception of *the self* in accordance with the relational approach and the stories that we tell ourselves; and, finally, intelligibility thesis states that there is a clear dependency between our actions, beliefs, intentions, values etc.[9] are meaningful only under the social framework under which they have

[7] A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, Notre Dame Press, Indiana., 1981., p. 206.
[8] *Ibid.* p. 208.
[9] We can also take these attributes as the basics of our self-constitution.

been formed. Let us, therefore, apply these concepts onto a concrete case. This will enable us to make an argument that intelligibility/intelligibility crisis is an important part of how we perceive ourselves living in harmony or living in conflict.

2.0. Describing Intelligibility Crisis: A Case Study of Yugoslavia

I would like to start this chapter with a purely practical example which leads from what we have talked about in the previous sub-chapter. We will explore one historical case study in order to provide the implications of what will be called the intelligibility crisis. This example will portray the conditions of changing one social structure, or a social narrative and the effects of it on the individuals who have been formed under it. The content of this project will rest on the premises of the social and personal narrativity thesis and their correlation within the notion of the intelligibility crisis. We have mentioned intelligibility as one of the key concepts, meaning, respectively, that our actions and thoughts make sense within the boundaries of one social narrative. Intelligibility, in this project, as we have established, means that a subject is making sense of the social status around him/her and acting/thinking in such a way that makes sense to do within that social status. Intelligibility crisis, in this sense, will be shown as a discontinuation of that coherency. As an example, I will use the case of former Yugoslavia and provide sufficient evidence why the intelligibility crisis was especially relevant in that situation. Afterwards, I will explore intelligibility crisis through the lens of nostalgia and show its political and moral relevance.

Therefore, for the sake of an example, we will consider someone who grew up in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He/she has been encumbered by one social and political system, or a narrative. Assuming that the model we have provided in the first sub-chapter works, this person has formed his/her *self* by deriving meaning from the social context in which he/she found him/herself to be a part of, through the process of narrative hermeneutics. This leads us to connect the narrative notion of *the self* with the social narrative in which *the self* was formed. The person who has been raised in Yugoslavia considers him/herself to be a part of the community which has social structures, rules, norms etc. that are unique to it. Yugoslavia has been a unity of autonomous areas, an alliance between nations which have shared an economic and political unity.[10] Let us consider a Yugoslav narrative as N2. To fulfill the requirement of portraying the social change, we will take three narratives into consideration – pre-Yugoslav narrative, Yugoslav narrative, and post-Yugoslav narrative.

[10] A. Finlan, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-99*, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2004., p. 13.

Yugoslavia is the key denominator in this relation, and it would be of major importance to describe the Yugoslav project. The idea of the unified project of the southern Slavs has been in the making through the years before its formation. The notion of creating this project also brought a fresh air of freedom for the countries at hand, since they have been under the influence of the forces such as Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire. Dejan Djokić stresses that the creation of this state was not only reasonable, but maybe the only choice the given countries could have made after the First World War.[11] That is to say, the idea of many intellectual and political circles (both Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian and Slovenian)[12] has achieved its actualization after the First World War in the form of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians (which would later become Yugoslavia). Decades of intellectual endeavors have made it possible for the general public to accept the idea of a unified project. As Marie-Janine Calic rightfully observes, the public has been made nationally conscious by both horizontal and vertical cultural mobilization.[13] For it to be achievable, Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire needed to lose their power over the mentioned countries, and this was the consequence which arose after the First World War. Therefore, there was a need for national freedom and unity, as well as practical and economic benefit of working together after the time of war. The Yugoslav narrative was a construct of those who were craving national freedom that was not coerced by higher powers.

The major importance lies in the idea of national unity being created and constituted, since it needed to be based on a specific social narrative which provided means for the people to accept living under these conditions. To understand this, we need to refer back to the singular nationalist sentiments that were always lurking in the shadows of Yugoslavia. Vesna Pešić argues that Yugoslavia was never able to accommodate multiple nationalistic ideologies which were especially fueled after World War II.[14] Three nationalistic ideologies are notable in this picture and, as John R. Lampe rightfully highlights, those are of Serbian nationalism, Croatian nationalism, and Yugoslav nationalism.[15] Prior to the official birth of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there was a strong ideological battle in the particular nations. On the one hand, we had a strong idea of a nation, a community which is constituted

[11] D. Djokić, *Vek Jugoslavije: Kako i Zašto su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci Stvorili Zajedničku Državu* in *Tragovi vol. 2, no. 1,* 2018., p. 30.

[12] *Ibid.* p. 32-34.

[13] M. Calic, *A History of Yugoslavia,* Purdue University Press, Indiana, 2019., p. 40.

[14] V. Pešić, *Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 1996., p. 3.

[15] J. R. Lampe, *The Failure of Yugoslav National Idea* in *Studies in East European Thought*, Springer, 1994., p. 71-72.

on the grounds of the shared past. Stressing the importance of the past is absolutely the key and we will soon see why that is the case. Opposite to this idea, there were, as Charles Jelavich call them, idealists who believed that Slavic people should overcome their differences and rise above the factors which have divided them within one unified state.[16] Sociologically speaking, Serbian and Croatian nationalism were a political reality in the nineteenth century. This political sentiment of nationalism was deeply encoded in the past and has never been confronted with absolute honesty. Serbian nationalism was exactly this, a force from the past, originating in the idea of a medieval times in which Serbia was a great nation.[17]

Also, it is worthy to note the importance of the historical battle that being presented in the nationalist narrative. Serbia, according to the nationalist picture, has always battled against the foreign forces and has, through the battle of virtue and glory, overcame all obstacles. The same thing can be said in regard to the Croatian nationalism. According to Davorka Matić, the root of the Croatian nationalism is in the medieval "nation Croatica", an idea used to build foundation for the notion of the Croatian political nation.[18] These sentiments were carried by the political parties such as the National Party (Narodna stranka) and the Party of Rights (Stranka prava).[19] So, keeping that in mind, we will call this pre-Yugoslav narrative N1; a narrative based on the political affiliation with the particular states.

During the period of N2, citizens born and raised in the former Yugoslavia mostly have a different sentiment linked to their political deliberation. As the time went on, the idea of unity became so powerful with public opinion being completely swayed by the idea of the Yugoslav nation. This is the third nationalist sentiment mentioned before, the Yugoslav one. Aleksa Djilas notes that the values based on non-alignment (or to be precise, alignment to Yugoslavia) have held the country together and have been at the center of keeping it unified.[20] This idea of unity and shared practices is the bases that the "neighbors" used to form an idea of one nation under the banner of Yugoslavia.

N3 would describe a narrative which is post-Yugoslav. There were multiple reasons why Yugoslavia, as a project, didn't work. The underlying economical

[16] C. Jelavich, *Serbian Nationalism and the Question of Union with Croatia in the Nineteenth Century* in *Balkan Studies,* Thessaloniki, 1961., p. 1.

[17] P. J. Cohen, *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History*, Texas A&M University Press, Texas, 1996., p. 136.

[18] D. Matić, *Is Nationalism Really That Bad? The Case of Croatia* in *Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education & Media*, Texas A&M University, Texas, 2007., p. 327.

[19] *Ibid*. p. 327.

[20] A. Djilas, *Tito's Last Secret: How Did He Keep the Yugoslavs Together?* In *Foreign Affairs* vol. 74, no. 4, Council of Foreign Relations, 1995., p. 121.

inefficiencies, the piling of costs, the problem of getting new foreign investors, the rise of unemployment, etc. has shaken the former nation of Yugoslavia.[21] When the economic state of one nation starts to falter, the civil disappointment follows. It was not long before the trust in the very institutions started to weaken and the game of blaming one another began. During the 1980s, as one might imagine, the narrative started shifting back towards the detachment of the nations and the pro-Serbian and pro-Croatian ideal.[22] The craving for dominance, the need for the detachment, the longing for the past greatness has culminated during the beginning of the 1990s when the bloody Balkan wars happened, and the violent fall of Yugoslavia occurred.

What does this show; what does this tell us? From this very broad portrayal of the history of Yugoslavia we have tried to illustrate the short time span of the drastic social and political changes. Let us now try to formalize what was happening and how the theory given in the previous chapters can be of service to our cause. Formalization can go as it follows - social narratives, as stated, will be referred to as N1 (pre-Yugoslav narrative), N2 (Yugoslav narrative) and N3 (post-Yugoslav narrative). The people that constitute the social order N1 will be referred to as P1, and the same goes for P2 and P3. Since the social narrative shapes personal narratives, the emphasis must be put on the role of the people.

By addressing the people of a given narrative structure, I am assuming the connection between the social narrative and the narrative constitution of *the self*. Since *the self*, as we have stated, is formed under the social narrative which is formative for *the self*. In this sense, those who are Px are *the selves* formed under the social narrative Nx.

Of course, it is safe to assume that this is based on a broad generalization since we also need to embrace a plurality of ways of life. As stated earlier, in N1 there have been groups of people who were striving for unification of the nations and those who were striving for conservation of power. Noting this might be obvious, but it needs to be addressed. Every narrative tends to shape various people who are assessing it from a specific standpoint. Some of them are against it, while some of them affirm it. The means for affirmation or negation can be various and are often located in the form of one's life. To repeat the previous claim in this context, when I talk about Px being related to Nx, it is said that Px has been shaped by Nx. Also, I am taking Px as a group of people withholding the dominant public opinion of the given narrative. Therefore, when I talk about P1, it is referring to the people

[21] S. P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević,* Westview Press, Colorado, 2002., p.49.

[22] *Ibid.* p. 52.

who have been raised in a narrative that is strictly nationalist and it is by no means saying that there was no plurality of opinions.

Now, let us continue to talk about the relation between N1, N2, N3, and P1, P2 and P3. What happened in the first place, when the Yugoslav nation appeared, was that N1 has shifted into N2. Yet, P1 has not shifted into P2; P2 were the new generations being raised by P1. The problem arises here – you take one group of people with specific sentiments and ways of life and throw them into the new social order. Let us also assume that this new social order was more just, and the institutions were operating under the premise of equal consideration of interests. It takes both parts of the equation for the narrative to function, there needs to be an equilibrium between Px and Nx. If there is no such a thing, Px will feel thrown into the unknown, new world and, most likely, they will long for the world that they have been a part of. This is what intelligibility crisis is, a sense of disorientation in one narrative. Actions and beliefs that we held before do not seem intelligible with the new context and we feel a sense of loss, anger, intense dislike, or rage.

There are still practices and meanings transferring from one narrative to another, as James Connelly notes[23]. One of the replies would be that these practices and meanings transform their intelligibility to the wider context. P1 who is working in the bureaucracy institution does not feel that his/her efforts are having the same designatum in N1 and N2. The motive changes, in N1, the goal was promoting welfare in the national borders, while in N2, it is to promote the unified good. The consequences of this individual practice might lead to an unequal reception of people. A good example (and certainly the one of contemporary importance) might be racism in the USA law enforcement institutions. The police brutality against the people of color resulted in the formation of the BLM international social movement in 2013 which went out to organize massive protests in the 2020 following the brutal killing of George Floyd.[24] Considering the data studies, people of color are 2.5x more likely to be killed by the police than white people.[25] Surely, we cannot simplify institutional racism and claim that there is only one factor contributing to it. Steven O. Roberts and Michael Rizzo find that there are seven factors contributing to the institutional racism in the USA.[26] First two factors are quite

[23] J. Connelly, *Reasoning Through Crisis, Incommensurability and Belief* in *Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique* XXI-2, 2016., p. 9.

[24] Brittanica.com, *Black Lives Matter*, site: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Black-Lives-Matter accessed: 29.03.2022.

[25] Nature.com, *What Data Say About Police Brutality and Racial Bias – And Which Reforms Might Work*, site: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01846-z accessed: 29.03.2023.

[26] News.stanford.edu, *Stanford Psychologist Identifies Seven Factors that Contribute to American Racism*, site: https://news.stanford.edu/2020/06/09/seven-factors-contributing-american-racism/ accessed: 29.03.2023.

important – categories and the factions.[27] The first factor leads us to correlate ourselves with specific groups while the second factor triggers the sentiment of loyalty towards that group. Now, this invokes a feeling of pride for one nation or, in this instance, one race. There have also been multiple links between patriotic nationalism and white racism. Donna Goldstein and Kira Hall take a step further and deduce that this feeling is intensified by the nostalgic sentiments of once a great nation residing in the mid-twentieth century.[28] When we combine these factors, you have institutional injustice committed against those who do not fit into the categories of belonging. Some police officers working for the law enforcement institution are providing less care for those who do not fit into their groups towards which they have loyalty, nor with which they share the collective, nostalgic dream.

The same can be said for P1 shifting into N2. Now they have to live in a narrative with the people with whom they do not share this sense of belonging nor the sense of unified past. This feeling was, arguably, a constant sentiment that has plagued Yugoslavia. Now, when we introduce P2 into the picture, the situation becomes much more chaotic. We can differentiate between P2' and P2''. P2' refers to those individuals who have been shaped in N2 and find themselves to be national residents of Yugoslavia. P2'' are those who have been shaped in N2 as well, however, they still retain the strong sense of national belonging to the nationality which was linked with the pre-Yugoslav narrative. N3 happened because of the invocation of the sentiments that were held by P2'', awakening the past and feeding of the nostalgic feeling of the times that have passed. Neo-nationalism has swayed those that were idealizing the past and has opened the ideological battle which resulted in one of the most horrible wars since World War 2. N3, in this sense, is the new N1 while N2 has perished. In N3 we have P2 and P3, some of those who, yet again long for the past, and the ones who are affirming the present. Yet again we have the intelligibility crisis of those coming from N2. P2'' have achieved the goal of nationalization, however, the investigation shows that most of them are not happy with how the things turned out and that the majority of the ex-Yugoslav citizens think that the break-up did more harm than good.[29] P2' are considered Yugonostalgics, people that have longing towards the fallen state.[30]

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[27] *Ibid.*

[28] D. M. Goldstein, K. Hall, *Postelection surrealism and nostalgic racism in the hands of Donald Trump* in *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, 7, no.1, 2017., p. 402.

[29] E. Keating, Z. Ritter, news.gallup.com, *Many in Balkans Still See More Harm from Yugoslavia Breakdown*, site: https://news.gallup.com/poll/210866/balkans-harm-yugoslavia-breakup.aspx accessed: 30.03.2023.

[30] N. Chushak*, Yugonostalgic against All Odds: Nostalgia for Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia among Young Leftist Activists in Contemporary Serbia*, PhD thesis in *School of Social and Political Science*, University of Melbourne, 2013., p. 3.

Now, let us sum up the description given in this sub-chapter. The notion of the intelligibility crisis was described in the example of the Yugoslav narrative. We have compared the Yugoslav narrative to the post-Yugoslav and the pre-Yugoslav narrative in order to show the drastic change in how we perceive social reality. I have tried to argue that one reason in the sea of reasons for the fall of Yugoslavia was in the exploitation of the past narrative. The Yugoslav narrative was compared to the pre-Yugoslav narrative while the second one has been animated by the invocation of the sentiment of nostalgia. I have also argued that in the post-Yugoslav narrative nostalgia still remains.

However, this time, the nostalgia is not the pre-Yugoslav one, but a Yugoslav one. This nostalgia is a product of the world not making sense to us anymore and us being unable to find ourselves intelligible within the new structure of meaning. Apart from the narrative we have had an as example, countless others still stand. Many of the conservative strivings are explained by this intelligibility crisis. In this sense, many of the newer political problems and concerns make little to no sense to the people that have been embedded within the narrative of the old. The problems of the 2000s are not the same as the problems in the 1980s. The problems in 2022 are not the same as the problems we were facing in the early 2000s etc. Race issues, gender issues, and many forms of minority issues that certain groups of people are concerned with at this very moment become meaningless or are downplayed by those who have been shaped under the narrative which had their own set of problems. This has an immense impact on the overall consensus and on political choices themselves.

This is what I call an intelligibility crisis – a crisis occurring when those who have been formed as themselves under one social narrative do not find meaning in another social narrative.

3.0. Harmony and Conflict Explained from the Dichotomy of Intelligibility and Intelligibility Crisis

How do we define harmony and conflict within the boundaries of this project? Surely, these terms can mean various things when applied to various examples. This project, however, deals with the social realm or, to be more exact, relationship between the social and the individual. In this regard, I will follow Stephen Wright's and Gamze Baray's aspect of conflict and harmony; that is to say, I will use the term conflict to describe the negative intergroup relations while I will use the term harmony to describe the intergroup cohesion.[31]The reason why the

[31] S. C. Wright, G. Baray, *Models of Social Change in Social Psychology: Collective Action or Prejudice*

aspect of intergroup relations concerning conflict and harmony should be obvious. The three social narratives that we have established are directly related to the intergroup relations that share different narrative views.

Now, what I would like to argue is the following – the more we have intelligibility within one society, the more we will be in harmony with it. And vice versa, the less intelligibility there is within a society, we have further chances for conflict. The second claim is easily visible on the examples that have been provided, however, when it comes to harmony, it is a premise which is taken as a hypothetical implication from the analysis of conflict. The step that needs to be taken at this point is to return to the given examples and provide a claim.

Coming back to the previous examples, we have N1, N2 and N3; pre-Yugoslav, Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav narrative. Due to the rapid change in the social environment and the constant fragmentation of societal strivings and goals, a huge intelligibility crisis occurred. Those who were molded in society N1, did not feel like society N2 affirmed their beliefs, values, and attitudes; and the same thing goes with N2 and N3. By pinpointing the fact of rapid change and loss of intelligibility, we see the effects on social cohesion and intergroup relations. Furthermore, if we follow MacIntyre's view on intelligibility, we see it as a necessary constitute of the common good since it connects individual practices to the overall social narrative.[32]In short, what I want to argue for here is that without intelligibility, there cannot be a unified striving towards some form of common good. Without this striving, social cohesion and intergroup relations deteriorate. David Schiefer and Jolanda van der Noll claim that the orientation towards the common good is the essential component of social cohesion.[33]

On the other hand, the similar claim is argued for by many political theorists; the claim that without shared values and affirmed identities, social cohesion does not work.[34] Therefore, without the clear and coherent infrastructure of beliefs, values, and attitudes that we derive from the social narrative upon which we ground a specific account of good, we feel like we are in a state of crisis in correlation with the society in which we live. In this sense, I believe that the hypothesis which claims that intelligibility is an essential factor for intergroup relations has been set.

So, to summarize, I am using the term harmony to describe an aspect of intergroup relations which is a cohesive one. On the other hand, conflict is a term

Rejection? Conflict or Harmony? in *Beyond Prejudice: Extending the Social Psychology of Conflict, Inequality and Social Change*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012., p. 227.

[32] A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, Notre Dame Press, Indiana. 1981., p. 201.

[33] D. Schiefer, J. van der Noll, *The Essentials of Social Cohesion: A Literature Review* in *Social Indicators Research*, vol. 132, 2017., p. 589.

[34] K. N. Breidahl, N. Holtug, K. Kogshoj, *Do shared values promote social cohesion? If so, which? Evidence from Denmark*, in *European Political Science Review* vol. 10, no. 1, 2018., p. 98.

that I use to describe negative intergroup relations. N1, N2, and N3 have been plagued by conflicts, resulting in a strained and troubled relationship among those that belong to these narratives. If one narrative state of affairs were a consistent one, the intelligibility crises would not arise, and we would have more social cohesion. In the midst of it all, if a person who is born and raised within the Yugoslav narrative shifts him/herself into another narrative in a rapid way, the intelligibility that he/she had with the older narrative shatters and he/she is dealing with intelligibility crisis. Now, by having this, he/she does not share the same intelligibility as the person who is a member of N3 narrative, or post-Yugoslav one. By not having the same set of common goals in the overall structure of society, the intergroup relations are fragmented, and conflict arises. Steven L. Burg argues that in Yugoslavia, there have been little to no agreements on the borders of the territories, on the national questions etc. which bred inter-national hostility and led to many internal conflicts.[35] By not addressing the problems which were intelligible to N1, they were brought into the social narrative N2 and, therefore, caused the intelligibility crises of those who were a part of N1. As we have noted, N1 was a social narrative which has rested on the questions of national identity of a particular state while N2 was a social narrative of a unified national identity. The narrative identity of a person X who is a part of N1 and the narrative identity of a person Y who is a part of N2 are directly in conflict with each other. Therefore, harmony as intergroup cohesion was thrown out of the picture, and we were left with a conflictual environment. And, yet the same thing can be said going from N2 to N3.

In this respect, I am arguing for the following – intelligibility is an important part of intergroup relations. By using the terms such as conflict and harmony in direct correlation with the case of intergroup relations, I have tried to elaborate on the point that harmony has an important aspect of individuals being intelligible to their own social narrative while, at the same time, conflict arises (in this respect only) once the social narrative has become foreign and the individuals from the previous narrative start clashing with the individuals who were/are formed under the newer narrative.

4.0. Conclusion

We have started this paper with two opening premises – the one on social narrativity thesis and the one on the psychological narrativity thesis. Intelligibility is a term that is of key importance in this paper, and it was introduced after the

[35] S. L. Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1983., p. 19.

introduction of the two premises, since it is closely linked and dependent on them. Afterwards, the goal was to apply intelligibility and intelligibility crisis onto a particular example. The case of Yugoslavia was very convenient, and it has allowed us to test out our terminological framework. Finally, by providing the theoretical basis as well as giving a historical example, the stage was set to provide a main argument for this paper which is exploring the relationship between harmony-conflict and intelligibility-intelligibility crisis. I have tried to argue for the fact that, if we consider harmony as a descriptive account of positive intergroup relations, and if we consider conflict as the opposite, we can introduce intelligibility into the picture. That is to say, intelligibility is an important aspect of intergroup cohesion and, by having a strong sense of intelligibility between the individuals and the social narrative within which they are shaped, we have a harmonious relation. On the other hand, intelligibility crisis arises when the individuals do not share the same set of values, beliefs, and attitudes with the social narrative within which they are found to be a part of and, therefore, do not find harmony with the individuals embedded with the narrative they are not a part of, neither the social narrative itself. Finally, by providing this claim, we have connected the notions of intelligibility with harmony and intelligibility crisis with conflict.

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