

UNIVERSITY OF PARDUBICE

Faculty of Arts and Philosophy

Institute of Historical Sciences

Master's Thesis

**BETWEEN PARIS AND VIENNA
The Diplomatic Mission of Heinrich Franz von
Mansfeld, 1680–1683**

Anna Adamčíková

Supervised by doc. Mgr. Jiří Kubeš, PhD.
Pardubice 2023

Univerzita Pardubice
Fakulta filozofická
Akademický rok: 2020/2021

ZADÁNÍ DIPLOMOVÉ PRÁCE

(projektu, uměleckého díla, uměleckého výkonu)

Jméno a příjmení: **Bc. Anna Adamčíková**
Osobní číslo: **H20353**
Studijní program: **N7105 Historické vědy**
Studijní obor: **Kulturní dějiny: Péče o kulturní dědictví**
Téma práce: **Mezi Paříží a Vídní. Diplomatická mise Henricha Franze von Mansfeld, 1680-1683**
Zadávající katedra: **Ústav historických věd**

Zásady pro vypracování

Diplomová práce se bude zabývat činností císařského vyslance Heinricha Franze hraběte von Mansfeld na francouzském dvoře krále Ludvíka XIV. v letech 1680-1683. Tato problematika není dosud ve středo-evropských historiografiích zpracována a analýza mise pomůže rozšířit znalosti dějin diplomacie a rakousko-francouzských vztahů ve druhé polovině 17. století. Posluchačka vyjde zejména z instrukce daného vyslance a jeho následných diplomatických relací, bude analyzovat průběh mise a zasadí ji do kontextu dějin raně novověké diplomacie, který se v posledních letech utěšeně rozvíjí a tento výzkum přináší mnoho plodů v zahraničí i v České republice.

Rozsah pracovní zprávy:

Rozsah grafických prací:

Forma zpracování diplomové práce: **tištěná/elektronická**

Seznam doporučené literatury:

Prameny:

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilungen, Frankreich, kart. 20, 24-25.

Literatura:

ADAMS, Robyn – COX, Rosanna (edd.), *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, Basingstoke 2011.

BÉLY, Lucie (ed.), *L'art de la paix en Europe. Naissance de la diplomatie moderne, XVI^e – XVIII^e siècle*, Paris 2007.

BÉRENGER, Jean, *Le conflit entre les Habsbourg et les Bourbons (1598-1792)*, in: *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 116, 2002/3, s. 193-232.

BÉRENGER, Jean (ed.), *Les Relations franco-autrichiennes sous Louis XIV. Siègle de Vienne 1683*, Colloque à propos du tricentenaire de Vienne, 9-11 mars 1983. Saint-Cyr 1983.

BITTNER, Ludwig – GROß, Lothar (edd.), *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648–1715)*, Oldenburg–Berlin 1936.

BRAUBACH, Max, *Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV. bis Kaunitz: die Vorstadien der diplomatischen Revolution im 18. Jahrhundert*, Köln 1952.

DUINDAM, Jeroen, *Vienna and Versailles. The Courts of Europe's Dynastic Rivals*, Cambridge 2003.

FEDELE, Dante, *Naissance de la diplomatie moderne (XIII^e–XVII^e siècles): L'ambassadeur au croisement du droit, de l'éthique et de la politique*, Baden Baden–Zürich 2017.

HARTUNG, Fritz, *L'État c'est moi*, *Historische Zeitschrift* 169, 1949, s. 1–30.

KUBEŠ, Jiří a kol., *V zastoupení císaře. Česká a moravská aristokracie v habsburské diplomacii 1640–1740*, Praha 2018.

LEWIN, André, *De l'ambassade de France à Vienne et de quelques un des ambassadeurs*, Wien 1995.

MÜLLER, Klaus, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648–1740)*, Bonn 1976.

PICAVET, Camille George, *La diplomatie française au temps de Louis XIV (1661–1715) Institution, Moeurs et Coutumes*, Paris 1930.

ROOSEN, William J., *The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1976.

Vedoucí diplomové práce:

doc. Mgr. Jiří Kubeš, Ph.D.

Ústav historických věd

Datum zadání diplomové práce:

30. března 2021

Termín odevzdání diplomové práce:

31. března 2022

doc. Mgr. Jiří Kubeš, Ph.D.
děkan

doc. Mgr. Pavel Marek, Ph.D.
vedoucí katedry

V Pardubicích dne 30. listopadu 2021

AFFIDAVIT

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this work; no assistance other than that permitted has been used and all quotes and concepts taken from unpublished sources, published literature or the internet in wording or in basic content have been identified by footnotes or with precise source citations.

Hradec Králové, date

Anna Adamčiková

.....

.....

PROHLÁŠENÍ

Prohlašuji, že práci s názvem *Between Paris and Vienna. The Diplomatic Mission of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld, 1680–1683*, jsem vypracovala samostatně. Veškeré literární prameny a informace, které jsem v práci využila, jsou uvedeny v seznamu použité literatury.

Byla jsem seznámena s tím, že se na moji práci vztahují práva a povinnosti vyplývající ze zákona č. 121/2000 Sb., o právu autorském, o právech souvisejících s právem autorským a o změně některých zákonů (autorský zákon), ve znění pozdějších předpisů, zejména se skutečností, že Univerzita Pardubice má právo na uzavření licenční smlouvy o užití této práce jako školního díla podle § 60 odst. 1 autorského zákona, a s tím, že pokud dojde k užití této práce mnou nebo bude poskytnuta licence o užití jinému subjektu, je Univerzita Pardubice oprávněna ode mne požadovat přiměřený příspěvek na úhradu nákladů, které na vytvoření díla vynaložila, a to podle okolností až do jejich skutečné výše.

Beru na vědomí, že v souladu s § 47b zákona č. 111/1998 Sb., o vysokých školách a o změně a doplnění dalších zákonů (zákon o vysokých školách), ve znění pozdějších předpisů, a směrnicí Univerzity Pardubice č. 7/2019 Pravidla pro odevzdávání, zveřejňování a formální úpravu závěrečných prací, ve znění pozdějších dodatků, bude práce zveřejněna prostřednictvím Digitální knihovny Univerzity Pardubice.

Hradec Králové, datum

Anna Adamčíková

.....

.....

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor and mentor, Jiří Kubeš, who enlightened my way through as a splendid theme as the Early Modern diplomacy certainly is. This endeavour would not have been possible without his patience, guidance and help. Moreover, I wish to thank to Vítězslav Prchal for copying of archival sources for my research. Additionally, thanks should also go to Cody Alan Sketoe whose proofreading of this text was of invaluable assistance. I would like to thank all who generously offered me their time and insight while I was researching, writing, and translating.

Anna Adamčiková

ABSTRACT

The following text is focused on the diplomatic mission of the Imperial diplomat, Count Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld (1641–1715), in France between 1680 and 1683. The main task of this text is an analysis of the 61 reports from the Mansfeld's mission, which are deposited in The Austrian State Archives in Vienna. His reports, however, have not preserved completely. Hence a larger range of historical sources and working approaches has been used. It is the instruction for Mansfeld dated from 27 March 1680, or the period newspaper La Gazette. The method employed in my research is the contextual-comparative analysis. Such a case study has not yet been published. Because of that, we have had only a limited knowledge of what Mansfeld in Paris had done, and why. The court of Louis XIV was moreover an exemplary case in many ways, such as a centre of pre-modern western aristocratic culture, a centre of European politics, and a centre of European diplomacy.

KEYWORDS

Mansfeld; Diplomacy; Early Modern Period; 17th century; France; Holy Roman Empire; Leopold I; Louis XIV

ANOTACE

Následující text se zabývá diplomatickou misí císařského diplomata hraběte Heinricha Franze von Mansfeld (1641–1715) ve Francii mezi lety 1680 až 1683. Hlavním úkolem této práce je analýza 61 dopisů z Mansfeldovy mise, které jsou uloženy v Rakouském státním archivu ve Vídni. Jeho zprávy se však bohužel nedochovaly v úplnosti. Proto bylo užito více historických pramenů a přístupů. Nejvíce pak Mansfeldovi určená instrukce z 27. března 1680 a noviny La Gazette. Aplikovanou metodou byla kontextuálně komparativní analýza. Takováto případová studie dosud nebyla publikována. Proto jsme měli pouze limitovanou znalost toho, co Mansfeld v Paříži dělal a proč. Dvůr Ludvíka XIV. je v mnoha ohledech více než dobrý příklad pro studium, neboť byl centrem předmoderní západní aristokratické kultury, centrem evropské politiky i evropské diplomacie.

KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA

Mansfeld; diplomacie; raný novověk; 17. století; Francie; Svatá říše římská; Leopold I.; Ludvík XIV.

TABLE OF CONTENT

INTRODUCTION	10
CHAPTER I: THE POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HABSBURGS AND THE BOURBONS AFTER THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR (1648–1689).....	18
I/1 THE INITIAL SITUATION OF LEOPOLD I.....	20
I/2 THE INITIAL SITUATION OF LOUIS XIV.....	22
I/3 THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AMONG THE SUPERPOWERS (1657–1689)	25
I/4 WARS AMONG THE POWERS (1667–1684)	29
CHAPTER II: DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA	37
II/1 LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA	37
II/2 THE PERIOD AFTER THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA.....	41
CHAPTER III: HEINRICH FRANZ VON MANSFELD (1641–1715): AN ORIGIN AND LIFE OF AN IMPERIAL DIPLOMAT	50
CHAPTER IV: PREPARATION OF THE MISSION, BASIC TASKS AND MANSFELD'S TRIP TO FRANCE.....	56
IV/1 THE INSTRUCTION FOR MANSFELD (PRAGUE, ON 27 MARCH 1680).....	56
IV/2 MANSFELD'S JOURNEY TO PARIS (SPRING – SUMMER 1680)	64
CHAPTER V: MANSFELD AS A MEDIATOR	69
V/1 LOUIS VERJUS, COMTE DE CRÉCY AND HIS INSUFFICIENT CREDENTIALS.....	73
V/2 ALSACE AND FURTHER AUSTRIA: THE COMPLAINTS OF THE IMPERIAL ESTATES	74
V/3 THE ANNEXATION OF THE CITY OF STRASBOURG IN 1681.....	79
V/4 LORRAINE: AN EFFORT TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE FRENCH KING AND THE DUKE OF LORRAINE.....	85
V/5 THE AFFAIRS OF MANTUA: THE FRENCH EFFORT TO GAIN CASALE AND FIND A NEW ALLY	89
CHAPTER VI: MANSFELD AS AN INFORMANT	97
VI/1 AFFAIRS WITH THE SPANISH KINGDOM	97
VI/2 THE AFFAIRS OF ENGLAND	100
VI/3 AFFAIRS OF THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES.....	104
VI/4 AFFAIRS OF THE IMPERIAL ELECTORS	106
VI/5 FURTHER INFORMATION	113
CHAPTER VII: THE CLOSE OF MANSFELD'S MISSION.....	117
CONCLUSION	122
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	125
LIST OF TABLES.....	126
BIBLIOGRAPHY	127

INTRODUCTION

The following text is focused on a diplomatic mission of an Imperial diplomat in seventeenth-century France. The choice is not casual. The theme concerning pre-modern Imperial diplomats in France, in particular at the court of Louis XIV is tempting for historians on a number of counts. First, such a case study has not yet been published; second, the court of the Sun King was an exemplary case in many ways, such as a centre of pre-modern western aristocratic culture,¹ a centre of European politics, and at last but not least a centre of European diplomacy.

The phenomenon of early modern European diplomacy and its influence on the policy in pre-modern Europe is undoubtedly of wider than regional importance. Diplomats, members of the aristocracy, or at least the nobility, played a key role in political history across Europe, then. Hence, there are not many other research topics in the global writing of history after 1945 as this theme because its results help us to better understand the given period of time, and the (backstage) methods (intrigues?) of pre-modern politicians. It is impossible to separate the diplomatic relations or talks of diplomatic representatives from the political work of internal dignitaries. At least, both categories of men (almost not women) came from the nobility, the particular social group of people with a similar upbringing, education, and “vocational preparation”, who tended to recognise each other as members of the same social estate. The nobles managed to maintain their dominant position in diplomacy of most European countries until 1918, but very often until 1945, that means until the time, when noblemen lost most their privileges and power. Despite these facts, the topic contains many, so-far unanswered, queries and knowledge gaps which have yet to be resolved. The theme has also been researched not to an equal extent in various countries. Still, the research was able to be conducted because there is a comprehensive list of early modern diplomats in Europe with all main official data.²

The historians of diplomacy working until the early 1970s mostly perceived their field of study as the history of impersonal state formations, they focused chiefly on political and military history, full of peace treaties, as well as treaties of alliance, negotiations of rulers, and

¹ See, for instance, a very influential book Norbert ELIAS, *The Court Society*, ed. by Stephen Mennell, Oxford 2006 (org. as an unpublished academic work in 1930, published in Germany in 1969).

² Ludwig BITTNER – Lothar GROß (eds.), *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648)*, vol. 1 (1648–1715), Berlin 1936.

wars. The historians, such as Max Braubach,³ Matthew Smith Anderson⁴ or Garrett Mattingly⁵ can be ranked among the classics of the historical scholarship considering the history of European diplomacy in the Early Modern period.

The generations of the 1970s to 1990s, however, mostly saw persons of individual diplomats and their closest surroundings behind international treaties and complicated negotiations.⁶ The paradigm change occurred under the influence of cultural anthropology, striving to approach to the history of diplomacy as a cultural phenomenon.⁷ This perspective has dominated since the 1990s. The historians⁸ came up with the concept of “composite monarchies”, such as the Habsburg monarchy, the Great Britain, or Spain, as early modern states, which were not centralised. The fact had its consequences. France, for instance, could negotiate with the insurgents in Hungary, without the Emperor. The turn came, for instance, with William James Roosen and his book *The Age of Louis XIV. The Rise of Modern Diplomacy* (1976), based on the actual practices and institutions of that era, rather than on the writing of early theoreticians. Klaus Müller⁹ came up with a similar concept in conducting research on the pre-modern Imperial diplomacy. The diplomacy of the Great Britain was newly analysed by Jeremy Black.¹⁰ The new approach to the theme is rooted in describing relationships between the ideological and socioeconomic structures and the diplomatic personalities who have influenced modern diplomacy. W. J. Roosen thus provides an excellent basis for comparison with twentieth century international relations.

Outlines of the pre-modern diplomacy exist, but they are not numerous. However, the works by above-mentioned Klaus Müller, Lucien Bély¹¹ (very useful for my research), Heidrun

³ *Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV. bis Kaunitz. Die Vorstadien der diplomatischen Revolution im 18. Jahrhundert*, Bonn 1952; *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen. Eine Biographie*, 5 Bde., München 1963–1965; *Diplomatie und geistiges Leben im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, Bonn 1969; *Wilhelm von Fürstenberg (1629–1704) und die französische Politik im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV.*, Bonn 1972.

⁴ Matthew Smith ANDERSON, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919*, London 2013.

⁵ Garrett MATTINGLY, *Renaissance diplomacy*, Boston 1955.

⁶ For a description of this demanding way of the writing of history of diplomacy, see Jiří HRBEK, *Cesty evropské historiografie k diplomacii raného novověku* [Ways of European Historiography to the Diplomacy of Early Modern Period], *Theatrum historie* 13, 2013, pp. 7–30. Jacques LE GOFF, *Is politics still the backbone of history?*, *Daedalus* 100, 1971, pp. 1–19 saw the history of politics as “junk”.

⁷ See the nice examples by Jeannette FALCKE, *Studien zum diplomatischen Geschenkwesen am brandenburgisch-preußischen Hof im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 2006 and by Christian STEPPAN, *Akteure am fremden Hof politische Kommunikation und Repräsentation kaiserlicher Gesandter im Jahrzehnt des Wandels am russischen Hof (1720–1730)*, Göttingen 2016.

⁸ E. g. John H. ELLIOTT, *A Europe of Composite Monarchies*, *Past and Present* 137, 1992, pp. 48–71.

⁹ Klaus MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden: (1648–1740)*, Bonn 1976.

¹⁰ Jeremy BLACK, *The British Diplomats and Diplomacy 1688–1800*, Exeter 2001.

¹¹ Lucien BÉLY, *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV.*, Paris 1990; *Les relations internationales en Europe, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles*, Paris 1992; *Objectifs et conduite de la politique extérieure*, ed. by Jean-Christian Petitfils, *Le siècle de Louis XIV*, Paris 2017.

Kugeler,¹² Ralph Kauz, Giorgio Rota, and Jan Paul Niederkorn,¹³ a main reference book by Tracey Amanda Sowerby and Jan Hennings¹⁴ are to be mentioned. The publication by Roberta Anderson and Charlotte Backerra, where there are, among others, the studies of the Czech historians, is also to be highlighted here.¹⁵ Each historian has had a different approach and method. Lucien Bély, for instance, analysed a role of agents as go-betweens and helpers of diplomats.¹⁶ The thema is closely connected to using cyphers and secret codes. Other historians focus on a role of women in early modern diplomacy,¹⁷ or they concern a cultural transfer,¹⁸ the topic of the last two decades. Transnational history is another dominant theme within the research of pre-modern diplomacy.¹⁹ In short, there are case studies dealing with various countries,²⁰ particular diplomats²¹ (the opinion makers of their time), and/or various problems.²²

¹² Heidrun R.I. KUGELER, *'Le Parfait Ambassadeur'. The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the Century following the Peace of Westphalia*, Oxford 2006.

¹³ Ralph KAUZ, Giorgio ROTA, and Jan Paul NIEDERKORN (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der Früher Neuzeit*, Wien 2009.

¹⁴ Tracey Amanda SOWERBY – Jan HENNINGS (eds.), *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c. 1410–1800*, London 2017.

¹⁵ Roberta ANDERSON – Charlotte BACKERRA (eds.), *Confessional Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe* (= Routledge Studies in Renaissance and Early Modern Worlds of Knowledge), Routledge 2021.

¹⁶ Françoise AUTRAND, *Les légats a latere à l'époque moderne et le personnel des légations*, in: Lucien Bély – Isabelle Richefort (eds.), *L'invention de la diplomatie. Moyen Age – Temps modernes*, Paris 1998, pp. 207–224. Tomáš Parma notably works with this concept within the Czech historiography. See Tomáš PARMA, *František kardinál Dietrichstein a jeho vztahy k římské kurii. Prostředky a metody politické komunikace ve službách moravské církve* [Francis Dietrichstein and His Reports with the Roman Curia. The Means and Methods of Political Communication in the Service of Church in Moravia], Brno 2011.

¹⁷ Corina BASTIAN, *Verhandeln in Briefen. Frauen in der höfischen Diplomatie des frühen 18. Jahrhunderts*, Köln-Wien-Weimar 2013; Corina BASTIAN – Eva Kathrin DADE – Hillard von THIESSEN – Christian WINDLER, *Das Geschlecht der Diplomatie Geschlechterrollen in den Außenbeziehungen vom Spätmittelalter bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Köln et al. 2014.

¹⁸ Bianca Maria LINDORFER, *Cosmopolitan Aristocracy and the Diffusion of Baroque Culture: Cultural Transfer from Spain to Austria in the Seventeenth Century*, Florence 2009; Veronika HYDEN-HANSCHO, *Reisende, Migranten, Kunstmanager. Mittlerpersönlichkeiten zwischen Frankreich und dem Wiener Hof 1630–1730*, Stuttgart 2013.

¹⁹ Margit PERNAU, *Transnationale Geschichte. Grundkurs Neue Geschichte*, Göttingen 2012.

²⁰ Anuschka TISCHER, *Französische Diplomatie und Diplomaten auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß: Außenpolitik unter Richelieu und Mazarin*, Münster 1999; Jean BÉRENGER, *Le Conflit Entre les Habsbourg et les Bourbons (1598-1792)*, in: *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, Vol. 116, 2002/3, pp. 193–232; Heiko DROSTE, *Im Dienste der Krone. Schwedische Diplomaten im 17. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 2006; Lucien BÉLY, *La France au XVIIe siècle Puissance de l'État, contrôle de la société*, Paris 2009; Hillard von THIESSEN, *Diplomatie und Patronage. Die spanisch-römischen Beziehungen 1605–1621 in akteurszentrierter Perspektive*, Epfendorf 2010; Judith MATZKE, *Gesandtschaftswesen und diplomatischer Dienst Sachsens 1694–1763*, Leipzig 2011; Daniel RICHES, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture Brandenburg-Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, Leiden–Boston 2013; Rubén GONZÁLEZ CUERVA – Pavel MAREK, *The Dynastic Network between the Imperial and the Spanish Courts (1556–1619)*, in: *A Europe of Courts, a Europe of Factions*, vol. 12, 2017, pp. 130–155.

²¹ Friedrich POLLEROSS, *Die Kunst der Diplomatie. Auf den Spuren des kaiserlichen Botschafters Leopold Joseph Graf von Lamberg (1653–1706)*, Peterberg 2010; Laura OLIVÁN SANTALIESTRA, *Judith Rebecca von Wrbna und Maria Sophia von Dietrichstein: Two Imperial Ambassadors from the Kingdom of Bohemia at the Court of Madrid (1653–1674)*, *Theatrum historiae* 19, 2016, pp. 95–117.

²² Jan Paul NIEDERKORN, *Diplomaten-Instruktionen in der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: Anita Hipfinger et al. (eds.), *Ordnung durch Feder und Tinte? Genese und Wirkung von Instruktionen im zeitlichen Längenschnitt vom Mittelalter bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Wien 2012, pp. 73–84; Martin BAKEŠ – Jiří KUBEŠ, *Imperial Chapels and*

A common knowledge about the diplomats from the pre-modern Habsburg monarchy is notably poor. Although the diplomats often came from the Bohemian lands, they did not receive – unlike Western European countries – appropriate and systematic attention in the Czech historiography.²³ In 1948–1989, in the time of the prevailing Communist ideology, some historical topics were unwanted – one of them was undoubtedly the nobility and its activity because noblemen were considered to be the personalities of non-Czech, i.e. Czech-speaking culture. As the Communist did not recognize social hierarchy, in particular feudalism of the premodern era, the nobility was not to the liking of the Communist regime. Moreover, everything should have led to a classless society according to the Communists' interpretation of history.

Nevertheless, there were published several monographs and a number of research studies until 1948. The positivistic case studies and critical editions by Ferdinand Menčík,²⁴ František Tischer,²⁵ Zdeněk Kalista²⁶ or Josef Macůrek²⁷ were the pioneering works in this field of study in the Czech historiography. Several research studies were published between 1949 and 1989, too. Yet they are seldom, published in regional journals in Czech,²⁸ or they analysed the

Chaplains: A Comparative Study of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Dresden in the Later Seventeenth Century, in: Roberta Anderson – Charlotte Backerra (eds.), *Confessional Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe* (= Routledge Studies in Renaissance and Early Modern Worlds of Knowledge), Routledge 2021, pp. 200–221; Veronika HYDEN-HANSCHO, *The cultural role of diplomats in an age of war: French fashion in Vienna under Leopold I*, in: *The Seventeenth Century* vol. 36, no. 3, 2021, p. 485–507.

²³ J. HRBEK, *Cesty evropské historiografie*, pp. 22–29.

²⁴ *Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach. Tagebuch über den Aufenthalt in Spanien in den Jahren 1673–1674*, Wien 1913; *Úmluvy vídeňské z roku 1725 a jejich následky* [The Treaty of Vienna in 1725 and its Impact], Praha 1897.

²⁵ *Zweite Gesandtschaftsreise des Grafen Hermann Czernin von Chudenic nach Constantinopel im Jahre 1644*, Neuhaus 1879; *Heřman hr. Černín z Chudenic. Obraz ze života a činnosti jeho* [Heřman Count of Czernin of Chudenic – A Portrait of his Life and Work], Praha 1903/04.

²⁶ *Humprecht Jan Černín jako mecenáš a podporovatel výtvarných umění v době své benátské ambasády (1660–1663)* [H. J. Czernin as a Patron and Benefactor of the Fine Arts in the Time of his Diplomatic Mission in Venice, 1660–1663], in: *Památky archeologické* 36, 1928–1930, pp. 53–78. *Čechové, kteří tvořili dějiny světa: (Z historikova skicáře o XVI. a XVII. věku)* [The Inhabitants from the Bohemia Lands who made the World History – Notes of a Historian of the 16th and 17th Centuries], Praha 1939.

²⁷ *Čechové a Poláci v 2. pol. XVI. století: 1573–1589: tři kapitoly z dějin česko-polské politické vzájemnosti* [The Czechs and the Poles in the 2nd Half of the 16th Century, 1573–1589 – Three Chapters on the History of the Czech-Polish Political Relationship] Praha 1948.

²⁸ Bohumír SMUTNÝ, *Relace císařského vyslance Waltera Leslieho o cestě do Cařihradu a zpět v letech 1665–1666* [The Report of the Imperial Envoy Walter Leslie on his Journey to Constantinople and Back in 1665–1666], *Sborník prací východočeských archivů* 1, 1970, pp. 167–182; Jaroslav HONC, *Cestovní účet diplomatické mise Viléma z Rožmberka do Polska r. 1588/89 a budget šlechtické domácnosti a dvora*. [The Reimbursement of Travel Expenses from the Diplomatic Mission of Vilém of Rožmberk in Poland in 1588/89], *Archivum Trebonense* 2, 1973, pp. 44–83; August SEDLÁČEK, *Diplomatická činnost Jana Václava Gallase v Anglii v letech 1704–1711* [The Diplomatic Work of Jan Václav Gallas in England in 1704–1711], *Sborník Severočeského muzea, Historia* 9, 1988, pp. 53–67.

circumstances in the East,²⁹ not in the West. An honourable exception is the book by Václav Čihák *Les Provinces-Unies et la cour impériale 1667–1672* (Amsterdam 1974).

A totally different situation came after 1989 and in particular in the last decade. It has been thanks to the Institute of History at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Pardubice, Czech Republic, under the leadership of Jiří Kubeš.³⁰ He has been the *spiritus agens* of conducting research in the Czech Republic on the early modern diplomacy in the Habsburg monarchy as one can see in the book *V zastoupení císaře: Česká a moravská aristokracie v habsburské diplomacii 1640–1740* [On Behalf of the Emperor: The Bohemian and Moravian Aristocracy in the Habsburg Diplomacy, 1640–1740] (2018), whose editor-in-chief he was. Nevertheless, a chapter on Habsburg diplomats in France is missing in the book. Moreover, there are his colleagues and PhD students who have focused on the theme, such as Martin Bakeš³¹ or Pavel Marek.³² Of the historians out of the University-of-Pardubice-circle can be mentioned Jiří Hrbek, Zdeněk Hojda and his students,³³ Rostislav Smíšek and his student

²⁹ Jaroslav PÁNEK, *Poslední Rožmberkové* [The Last Members of the House of Rožmberg], Praha 1989, esp. pp. 161–180. Pánek focuses on the Diplomacy of the Rožmbergs in Poland.

³⁰ He is also an author of case studies, such as Jiří KUBEŠ, *Imperial Envoys at the English and British Court (1660–1740): Reception Ceremonies and Disputes over Titles*, in: *The Court Historian* 27/1, 2022, pp. 42–60; *Ibidem*, *Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz' Diplomatic Mission in Warsaw in 1695. A Contribution Towards the Travel Arrangements of Imperial Diplomats*, *Theatrum historiae* 19, 2016, pp. 171–203.

³¹ Martin BAKEŠ, *Diplomatem v půlnoční zemi: Zástupci Habsburků ve Švédském království mezi lety 1650–1730* [Diplomat in the Country of the Midnight Sun. Representatives of the Habsburgs in the Kingdom of Sweden, 1650–1730], Praha 2020.

³² Pavel MAREK, *La embajada española en la corte imperial 1558–1641. Las figuras de los embajadores y estrategias clientelares*, Praha 2013; Pavel MAREK – Tomáš ČERNUŠÁK, *Gesandte und Klienten. Päpstliche und spanische Diplomaten im Umfeld von Kaiser Rudolf II.*, Berlin 2020.

³³ Zdeněk HOJDA, *Humprecht Johann Czernin von Chudenitz and His Venice Legation*, pp. 328–351; *Ibidem*, *Georg Adam II von Martinitz – A High-Conflict Diplomat?*, pp. 392–402; *Ibidem*, *Johann Wenzel Gallas – The High Baroque Diplomat in the Right Place*, pp. 403–415; all in: Petr Pavelec, Martin Gaži and Milena Hajná (eds.), *The Nobility of the Czech Lands on the Chessboard of European Diplomacy*, České Budějovice 2022. Of Hojda's students, see: Anežka HREBIKOVÁ, *Pobyť Štěpána Viléma Kinského v Ruském impériu v letech 1721–1722* [The Residence of Stephan Wilhelm Kinsky in Russian Empire in 1721–1722], in: *Rusko a slovanský svět: staletí soužití a střetů*, Červený Kostelec 2021, pp. 211–223; Kristýna ANSORGOVÁ, *Závěr první Severní války v zrcadle císařské diplomacie. František Karel I. Libštejnský z Kolovrat a zprostředkování míru v Olivě roku 1660* [The End of the First Northern War in the Context of the Imperial Diplomacy. Franz Karl I Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky and the Peace Negotiation in Oliva in 1660], in: *Historie 2017–2018: sborník prací z celostátní studentské vědecké konference konané 11. a 12. dubna 2018 v Praze*, Praha 2019, pp. 35–73.

Monika Hrušková, née Konrádová,³⁴ or Zdeněk Kazlepka.³⁵ Further, one issue of the scholarly journal of the Institute was devoted to the topic.³⁶

The early modern imperial diplomats in France have been omitted by Czech historiography. The Imperial-French relations, however, were outlined by Max Braubach,³⁷ the personality of Windischgrätz was analysed by Karl Vocelka.³⁸ The book *The Nobility of the Czech Lands on the Chessboard of European Diplomacy* (2022), edited by Petr Pavelec, Martin Gaži and Milena Hajná, repays a debt of the Czech historiography to some extent and provides in English an up-to-date outline of the Bohemian lands and the European diplomacy from the mediaeval period until the mid-20th century.³⁹

A comprehensive history of doing the pre-modern diplomacy by the Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian aristocracy,⁴⁰ as well as the nobility, however, is a long-term task for a research team of historians and other experts. Many other tasks remain to be solved for these specialists.

Many historical sources have been preserved for the mission of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld (1640/41–1715), the diplomat of Leopold I, in Paris in September 1680 to February 1682.⁴¹ His mission is documented by his reports to Vienna which, however, have not preserved completely. The development of his mission has not been reconstructed yet in literature. The main task of this text is an analysis of the 61 reports⁴² from the Mansfeld's mission, which are deposited in The Austrian State Archives in Vienna.⁴³ We can gain notably the information about the topics

³⁴ Rostislav SMÍŠEK – Monika KONRÁDOVÁ (eds.), *Mezi Vídní, Varšavou a Moskvou: diplomatická cesta Jana Kryštofa z Fragsteinu do Moskvy v letech 1657–1658* [Between Vienna, Warsaw and Moscow – A Diplomatic Journey of Jan Christopher of Fragstein to Moscow in 1657/58], České Budějovice 2020 and other studies by the authors.

³⁵ Zdeněk KAZLEPKA, *Ostrov italského vkusu. Umělecký mecenát Antonia Rambalda hraběte z Collalto a San Salvatore mezi Itálií, Vídní a Moravou v první polovině 18. století* [An Island of the Italian Taste. The Artistic Patronage of Count Antonius Rambald von Collalto a San Salvatore between Italy, Vienna and Moravia in the First Half of the 18th Century], Brno 2011. The book includes among others a chapter on the Collalto's diplomatic stay in Rome.

³⁶ See *Theatrum historiae*, No. 19, 2016 (online: <https://theatrum.upce.cz/index.php/theatrum/issue/view/154> [2022–12–29]). The issue is published in English.

³⁷ M. BRAUBACH, *Versailles und Wien*, esp. pp. 7–44.

³⁸ Karl VOCELKA, *Geschichte der Familie Windisch-Graetz im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*, Wien 1984.

³⁹ See chiefly one chapter of the book, which considers the topic, Jiří KUBEŠ – Anna ADAMČIKOVÁ, *Imperial Envoys in France in the Second Half of the 17th Century*, pp. 374–391. Some text passages derived from this study are used in the MA thesis.

⁴⁰ A history of noble and aristocratic houses has been published in the Czech Republic in more than dozen volumes. Moreover, non-Czech historians also published many treatises.

⁴¹ Mansfeld visited the French court in March 1683, too. Nevertheless, he was then only passing through France because he was charged with a diplomatic mission at the Spanish court.

⁴² 50 of them were written in German, 8 of them in French and 3 of them in Italian. However, there was probably more than 61 messages; unfortunately, the missive from the spring and summer of 1681 did not remain.

⁴³ Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [The Austrian State Archives in Vienna] (hereafter ÖStA Wien), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereafter HHStA), Staatenabteilungen (hereafter StA), Frankreich, cart. no. 24–25. The cart. no. 24

of the interviews between Mansfeld and his collocutors from the source. Further, the reports show us a style of the negotiations, and partly what Mansfeld thought about the topic, as well as the collocutor. Interestingly enough, the Imperial envoy often advised the Emperor, how to act in a particular situation. Mansfeld's conclusions of his reports are also uncommon – too obsequious. However, the reports did not naturally offer truly opinions of the French. For that reason, a larger range of historical sources and working approaches has been used. It is the instruction for Mansfeld dated from 27 March 1680,⁴⁴ the period newspaper *La Gazette*,⁴⁵ which informs us of Mansfeld's journey to Paris and enumerates the Mansfeld's audiences at the court of Louis XIV that are not mentioned in the reports. Besides, I used reference books dealing with the diplomacy written by early modern participants from Spain, France, the Netherlands, and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, such as Abraham Van Wicquefort,⁴⁶ who helped me to better understand the period context of the diplomatic activity.

The method employed in my research is the contextual-comparative analysis. In five chapters I will proceed determining the significs of the concepts by the means of negations and distinctions with regards to other related, connected or opposing concepts. As a matter of fact, the above-mentioned observations should lead to the conclusion that every research on pre-modern diplomacy in the Habsburg realm and the Bohemian lands respectively cannot avoid the adoption of a comparative and diachronic method. Every outline of any activity of the Habsburg diplomats would be incomplete (if not distorted) if the political, social, religious and philosophical background that shaped their thoughts is ignored. To understand the aims and thought of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld, the historians must be aware of not only the political, but also the religious, moral, and historical debate in Europe; they must be conscious of how other diplomats across the continent were dealing with it; and, in particular, they should be cognisant that a conscience is always the product of a process and not an extemporary expression. The diachronic and comparative approach thus delineated above has been employed in this text. The new in this thesis is the in-depth (content) analysis of the 61 reports from the Mansfeld's mission, which has never been carried out so far. Because of that, we have had only a limited knowledge of what Mansfeld in Paris had done, and why.

includes the reports from 1680 (21), the cart. no. 25 contains reports from July–December 1681 (25), from January–February 1682 (9), and those from March 1683 (3).

⁴⁴ It is preserved at ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20. It numbers 24 pages.

⁴⁵ La Gazzete, Paris 1680–1683. Online source: <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6458075r/f3.item.texteImage> [2023–01–10].

⁴⁶ Abraham Van WICQUEFORT, *L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions I–II*, Cologne 1715.

My master thesis has seven main chapters. The first two serve as an introduction; the third one summarizes a life of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld, which has been wrapped up in secret due to the lack of historical sources;⁴⁷ the next chapter shows a preparation of the diplomat before his departure, as well as his journey to Paris; the next two chapters describe his stay at the court of Louis XIV through Mansfeld's reports to Leopold I and their analysis; the last one deals with the ending of Mansfeld's mission. I have taken interest chiefly in the envoy. Who was Mansfeld and why just he was chosen for this mission? What were his personal qualities for this job? To what extent was Mansfeld successful in fulfilling his goals? Did he encounter the French king and/or his ministers on a regular basis? Did Mansfeld work as an informer, or even as a spy? Did he gain any information about the French army? And what about the French? Was Mansfeld accorded a warm welcome at the court of Louis XIV?

As far as our theme is concerned, it is necessary to find out more about a Mansfeld's counterpart, a French diplomat in Vienna at the time. It was Bernardin Cadot Marquis de Sébeville (1641–1711)⁴⁸ who was the “envoyé extraordinaire de Louis XIV” in Vienna between 1681 and 1684. His reports, written in French, are preserved in Paris, in the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁹ I already did make the first move and scanned all his reports to Louis XIV from the period, when Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld was active at the French court. The next steps remain to be done.

⁴⁷ The studies relating to the noble House of Mansfeld are rare. See e.g. Ludwig Ferdinand NIEMANN, *Geschichte der Grafen von Mansfeld*, Aschersleben 1834.

⁴⁸ On an official website of the French ambassadors (<https://at.ambafrance.org/Les-Ambassadeurs-de-France-du-XVIIIeme-siecle-a-nos-jours> [2022–12–29]) is mistakenly given François Cadot Marquis de Sébeville, who is actually his brother. They belonged to the old Norman house, which had unwaveringly served to the royal power long before François Cadot was born. François joined the army at a young age and for most of his life he was mainly active in the army.

⁴⁹ Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères – Centre des Archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve, Direction des Affaires politiques, Correspondance politique – Autriche, sign. 11CP/50, 11CP/52, 11CP/53, 11CP/54, 11CP/55, and 11CP/56. There are hundreds of them.

CHAPTER I: THE POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HABSBURGS AND THE BOURBONS AFTER THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR (1648–1689)

The Emperors and the French kings stood on opposite sides of the barricades regularly. Both powers had ambitions to play a leading role in European politics; both felt that they were the only one true descendants of Charlemagne, and that it was they who might have the imaginary first position among the others.

The rivalry between the Habsburgs and the King of France, as already mentioned, is not just a 17th-century issue. From the outset of the Early Modern period, the monarchs Francis I⁵⁰ (House of Valois-Angoulême) and Charles V⁵¹ stood at the beginning of the power malice of the royal families. Both sovereigns wanted to expand their territories. They fought many battles; the most humiliating,⁵² and never forgotten, for king Francis I was the battle of Pavia in 1525⁵³ in which the king of France was captured by Charles de Lannoy.⁵⁴ Francis had to order a retreat to his army and was forced to sign the Treaty of Madrid in which he abandoned his claims over Flanders, Milan⁵⁵ and Burgundy.⁵⁶ Wars of territories also continued in the next generation of the kings – Henry II⁵⁷ (House of Valois-Angoulême) and Philip II.⁵⁸ This time, they tried to end the war by marriage. In 1559, Philip II married the daughter of Henry II – Elisabeth of Valois. The mutual connection of both houses was deepened by another marriage. In 1569, the French king Charles IX⁵⁹ (House of Valois-Angoulême) married the daughter of Maximilian II⁶⁰ – Elisabeth of Austria.

Nothing changed with the ascension of the Bourbon family to the French throne. Surprisingly enough, there were also bright moments. Owing to Queen Maria Medici,⁶¹ the wife

⁵⁰ Robert Jean KNECHT, *Francis I*, Cambridge 1982.

⁵¹ Willem Pieter BLOCKMANS, *Emperor Charles V 1500–1558*, Oxford 2002.

⁵² Francis was so offended by this event that he overtly made an alliance with the Ottoman Turks against Charles.

⁵³ Battle of Pavia was a turning point of the Italian War (1521–1526). The Kingdom of France stood against the Holy Roman Empire and the Kingdom of Spain.

⁵⁴ Lucile Kathryn DELANO, *Charles de Lannoy: Victor of Pavia*, Springville 1984.

⁵⁵ After the extinction of the House of Sforza Francis claimed his inheritance right after his great-grandmother Valentina Visconti.

⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Francis asserted that the treaty had been signed under pressure, so it was not valid. On that account he started another series of battles, known as the War of the League of Cognac.

⁵⁷ Frederic J BAUMGARTNER, *Henry II King of France, 1547–1559*, Duke 1988.

⁵⁸ Henry KAMEN, *Philip V of Spain*, Yale 1999.

⁵⁹ Encyclopædia Britannica, headword: “Charles IX. (King of France)”, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-IX-king-of-France> [2022–09–19].

⁶⁰ Paula Sutter FICHTNER, *Emperor Maximilian II*, Yale 2001.

⁶¹ Michel CARMONA, *Marie de Médicis*, Paris 1981.

of Henry IV,⁶² the French court maintained a pro-Spanish (i.e., pro-Habsburg) mood. The marriage peace policy continued with the house of Bourbon in the same manner. Louis XIII⁶³ married Anne of Austria, and Philip IV⁶⁴ married Elisabeth of France. Even so, Louis led his foreign policy in anti-Habsburg manner (he was influenced by Armand Jean du Plessis, Duke of Richelieu, known as Cardinal Richelieu).⁶⁵ He wanted to weaken the power of the Emperor. A great opportunity came Louis' way – the Thirty Years War. Ostensibly, a religious conflict, but then France entered the war. Hence, it was no longer a religious war – it was a war of conquest, in which one catholic country stood against another. Unfortunately, Louis XIII died before the declaration of the Peace of Westphalia, so he could not fully enjoy the results of his foreign policy.

The second half of the 17th century in Europe was almost entirely formed by the prominent political figure of the time – King Louis XIV of France. When Louis ascended the throne, he began a very ambitious and determined foreign policy, which reached its peak, notably, after the death of Cardinal Mazarin in 1661.⁶⁶ He wanted to expand the territory so that his kingdom would have natural borders. Louis' reign had a clear aim – surmount the Spanish kings and even the Emperor – to become the hegemon in Europe. The entire House of Habsburgs stood against him and to reverse their leader position in Europe was not entirely without problems.

⁶² Chris GIVEN-WILSON, *Henry IV*, Yale 2016.

⁶³ Pierre CHEVALLIER, *Louis XIII, roi cornélien*, Paris 1979.

⁶⁴ Robert Arthur STRADLING, *Philip IV and the Government of Spain 1621–1665*, Cambridge 1988.

⁶⁵ Auguste BAILLY, *Richelieu*, Paris 1934.

⁶⁶ John LYNN, *The Wars of Louis XIV 1667–1714*, London 1999, p. 6.

I/1 THE INITIAL SITUATION OF LEOPOLD I



Figure 1: The Portrait of Leopold I⁶⁷

The Peace of Westphalia caused a great enfeeblement and decentralization of the Holy Roman Empire.⁶⁸ This peace brought a considerable fragmentation of the German-speaking territory.⁶⁹ Additionally, any intervention from the Austrian Habsburg Court with the Royal Habsburg Court in Spain of matters related to the Franco-Spanish War was prohibited.⁷⁰ Altogether, this caused a certain isolation of the Imperial international relations which were more than dismal in the middle of the century. The Emperor (in that time Ferdinand III⁷¹) was also worried about the Swedish army, which did not leave the territory of his empire until 1654.⁷²

The young Leopold was definitely in a worse situation than that of Louis. Dark times arrived in the Holy Roman Empire, as the danger did not exist only in the west – the southeastern border of the Empire was not peaceful either. The threat of the Turks invading

⁶⁷ Portrait by Benjamin von Block, 1672, online source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/43/Benjamin_von_Block_001.jpg/800px-Benjamin_von_Block_001.jpg [2023-04-01].

⁶⁸ Joachim WHALEY, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, Volume 2: From the Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich 1648–1806*, Oxford 2012, p. 3.

⁶⁹ Steven PATTON, *The Peace of Westphalia and its Effects on International Relations, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, in: *The Histories*, vol. 10, issue 1, 2019, p. 96.

⁷⁰ Patrick MILTON, *The Mutual Guarantee of the Peace of Westphalia in the Law of Nations, and Its Impact on European Diplomacy*, in: *Journal of the History of International Law* 22, 2020, p. 112.

⁷¹ Lothar HÖBELT, *Ferdinand III. Friedenskaiser wider Willen (1608–1657)*, Graz 2008 (the Czech edition 2015).

⁷² Charles W. INGRAO, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618–1815*. Second edition, Indiana 2019, p. 53.

again was something Leopold had to consider. At the beginning of the 1660s, the relations with the Turks were already considerably escalated. The Habsburg army recaptured fortresses on the territory of Transylvania – Säcueni (in German, Zickelhid; in Hungarian, Székelyhíd) and Cluj-Napoca (in German, Klausenburg; in Hungarian, Kolozsvár) which worsened the already strained relations. After these incidents, the first attempt was to resolve the dispute diplomatically. The Holy Roman Empire was represented by Simon Reniger von Reningen, then the Ottomans by Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü Pasha.⁷³ The former was accompanied by Johann Philipp Beris on his expedition to the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁴ Unfortunately, the negotiations did not lead to any goal, neither side was willing to step back from their demands. It did not take long and on 18 April 1663, the Ottoman Empire declared a war against the Emperor. This time, however, the Turks were not heading to Vienna, but to Upper Hungary (present-day Slovakia). The Ottomans conquered many fortresses and castles, and plundered many territories,⁷⁵ finishing with the Battle of St. Gotthard; the war ended by the Peace of Vasvár (on 9 August 1664), which defined new borders. According to some historians,⁷⁶ the Ottomans suffered an annihilating defeat in this last battle, but focusing on the Peace of Vasvár, the Ottoman side came out better and the areas in Transylvania returned to the Ottomans.⁷⁷ On both sides, conquests on neighbouring territories were to be harshly suppressed. Finally, the mutual sending of “high-class” diplomats was also a part of the contract.⁷⁸ “Öküz” Kara Mehmed Pasha⁷⁹ was sent to the Vienna Imperial Court. The Emperor was represented within the Ottoman Empire by Walter Leslie.⁸⁰

⁷³ Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa”, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Koprulu-Fazil-Ahmed-Pasa> [2022–09–02].

⁷⁴ Hakan KARAGÖZ, *Der Habsburgisch-Osmanische Krieg von 1663/64 und der Friede von Eisenburg/Vasvár aus osmanischer Sicht*, in: *Burgenländische Forschungen: Die Schlacht von Mogersdorf/St. Gotthard und der Friede von Eisenburg/Vasvár 1664*, vol. 108, 2016, p. 121.

⁷⁵ Jiří MIKULEC, *Leopold I. život a vláda barokního Habsburka* [Leopold I: The Life and Reign of a Baroque Habsburg], Praha–Litomyšl 1997, p. 75.

⁷⁶ J. WHALEY, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, p. 30; H. KARAGÖZ, *Der Habsburgisch-Osmanische Krieg*, p. 125; Oswald REDLICH, *Weltmacht des Barock: Österreich in der Zeit Kaiser Leopolds I.*, Wien 1961, p. 236.

⁷⁷ Hajnalka TÓTH, *The Circumstances and Documents of the Peace of Vasvár*, in: *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vol. 34, 2017, p. 246.

⁷⁸ H. KARAGÖZ, *Der Habsburgisch-Osmanische*, p. 129.

⁷⁹ Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias, headword: “Öküz Kara Mehmed Pasha”, online source: <https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/2045079.html> [2022–09–02].

⁸⁰ Dominik COBANOGLU, *Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen den Osmanen und den Habsburgern im 17. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Großbotschaft von Graf Walter von Leslie im Jahre 1665/1666*, BA thesis, Wien 2017; Philip STEINER, *Die habsburgische Großbotschaft unter Walter Leslie anhand des Reiseberichts des jesuitischen Gesandtschaftskaplans Paul Tafferner (1665/66)*, in: Karin Sperl – Martin Scheutz – Arno Strohmeyer (Eds.), *Die Schlacht von Mogersdorf/St. Gotthard und der Friede von Eisenburg/Vasvár 1664. Rahmenbedingungen, Akteure, Auswirkungen und Rezeption eines europäischen Ereignisses*, Eisenstadt 2016, pp. 233–268.

Leopold had to deal with the tense situation in Hungary, too. The dispute continued to be aggravated by the religious question – Protestants prevailed in Hungary. The Hungarian nobility was not afraid to demand concessions from the Emperor through the religious question. The Peace of Vasvár, when part of Transylvania was ceded, added fuel to the fire. Gradually, an anti-Habsburg coalition of Hungarian and Croatian magnates led by Ferenc Wesselényi began to form.⁸¹ It was not an organized fellowship, so nothing ever came out of it that the Habsburg Empire had to worry about. Nevertheless, even this conspiracy was seriously suppressed in 1670.⁸² The leading representatives were executed without the consent of the Hungarian land court.⁸³ Leopold's efforts to enforce absolutism in Hungary were, however, in vain. The 1670s were interwoven with small conflicts between the Emperor and the opposing Hungarian magnates.⁸⁴ The unrests led to the well-known uprising of Imrich Thököly of 1678–1686.

I/2 THE INITIAL SITUATION OF LOUIS XIV



Figure 2: The Portrait of Louis XIV⁸⁵

⁸¹ László BENCZÉDI, *Hungarian National Consciousness as Reflected in the Anti-Habsburg and Anti-Ottoman Struggles of the Late Seventeenth Century*, in: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 10, n. 3/4, 1986, p. 424.

⁸² Georg B. MICHELS, *The Habsburg Empire under Siege: Ottoman Expansion and Hungarian Revolt in the Age of Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü (1661–76)*, Montreal 2021, p. 137.

⁸³ J. MIKULEC, *Leopold I.*, p. 95.

⁸⁴ G. B. MICHELS, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 342.

⁸⁵ Portrait by Hyacinthe Rigaud, circa 1701, online source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/5f/Louis_XIV_of_France.jpg/800px-Louis_XIV_of_France.jpg [2023–04–01].

Louis was only four years old when he ascended the throne. He was therefore initially represented by the regency government of his mother – Queen Anne. She had a powerful, experienced, and devoted Cardinal Mazarin as an advisor (as Louis later). He almost fully deputized her in the field of foreign, as well as inner policy. However, at the very beginning of Louis's reign, they had to cope with the Fronde⁸⁶ (1648–1653). The entire conflict was provoked by the inner policy of the Cardinal, who constantly raised taxes for the local nobility. The first campaign of the Fronde, also called Parliamentary, took place between 1648–1649. In 1648, the Parliament refused further increase in taxation; moreover, it wanted to call off the taxation, which members had already agreed to.⁸⁷ The members of the Parliament resisted Cardinal Mazarin, and the opposition came forward. More opponents of the established regime began to appear. Suddenly, an opportunity came to the Cardinal – Louis II de Bourbon-Condé⁸⁸ had won at the Battle of Lens over Spain. Mazarin took an advantage of the confusion arising during the celebrations in the streets of Paris and captured the leaders of the uprising – Henri Charton, René Potier de Blancmesnil, and Pierre Brussel.⁸⁹ The response of the Parisians was prompt – on 26–28 August, they built barricades around the Palais-Royal⁹⁰ and Mazarin had to release the leading representative of the opposition. The royal court, including young Louis, moved to Rueil (Malmaison) for a while.⁹¹ Peace negotiations gradually began on 25 September in Saint-Germain-en-Laye.⁹² On 22 October, both sides had agreed on the concessions, and so, on 30th October, the court returned to Paris.

The second phase of the Fronde, called the Fronde of the Princes, began with the imprisonment of the Prince of Condé, Armand de Bourbon-Conti⁹³ and Henri II d'Orléans-Longueville⁹⁴ at the Château de Vincennes.⁹⁵ This action understandably provoked a strong response from their clientele and their respective provinces. Tourenne took charge of the opposing armies. He relied on the help of the King of Spain, who came to his aid. Very soon,

⁸⁶ The Fronde was a series of civil wars in France, the main purpose was to suppress the power of Cardinal Mazarin and Louis XIV.

⁸⁷ Orest RANUM – Patricia RANUM, *The Century of Louis XIV*, London–Basingstoke et al. 1972, p. 41.

⁸⁸ Dominique PALADILHE, *Le Grand Condé: Héros des armées de Louis XIV*, Paris 2008.

⁸⁹ Paul SONNINO, *Mazarin's Quest – The Congress of Westphalia and the Coming of the Fronde*, London 2008, p. 164.

⁹⁰ Hubert MÉTHIVIER, *L'Ancien Régime en France, XVI^e-XVII^e-XVIII^e siècles*, Paris 2003, p. 263.

⁹¹ Orest RANUM, *Paris in the Age of Absolutism*, Pennsylvania 2002, p. 290.

⁹² P. SONNINO, *Mazarin's Quest*, p. 167.

⁹³ Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: „Armand I de Bourbon, prince de Conti“, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Armand-I-de-Bourbon-prince-de-Conti> [2022–09–14].

⁹⁴ Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: „Henri II d'Orléans, duke de Longueville“, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henri-II-dOrleans-duc-de-Longueville-duc-de-Coulommiers>. [2022–09–14].

⁹⁵ O. RANUM – P. RANUM, *The Century*, p. 468.

however, Caesar de Choiseul, comte du Plessis-Praslin,⁹⁶ who was loyal to the king,⁹⁷ clashed with the Spanish army, causing the Spaniards to retreat. On 15 December 1650, one of the most important conflicts of the second Fronde took place – the Battle of Rethel.⁹⁸ The Tourennes' army was forced to retreat, Tourenne himself subsequently begged Louis for forgiveness, which he received. Cardinal Mazarin left France and the captured princes were released. However, even this did not moderate the conflict, as Mazarin returned with a small army in December 1651, and another fight arose between the opponents, led by the Prince of Condé, and Tourenne, who stood for the army on the side of the king.⁹⁹ After several fierce battles, the bloodiest one taking place on 2 July 1652, near Paris. The royal army defeated the opponents led by the Prince of Condé in the Faubourg St. Antoine.¹⁰⁰ They retreated and were let into the gates of Paris. Paris city representatives longed for peace and the Prince of Condé was progressively abandoned by his supporters as Mazarin went into exile again. A Parliament was convened outside the walls of Paris and a further course of action was discussed.¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, in Paris, the rebel government surrendered under pressure, the Prince of Condé leaving to serve the King of Spain.¹⁰² The second Fronde ended on 21 October 1652, when young Louis was proclaimed the king and triumphantly returned to Paris.¹⁰³

Cardinal Mazarin did return to the court of Louis, but he did not enjoy it for long, dying on 9 March 1661. Since the Cardinal's death, Louis firmly grasped the helm of governance. Although Mazarin advised Louis to choose Jean Baptiste Colbert¹⁰⁴ as his adviser, the king never allowed another favourite to take the office. Nonetheless, great changes awaited the Kingdom of France. Unlike Leopold, Louis had an advantage – although he had to face the Fronde at the beginning of his reign, he faced no additional major problems in the next few years of his reign. He was fully able to concentrate on his ambitious foreign policy and the modernization of the internal organization of the kingdom. Colbert, as a Minister of Finance, succeeded in softening the internal policy against the French nobility during the reigns of Cardinal Mazarin and Cardinal Richelieu.

⁹⁶ Encycloaedia Britannica, headword: „Caesar, duc de Choiseul“, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Choiseul,_César [2022–09–15].

⁹⁷ David PARROTT, *1652 The Cardinal, the Prince, and the Crisis of the Fronde*, Oxford 2020, p. 60.

⁹⁸ Thomas Henry DYER, *The Supremacy of France and the Wars of Louis XIV*, San Diego 2015, p. 390.

⁹⁹ Lucien BÉLY, *La France au XVIIe siècle Puissance de l'État, contrôle de la société*, Paris 2009, p. 443.

¹⁰⁰ O. RANUM, *Paris*, p. 296.

¹⁰¹ D. PARROTT, *1652 The Cardinal*, p. 147.

¹⁰² William James ROOSEN, *The Age of Louis XIV. The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, London–New York 2017, p. 17.

¹⁰³ T. H. DYER, *The Supremacy*, p. 397.

¹⁰⁴ Inès MURAT, *Colbert*, Paris 1980.

Although Louis had to deal with less pressing internal problems than Leopold, he was constantly concerned about the lack of finances. His ambitious foreign policy demanded more and more financial means. New provincial posts were artificially established, so that the crown was able to sell them to the nobility. For purely financial reasons, new guild branches were also created, which artisans were forced to join.¹⁰⁵ Colbert, however, was still able to boost the French economy. He promoted the policy of Colbertism (mercantilism), that is an economy based on the defence of internal markets to strengthen them. This, of course, went hand in hand with the policy of colonialism, in which overseas companies played a key role. The post of the Minister of War was taken by François Michel Le Tellier de Louvois¹⁰⁶ – he primarily reorganized the system of the then French army. In addition to masterfully representing Louis in matters of war, he also improved the recruitment system, legislated the obligation to participate in military service and introduced a uniform salary system. Additionally, Louvois constructed a system of barracks and established a military hospital – *l'hôtel des Invalides*.

I/3 THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AMONG THE SUPERPOWERS (1657–1689)

The path of diplomacy was not always the easiest, France was superior to other countries in almost all-important aspects (natural resources, placement, vastness of population, and of course the ability to use money to the maximum), Louis XIV was very aware of this fact.¹⁰⁷ Diplomacy was a challenging job in the case of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire – Two significant European leaders crossed each other's paths on the international field from the very beginning. The French kingdom tried to do its best in order to prevent Leopold from being elected as the Emperor. Cardinal Jules Raymond Mazarin¹⁰⁸ even tried to enforce Louis XIV to the Imperial throne.¹⁰⁹ However, this idea did not have much chance of success, which Mazarin came to understand. The Cardinal had therefore promoted the Bavarian Prince-Elector from the House of Wittelsbach; though the Prince-Elector rejected the candidacy

¹⁰⁵ Francis Ludwig CARSTEN, *The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 5 The Ascendancy of France 1648–88*, Cambridge 1961, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ Aimé RICHARDT, *Louvois le bras armé de Louis XIV*, Paris 1998.

¹⁰⁷ W. J. ROOSEN, *The Age*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁸ Simone BERTIÈRE, *Mazarin: le maître du jeu*, Paris 2007; Gérard MONTASSIER, *Mazarin: l'étranger qui a fait la France*, Paris 2015.

¹⁰⁹ J. WHALEY, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, p. 24.

immediately after.¹¹⁰ Despite the fact that the French representatives, together with the anti-Habsburg forces, failed to prevent Leopold's election, they at least managed to slow it down.¹¹¹

Louis' ambitions were great, he saw the Kingdom of Spain as another imaginary aim on his way to domination over Europe. The disunited Spanish kingdom, teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, could not compete with France at this time.¹¹² Louis could therefore take the power and replace them in the position of the European hegemon. In addition to constant fighting with France, the Spanish kingdom had to focus on rebellions in Portugal as well. Louis's time had come; Philip IV began negotiations in order to end the Franco-Spanish War, which had dragged on for an exhausting 24 years (1635–1659). The Treaty of the Pyrenees was signed in 1659.¹¹³ This treaty thrust yet another wedge in the mutual relations of Louis and Leopold. Mazarin, thanks to his skilful policy, made a peace negotiation conditional on royal wedding.¹¹⁴ Philipp IV acceded to it – Louis married Maria Theresa which had originally been promised to Ferdinand IV. After his unexpected death, the Spanish infanta was to marry Leopold I. On that account Leopold had to marry (much later, in 1666) the second daughter¹¹⁵ of the Spanish king – Margaret Theresa.¹¹⁶ The conditions were nonharmonic already; moreover, the power of Spain was falling. After the death of Philip IV (d. 1665), his son Charles II,¹¹⁷ the last member of the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs, ascended the Spanish throne. He was tormented by poor health from his early childhood, thus no one expected that he would rule for a long time.¹¹⁸ Both empires wanted to put their families on the Spanish throne. For that reason, this marriage seemed to be crucial for the Emperor.

Although it seemed to be almost impossible after all these rigmaroles, the Bourbon-Habsburg coexistence had its “bright moments” in the 60s of the 17th century. Jacques Bretel de Grémonville,¹¹⁹ as the French envoy in Vienna, turned to Leopold in 1667 with a proposal

¹¹⁰ J. WHALEY, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, p. 24.

¹¹¹ Jiří KUBEŠ, *Trnitá cesta Leopolda I. za římskou korunou (1657–1658). Volby a korunovace ve Svaté říši římské v raném novověku* [The Thorny Path of Leopold I for the Roman Crown (1657–1658). The Elections and Coronations in the Early Modern Holy Roman Empire], České Budějovice 2009.

¹¹² W. J. ROOSEN, *The Age*, p. 12.

¹¹³ L. BÉLY, *La France*, p. 465.

¹¹⁴ L. BÉLY, *Les relations*, p. 201.

¹¹⁵ Wouter TROOST, *Leopold I, Louis XIV, William III and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession*, in: *History*, vol.103, no. 357, 2018, p. 547.

¹¹⁶ Despite the significant age difference between the spouses, it was a happy marriage. They shared common interests in culture (both of them adored theater and music). For further information, see Alfred STRNAD, headword: “Margarethe”, in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 16 (1990), <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118730991.html#ndbcontent> [2022–09–02].

¹¹⁷ Ludwig PFANDL, *Karl II. Das Ende der spanischen Machtstellung in Europa*, München 1940.

¹¹⁸ W. J. ROOSEN, *The Age*, p. 18.

¹¹⁹ Olivier CHALINE, *Chronologie*, in: *Dix-septième siècle*, vol. 3, no. 240, 2008, p. 532.

of division of the Spanish inheritance. Leopold agreed to the treaty.¹²⁰ The *Obrist Hofmeister* of Leopold Wenzel Eusebius, Prince of Lobkowitz, promoted the pro-French policy. The pro-French attitude of the Viennese court did not last long, however. Because of the Devolution War (1667–1668) and due to the seemingly-imminent subsequent Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678/9), this turnabout is fully understandable. After the reverse of the inner state policy back to the anti-French side, Lobkowitz's rapprochement with France deprived him of the favour of the Emperor. He was expelled from the court and interned at his castle in Roudnice nad Labem.¹²¹ Involving the Emperor, the Northern Netherlands, Spain, and the Duke of Lorraine, a coalition and an anti-French agreement was signed in The Hague in the summer of 1673.¹²² A peace was restored again in 1678 with the signing of the Peace of Nijmegen.

The tension between the dynasties manifested itself in enmity among diplomats as well. The Emperor gave priority to the Spanish Ambassador over others at the Imperial Court of Vienna. The idea that the Spanish Ambassador would have priority over the French one was an unimaginable situation for Louis, and that is why he rather “diplomatically” brushed it off by sending a diplomat with a special status of an extraordinary envoy.¹²³ Spanish diplomats fancied to use this priority right not only at the Viennese court. One of the famous conflicts arose from this haughtiness of the Spaniards; Samuel Pepys¹²⁴ depicted it in his memoir – this conflict took place in a street of London in 1661. Diplomats of Spain and France fought for a precedence in the ceremonial entrance of a Swedish ambassador. The bloody conflict was paid by several lives of French soldiers and the three carriage horses.¹²⁵ However, this dispute over precedence was certainly not the only one. The following year, the Spanish ambassador in Paris had to publicly apologize for this conflict and promise that the next time France's preferential rights would be fully recognized. Louis did not miss this moment; furthermore, he invited all the representatives of other states who were in Paris to listen to the Spanish apology.¹²⁶ The Spanish diplomats then avoided the French ones as much as possible – they did not have to give them priority. Even in relatively peaceful times, these struggles for priority did not stop. The best example is the meeting in Münster in 1644. Everything was delayed by half a year just because

¹²⁰ Hubert MÉTHIVIER, *Le siècle de Louis XIV*, ed. Pierre Thibault, 2nd ed., Paris 1994, p. 129.

¹²¹ Adam WOLF, *Fürst Wenzel Lobkowitz, erster geheimer Rath Kaiser Leopold's I. 1609–1677. Sein Leben und Wirken*, Wien 1869, p. 403.

¹²² Pierre COGNY, *La France de Louis XIV 1650–1715*, Paris 1970, p. 29.

¹²³ Lucien BÉLY, *Les relations internationales en Europe, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles*, Paris 1992, p. 340.

¹²⁴ Richard OLLARD, *Pepys: a Biography*, Oxford 1974.

¹²⁵ Samuel PEPYS, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, ed. by Richard Le Gallienne, New York 2003, p. 81, online source: <https://www.pepysdiary.com/diary/1661/09/30/> [2022–09–19].

¹²⁶ Matthew Smith ANDERSON, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919*, London 2013, p. 64.

of arguments about precedence in ceremonies.¹²⁷ Another great example was the signing of the peace between France and Spain in 1659. Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro¹²⁸ met each other for this occurrence on an island on the river Bidassoa, which was exactly between the territories of the two representatives. The special bridges were then built from each side just for this occasion, so that the deputies could come from “their” side to the island.¹²⁹ Despite peacetime, there was a kind of tension in the air. Louis’ constant efforts to lie at the heart of all the other monarchs did not help it in any way. In his memoirs the Sun King express himself in a very anti-Habsburg’s way, he was especially against the Emperor. He condemned Leopold, entitled him as a zero-threat to the powerful French kingdom, a cultural barbarian, an undignified and immature person.¹³⁰

Louis XIV had shocked everyone with his enormous demands, as well as with his visions about the “French empire”. This caused that the other realms started to be afraid of his unrealistic ideas and his self-greed, which strained diplomatic negotiations. The royal cousins constantly butted heads with each other, albeit indirectly. For example, *Le Roi Très Chrétien* supported the Ottomans in their campaign against the Habsburgs.¹³¹ Louis also enthusiastically reinforced the opposing Hungarian magnates. The fact that Leopold was brought up in a strongly anti-French environment¹³² did not help mutual relations either.¹³³

Nevertheless, both sides tried to negotiate in a diplomatic way. The talks were mostly carried out in a “friendly spirit”. In the next nine years after the Peace at Nijmegen of 1678, we can study six successive envoys of the French king in Vienna and four successive envoys of the Emperor in Paris.

¹²⁷ M. S. ANDERSON, *The Rise*, p. 65.

¹²⁸ Encyclopædia Britannica, headword: “Luis Méndez de Haro“, online source: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Luis-Mendez-de-Haro> [2022–09–20].

¹²⁹ M. S. ANDERSON, *The Rise*, p. 65.

¹³⁰ Louis XIV, *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l’instruction du Dauphin*, ed. by Charles Dreyss, vol. 2, Paris 1860, pp. 380, 407, 414, etc.

¹³¹ Lucien BÉLY, *Objectifs et conduite de la politique extérieure*, ed. by Jean-Christian Petitfils, *Le siècle de Louis XIV*, Paris 2017.

¹³² J. MIKULEC, *Leopold I.*, p. 70.

¹³³ However, the situation was different in the case of French culture. The Austrian aristocracy looked up to France with admiration. Paris was the destination of many young aristocrats on their Grand Tour. The upbringing of young nobles was often influenced by French customs, etiquette and style of appearance, behaviour, and even fashion. Almost every young cavalier desired to be at the famous court of Louis XIV. Veronika HYDEN-HANSCHO, *The cultural role of diplomats in an age of war: French fashion in Vienna under Leopold I.*, in: *The Seventeenth Century* vol. 36, no. 3, 2021, p. 490; in Czech: Jiří KUBEŠ, *Náročné dospívání urozených. Kavalířské cesty české a rakouské šlechty (1620–1750)* [The Difficult Maturing of the Nobles. The Grand Tours of the Bohemian and Austrian Nobility (1620–1750)], Pelhřimov 2013; Hugh Murray BAILLIE, *Etiquette and the Planning of the State Apartments in Baroque Palaces*, *Archaeologia* 101, 1967, pp. 169–199.

Table 1: The List of the Imperial Diplomats in France and the French Diplomats in the Holy Roman Empire between 1679 and 1689¹³⁴

DIPLOMATS OF THE FRENCH KING		DIPLOMATS OF THE EMPEROR	
Nicolas-Marie de l'Hospital Marquis de Vitry	Nov. 1679– Aug. 1680	Heinrich Franz Graf von Mansfeld	Sept. 1680– Febr.1682; March 1683
François Cadot Marquis de Sébeville	Jan. 1681– March 1684	Johann Graf von Althann	Oct. 1683– ???
Louis de Clermont-Gallerande Comte de Cheverny	March 1684– June 1685	Johann Friedrich von Seilern	Jan. 1685– Sept. 1685
André de Bétoulat Comte de La Vauguyon	Jan. 1686– Dec. 1687	Wenzel Ferdinand Poppel Graf von Lobkowitz	Oct. 1685– June 1688
Claude-Louis Hector Marquis de Villars	Jan. 1687		
Claude-Hugues de Lezay Comte de Lusignan	Dec. 1687– Feb. 1688		

I/4 WARS AMONG THE POWERS (1667–1684)

As famous theoretician Carl von Clausewitz once said in the 19th century: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means”. These “other means” were summoned quite often by Louis. After the death of the King of Spain, Philip IV (1605–1665), the War of Devolution (1667–1668) was brewing. Philip was succeeded by his first son out of the second marriage – Charles II.¹³⁵ Louis XIV did not deny his inheritance law; nonetheless, he laid claim on territory of the Spanish Netherlands gained through his marriage to Maria Theresa,¹³⁶ as she was the oldest daughter from the first marriage of Philip IV.¹³⁷ Prior to the marriage, Maria Theresa’s right to inherit from her father was contractually waived, for which 500,000 gold escudos were to be paid to Louis XIV as compensation.¹³⁸ However, they were never paid to him,¹³⁹ which Louis referred to.

Louis XIV did not underestimate the beginning of the war and prepared the diplomatic and military field well. Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne Vicomte de Turenne¹⁴⁰ was Commander-In-Chief – he had 35,000 men and artillery at his disposal, all concentrated around the town of Mézières on the Meuse River. Another segment of the army, consisting of 9,000 men, was under

¹³⁴ The compilation of the table is based on L. BITTNER – L. GROß (eds.), *Repertorium*, pp. 141 and 214.

¹³⁵ Jean-Philippe CÉNAT, *Le roi stratège: Louis XIV et la direction de la guerre, 1661–1715*, Rennes 2010, p. 79.

¹³⁶ Jean BÉRENGER, *Le Conflit Entre les Habsbourg et les Bourbons (1598–1792)*, in: *Revue d’histoire diplomatique*, Vol. 116, 2002/3, pp. 193–232, p. 205.

¹³⁷ Lucien BÉLY, *Les relations*, Paris 1992, p. 224.

¹³⁸ J.-P. CÉNAT, *Le roi stratège*, p. 79.

¹³⁹ John Baptist WOLF, *Louis XIV*, Gollancz 1968, p. 117.

¹⁴⁰ Jean BÉRENGER, *Turenne*, Paris 1987.

the leadership of Antoine de Rochebaron. François de Blanchefort de Créquy, later Marquis de Marines, commanded 6,000 light horsemen who were waiting at Sierck-les-Bains, guarding the flank against an attack from the Holy Roman Empire side.¹⁴¹ The war started on 24 May 1667, when French army crossed the borders with the Spanish Netherlands. Charleroi was Turenne's first clear target, as it was a key supply base for the Kingdom of Spain. The French side managed to occupy the cities of Tournai, Kortrijk, and Oudenaarde. Another intention was to conquer Antwerp.¹⁴² The United Provinces therefore began to negotiate with England¹⁴³ and Spain to form an anti-French coalition. The advance of the French troops was further hampered by water defences when the Governor Francisco de Moura Corte Real, 3rd Marquis of Castelo Rodrigo, had the land flooded.¹⁴⁴ On 17 October, Louis, accompanied by his brother, Generals, Ministers and even with his courtesans, was already with his army, counting 25,000 men, *ante portas* of the city of Lille, ready to start a campaign.¹⁴⁵

By the end of January 1668, The United Provinces, Sweden, and England made a Triple Alliance.¹⁴⁶ The French side had better military logistics; taking this advantage, they occupied Franche-Comté. On 4 February 1668, French troops entered this territory, commanded by Prince de Condé personally. It was another successful campaign, as key cities were surrendering in quick succession¹⁴⁷ – Besançon and Salins-les-Bains on 7 February, Dole on 14 February, and Gray on 19 February.¹⁴⁸ On the French side, two different voices began to appear on whether to continue the conquests. Turenne, Condé and Orléans urged the king to continue the war with his, at the time, gigantic army. In contrast, Lionne, Colbert and Le Tellier recommended peace, mainly for financial reasons.¹⁴⁹

Yet luck played into Louis' hands. The Spanish king was reported to be suffering from smallpox. There was hence no need for a further fighting and Louis decided on peace. On that account, the Treaty of Saint Germain was concluded between France and England on 25 April,

¹⁴¹ Édouard Hardy de PÉRINI, *Batailles françaises*, vol. 5, Paris 1896, pp. 299–300.

¹⁴² E. H. de PÉRINI, *Batailles*, p. 301.

¹⁴³ The Treaty of Breda was concluded on July 31, 1667, between England and the Netherlands, this agreement ended the Anglo-Dutch War and began negotiations for a common front against France. See P. GEYL, *Johan de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1653–72*, History, vol. 20, no. 80, 1936, pp. 303–319.

¹⁴⁴ E. H. de PÉRINI, *Batailles*, p. 301.

¹⁴⁵ L. BÉLY, *Les relations*, p. 226.

¹⁴⁶ Herbert H. ROWEN, *John de Witt and the Triple Alliance*, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 26, no. 1, 1954, pp. 1–14.

¹⁴⁷ J.-P. CÉNAT, *Le roi stratège*, p. 95.

¹⁴⁸ E. H. de PÉRINI, *Batailles*, p. 306.

¹⁴⁹ Claude Truman MACINTOSH, *French Diplomacy during the War of Devolution, the Triple Alliance and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle*, Ohio 1973, p. 153. Ph.D. theses, online: https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=osu1487351601949172&disposition=inline [2022–07–14].

which was later incorporated into the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.¹⁵⁰ On one hand, Louis had to return Franche-Comté and withdrew from the Spanish Netherlands, but on the other hand, he received several important cities – Armentières, Bergues, Douai, Lille, Tournai, and Oudenarde.¹⁵¹ In doing so, he strengthened the northern border of the French empire.¹⁵² It did not take long, and Louis began to plan another war – the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678/9).

With his skilful diplomacy, supplemented by a considerable amount of money, Louis was able to convince Sweden to withdraw from the Alliance. He left nothing to chance and therefore concluded on 1 June 1670, the secret Treaty of Dover with Charles II, the King of England.¹⁵³ However, the French king did not hesitate to use the time among the negotiations. In 1670, he seized the Duchy of Lorraine.¹⁵⁴ Then, Louis started to negotiate with Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, whom he remunerated with a subsidy and with a support of his candidate for the Polish throne in return for not joining the Triple Alliance. The French king was not afraid of going even further, he even started negotiations with Leopold I, with whom he concluded an agreement in November 1671 that ensured the Empire's neutrality in the Franco-Dutch war (1672–1678/9). By pledging neutrality, Leopold I attempted to limit the scope of the war, but insisted on maintaining the Munich and Aix-la-Chapelle agreements.

Louis did not declare war in a classic old fashion way by dispatching a herald; on the contrary, he promulgated a manifesto, in which he declared war. France started an offensive on 4 May 1672; three assailing armies (the main force with around 50,000 soldiers) were marching towards the Dutch Netherlands.¹⁵⁵ On 12 June, the Battle of Tolhuis¹⁵⁶ took place; it was one of the victories that Louis was very proud of for many years. Because of this famous triumph, the French troops were able to cross the Rhine.¹⁵⁷ Gradually, more great victories began to come. Not surprisingly, the Dutch wanted to start negotiations for peace. They offered a quite generous proposal – Louis could keep The Generality Lands, Maastricht, and the Dutch would give him a compensation of ten million livres. Nevertheless, all this was not enough for Louis; he also demanded more territory – Gelderland, Overijssel, and Utrecht. Yet the situation turned around and the enemy's trump-card came into play: Brandenburg joined the side of the Dutch.

¹⁵⁰ Randall LESAFFER, *The Wars of Louis XIV in Treaties (Part II): The Peace Treaty of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) (2 May 1668)*, online source: <https://opil.oup.com/page/Peace-Treaty-of-Aachen> [2022–07–15].

¹⁵¹ Lucien BÉLY, *Louis XIV: le plus grand roi du monde*, Paris 2005, p. 122.

¹⁵² C. T. MACINTOSH, *French Diplomacy*, p. 165.

¹⁵³ J. LYNN, *The Wars of Louis*, p. 109.

¹⁵⁴ L. BÉLY, *La France*, p. 640.

¹⁵⁵ J. LYNN, *The Wars of Louis*, p. 113.

¹⁵⁶ Randall LESAFFER, *The Wars of Louis XIV in Treaties (Part IV): The Second Peace of Westminster (19 February 1674)*, online source: <https://opil.oup.com/page/second-peace-westminster> [2022–07–15].

¹⁵⁷ L. BÉLY, *Louis XIV*, p. 127.

Emperor Leopold I also entered the scene. Although he had promised his impartiality, he sensed an opportunity to gain an advantage over his long-time enemy as the French side weakened. Even though the French side managed, mainly thanks to the genius manoeuvre of General Turenne, to conclude the Treaty of Vossem¹⁵⁸ with Brandenburg on 6 June, France had to partially-withdraw. In 1673, one of the greatest successes¹⁵⁹ was the conquest of Maastricht.¹⁶⁰ In August 1673, Spain, and Emperor Leopold I, along with other states within the Holy Roman Empire, joined in another anti-French alliance and signed separate alliances with the United Provinces. On 16 October, the Kingdom of Spain declared war on France, the French side declared war on Spain on 19 October.

After the formation of the anti-French coalition, Louis had to change his plans. The French army focused on recapturing the Spanish possessions that France had acquired in 1667–1668. Eventually, France was forced to return them after the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle. In the early spring of 1674, Louis planned an invasion of the Spanish province of Franche-Comté. They managed to occupy this territory in six weeks. Originally, Louis wanted to complete this plan by the end of 1673, but he failed. Allied armies led by William of Orange attacked French Flanders, the French army led by the Prince of Condé stopped the advance of the enemy and won the Battle of Seneffe, albeit at the cost of heavy losses.¹⁶¹

Tourenne stayed with his troops in Alsace during the winter of 1673/1674. In July 1674, he began a military campaign, which was conducted in a masterly manner. He started a series of victories for the French armies:¹⁶² He defeated the Imperial army several times in a row, for the first time in the Battle of Sinsheim, again in another battle on the Neckar River, forcing them to retreat again. This series of defeats continued, his greatest success was then the Battle of Turckheim, which took place on 5th January 1675. The decisive factor in this battle was not the number of soldiers – there were almost equal numbers on both sides, the French had approximately 30,000 and the Imperial between 30,000 and 35,000 men¹⁶³ – but a tactic that Tourenne had thought out perfectly. Unfortunately, he was killed by a stray cannonball while scouting enemy positions in Salzbach on 27th July. This overwhelming loss was very

¹⁵⁸ William YOUNG, *International Politics and Warfare in the Age of Louis XIV and Peter the Great*, Lincoln 2004, p. 131.

¹⁵⁹ J.-P. CÉNAT, *Le roi stratège*, p. 94.

¹⁶⁰ J. LYNN, *The Wars of Louis*, p. 120.

¹⁶¹ Some historians, especially the French ones, tend to see this campaign as one of another glorious victories of the French side. However, there are also echoes that, considering the losses on both sides, it was more of a “draw” when both countries kept their territory, and the borders did not move in any way. Casualties were estimated to range from 7,000 to 10,000 dead or wounded people on the French side, and Allied losses from 10,000 to 15,000 people. See É. H. de PÉRINI, *Batailles*, p. 107.

¹⁶² J. LYNN, *The Wars of Louis*, p. 131.

¹⁶³ Gaston BODART, *Losses of Life in Modern Wars, Austria-Hungary*, Oxford 1916, p. 28.

demoralizing for the French side, they thus retreated to Alsace after a short fight.¹⁶⁴ The war began to be very loss-heavy on both sides, there were no major battles in 1676 and 1677, the two powers rather “exchanged” individual cities – the imperial army captured Philippsburg in September 1676, and the French captured Freiburg in November 1677. The most active fighting erupted in the territory of Alsace, where the French army conquered the town of Kehl and the bridge over the Rhine near Strasbourg. With these two victories they secured possession of Alsace. In contrast, practically no fighting took place on the territory of Spain.¹⁶⁵ The last conquered territory was the cities of Ypres and Ghent in 1678 in favour of Louis.¹⁶⁶ In 1677, however, peace negotiations had already begun in Nijmegen. The last important battle was fought at Saint-Denis on 13th August 1678, for the possession of Mons – the outcome of this battle is debatable.¹⁶⁷ Just a few days later, Spain and France agreed to an armistice, and on 17th September, the Peace of Nijmegen was signed, which the peace was confirmed.¹⁶⁸

The Peace of Nijmegen consisted of several treaties signed in the city of Nijmegen between August 1678 and October 1679. The most important was the one that ended the rivalry among France and the Dutch Republic. By concluding that peace, France acquired the territory of Lorraine – the issues of Lorraine was very important to Louis, he longed for its gain and later refused to give up its possession – Franche-Comté and some territories in the north of Spain.¹⁶⁹ To this end, French troops withdrew from the occupied city of Maastricht, as well as from territories in northern Flanders and Hainaut.¹⁷⁰ The Emperor had to give up Freiburg and Kehl on the right bank of the Rhine, keeping Philippsburg.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁴ J. LYNN, *The Wars of Louis*, p. 141.

¹⁶⁵ Cathal J. NOLAN, *Wars of the Age of Louis XIV, 1650–1715: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization*, Greenwood 2008, p. 127.

¹⁶⁶ Randall LESAFFER, *The Wars of Louis XIV in Treaties (Part V): The Peace of Nijmegen (1678–1679)*, online source: <https://opil.ouplaw.com/page/peace-of-nijmegen> [2022–07–15].

¹⁶⁷ See Stanley SANDLER, *Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia*, vol. 1, Santa Barbara 2002, p. 514 or Olaf van NIMWEGEN, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions 1588–1688*, Woodbridge 2010, p. 510.

¹⁶⁸ L. BÉLY, *Louis XIV: le plus grand*, p. 133.

¹⁶⁹ Alistair HORNE, *La Belle France*, New York 2005, p. 164.

¹⁷⁰ Jean-Pierre BOIS, *Louis XIV, roi de paix?*, *Revue historique des armées*, 263, 2011, p. 6.

¹⁷¹ L. BÉLY, *Les relations*, p. 260.



Figure 3: The Signing of the Peace of Nijmegen between France and Spain on 17 September 1678¹⁷²

Louis XIV did not even wait long after the Peace of Nijmegen and had already another plan ready in his mind – to continue the *politique des Réunions*, which had been started by Richelieu.¹⁷³ The first step towards it was to appoint a much more brash and cynical foreign minister, whom Colbert de Croissy was to become. He was appointed on November 18, 1679.¹⁷⁴ For this reason, Louis created the so-called *Chambres de réunion* in 1679,¹⁷⁵ which was commissioned to inquire the tally of lands granted to France by the Treaties of Westphalia, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Nijmegen for reunification. As *Réunions*, they were designated territories once subordinated to the Kingdom of France. The representatives of these regions should come forward as well and make a declaration of faith and obeisance, an act to show that they recognized the sovereignty of the King of France.¹⁷⁶ In doing so, *Le Roi Soleil* started a new

¹⁷² Painting by Henri Gascard, 1679, online source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e1/Vrede_van_Nijmegen_-_De_ondertekening_van_de_Vrede_tussen_Frankrijk_en_Spanje_door_Henri_Gascard_%281635-1701%29.jpg/1024px-Vrede_van_Nijmegen_-_De_ondertekening_van_de_Vrede_tussen_Frankrijk_en_Spanje_door_Henri_Gascard_%281635-1701%29.jpg [2023-04-01].

¹⁷³ Ibidem, p. 277.

¹⁷⁴ Ibidem, p. 277.

¹⁷⁵ L. BÉLY, *Louis XIV: le plus grand*, p. 221.

¹⁷⁶ L. BÉLY, *Les relations internationales*, p. 277.

campaign; his intentions were clear – to gain several important border settlements: the Réunions.

On 30 August 1681, the French armies were already standing in front of Strasbourg, which signed the capitulation without any protest.¹⁷⁷ The city retained all the rights it had until that time. Louis then took possession of the city solemnly, without a single casualty, on 23 October 1681.¹⁷⁸ In 1680–1681, the *Chambres de réunion* of Metz propounded that the Duchy of Luxembourg should be dependent on the County of Chiny, which itself fell under the Bishopric of Metz, so again this territory should be annexed by France. The increasing threat of French expansionism was understandably not to the Emperor's taste. That was the reason why Leopold sent his army to the Rhineland. Bavaria and the King of Poland, John III Sobieski, also sided with the Emperor. The Kingdom of Spain declared war on 26 October 1683. Nonetheless, everything changed when the Turks attacked the Empire. Louis took advantage of the Turks and conquered Courtrai¹⁷⁹ in November 1683 and Luxembourg on 4 June 1684.¹⁸⁰

The fighting ended with the Truce of Ratisbon on 15 August 1684.¹⁸¹ This peace was supposed to guarantee twenty years of peace between the Bourbons and the Habsburgs. Louis was allowed to keep most of the conquered territories;¹⁸² the city of Strasbourg was the most important gain for him. In return, he pledged not to continue with the policy of Réunions. Although this agreement was supposed to ensure peace, it never happened. A few years later, another conflict broke out again between France and the Grand Alliance – the Nine Years' War (1688–1697).¹⁸³

Drawing to the end of his reign, Louis managed to doubt the existence of the universal monarchy of the Habsburgs in Europe.¹⁸⁴ The whole conflict was ended by the War of the Spanish Succession when the ascendancy of Habsburgs in Spain ended definitively. However, no side moved to defend the preferential status. For the first time in history, by the end of Louis's

¹⁷⁷ Jean BÉRENGER, *Louis XIV, L'Empereur et l'Europe de l'Est*, in: XVIIe siècle: bulletin de la Société d'étude du XVIIe siècle, vol. 123, Année 31, N. 2, 1979, p. 190.

¹⁷⁸ L. BÉLY, *Les relations*, p. 278.

¹⁷⁹ Heinrich LEO, *Zwölf Bücher niederländischer Geschichten. 2: Enthaltend die letzten sechs Bücher oder Die Geschichte der Niederlande vom Beginn der Herrschaft des Hauses Burgund bis 1830*, Hale 1835, p. 865, online source: <https://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/view/bsb10274076?page=903> [2022–07–28].

¹⁸⁰ L. BÉLY, *Les relations*, p. 279.

¹⁸¹ J. BÉRENGER, *Louis XIV, L'Empereur*, p. 191.

¹⁸² J.-P. CÉNAT, *Le roi stratège*, p. 122.

¹⁸³ J. BÉRENGER, *Le Conflit Entre*, p. 207.

¹⁸⁴ Hillard von THIESEN, *Diplomatie vom type ancien. Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens*, in: *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen, Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, vol. I, Koln–Weimar–Wien 2010, p. 474.

life, an official equality was acknowledged among the Christian monarchs. No one, not even the Emperor, could claim the precedence.

CHAPTER II: DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

II/1 LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

From the 15th century onwards, the main consolidation of traditional states around monarchs and their courts started; most of them can be ranked to the leading European powers. It was, therefore, understandable that monarchs had a mutual contact with each other. The first such communication can likely be traced back to the 12th century.¹⁸⁵ However, the truly traceable beginnings of the new diplomatic practice are documented in Italy from about the middle of the 15th century.¹⁸⁶ Italian methods and continuous interstate relationships got through the Alps at the end of the 15th century.¹⁸⁷ Europe slowly entered the political age, which gradually led to demand a sophisticated modern diplomatic system. Louis XI was one of the first rulers who proclaimed that only he, as a King of France, was able to accept ambassadors in Paris.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, European heads of states did not receive envoys from foreign countries with fully open arms.¹⁸⁹ It was still not seen as something “safe”, but rather as something that could incite disloyalty and turn people against their own sovereign.¹⁹⁰ They were especially vigilant in Eastern Europe – Poland or Russia – and in Venice, they even forbade talking about state affairs with people from foreign countries.

One of the main differences which slowly commenced to appear in the north of Italy (Venice, Florence, and especially the Duchy of Milan) – diplomats were not sent ad hoc, but for an “indefinite period”.¹⁹¹ Gradually, this tendency also reached the Transalpine area.¹⁹² From the first quarter of the 16th century, Western Europe and Italian monarchs and governments had a regular mutual contact. In the West, it progressively became more common

¹⁸⁵ M. S. ANDERSON, *The Rise*, p. 1.

¹⁸⁶ Riccardo FUBINI, *Diplomacy and government in the Italian city-states of the fifteenth century (Florence and Venice)*, in: *Politics and diplomacy in early modern Italy: the structure of diplomatic practice, 1450–1800*, Cambridge 2000, p. 28.

¹⁸⁷ Garrett MATTINGLY, *Renaissance diplomacy*, Boston 1955, p. 52.

¹⁸⁸ M. S. ANDERSON, *The Rise*, p. 5.

¹⁸⁹ Jeremy BLACK, *A History of Diplomacy*, London 2010, p. 59.

¹⁹⁰ M. S. ANDERSON, *The Rise*, p. 13.

¹⁹¹ Tracey Amanda SOWERBY – Jan HENNINGS (eds.), *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c.1410–1800*, London 2017, p. 3.

¹⁹² E.g. Pavel MAREK, *La embajada española en la corte imperial 1558–1641. Las figuras de los embajadores y estrategias clientelares*, Praha 2013.

to send permanent diplomats to major European courts.¹⁹³ This approach was even more favourable, as with increase of temporary envoys expenses rose considerably. The task of these permanent representatives was mainly to collect the information and then sent them to his homeland regularly.¹⁹⁴ Especially important messages were very often encrypted. Ambassadors' missives and final reports to their kings are usually the only, and therefore very valuable, source on the history of international relations.¹⁹⁵ With the increasing rivalry among the main courts, it was more than important to know, what happened in the neighbouring states; to be one step ahead was always advantageous.

However, from the 1560s on, religious disputes initiated to disturb the established relations.¹⁹⁶ In 1568, England, as the main representative of the Protestants, withdrew the resident diplomat from Madrid. It meant an escalation of relations between Italy and the Protestant part of Europe¹⁹⁷ – likewise, between the Catholic part of Europe and Scandinavia.¹⁹⁸ After a series of wars at the end of the 16th and at the beginning of the 17th century, mutual contacts were restored again (it was the period of deconfessionalization of politics). The religious question turned out not to be as burning as the threatening wars. French ambassadors were soon sent to the Netherlands, Spanish ambassadors to London, Dutch ambassadors to Venice. In short, international communication was again in full-swing.¹⁹⁹

All this together gave the aristocrats another opportunity to get into the king's favour. To the success of the mission, it was crucial to choose the proper noble. He had to be a person who grew up in an aristocratic background; only then could he adequately represent his master. He had to know a way of life of nobility and to acquire a know-how about a court life. An acquaintance with the ceremonial rules was also a necessity, for it was the only way to protect sovereign's interests. All this could be called the overall term – professionalism of the Estates.²⁰⁰ Everything went hand in hand with clientelism; it was always assumed that the

¹⁹³ Hillard von THIESEN, *Diplomatie vom type ancien. Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens*, in: *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen, Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, vol. I, Köln–Weimar–Wien 2010, p. 478.

¹⁹⁴ This was possible mainly because of the improvement of the postal network in the 17th century. See Michèle CHAUVET, *Introduction à l'histoire postale*, Paris 2002.

¹⁹⁵ Francis Ludwig CARSTEN, *The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 5 The Ascendancy of France 1648–88*, Cambridge 1961, p. 198.

¹⁹⁶ J. BLACK, *A History*, p. 44.

¹⁹⁷ G. MATTINGLY, *Renaissance diplomacy*, p. 167.

¹⁹⁸ For further information, see Martin BAKEŠ, *Diplomatem v půlnocní zemi: Zástupci Habsburků ve Švédském království mezi lety 1650–1730* [Diplomat in the Country of the Midnight Sun. Representatives of the Habsburgs in the Kingdom of Sweden (1650–1730)], Prague 2020, pp. 55–104; Daniel RICHES, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture Brandenburg-Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, Leiden–Boston 2013, pp. 25–77.

¹⁹⁹ J. BLACK, *A History*, p. 50.

²⁰⁰ H. von THIESEN, *Diplomatie vom type ancien*, p. 489.

diplomat would leave a significant part of his movable property in the given country. Thus, if a noble accepted the post of envoy (or an ambassador), he, in a certain way, made the king feel obliged. There was nothing as a “diplomatic career” because all posts were just temporary, and most noblemen did not want to spend their lives abroad away from their estates. However, if the man proved himself in his foreign mission, he was sometimes sent on further and further diplomatic trips. One of the best examples is Sigismund von Herberstein (1486–1566), who served approximately 70 foreign missions in Habsburg service.²⁰¹

In the mid-16th century, the first hierarchy between the ranks of ambassadors proceeded to be created. Special ambassadors were distinguished from residents and ad hoc ones. There was also a tendency that only a sovereign monarch (e.g. the Republic of Venice or the Republic of Genoa were the exceptions) could send a diplomat of the highest rank. The others could send diplomats of a lower rank only, but it was still not strictly followed.

A resident diplomat, as already mentioned, usually informed his homeland about what had happened in a concrete country – about the opinions of the court, people who lived there, what activities they did, what was going to happen, etc. If there was a need for negotiations, another special envoy was usually sent for it; he usually came only for this given purpose.

Ceremonials have played an important role since the beginnings of the diplomacy.²⁰² In the early period, as a holdover from the Middle Ages, everything was associated with religion. Quite often, negotiations commenced with a prayer, agreements were signed in the church, and relics were added to the agreements.²⁰³ With the rise of diplomats in the early 16th century, the importance of ceremonies increased. Foreign envoys – if it was an important one – were welcomed directly by the royal family; or at least by royal officials – in the case of a less important diplomat. Eminent diplomats had entitlement to a solemn entrance, which was often very pompous, grandiloquent and was intended to awaken admiration.²⁰⁴ Everything was decided: the size of the expedition, how the members were dressed,²⁰⁵ how many horses they had and in what kind of harness or equipment they were tacked; of course, also the size and equipment of the embassy.²⁰⁶ If any one of them was insufficient, it could cast a negative light on both the diplomat and his sovereign. Nevertheless, the fight for precedence caused the

²⁰¹ Dorothea BERGSTRAESSER, headword: Herberstein, Sigmund Freiherr von (Reichsfreiherr 1537), in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 8, online source: <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118710656.html> [2022–10–03].

²⁰² J. BLACK, *A History*, p. 35.

²⁰³ M.S. ANDERSON, *The Rise*, p. 15.

²⁰⁴ G. MATTINGLY, *Renaissance diplomacy*, p. 33.

²⁰⁵ Giulia GALASTRO, *Materiality and the senses in diplomatic hospitality in sixteenth-century Genoa*, in: T. A. Sowerby – J. Hennings (eds.), *Practices*, p. 105.

²⁰⁶ W. J. ROOSEN, *The Age*, p. 115.

biggest disputes over ceremonial matters.²⁰⁷ The effort to appear bigger and stronger than their “neighbours”, as well as the effort to defend their primacy over the representatives of the other monarchs – those were also the tendencies that appeared in diplomacy in subsequent centuries.

It was generally accepted that the Pope always occupied the imaginary first place.²⁰⁸ The second place belonged to the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.²⁰⁹ The remaining powers, most often the Kingdom of France and Spain, had disputes constantly over the next positions right after the Pope and the Emperor.²¹⁰ Eventually, they even fought over the second, the Emperor’s position, which chair the diplomat was seated, in which sequence the treaty was signed, in which order the king accepted the diplomats, and even over the right to a specific salutation. All of this testified about the monarch who sent the diplomat, hence all of it was carefully watched. Even the slightest slackness would mean that the power, fame and appreciation of the king and his lands were decreasing. For example, in London in 1619, during the birthday celebration of James I, the French representative refused to participate in the event because, according to him, the Spanish representative had a better place. The representative of the Republic of Venice did the same, he complained that he had not gotten a place that corresponded to the status of Venice, too. The Dutch representative refused to participate as well because he was seated like the Duke of Savoy – representative of Savoy did not participate since he was not sure as whether to give priority to the representative of the Bohemian king.²¹¹ The diplomat who stepped back in a dispute over precedence would automatically admit the inferior position of his sovereign. This was seen as one of the worst misdemeanours and a dereliction of his duty. Guarding of the honour and position of a sovereign was one of the most important assignments of all diplomats.²¹²

At the times of Louis XIV several monarchs “rightfully” felt that they should have priority over the others.²¹³ The Sun King tried to be at the top of them, but, of course, Emperor Leopold I and the Spanish kings competed with him.²¹⁴ Yet, in the case of precedence,

²⁰⁷ J. BLACK, *A History*, p. 46.

²⁰⁸ Niels F. MAY, *Diplomatic ceremonial at the Westphalian peace negotiations (1643–1648)*, in: T. A. Sowerby – J. Hennings (eds.), *Practices*, p. 84.

²⁰⁹ G. MATTINGLY, *Renaissance diplomacy*, p. 217.

²¹⁰ William ROOSEN, *Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach* in: *The Journal of Modern History* 1980, Vol. 52, No. 3, p. 462.

²¹¹ M. S. ANDERSON, *The Rise*, p. 58.

²¹² André J. KRISCHER, *Souveränität als sozialer Status: zur Funktion des diplomatischen Zeremoniells in der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: R. Kauz, G. Rota, J. P. Niederkorn (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell*, pp. 1–32.

²¹³ William J. ROOSEN, *The Functioning of Ambassadors under Louis XIV*, in: *French Historical Studies*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1970, p. 331.

²¹⁴ J. BLACK, *A History*, p. 77; in detail see Michael ROHRSCHEIDER, *Das französische Präzedenzstreben im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV.*, *Francia – Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte* 36, 2009, pp. 135–179.

institutionalization manifested itself, as specialized officials appeared. However, there was still a kind of consensus: the Emperor was the first of the profane rulers. Further, the hereditary monarchs were of a higher rank than the elected ones and monarchies were commonly more honoured than republics.²¹⁵

II/2 THE PERIOD AFTER THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

During the Westphalian peace negotiations (1642–1648), an official institutionalized diplomatic service was arranged.²¹⁶ For the diplomats of a higher rank the special salutation “Excellence” was acknowledged. The Imperial Estates acquired the right to build an army and the right to form an alliance with the foreign rulers, as well as sending of their own representatives. This was perceived as one of the main steps to their own sovereignty. As mentioned earlier, the new categories of diplomats were validated. All of this led to a definitive separation of medieval and early modern diplomacy. Yet one of the last mediaeval relics – religious symbolism – gradually disappeared. For the longest time, it remained in the contracts signed by Spain’s representatives.²¹⁷ The diplomat’s task was not just to receive and to send information back to his court, but his main assignment was to represent his sovereign, to attend court events, to make contacts, and, lastly, to expand his master’s social and client network.²¹⁸ Before his departure, he received instruction over what specific information he should concentrate on. Many handbooks were published in the Early Modern period on how a good diplomat should look and act.²¹⁹

Not surprisingly, most of these manuals were written on French territory since the France was the largest diplomatic power at those times. By the end of 1661, Louis XIV had already permanent envoys in Vienna, Venice, Turin, and Solothurn. In addition, French

²¹⁵ W. J. ROOSEN, *The age*, p. 59.

²¹⁶ Anuschka TISCHER, *Französische Diplomatie und Diplomaten auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß: Außenpolitik unter Richelieu und Mazarin*, Münster 1999; Derek CROXTON – Anuschka TISCHER, *The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical Dictionary*, Westport 2001.

²¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 47.

²¹⁸ For further information, see Hillard von THIESSEN, *Diplomatie und Patronage. Die spanisch-römischen Beziehungen 1605–1621 in akteurszentrierter Perspektive*, Epfendorf 2010. Pavel MAREK – Tomáš ČERNUŠÁK, *Gesandte und Klienten. Päpstliche und spanische Diplomaten im Umfeld von Kaiser Rudolf II.*, Berlin 2020; Rubén GONZÁLEZ CUERVA – Pavel MAREK, *The Dynastic Network between the Imperial and the Spanish Courts (1556–1619)*, in: *A Europe of Courts, a Europe of Factions*, vol. 12, 2017, pp. 130–155.

²¹⁹ Juan Antonio de VERA y FIGUEROA, *El Enbaxador*, Sevilla 1620; Louis Rousseau de CHAMOY, *L’Idée du parfait ambassadeur*, Paris 1697; Abraham Van WICQUEFORT, *L’Ambassadeur et ses fonctions I–II*, Cologne 1715; François de CALLIÈRES, *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains*, Paris, 1716; Johann Christian LÜNIG, *Theatrum Ceremoniale Historico-politicum I–II*, Leipzig 1719–1720; Jean Rousset DE MISSY, *Recueil historique d’actes, négociations, mémoires et traités, depuis la Paix d’Utrecht*, La Haye, 1728; Antoine PECQUET, *Discours sur l’art de négocier*, Paris 1737.

residents were in Bavaria, Saxony, and Hamburg. He also had a diplomatic representation in Rome, Lisbon, Madrid, The Hague, London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and much more.²²⁰ In contrast, the branch of the Austrian Habsburgs, including the Emperor, had a somewhat more hesitant approach. For a long time, they relied on their Spanish branch, which acted on their behalf in the matter of the diplomatic relations (at least in western Europe). Until the mid-17th century, the Emperor had an ambassador in Madrid, Rome, and Venice. He was also represented by a special envoy or a resident in Paris, and Constantinople.²²¹ The Thirty Years' War gave a rise to the establishment of permanent Imperial diplomatic representations. Gradually, the Emperor's diplomats – during the rule of Leopold I – started to appear at the courts of other souverains and electors (Rome, Poland-Lithuania, England, Sweden, the electors of Bavaria, Saxony or Brandenburg), but also at other allies (Venice, the United Provinces, or Old Swiss Confederacy).²²² Yet the imperial diplomacy still maintained a certain distance. In the late 17th century, the Emperor even commenced to send envoys to such courts, where no diplomatic negotiations took place.

Before 1648, there was a huge number of titles, under which diplomats travelled on their missions to other countries.²²³ Gradually, with the greater development of diplomacy, the whole process had to be hierarchized. Still, this could cause more problems than meets the eye. It should be remembered that the diplomatic ranks reflected the *société des princes*. The question of precedence was thus a crucial issue again, as the position of diplomats directly reflected the position of their masters.²²⁴ Different levels of diplomats hence required different degrees of representation, and ceremonial honours. The importance of the diplomat symbolized the magnitude of the sovereign himself.

After the Peace of Westphalia, there were basically two classes of diplomats.²²⁵ The ambassadors were ranked among the highest. Having taken as the direct representative of the sovereign who sent them, they were therefore entitled to all the honours that would belong to the monarch himself (e.g. the entitlement to solemn entrance was one of the most important). The ambassadors, especially in the case of the French ones, were chosen from the oldest and

²²⁰ Lucien BÉLY, *Les relations internationales en Europe, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles*, Paris 1992, p. 340.

²²¹ Klaus MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden: (1648–1740)*, Bonn 1976, p. 60.

²²² *Ibidem*, pp. 61–76.

²²³ W. J. ROOSEN, *The age*, p. 59.

²²⁴ Heidrun R.I. KUGELER, 'Le Parfait Ambassadeur'. *The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the Century following the Peace of Westphalia*, Oxford 2006, p. 70.

²²⁵ Helmer HELMERS, *Public Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe: Towards a new history of news*, in: *Media History* 22 (3–4), 2016, p. 404.

most noble aristocratic families; in the society of the Sun King, entitled *noblesse d'épée*.²²⁶ Dispatching a diplomat of this highest rank was a privilege only of the monarchs or the great republics (e.g. Venice). No one else, however powerful, was granted this opportunity.²²⁷ Nonetheless, the exception that proves the rule, as Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld mentions in one of his letters, was chartered for the Duke of Savoy, whose envoy was promoted to the ambassador in 1681.²²⁸

The second group, according to Abraham de Wicquefort's²²⁹ work *L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions*, included a large number of new ranks²³⁰ – *envoyé*, *envoyé extraordinaire*, *résident*, agent, etc; these were often selected from the *noblesse de robe*,²³¹ the noblemen to whom the rank belonged due to their offices in administrative or judicial functions. Sending of an envoy was chosen more often since there was no need to deal with so many ceremonial matters, often very expensive, which the ambassador had the right to. Nonetheless, in this second class, there was still some ambiguity in matters of precedence. Therefore, in the 1660s, the adjective *extraordinaire* was determined as honorary, and was thus given priority over resident. Likewise, an envoy was considered to be a higher rank than a resident diplomat.²³² In the case of the Holy Roman Empire, ambassadors and envoys were always chosen from the nobility.²³³

Even though the diplomacy was naturally still consisted of the individuals' actions, the diplomats had to respect a rank in their staging. They had to abide quintessential sets of formal rules.²³⁴ Every action, from the ceremonial entry through a court life to diplomatic actions, was predetermined by protocols.²³⁵ The rank of ambassadors was then not determined by their own nobility but based on which sovereign they represented. Everything depended above all on the credentials they were given.²³⁶ What was contained in the letter of credit and what exact rank their sovereign assigned them was pivotal. They had to behave according to this fact.²³⁷

²²⁶ F. L. CARSTEN, *The New Cambridge Modern History*, p. 199.

²²⁷ M. S. ANDERSON, *The Rise*, p. 42.

²²⁸ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 27 August 1681, Paris.

²²⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: "Abraham de Wicquefort", <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abraham-de-Wicquefort> [2022–10–03].

²³⁰ Abraham Van WICQUEFORT, *L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions*, vol. I, Cologne 1715, p. 62.

²³¹ H. KUGELER, *Le Parfait Ambassadeur*, p. 105.

²³² *Ibidem*, p. 107.

²³³ See the list of 135 Imperial representation promulgate in the book: Jiří KUBEŠ (ed.), *V zastoupení císaře: Česká a moravská aristokracie v habsburské diplomacii 1640–1740* [On Behalf of the Emperor: the Bohemian and Moravian Aristocracy in the Habsburg Diplomacy, 1640–1740], Praha 2018, p. 391–397.

²³⁴ Veronika HYDEN-HANSCHO, *The cultural role of diplomats in an age of war: French fashion in Vienna under Leopold I*, in: *The Seventeenth Century* vol. 36, no. 3, 2021, p. 488.

²³⁵ G. MATTINGLY, *Renaissance diplomacy*, p. 32.

²³⁶ W. J. ROOSEN, *The age*, p. 102.

²³⁷ L. BÉLY, *Les relations*, p. 340.

After 1650, however, the official main emphasis of diplomats was on honesty. In reality, the art of dissimulation²³⁸ was a key for the diplomat and for his host as well.²³⁹ He should behave himself in such a way in order to awaken confidence with those he negotiated with. The magic of diplomacy was in the person of the diplomat himself, he had to be sufficiently adroit in a social speech, socially humorous. In addition, he had to have a feeling for recognition a convenient situation and used it guilefully.²⁴⁰ They had to be able to react to unpredictable situations, to quickly change their statements and they skilfully manipulated their companions. The sham was a diplomat's daily routine; it was a kind of "legal fiction".²⁴¹ The double-tongue, and a certain double composition, was one of the basic strategies of early modern diplomacy.²⁴² This action was often related to gain various benefits, which is directly related to the following passage.

The early-modern diplomats, too, placed great emphasis on ceremonies and symbolic behaviour.²⁴³ As in previous years, this ceremony showed the power, greatness, richness, and importance of the monarch whom the ambassador represented.²⁴⁴ The symbolic behaviour of the actors was often crucial during the negotiations, where even the smallest details were often the most important ones – in what order and on which side the guests were seated, or whether did they have to stand, or if they had to take off their hats during the meeting.²⁴⁵ Mansfeld, for instance, felt offended when he was invited to an audience with the Prince de Condé on his French mission since he was forced to stand, and, what is more, without a hat.²⁴⁶ All of these were an evidence of their status. Based on the performed ceremonies, we can recognise the relationship between the rulers easily. The solemn entry of a new ambassador can be ranked among the most pompous ones. The grandeur of the ambassador's ceremonial arrival was one

²³⁸ H. HELMERS, *Public Diplomacy*, p. 403.

²³⁹ The King of England, Charles II, was the expert in dissimulation. The Emperor's envoy, Franz Sigismund von Thun und Hohenstein, was often trapped in his web of lies. Charles II promised many things and happily announced a new piece of information to Thun, but, in reality, he was an ally of the French king. It took quite long for Thun to recognize that Charles II was just a great actor with "many great words but without actions", in: J. KUBEŠ, *Kontakty s ostrovním královstvím: císařští diplomaté v Anglii, resp. Velké Británii* [The Contacts with the Island Kingdom: Imperial Diplomats in England and the Great Britain respectively], in: *Ibidem* (ed.), *V zastoupení císaře*, p. 260.

²⁴⁰ Lovro KUNČEVIĆ, *Representations of diplomacy in the literature of early modern Ragusa (Dubrovnik)*, in: T. A. Sowerby – J. Hennings (eds.), *Practices*, p. 72.

²⁴¹ Katharina N. PIECHOCKI, *Eroticizing diplomacy in early seventeenth-century opera librettos at the French embassy in Rome*, in: T. A. Sowerby – J. Hennings (eds.), *Practices*, p. 116.

²⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 119.

²⁴³ H. von THIESSEN, *Diplomatie vom type ancien*, p. 481.

²⁴⁴ N. F. MAY, *Diplomatic ceremonial*, p. 84.

²⁴⁵ Jiří KUBEŠ, *Ceremoniál jako jazyk diplomatické komunikace* [Ceremonial as the Language of the Diplomatic Communication], in: *Ibidem*, (ed.), *V zastoupení císaře*, p. 43.

²⁴⁶ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 19 December 1681, Paris.

of the important indicators of his sovereign's position.²⁴⁷ Unless the ambassador made his first ceremonial entrance into his host's court and audience, he travelled incognito.²⁴⁸ The night before an arrival the ambassador was often accommodated near the capital, and, the next day, it was pretended that he had arrived newly. After the first part of his journey, the ambassador gave a ceremonial oration, then he set out on the last part of the tour, being accompanied by the carriages of the royal family, important officials, and other diplomats. The crowded streets cheered at the sight of such splendour.²⁴⁹ In this way they reached the ambassador's accommodation where entertainment was prepared for him and his entire suite. The ruler often paid out of his own pockets for a few days of these parades.²⁵⁰ Nonetheless, the ceremonial entry was related only to the ambassadors.²⁵¹ Throughout the second half of the 17th century, however, courts were gradually forsaken of this practice since it was a very expensive and toilsome matter. For this reason, diplomats often travelled in a rank, which was lower than the ambassador. The situation was even more complicated in the case of French-Imperial relations in the second half of 17th century. Because of the strained relation of both monarchs, they mutually did not send any ambassadors, only diplomats of the lower rank. The tradition of sending an ambassador was again restored after the War of Spanish Succession after 1714.

The first and the last public audience, which applied to envoys and other diplomats of a lower rank as well, at the court where the diplomat dwelt was a similarly significant ritual.²⁵² The first audience took place on the day of his arrival or several days after – at the French court, it was usually up to two days after the ceremonial entry, which traditionally took place on Sunday, whereas the first public audience on Tuesday²⁵³ – the whole process had fixed rules. On the example of France: the diplomat was always picked up by a luxurious carriage at his residence and brought with his entire suite directly to king's residence. Being the ambassador, the diplomat had the right to be ceremoniously received right at the carriages.²⁵⁴ In 1670, for instance, the Imperial envoy in France, Gottlieb von Windischgrätz, arrived at Louvre to his first public audience, accompanied by carriages full of 50 people. His suite consisted of

²⁴⁷ W. J. ROOSEN, *The age*, p. 115.

²⁴⁸ J. KUBEŠ, *Ceremoniál*, p. 47.

²⁴⁹ Richard L.M. MORRIS, *Triumphal entries, ambassadorial receptions and banquets*, in: Erin Griffey (ed.), *Early Modern Court Culture*, London–New York 2022, p. 231.

²⁵⁰ W. J. ROOSEN, *The age*, p. 116.

²⁵¹ K. MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, p. 126.

²⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 129; Gérard SABATIER, *Les itinéraires des ambassadeurs pour les audiences à Versailles au temps de Louis XIV*, in: R. Kautz, G. Rota, J. P. Niederkorn (eds.), *Diplomatiches Zeremoniell*, pp. 187–211; For the English-speaking world, see Jiří KUBEŠ, *Imperial Envoys at the English and British Court (1660–1740): Reception Ceremonies and Disputes over Titles*, *The Court Historian* 27, 2022, Issue 1, pp. 42–60.

²⁵³ J. KUBEŠ, *Ceremoniál*, p. 61.

²⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

members of prominent noble families, such as the Dietrichsteins, Kaunitzs, or Schallenbergss. He also had a few loads of servants – four valets, two pages, and four liveried servants were written down.²⁵⁵ The dignitaries had already been waiting for him and they then presented him to the king in the audience room.

Firstly, the envoy had made a short speech, afterwards he, or rather his secretary of legation, handed the letters which accredited him for a certain rank to the king. The sovereign then had to formally answer to his credentials. After this point, the diplomat could fully enjoy the rights and privileges that belonged to his position. After the audience, the envoy was taken back home. This seemingly only necessary formal practice was, in fact, essential. The mutual affection of each side was already evident here. Were all the honours the ambassador asked acknowledged? What compliments were given?²⁵⁶ And last, but not least, what language was chosen? All of these points played a role. This first audience with the monarch was only the beginning, being followed by mandatory visits of the entire royal family (the queen, the heir to the throne, and the rest of the family), as well as with important officials. The same rules were then applied to the last audience.²⁵⁷ In addition, it was a custom to give a gift on the last audience; it, again, had to be commensurate with the social status.²⁵⁸

In accordance with the length and importance of the mission, the diplomat was accompanied by his own bigger or smaller suite. In the case of a longer mission, the envoy was accompanied by his entire “personal court” consisting of servants, a secretary of legation,²⁵⁹ sometimes of a chaplain or a curate. In the case of longer missions, the diplomat’s family was part of the “court” as well. The greatness of the suite also depended on the rank of the concrete representative. Only ambassadors had their own guard; they were, too, accompanied with the bigger group of chevaliers and, of course, liveried servants than envoys. The largeness of the retinue devolved on the importance of the mission. For example, the ambassador Walter Leslie on his mission in Turkey had around 270 persons with 25 chevaliers; Johann Philipp von Lamberg was accompanied to Poland by 200 persons. These two noblemen were an exceptional example, a common suite of the diplomat within the Holy Roman Empire numbered between ten and twenty people, whereas the retinue to sovereigns had at least seventy persons.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁵ J. KUBEŠ – A. ADAMČIKOVÁ, *Imperial Envoys*, p. 378.

²⁵⁶ W. J. ROOSEN, *The age*, p. 117.

²⁵⁷ J. KUBEŠ, *Ceremoniál*, p. 67.

²⁵⁸ Jeannette FALCKE, *Studien zum diplomatischen Geschenkwesen am brandenburgisch-preußischen Hof im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 2006.

²⁵⁹ The secretary of legation was part of the representative’s suite, but he was chosen by the *Cancellaria Aulica*.

²⁶⁰ Jiří KUBEŠ, *Diplomat a jeho lidé* [Diplomat and his Suite], in: *Ibidem* (ed.), *V zastoupení císaře*, p. 91.

The secretary of legation was chosen by the sovereign, or rather by the court chancery, therefore he was not paid from the personal money of the diplomat. The secretaries of legation had even their own credentials and, in the case that the diplomat died or left, he was in charge (this was also the case of Mansfeld, as mentioned later). He thus quickly became one of the most useful figures that the envoy had. The Secretaries had to command the language of the country, as well as to know how the foreign court works, and, too, to have an orientation in local politics.²⁶¹ Furthermore, he was also supposed to be the diplomat's confidant. Occasionally, a chaplain or, a curate in the case of the Anglican church, was also part of a mission since he celebrated personal masses in the diplomat's chapel in the embassy.²⁶²

The wife with children may have been the companions that formed the family environment.²⁶³ In the second half of the 17th century, ambassadors' wives were awarded the title of *ambassadrice*,²⁶⁴ having accompanied their spouses on their missions. Moreover, even wives could become part of this political game. They, for example, could take an advantage of informal contacts between regents and other ladies of the court (especially in Spain with the strong position of the Queen-mother in the second half of the 17th century). These unofficial friendships meant another way to get more comprehensive information.²⁶⁵ At the same time, owing to this title, women gained special rights that they could demand. This was again reflected in the conflicts of precedence. It went so far that around the year 1700, the ceremonial instructions were published for these cases.²⁶⁶

Accommodation was also of the issues that the representatives had to deal with. There were many emphases on the differentiation of lodgings between an envoy and an ambassador. The ambassador had to look for a suitable noble residence, ideally already built, so that he could immediately move in.²⁶⁷ However, he had to find it himself very often – Spain and Russia were the exceptions; ambassadors were accommodated directly at the court there. The easiest option

²⁶¹ J. KUBEŠ, *Diplomat a jeho lidé*, p. 86.

²⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 94.

²⁶³ Tracey A. SOWERBY, *Diplomats*, in: Erin Griffey (ed.), *Early Modern Court Culture*, London–New York 2022, p. 112.

²⁶⁴ Matthias POHLIG, *Gender and the Formalisation of Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe*, in: *The International History Review*, vol. 44, no. 5, 2021, p. 1064; Florian KÜHNEL, *'Minister-like cleverness, understanding, and influence on affairs'*. *Ambassadors in everyday business and courtly ceremonies at the turn of the eighteenth century*, in: A. Sowerby – J. Hennings (eds.), *Practices*, pp. 130–146.

²⁶⁵ Allen GEMMA, *The Rise of the Ambassadrice: English Ambassadorial Wives and Early Modern Diplomatic Culture*, in: *The Historical Journal* 62/3, Cambridge 2019, p. 617; Laura OLIVÁN SANTALIESTRA, *Judith Rebecca von Wrbná and Maria Sophia von Dietrichstein: Two Imperial Ambassadors from the Kingdom of Bohemia at the Court of Madrid (1653–1674)*, in: *Theatrum historiae* 19, 2016, pp. 95–117.

²⁶⁶ J. KUBEŠ, *Diplomat a jeho lidé*, p. 78.

²⁶⁷ W. J. ROOSEN, *The age*, p. 113.

was to make an agreement with his predecessor, after which he took the tenancy.²⁶⁸ The mansion had to include a spacious entrance, stables, and a representative staircase, followed by two antechambers, and eventually by the audience room. The equipment of the audience room was even more important. A baldachin with the symbol of sovereignty of the sending monarch, a throne and usually a painting of the ruler did not have to miss in the room.²⁶⁹ Gradually, there was more and more pressure on the Emperor to purchase buildings in great cities, ideally already lavishly equipped, that would serve as embassies. The ambassador's accommodation usually included a chapel playing a significant role in the countries where the other religious confessions predominated.²⁷⁰ After the Peace of Westphalia, it was possible to celebrate a mass for the other confessions. Still, they were to be held only for the envoy and his court; later, these issues were a frequent subject of many disputes.²⁷¹

The system of diplomatic immunities was also developing. Immunities had, of course, been applied even before the Peace of Westphalia; there had already been the personal immunity of a diplomat from criminal and civil jurisdiction, the same applied to his suite and the residences of his embassy,²⁷² but they were largely formed after the peace. The principle of personal inviolability was internationally approved.²⁷³ However, this right was sometimes violated. In 1688, for example, the Count Anton Johann von Nostitz-Rieneck, the Imperial envoy in Sweden, was assailed by an ignoble soldier in Stockholm. Shortly after, Anton Johann had an argument with the commander of city guard Erik Knöös – he even tried to drag the Imperial envoy out of his carriage. The Swedish king Charles XI was highly involved in this case. Eventually, the soldier was sentenced to death by the military court, but as a sign of satisfaction Anton Johann had the last word in the incident. Followed by the *Reichshofkanzlei* advice, the Imperial envoy decided to grant a pardon to Erik Knöös.²⁷⁴ The diplomatic mission of Anton Johann was interweaved even with another issue. Shortly after arriving of the Imperial

²⁶⁸ Jiří KUBEŠ, *Diplomat a jeho sídlo* [The Diplomat and his Residence], in: Ibidem (ed.), *V zastoupení císaře*, p. 102.

²⁶⁹ Ibidem, p. 101; For more details, see Jiří KUBEŠ, *Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz' Diplomatic Mission in Warsaw in 1695. A Contribution Towards the Travel Arrangements of Imperial Diplomats*, *Theatrum historiae* 19, 2016, pp. 171–203.

²⁷⁰ Martin BAKEŠ, *Kaple císařských diplomatů*, in: J. Kubeš (ed.), *V zastoupení císaře*, p. 124.

²⁷¹ M. BAKEŠ – J. KUBEŠ, *Imperial Chapels*, pp. 200–221.

²⁷² G. MATTINGLY, *Renaissance diplomacy*, p. 242.

²⁷³ T. HAMPTON, *Fictions*, p. 37.

²⁷⁴ M. BAKEŠ, *Diplomatem*, pp. 146–147.

envoy, his *Hausknecht*, Martin Grelson, organized a burglary of the Imperial embassy. Nevertheless, it was exposed in time, and the robbers were punished.²⁷⁵

Disputed moments set-in if a diplomat committed a crime against the *société humaine*, i.e., murder or other such crimes against society. In such cases, the diplomat was to be handed back to his sovereign, who judged him himself – diplomats were only under the jurisdiction of their masters.²⁷⁶ It applied to a suit of diplomats as well. For example, the guard member of Herman Jakub Czernina von Chudenitz, who was the Emperor's ambassador in Poland in 1695, shot down a page of the Polish king. For that reason, Czernin nearly left the Polish kingdom without the last ceremonial audience, which would have meant the ceremonial fiasco for the Emperor.²⁷⁷ Although Jan III Sobieski demanded the death of the Czernin guard member, he did eventually show a mercy and granted the last official audience to Czernin. Financial debts of resident diplomats, too, most often led to conflicts. The question of whether to summon a diplomat for debts was resolved in the 18th century.²⁷⁸ However, there was often a misuse of these advantages. For example, diplomats did not have to pay customs duties, which they were suitable for transporting goods that were otherwise subject to customs tariffs. They also took advantage of the fact that their embassies were untouchable land, so they could hide wanted persons.²⁷⁹ Hence, these immunities began to be decreased.²⁸⁰

Collecting the general knowledge about functioning of the Early Modern diplomacy, we are ready to focus on the mission of an Imperial envoy in France – Count Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld. First and foremost, let him be introduced in detail.

²⁷⁵ Martin BAKEŠ, *Diplomatická mise jako nejistá investice. Antonín Jan z Nostic u stockholmského královského dvora (1685–1690)* [The Diplomatic Mission as a Non-guaranteed Investment. Antonín Jan of Nostitz at the Stockholm Royal Court (1685–1690)], *Český časopis historický* 113, 2015, no. 3, p. 726.

²⁷⁶ A. WICQUEFORT, *L'Ambassadeur*, p. 817.

²⁷⁷ Jiří KUBEŠ, *Misja Dyplomatyczna Hermana Jakuba Czernina z Chudenic w 1695 R. Cesarski Ambasador i Rzeczpospolita u Schyłku Panowania Jana III Sobieskiego*, in: *Kronika Zamkowa* 3, no. 69, 2016, esp. p. 147–150.

²⁷⁸ H. KUGELER, *Le Parfait Ambassadeur*, p. 126.

²⁷⁹ Of course, the exception proved the rule, in 1679 troops of the King of England invaded into an embassy of Karl Ferdinand von Waldstein in London and took away an English-speaking priest. Because of this incident, Karl even had to end his mission before scheduled date. J. KUBEŠ, *Diplomat a jeho lidé*, p. 95.

²⁸⁰ H. KUGELER, *Le Parfait Ambassadeur*, p. 127.

CHAPTER III: HEINRICH FRANZ VON MANSFELD (1641–1715): AN ORIGIN AND LIFE OF AN IMPERIAL DIPLOMAT

Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld, a son of Count Bruno, belonged to the branch of the family Bornstedt lineage of Vorderortischen,²⁸¹ established mainly in Saxony, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. His father, Bruno III von Mansfeld-Bornstedt (1576–1644), as well as his uncle Wolfgang (1575–1638), were raised as Protestants but they converted to Roman Catholicism (Bruno around 1600, Wolfgang later in 1627). Shortly after conversion, Bruno entered the army of Emperor Rudolph II and fought in the war against the Turks in Hungary, particularly in the conquest of Hátvan. In 1603, he was appointed as a *Hofkriegsrat*. After, Bruno sided with archduke and later Emperor Matthias. In 1607, Bruno became his *Kämmerer*, in 1615 the *Trabantenhauptmann*, and finally the *Oberjägermeister* at the court of Emperor Matthias. His career culminated during the reign of Ferdinand II because he served as the *Obriststallmeister* (1620–1637).²⁸² His brother, Wolfgang, joined him in the Habsburg service as a military commander in the 1620s and became a *Feldmarschall* and a member of Privy Council.²⁸³

Bruno's first wife (married in 1606) was Maria Manrique de Lara y Mendoza the younger (1570?–1636?), a widow of Johann V of Pernstein. His second wife (1636) named Maria Magdalena, countess von Törring-Seefeld (1616–1668). Both wives came from rich and well-established Catholic houses, Maria Magdalena von Törring was especially crucial to his next advancement because she served as an *Obristhofmeisterin* of the Empress. Her father was Ferdinand I von Törring-Seefeld, a member of the House with a great diplomatic tradition and with a huge social network. Maria Magdalena bore her husband four children and two sons – Franz Maximilian (1639–1692) and Heinrich Franz – reached adulthood.²⁸⁴

²⁸¹ The basic information on the history of this old and wealthy family is still included in Ludwig Ferdinand NIEMANN, *Geschichte der Grafen von Mansfeld*, Aschersleben 1834. For further information, see also Harald ZINNER, *Das Gartenpalais Mansfeld-Fondi-Schwarzenberg. Genese eines barocken Gartenpalais unter Einbeziehung des Milieus der Wiener Adelsarchitektur*, MA thesis, Wien 2011, p. 11.

²⁸² Felix STIEVE, headword: "Mansfeld, Bruno III. Graf von", in: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* 20 (1884), online edition: <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd137124627.html#adbcontent> [2022–05–20].

²⁸³ L. F. NIEMANN, *Geschichte*, pp. 244–248.

²⁸⁴ L. F. NIEMANN, *Geschichte*, p. 251; Jochen VÖTSCH, headword: "Bruno III. von Mansfeld-Bornstedt" in: *Sächsische Biografie*, hrsg. vom Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V., online source: [https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Bruno_II_\(III.\)_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_\(1576-1644\)](https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Bruno_II_(III.)_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_(1576-1644)) [2022–05–18].

Besides the offices in the Habsburg service, Bruno paid attention to his dominions as well. He and his brother Wolfgang, step by step, gained Bohemian estates. Wolfgang bought Šluknov (Schlukenau) and Lipová (Heinsbach) at the border of Bohemia and Saxony, Bruno purchased the dominion Dobříš (Doberschisch), later inherited by his older son Franz Maximilian. Bruno bought it from the royal chamber in 1630 and initiated a reconstruction of the residence there.²⁸⁵



Figure 4: Bruno von Mansfeld²⁸⁶

We do not know anything about the childhood and education of Bruno's sons. In the early 1660s, the Mansfeld brothers Franz Maximilian and Heinrich Franz undertook a grand tour. In the course of their grand tour, they enrolled on the University of Sienna in present-day Italy.²⁸⁷ Even though both brothers were enrolled in university, they did not spend much time studying, as it was common in the Early Modern period. They may have toured Florence and, in 1662, (perhaps even in 1661) spent Easter in Rome but they did not stay for a long time.

²⁸⁵ See Pavel VLČEK, *Ilustrovaná encyklopedie českých zámků* [Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Bohemian Castles], Praha 1999, pp. 221–222.

²⁸⁶ Author and dating unknown, online source: https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruno_III._z_Mansfeldu#/media/Soubor:Bruno_III._von_Mansfeld.jpg [2022–04–25].

²⁸⁷ Fritz WEIGLE (Ed.), *Die Matrikel der deutschen Nation in Siena (1573–1738)*, vol. 1, Tübingen 1962, p. 309, record of the matriculation of the Mansfeld brothers: 15 September 1661.

Unfortunately, the details of the journey are not known. We can only speculate that they also visited France and the Netherlands, as was customary at the time.²⁸⁸

Heinrich's brother, Franz Maximilian,²⁸⁹ inherited the dominion of Dobříš, but also the dominion of Neuhaus (near Sangerhausen) and Arnstein – both in the Holy Roman Empire. Like his father, he was active at the Viennese court. He focused mainly on the internal politics contrarily to his brother – Heinrich Franz. In 1663, Franz married Maria Elisabeth (1637–1710),²⁹⁰ a daughter of Karl Leonhard von Harrach (1570–1628) and Maria Francisca von Eggenberg (1609–1680); they had eight children together. During the reign of Leopold I, Franz Maximilian became his *Kämmerer* (1662);²⁹¹ however, he quickly achieved even higher ranks: he became the *Reichshofrat* (1667–1681) and the Emperor sent him as a diplomat on two, albeit less important, missions. The first of them took place in 1667 in Berlin, and it lasted shorter than a month. During the mission he requested an audience with the Elector of Brandenburg and offered his condolences on the death of his wife.²⁹² The second one led him to Prince-Elector of Saxony in 1672, officially, just as a one day stay.²⁹³ The first more important court function came in 1681 and Mansfeld was appointed as the *Hartschierhauptmann* (to 1683). In the same year, Franz Maximilian obtained the Order of the Golden Fleece. Two years later he became *Trabantenhauptmann* (1683–1690) and was responsible for a guard of Leopold I. His career hit its peak when he was in 1690 appointed as the *Obersthofmeister* of Leopold's wife – Empress Eleonore Magdalene of Neuburg.²⁹⁴

Heinrich Franz – typically for noble younger brothers – started as a soldier and rose through the ranks of the army, but gradually combined his military career with diplomatic and court ranks. Having entered the Austrian Habsburg services as a soldier at a young age, he rose exceptionally quickly in the rank of officers. In 1675, Heinrich became the *Oberst*²⁹⁵ and, four

²⁸⁸ Jiří KUBEŠ, *Náročné dospívání urozených. Kavalírské cesty české a rakouské šlechty (1620–1750)* [Grand Tours of Bohemian and Austrian Nobility (1620–1750)], Pelhřimov 2013.

²⁸⁹ Johann Heinrich ZEDLER, *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, Leipzig 1739, col. 1072; L. F. NIEMANN, *Geschichte*, pp. 254–255.

²⁹⁰ Ernst Adalbert von HARRACH, *Die Diarien und Tagzettel des Kardinals Ernst Adalbert von Harrach (1598–1667)*, eds. Alessandro Catalano – Katrin Keller, vol. 7: Tagzettel 1661–1667, Wien–Köln–Weimar 2010, 15 November 1663, Prague.

²⁹¹ Franz Maximilian Mansfeld (1639–1692), in: Kaiser und Höfe, Personendatenbank der Höflinge der Österreichischen Habsburger in der Frühen Neuzeit, online source: <https://kaiserhof.geschichte.lmu.de/14068> [2022–11–27].

²⁹² L. BITTNER – L. GROß (eds.), *Repertorium*, p. 128.

²⁹³ *Ibidem*, p. 162.

²⁹⁴ ÖStA Wien, Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv, Hofzahlamtsbücher, Bd. 109–137 (1664–1692). I wish to thank Jiří Kubeš, supervisor of my thesis, for calling this document to my attention.

²⁹⁵ To his *Oberst-Patent*, see ÖStA Wien, Kriegsarchiv, Zentralstellen, Wiener Hofkriegsrat, Sonderreihen, Bestellungen und Vormerkprotokolle, Bücher, Band Nr. 2, Repertorium, 1639–1685, record n. 1938: “Obristen patent für dem Heinrichen grafen von Mansfeld, über das vacierende keßliche Regiment zu fueß, de dato Wien den 1ten Februar Anno 1675.” Then, Mansfeld was the owner of the infantry regiment, which, after 1769, received

years later (1679), the *Oberstfeldwachtmeister*.²⁹⁶ Although he focused more on his political career in the following years, Heinrich also rose in the military ranks, notably after his return from France. In 1682, he was appointed as the *Feldmarschall-Leutnant* and during his stay in Spain he was awarded the rank of the *Oberfeldzeugmeister* (1684) and later of *Feldmarschall* (1689).²⁹⁷ After his return, in 1692, he was appointed governor of Komorn Fortress (in Hungarian, Komárom) which was prestigious function connected with a fine salary. Mansfeld's military career hit its peak in 1701, when he became the *Hofkriegsratspräsident*,²⁹⁸ but only for two years.



Figure 5: Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld as an Imperial Feldmarchal²⁹⁹

the order number IR 24 (*Galizisch-bukowina'sches Infanterie-Regiment*) till 1702. It corresponds to the time he focused his career on the court service. However, he, in fact, commanded the regiment only for five years (1675–1680), which matches to the beginning of his mission. See Alphons von WREDE, *Geschichte der k. und k. Wehrmacht. Die Regimenter, Corps, Branchen und Anstalten von 1618 bis Ende des XIX Jahrhunderts*, vol. 1, Wien 1898, pp. 281–283. For bringing these facts to my attention, I thank Dr. Vítězslav Prchal.

²⁹⁶ Constantin WURZBACH, *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Österreich – Sechzehnter Teil – Londonia – Marlow*, Graz 1867, p. 406.

²⁹⁷ Stefan SIENEL, *Die Geheime Konferenz unter Kaiser Leopold I.: personelle Strukturen und Methoden zur politischen Entscheidungsfindung am Wiener Hof*, Frankfurt am Main–Berlin–Bern–Bruxelles–New York–Oxford–Wien 2001, pp. 199–201; Antonio SCHMIDT–BRENTANO, *Kaiserliche und k. k. Generale (1618–1815)*, Wien 2006, p. 61.

²⁹⁸ Jochen VÖTSCH, headword: “Heinrich Franz I. von Mansfeld-Bornstedt”, in: *Sächsische Biografie*, hrsg. vom Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V., online source: [https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich_Franz_I.,_Fürst_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_\(1641-1715\)](https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich_Franz_I.,_Fürst_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_(1641-1715)) [2022–04–25].

²⁹⁹ Unfortunately, the author and dating are also unknown. I was in touch with the Musée des Beaux-Arts de Tournai, where the painting is displayed, particularly with Ms. Magali Vangilbergen, who confirmed it by saying: “*Je ne peux malheureusement vous renseigner sur son auteur car l'œuvre est signalée comme étant réalisée par un peintre anonyme du 17e siècle.*” However, I wish to thank her for the time she spent with my query. Online source: <https://www.prints-online.com/heinrich-franz-von-mansfeld-1640-1715-8273091.html> [2022–04–25].

However, from 1677 on, Heinrich – the *Kämmerer*,³⁰⁰ from 1664 on – also worked hard to achieve court functions. He was active chiefly in the field of foreign policy. He gained his first experiences as a diplomat on a short mission in Kassel (1677).³⁰¹ After this mission, Heinrich Franz took an important step – he married Marie Louise d’Aspremont, widow of Charles IV, the Duke of Lorraine (1604–1675). This marriage with Marie Louise, who spoke French fluently and has a significant kinship, most likely secured him the office of envoy to France because he had no significant diplomatic merits at the time.

Mansfeld learned about his mission to France in February 1680. Subsequently, at the end of March, he obtained an extraordinarily extensive instruction with precise requirements. The steps of the Imperial Envoy had to be exceedingly vigilant due to the volatile and tense situation between these two political powers. Nevertheless, this will be addressed thoroughly with the question of this concrete mission in the following chapters. Even though Mansfeld did not have a regular access to the court, which made him feel very frustrated, he still managed to obtain principal details outside the official source of information. He met other diplomats quite often, they were a very useful source of information as well. He had the closest relation with the Spanish ambassador with whom he was in regularly touch. Most likely, this relationship with the Spanish ambassador helped him to be chosen as a next diplomat for the mission to the Spanish kingdom. Throughout his whole stay (1680–1682) he therefore carefully kept his eye on everything, and then apprised the Emperor.

Though Mansfeld’s mission clearly did not fulfil the Emperor’s expectations, he did not receive any principal reproaches and it did not forestall him progressing his career. Still in 1682, he was also commissioned as an envoy on the short mission to Berlin (1682).³⁰² Shortly after his return from Paris and Berlin he became an ambassador to Spain (1683–1690).³⁰³ As we know from Heinrich’s correspondence, he learned about this Spanish mission in 1681. In 1685, Mansfeld obtained the Order of the Golden Fleece in Spain, he therefore could easily negotiate with the Spanish upper crust. With this Order he also ensured appropriate place in pursuance of court ceremonials.³⁰⁴ Throughout the reign of Leopold I, his career was greatly successful,

³⁰⁰ Heinrich Franz Mansfeld (1641–1715), in: Kaiser und Höfe, Personendatenbank der Höflinge der Österreichischen Habsburger in der Frühen Neuzeit, online source: <https://kaiserhof.geschichte.lmu.de/14069>. [2022–11–10].

³⁰¹ L. BITTNER – L. GROß (Eds.), *Repertorium*, p. 144. The mission was at the turn of April and May in 1677. The aim of this assignment was the support of Denmark, the Emperor’s ally, in a war against Sweden.

³⁰² C. WURZBACH, *Biographisches Lexikon*, vol. 16, Graz 1867, p. 128.

³⁰³ L. BITTNER – L. GROß (Eds.), *Repertorium*, p. 168.

³⁰⁴ Pavel MAREK – Michaela BURIÁNKOVÁ, *Nejstarší císařská ambasáda: zástupci rakouských Habsburků ve Španělsku* [The Oldest Imperial Embassy: The Habsburg’s Representatives in Spain], in: J. Kubeš (ed.), *V zastoupení císaře*, p. 188.

probably thanks to his French mission, on which he gained Emperor's trust. He became a *Geheimer Rat* (1689)³⁰⁵ and in 1690, Mansfeld accompanied a future wife of Charles II, King of Spain, Maria Anna, Princess of Pfalz-Neuburg, to Madrid; thanks to that, Charles awarded him with the principedom Fondi (near Naples).³⁰⁶

Finally, having returned to Vienna from his missions, Heinrich Franz was promoted by the Emperor to the office of the *Obersthofmarschall* (1694) and remained in this rank until September of 1701.³⁰⁷ In the later years of the rule of Leopold I (1703) he became the *Oberstkämmerer*;³⁰⁸ however, he was removed from the office in 1705.³⁰⁹ In 1702, Heinrich, for the first time in this family line, gained the most important advantage – the title of Prince.³¹⁰ On that account, we can say that Mansfeld was, albeit only temporarily, one of the most influential men at the court of aging Emperor Leopold I. After the death of the ruler who greatly protected him, however, Heinrich was removed – mainly because of his disagreement with Eugene of Savoy – from all his positions. Heinrich's instance impressively shows what career opportunities existed for members of high-ranking noble families at the exclusive and magnificent Viennese Imperial Court around 1700.³¹¹

Heinrich Franz, as well as his brother Franz Maximilian, equalled to their father Bruno. They were the highest Imperial dignitaries. This proved that the two generations of Mansfeld's were rightfully part of the Imperial court nobility.

³⁰⁵ Heinrich Franz Mansfeld (1641–1715), in: Kaiser und Höfe, Personendatenbank der Höflinge der Österreichischen Habsburger in der Frühen Neuzeit, online source: <https://kaiserhof.geschichte.lmu.de/14069> [2022–11–10]. On the contrary, in Karl SOMMEREGGER, headword: “Mansfeld-Fondi, Heinrich Franz Fürst von“, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 52 (1906), online source: <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd121795063.html#adbcontent> [2022–11–10], is mentioned that he became the *Geheimer Rat* already in 1682.

³⁰⁶ J. VÖTSCH, headword: “Heinrich Franz I.“, online source: [https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich_Franz_I.,_Fürst_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_\(1641–1715\)](https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich_Franz_I.,_Fürst_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_(1641–1715)) [2022–04–25].

³⁰⁷ Thomas FELLNER, *Anhang, Verzeichnis der Inhaber der obersten Hofwürden und der Vorstände der Zentralbehörden 1526–1749*, Wien 1907, p. 277.

³⁰⁸ T. FELLNER, *Anhang, Verzeichnis der Inhaber*, p. 279.

³⁰⁹ J. VÖTSCH, headword: “Heinrich Franz I.“, online source: [https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich_Franz_I.,_Fürst_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_\(1641–1715\)](https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich_Franz_I.,_Fürst_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_(1641–1715)) [2022–04–25].

³¹⁰ Johann Heinrich ZEDLER, *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, Leipzig 1739, col. 1074.

³¹¹ J. VÖTSCH, headword: “Heinrich Franz I.“, online source: [https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich_Franz_I.,_Fürst_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_\(1641–1715\)](https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich_Franz_I.,_Fürst_von_Mansfeld-Bornstedt_(1641–1715)) [2022–04–25].

CHAPTER IV: PREPARATION OF THE MISSION, BASIC TASKS AND MANSFELD'S TRIP TO FRANCE

IV/1 THE INSTRUCTION FOR MANSFELD (PRAGUE, ON 27 MARCH 1680)

The basis of every stay of the diplomat at the royal court was always an instruction from the sending sovereign, i.e. a key document that illuminates the envoy's journey and his tasks. Initially, the instructions were passed verbally, the oldest ones in Western and Southern Europe can be dated back to the 14th century. In the German language they were called *Gedechtnis* or *Gedenkzedl*, which meant "a memory" or "memorial letter".³¹² The Holy See was the first authority who started handing out written instructions during the period of Sixtus IV (1471–1484).³¹³ The page-range of instructions is very varied, some are brief, which was mainly common in the beginnings, others full of flowery words; extensiveness was typical especially for those from the 18th century (the instructions with supplements could number over a hundred pages).³¹⁴ For example, Mansfeld's instruction is extensive for its time; it consisted of 24 pages plus appendices.

The pattern of the instructions is mostly resembled. It commenced with the formal part – particularly is an intitulation of the monarch – then, there were grounds for the specific choice of the diplomat with full titles, the crucial part indicated the official character of the diplomat (if he was an ambassador, envoy, or mere resident) and a place of the particular mission. Then, the importance of the task was accented. Furthermore, the political history of the specific country to which the diplomat was sent was usually summarized. At the same time, there was also an informative passage about the current political situation. After that, the instructions move on to the operation of the mission itself. They often mentioned the details of the concrete ceremonials that should be used during the first public audience;³¹⁵ these parts were sometimes quite extensive because the introductory speeches of diplomats had already been prepared. There were also mentions of other ceremonials, namely about the ceremonial entrance, and the audiences of other family members (Queen, Queen's mother, an heir to the throne, his wife,

³¹² Jan Paul NIEDERKORN, *Diplomaten-Instruktionen in der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: A. Hipfinger et al. (eds.), *Ordnung durch Feder und Tinte?*, p. 74.

³¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 75.

³¹⁴ Albert SOREL (ed.), *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les Traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française – Autriche*, Paris 1884, p. 7.

³¹⁵ K. MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, p. 30.

King's brother, etc.) were occasionally summarized as well. Subsequently, a specific state was presented in its entirety, including personalities of the given court – especially those, with whom the diplomat was supposed to cooperate – they were usually briefly characterized. Of course, the diplomat's main and secondary tasks were summed up, too. It was also mentioned how and by what means he should achieve these goals. The instructions were often concluded with technical information, for instance, with the encryption of correspondence.³¹⁶ This information was included only in the case that it was the main instruction assigned at the beginning of the mission. During the course of a mission diplomats did receive further assignments through the rescripts, which were the crucial source of information, too.³¹⁷ At the very end of an instruction, there was often a simple communication – the Emperor hoped that the mission would live up to expectations.

However, the instructions did not include other similar significant pieces of information such as the issue of a diplomat's daily life, his suite (there were no mentions about the secretaries of legations), his accommodation and, of course, how the diplomats finance the whole mission. Likewise, any mention of the diplomat's length of stay, or events that ensued, have not been found.

Consequently, the instruction was one of the most crucial documents the diplomat had with. For that reason, if someone truly wanted to understand the essence of the diplomat's behaviour, they should have started with his instruction.³¹⁸ Unfortunately, in the countries of the Austrian Habsburgs, the diplomatic instructions have not yet been systematically researched and there is no comprehensive edition of them either. What is known is that this significant document was issued by *Reichshofkanzlei*,³¹⁹ with exception to that of Turkey. The instruction to Ottoman Empire was issued by *Hofkriegsrat*.³²⁰ It is often stated in the reference books that the instruction was drawn up in two manuscripts; the first one was public. Having been read in front of the sovereign or his officials, it played a key role. The second version was secret, only for the eyes of the diplomat himself. However, this theory did not meet practice in the second half of the 17th century. Any of the Imperial ambassadors or envoys at the time did not obtain the instruction in two versions. Heinrich Franz also received just one version of the instruction, the Emperor even pointed out that he was not supposed to give this document to Louis XIV.

³¹⁶ J. P. NIEDERKORN, *Diplomaten-Instruktionen*, pp. 79–81; K. MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, pp. 36–41; W. J. ROOSEN, *The Age*, pp. 137–138.

³¹⁷ W. J. ROOSEN, *The Age*, p. 195–197.

³¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 196.

³¹⁹ K. MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, p. 17.

³²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

Leopold I, among others, said about Mansfeld's instruction as follows: "*Solten obbeschriebene seine propositiones an deß königs ld. von ihne schriftlich begehret werden? hetten wir dessen kein bedencken: doch daß er abgesandter ihme dabey vorbehielte, daß ihm hinwiederumb auch die antwort darauf schriftlich gedeyen thue. Im übrigen aber erachten wir vor besser, daß er lieber münd- alß schriftlich die negociationes prosequire.*"³²¹

The instructions captured very often, mainly in the case of a negotiation process, the ideal of how it should look. Yet it is evident at first glance that reality was frequently far away from the ideal; that is also true in the case of Mansfeld's mission.³²² In his instruction he had many, notably political disputes, to be solved. It directly followed the Franco-Imperial feuds from the Franco-Dutch War, in which the French king had the upper hand. The territory which he gained owing to the Nijmegen Peace, especially Freiburg on the right shore of the Rhine, was one of the main sources of the strife.

At the beginning of 1680, Mansfeld received a document from the Charles V Duke of Lorraine, where the Emperor appointed him the Imperial envoy in France. Shortly afterwards, in March, he also received his instruction. The approach of both sides, chiefly the side of the Emperor, had to be cautious – they were skating on thin ice. For that reason, the official motive for Mansfeld's mission was reciprocity, since a French envoy – Nicolas-Marie de l'Hospital, marquis de Vitry – was sent to the Imperial court at the end of 1679.³²³ At the same time, Heinrich Franz was supposed to defend the interests of the Empire, so he, understandably, should act in favour of the Emperor.

Since the ceremonial played such a great role in the life of Early Modern diplomats it is more than appropriate to start description of the Mansfeld's instruction from this end.³²⁴ First, the Emperor pointed out that the diplomat should not cope with anything concrete at the first audience. The first ceremonial speech, as it was mentioned in the instruction, was originally supposed to be granted in Latin, but this note was crossed out. It should had been explicitly emphasized that the Emperor requited the sending of the Marquis de Vitry to renew "marvellous relations" and kept an eye on observation of the conditions of the last accepted peace. In the instruction it is said as follows: "*Und aber darauff deß königs ld. ihro hetten gefallen lassen uns durch ihren an unsern hoff abgefertigten abgesandten den Marquis de Vitry bestens zu sinceriren, daß sie ihres orts ermelten frieden in allem zu vollziehen und dabey das vorgeweste*

³²¹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20, a draft of the instruction from 27 March 1680, p. 22.

³²² Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 5.

³²³ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 6.

³²⁴ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 7.

gute vernehmen nicht nur zu restabiliren, sondern zu vermehren und zu erweiteren gedächten: wir alles alß ein sonderbahres zeichen der Göttlichen vorsehung, und dan alß ein merckliches kennzeichen ihrer Id: gegen unß und dem reich tragenden guten willens und nachbahrschafft, in gleicher begierdt und gegenerbietung aufgenommen, und demnach nicht hatten und lassen wollen, zu bezeugung dessen und zu contestirung unserer gegen ihre Id. und dero gesambtes könig.: haus tragender benevolentz und genaigten brüderlichen willens ihne unseren cammerern und obristen [= Mansfeld; A.A.] hinwiederumb an ihre Id. wie auch absonderlich zu dem end abzuschicken, damit er alle obstacula, so ermelten frieden, dessen conservation und nachbahrliche gute verstandtnuß turbiren oder abbmüsig sein möchten, in bestem vernehmen und aufrichtigkait bey dero königl: hoff auf die seithen zuraumen und zu complaniren sich auf alle weiß bearbeiten solle.“³²⁵

After the audience, Mansfeld was to visit the Queen Maria Theresa, the Dauphin (Louis, 1661–1711), his wife (Maria Anna Victoria of Bavaria, 1660–1690), the Duke of Orléans (Philippe, 1640–1701), and the Prince de Condé (Louis, 1621–1686) on behalf of the Emperor, to greet and relay the courtesies. Mansfeld, too, should not have forgotten to congratulate the Dauphin to his marriage³²⁶ and the Duke of Orleans on the marriage of the Duke’s daughter and the King of Spain.³²⁷ Heinrich Franz also had to find out in advance if the dauphin would accept only so called *Kanzleischreiben*, or whether he would demand to be written to him from the Emperor personally. If he had made this claim, the audience was to take place without the delivery of the letter.³²⁸ Since every little action in the ceremonies was symbolic, the *Handschriften* by the Emperor himself was significantly more valued than *Kanzleischreiben* which the Emperor just signed.³²⁹

The political matter clearly dominates; that is the most significant fact about the Mansfeld’s instruction. By contrast, the information about the French court or even a mention about trustworthy courtiers was completely missing. So, Mansfeld had to find out this piece of

³²⁵ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20, pp. 6–7.

³²⁶ The Dauphin married Maria Anna Victoria of Bavaria on 7 March 1680.

³²⁷ Marie Louise, the daughter of Duke of Orléans, married Charles II of Spain on 19 November 1679. The instruction mentioned these audiences as follows: “*Nach welcher ersten gehabtten könig. audientz alß dan mehrbesagter unser abgesandter auch bey der königin, wie nicht weniger bey dem Delphin und Delphinin, auch hertzogen von Orleans, printzen Condé und anderen nähern fürsten des könig: geblüts sich anzugeben, und bey einem ieden nach unterschied deß standts und persohnen unsern Kay: gruß und die gebräuchliche Curialiteten aufs freundlichste abzulegen, absonderlich aber dem Delphin und Delphinin zu ihrer, wie auch dem duc d’Orleans zu seiner tochter mit deß königs in Spanien Id.: iungst getroffenen heyrathen aufs anmütigste in unserm nahmen zu congratuliren hat.*” ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20, p. 7.

³²⁸ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 8.

³²⁹ Jiří KUBEŠ, *Imperial Envoys at the English and British Court (1660–1740): Reception Ceremonies and Disputes over Titles*, in: *The Court Historian* 27, no. 1, 2022, p. 54.

information on his own. The reason for this is probably that the Emperor likely did not have any envoy in the court of the French King in the past ten years, the last being Windischgrätz in October 1670 – April 1671.³³⁰ Nonetheless, the instruction contained one crucial task – the Imperial envoy had to force the ruler of France to observe the regulations of the Peace of Nijmegen and the Peace of Westphalia. In doing so, Heinrich Franz could forestall the universal monarchy under the baton of France.

The Imperial envoy also had three other partial assignments. First, Mansfeld had to open the matter of the French envoy Louis Verjus, comte de Crécy, who had gone to Regensburg right after the conclusion of the Peace of Nijmegen, in order to negotiate with the Imperial Diet.³³¹ Unfortunately, Verjus was given insufficient credentials, meaning that he could only deal with the Electors and the Estates, but not with other envoys.³³² This was one of the most frequent French tactics to delay the entire negotiations; Mansfeld was confronted by this approach several more times during his stay. On that account, the Electors and the Estates were forced to lodge complaints from Regensburg to Marquis De Vitry, who was then at the Imperial Court. However, Vitry referred them back to Verjus, who was supposed to handle the complaints.³³³ Nonetheless, Verjus still did not receive sufficient authorization, so the negotiations were dragging on. On that account, it was Mansfeld's task to turn to the French king, where he should have tried, for the good of Christendom, to speed up this process as much as possible. The negotiations had been going on for a notably long time and it was in everyone's interest to end them as soon as possible. By then, it had to be emphasized to Louis XIV that both Verjus and Vitry were aware that complaints from the Estates had gone directly to the Emperor; however, they did nothing about it.³³⁴

Another task to which the Emperor gave a great importance in his instruction to Mansfeld was to resolve the question of Further Austria, more concretely the city of Freiburg, and the territory of Alsace.³³⁵ From the Empire's point of view, there were carried out the activities against the Peace of Nijmegen and the Peace of Westphalia on this territory. Mansfeld was forced to place pressure on the king in order to observed both of these conventions and to resolve complaints of the Diet on this issue. The disagreements were concerned about incommensurately high taxes most of the time, which were enacted by the French authorities.

³³⁰ L. BITTNER – L. GROß (Eds.), *Repertorium*, p. 141.

³³¹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20, p. 1.

³³² *Ibidem*, cart. no. 20, p. 1: “*sein gehabtes creditiv, alß eß nur an die chur-fürsten und andere reichsstände, nicht aber zugleich an deren bottschaftlern, gesandten und rätthe gestellt zu sein befunden worden.*”

³³³ *Ibidem*, cart. no. 20, p. 4.

³³⁴ *Ibidem*, cart. no. 20, p. 8.

³³⁵ *Ibidem*, cart. no. 20, p. 2.

Leopold I specifically mentioned the conflict between the Estates of Breisgau and the French intendant in the instruction. In this area, the taxes were imposed in the amount of 500,000 francs, which was an exaggerated sum; that is why they appealed for its reduction. The reduction had to be pushed for as quickly as possible. Freiburg's questions also had to be re-opened. In this matter Heinrich Franz was to discuss with the councillor of the Further Austria government Johann Philipp Sommervogel, who was obliged to follow his advice. Sommervogel was supposed to help the Imperial envoy; although he did not have any diplomatic status, he should live in Mansfeld's household.³³⁶

The issue of Lorraine was another subject in the instruction, which was bound to solve.³³⁷ The Emperor benefited from defending the interests of the Charles V Duke of Lorraine (1643–1690) (Lorraine was partly an imperial fief), it was thus appropriate to “confirm their friendship” by having interceded by Mansfeld with the king on the audience for the duke. Leopold and Charles V were brothers-in-law since Charles V married Leopold's younger sister Eleonore of Austria³³⁸ in the Wiener Neustadt in 1678. Nevertheless, as the Charles V ruled over Lorraine just titularly,³³⁹ they had to stay after marriage in Innsbruck.³⁴⁰ However, Leopold had known the Duke much earlier; the Duke of Lorraine entered to the Imperial service in 1663 and fought against the Turks in the battle of Mogersdorf in 1664. Seven years later (1671) Charles V fought in Hungary, also participating in the siege of Murau in Styria as a commanding officer. One-year later, Charles V was already the *Befehlshaber* of the Imperial cavalry. In September 1675, he became the *Generalissimus* of the Imperial army, and, in 1676, he participated in the siege of Philipsburg.³⁴¹ In 1679, Charles V became the stadtholder in Tyrol and Further Austria. The Duke of Lorraine was also active in the Imperial service in the following years, playing a main role in the battle of Vienna (near Kahlenberg) in 1683, also helping Leopold in many other battles and sieges in future years.³⁴²

³³⁶ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20, p. 10.

³³⁷ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 15.

³³⁸ Eleonore was a widow of the Polish King, Michael I. Charles V tried to candidate on the Polish throne twice (in both cases on the impulse of Leopold I), in 1669 and 1674. However, he was rejected. For further information, see John STOYE, *The Siege of Vienna: The Last Great Trial Between Cross & Crescent*, New York 2007, p. 30.

³³⁹ Eleonore outlived her husband, Charles V never gained Lorraine back from the French king, but Eleonora did. She acquired the territory of Lorraine and ruled over it back by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697.

³⁴⁰ Karl Friedrich Hermann ALBRECHT, headword: “Karl, Herzog von Lothringen“, in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 15 (1882), online source: [https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118720902.html#ndbcontent\[2022-09-02\]](https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118720902.html#ndbcontent[2022-09-02]).

³⁴¹ One of the crucial sieges in the Franco-Dutch war. Charles V, Duke the Lorraine, was the main instigator of the Imperial victory. For further information, see Charles INGRAO, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1618–1815*, Cambridge 2000, p. 36.

³⁴² C. WURZBACH, *Biographisches Lexikon*, vol. 8, Wien 1860, pp. 390–395.

Great caution in this matter was prudent, for the Dukes of Lorraine had always been officially the enemies of France in the past. Therefore, Heinrich Franz ought to have talks about this question with the French ministers in order to prepare the king for the fact that Mansfeld would want to discuss it. During an audience, it was convenient that the ministers should be acquainted with the topic and therefore were able to advise the king in favour of Lorraine. Still, it was not yet a suitable time to demand Lorraine back, for the Emperor gave it up in the last peace. However, it was appropriate for the Imperial envoy to discuss with the circle of the Duke of Lorraine how to present this proposal to the king in the best way. Mansfeld was hence obliged to contact the duke who was to give a list of his confidantes to him.³⁴³ The Imperial envoy was then supposed to debate the matter with them. However, it was a very tricky topic and was kept secret for a proper time. In the case that the king inquired about it, he was bound to say that the current Duke – Charles V (a nephew of the deceased Charles IV) – did not participate in the tension and that he wanted to come to an agreement with the king. The duke still respected Louis and thus tried to find a way how to solve it. The duke did not even demand the restitution of the whole Lorraine (as the king had already arranged with Windischgrätz), but he wanted to receive at least a portion of the country. If the king set any conditions or was asking under what conditions the duke wanted the restitutions, Heinrich Franz should not have got involved. He ought to have informed the duke, who would have sent his envoy with the power of attorney.³⁴⁴ In such a case, the Imperial envoy was to cooperate closely with him. If the whole situation escalated and a war threatened, Mansfeld was to immediately take his hands off the matter and to continue to urge the duke in order to remain silent and rather to enter the Imperial service.³⁴⁵ If they asked why their first suggestion for peace was not accepted by the Duke, it would be best to say that the terms were too harsh and therefore the Duke could not accept it. His descendants could never be contented and would never understand his deeds. Hence, Charles V wanted to negotiate the possibility to change the confiscation of his country. The Duke of Lorraine relied on the generosity of the French king. This fact was given a high priority; if anything changed or was discussed, Mansfeld was to let the Emperor know immediately.

The Imperial envoy also had many other tasks; even before arriving at the Parisian court, he had been obliged to fulfil one such task – while passing through Strasbourg and the *Reich* cities, he ought to reconnoitre everything thoroughly and to gain present information about the occurrences in the city, so that he was then able to respond to the French proposals for solutions

³⁴³ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20, p. 16.

³⁴⁴ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 19.

³⁴⁵ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 20.

appropriately.³⁴⁶ His transfer was to be kept secret; the French would not learn of his activities.³⁴⁷

Heinrich Franz should further have noticed the French efforts to expand their territory.³⁴⁸ It was known that Louis XIV was preparing for war, likely against several countries on the Apennine Peninsula. It was also discernible from the offers, which were made to Genoa, the Savoys, the Spanish, and the Pope. They may have aimed to the fortress of Casale in the Duchy of Montferrat belonging to the Mantuan duke.³⁴⁹ Mantua's minister Mateoli even interceded for the region in order to join France. Of course, this was done without the knowledge of the Duke of Mantua, who did not definitely support it. Casale was an Imperial fief, so nothing like this was allowed to happen without a knowledge of the Emperor; on no account was the territory allowed to purloin from the Empire. Mansfeld was obliged to respond to this vehemently and to refute the claims as unjustified.

In the instruction, the issue of the defensive alliance with Poland against the Turks was also mentioned, but rather informatively.³⁵⁰ This was offered to the Emperor through the Polish envoy Prince Radziwill. Nevertheless, there was no need to mention it at the French court, as it was clear to everyone that the French would be against it. Mansfeld should observe only how the king assumed an attitude toward the Polish affairs. The instruction also stated what the Imperial envoy in The Hague found out about matters related to Poland. The Polish envoy Felix Morstin³⁵¹ spoke about the Emperor to the Dutch inappropriately – he said that they were promised subsidies, which their other envoys in Europe were instructed about, too. It was necessary to be rebutted by The Hague resident. Provided that this question would open in Paris, Mansfeld should do the same.

It was also ordered what ciphers and how Heinrich Franz was to use them in correspondence.³⁵² The first one was for correspondence with the Emperor and the second one

³⁴⁶ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20, p. 5.

³⁴⁷ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 5–6: “...alß im durchraissen zu Straßburg und andern reichsStätten dergestalt bestens informiren lasse, daß er die gravamina hernach am frantzösischen hoff nicht allain ihren umbstanden nach eigendlich zu proponiren, sondern auch auf die frantzösische einwürff und praetenten mit bestandt antworten und des reichs wie auch unsers lob. ertzhauß befugnuß und gerechtsamb mit nachtruck zu behaubten wisse und gefast seyn, bey welcher erkundigung doch aber er in dene reichsstätten und absonderlich zu Straßburg, sich alßo unvermerckt verhalten wirdt, damit solche informations oder auch contraventions einsamblung nicht vorhinauß am könig. hoff erschalle und ihne daselbst umb soviel odioser mache.“

³⁴⁸ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 3.

³⁴⁹ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 11.

³⁵⁰ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 13.

³⁵¹ L. BITTNER – L. GROß (eds.), *Repertorium*, p. 418.

³⁵² ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20, p. 22.

was supposed to be used in the correspondence with other Imperial envoys.³⁵³ The necessity of a contact with other envoys was accentuated. Therefore, the envoy was obliged to request any information from his predecessor, who was there in the same rank, as to what rules to follow. He had to fulfil his duty and maintained more intimate relations with the Spaniards and the Danes. The Emperor was aware of the fact that Mansfeld's wife would solve her own interests at the French court. He had no objection to it; however, she should do so only on condition that more important issues were settled.³⁵⁴

IV/2 MANSFELD'S JOURNEY TO PARIS (SPRING – SUMMER 1680)

Mansfeld learnt about his mission in January 1680 while he was in Augsburg. However, he denied setting out for a journey to Paris promptly, he implored the Emperor for the audience and for personal guidance, counsels and instruction. That was the reason he went from Augsburg to Prague, and then finally to Paris.

The first difficulties had awaited him during the journey to Paris, even before Mansfeld got to the court in order to fulfil the assigned tasks. Leopold was staying in Prague in 1680 (in June the Emperor was in Pardubitz as well) since the plague spread through Vienna,³⁵⁵ that is why the instruction was written down in Prague, too. In the second letter from the fourth of May 1680,³⁵⁶ Mansfeld wrote about his bad health condition in Prague, right before he left the city; after all, health problems accompanied him all the time.

The French side immediately made the first delay in the Mansfeld's mission. In May, Mansfeld was stopped in Augsburg by a letter from General Joseph de Pons-Guimera Baron de Montclair (1625–1690),³⁵⁷ in which the French refused to let him arrive in their country without

³⁵³ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 20, p. 22: "...und damit dan das ienige, so in seinen gehorsambsten relationibus an unß, oder auch correspondentzen mit unseren anderstwo sich befindenden ministren und residenten, einer mehrern geheimbnuß sein wirdt, nicht in gefahr stehe, durch interception oder irrghegnug der brieffe, zu seiner und der sachen gefahr außzukommen, wirdt er abgesandter hiebey zwo unterschiedliche zifras zuempfangen haben, deren einer sub A er sich alleinig in seinen relationibus an unß, der andern aber sub B (alß welche bereits alle unsere außwertige ministri auch haben) an dieselbe wirdt gebrauchen können." In October 1680, Mansfeld obtained the cipher, which he should use in the missive with other Imperial diplomats. See the letter from 19 October 1680.

³⁵⁴ Ibidem, cart. no. 20, p. 23.

³⁵⁵ Karel ČERNÝ, *Mor 1480–1730, Epidemie v lékařských traktátech raného novověku* [Plague 1480–1730: Epidemics in Early Modern Medical Literature], Praha 2013.

³⁵⁶ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 4th May 1680, Augsburg.

³⁵⁷ Mansfeld always named him as "General Monclas", like many German-written books of the 17th to 19th century. He was the best general of cavalry in the times of Louis XIV. From the 1670s on he participated in many sieges on the Franco-Imperial borders, such as the siege of Breisgau in 1676, the siege of Philipsburg, or of Basel in 1677. He fought against the Emperor and the Duke de Lorraine in 1678, and after the Peace of Nijmegen he commanded

a curative quarantine. He may have been the first imperial diplomat, as he himself stated, to whom it was ordered in this way. However, in this case the French attitude was fully acceptable since there was a plague in Vienna. In June, when the ordered quarantine of the Imperial envoy was going to terminate, Mansfeld's secretary of legation, Franz Chassignet,³⁵⁸ was already at Strasbourg.³⁵⁹ He should thus hand over to Montclair the Mansfeld's answer. They invited the Imperial Resident in Strasbourg Neveu³⁶⁰ to help with the negotiations. At first, they were refused, but in the end, they managed to negotiate the handover of the letter. Monclair replied to the letter immediately, Neveu was in charge by Heinrich Franz to open the answer, but it was full of vague wording, double-headed answers, and excuses. So, Chassignet as the Mansfeld's secretary of legation and Neveu immediately wrote a reply, asking once more about the real reasons why the Imperial envoy was not allowed to travel to France when he had already been quarantined. Everything was repeated, an indefinite answer came again.³⁶¹ Mansfeld was forced to write personally one more letter from Augsburg, where he was in quarantine.

the army in Alsace. He helped with the siege of Strasbourg in 1681. Louis XIV probably charged him to negotiate with Mansfeld because he was skilled in the Imperial matters. For further information, see Louis DUSSIEUX, *Les grands généraux de Louis XIV: notices historiques*, Paris 1888, pp. 226–232.

³⁵⁸ Heinrich Franz, in his letter from 4 August 1680, complained that the contract of Chassignet, as his secretary of legation, was cancelled; for that reason, Mansfeld was supposed to pay Chassignet out of his own pocket. The count lodge the complaint that it was not a standard procedure; he was also unstinting in Chassignet praise. Mansfeld pointed out that he was very satisfied with his service since he spoke French very well and what is more Heinrich would not find someone better. As it was stated in ÖStA, FHKA, Hofzahlamtsbücher (hereafter HZAB), vol. 124, 1680, fol. 190 from 1 August 1679 it was 1100 Gulden in total. Nonetheless, Chassignet was mentioned in the payments regularly. For further information, see HZAB, vol. 129, 1685; HZAB, vol. 135, 1690; HZAB, vol. 136, 1691; HZAB, vol. 137, 1692; HZAB, vol. 140, 1697; HZAB, vol. 141, 1698; HZAB, vol. 143, 1701.

³⁵⁹ The suite of Mansfeld divided. Chassignet with servants went ahead in order to prepare the accommodation for the Imperial envoy (it was a quite common praxis). Mansfeld planned to catch up them after his recover. However, his suite was stopped at Strasbourg (the letter from 4th May 1680), after this, they let Mansfeld know to Augsburg, where they were stopped.

³⁶⁰ Neveu was the Imperial resident in Strasbourg from 18 September 1679 to 26 May 1680, L. BITTNER – L. GROß (eds.), *Repertorium*, p. 169.

³⁶¹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 14 June 1680, Augsburg.




Figure 6: The Excerpt from Mansfeld's Letter to General Montclair³⁶²

He was sure that he would receive an equivocal answer again, and his mission would be delayed as so many times: *“Ich habe benebens meines orths auch nicht unterlaßen, obgemeltes monclasisches schreiben ... zu beantworten undt zweiffle fast nicht, ich werde diß – gleich dem vorigen mahl – von ihme ganz unclar undt unverstandtlich widerumb verbeschaiden werden, undt er mithin das intentum wegen fernerer protrahirung meiner rais ... erraichen”*.³⁶³ Heinrich Franz also stated that the French side was trying to deferment his arrival because Louis XIV had set out for the borders of the United Provinces, and they did not want Mansfeld would arrive earlier than the Sun King. Mansfeld, during the time of waiting for an answer, did not proceed to Strasbourg, where a part of his expedition awaited him since he did not received instructions yet, by which route he was to enter the territory of France.

³⁶² ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 23 May 1680, Augsburg.

³⁶³ Ibidem, 14 June 1680, Augsburg.



Figure 7: The Map with the Highlighted Itinerary of Mansfeld's Journey in 1680³⁶⁴

On 6 July 1680 (one month later),³⁶⁵ Mansfeld was told that he had to spend another twenty days in quarantine near the French border (in the vicinity of Offenburg). After this time, a French doctor would come to check him and if he had found nothing wrong with Mansfeld's health condition, the diplomat would have been allowed to enter France – that was not the case. Having stated in his next letter,³⁶⁶ he continued to be kept in a strict quarantine. On that account, in the end of July 1680, he did not start out the journey to Speyer and went to the Petersthal spa (nowadays Bad Peterstal-Griesbach) instead, where he wanted to try to gather information about the French influence in this area. At the beginning of August, Mansfeld moved (finally) to Strasbourg. The subsequent missive³⁶⁷ included the mention that the Imperial's Estates in Alsace paid subsidies to the king. Besides, Strasbourg was negotiating with Mansfeld because they wanted to pay these fees no longer. As Heinrich Franz mentioned in his letter: *"...wobeynebens auch die statt Straßburg nicht ermanglet, in ihrem gegen mir gepflogenen alten vertrauen, die erkandtnuß ihrer obhanden schwebender fast unumbgenglicher äußerster gefahr, sambt dem einzigen mittel, wodurch sie zu des gemeinen weesens nutzen hülfz zu erlangen glauben, mir gantz offenhertzig vorzustellen..."*³⁶⁸

³⁶⁴ For the source of the map, see: https://www.vintage-maps.com/en/antique-maps/europe/europe-continent/de-wit-europe-continent-1680::11510?fbclid=IwAR0YuycluNBcnyX_bDgfjFEC0HZBG7i7wI5p9SMijul746qkTmCikzIGN_4 [2022-11-30]. The additional adjustments were made by me.

³⁶⁵ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 6 July 1680, Augsburg.

³⁶⁶ Ibidem, 27 July 1680, Petersthal.

³⁶⁷ Ibidem, 19 August 1680, Strasbourg.

³⁶⁸ Ibidem.

After an endlessly long period of waiting – he had heard about his mission in February – he finally made his way to Paris at the beginning of September 1680, and he reached the city exactly two days after arriving of Louis XIV from his journey.³⁶⁹ Mansfeld’s wife, Marie Louise, did travel with the Imperial envoy; their paths diverged in Lorraine. There, Marie Louise d’Aspremont, essayed to solve her personal interests: “*Damit aber Euer Kayserliche Mayestät [hereafter E. K. M.] zu allen zeiten meineß thuen und lasßenß allertreüschuldigste und genaueste rechenschaft erstattet werde, alß haben dero allerunterthänigst berichten sollen, daß ich meine frau nich in Franckhreich sondern unter disen gueten vorwant allein biß in Lottringen mit mier nemme, auf daß sie imitelß meiner aabwesenhait, und in noch wehrenden fridenßzeit daß iherige alleß alda sueche zu geldt zu machen, ...*”³⁷⁰

Table 2: The Itinerary of Diplomatic Journey of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld to France (1680–1682/1683)³⁷¹

Place	Date	Number of the Letters
Augsburg	16 February 1680	1
Prague	March – April 1680 (?)	0
Augsburg	4 May, 14 June, 6 July 1680	7
Petersthal	27 July 1680	1
Strasbourg	4 and 19 August 1680	2
Paris	6 September – 18 December 1680 ³⁷²	17
Paris	21 May (18 July) 1681 – 9 February 1682	29
Augsburg	6 November 1682	1
Paris	2 March – 11 March 1683	3

³⁶⁹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 6 September 1680, Paris.

³⁷⁰ Ibidem, 8 September 1680, Paris.

³⁷¹ Compiled on the base of 61 missives of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld, preserved ibidem, cart. no. 24. However, Mansfeld did mention in one of his letters (the letter from 18 July 1681) that Leopold had not received nine of his missives between 21 May 1681 and 18 July 1681. Since the Emperor never got them, they are not deposited in The Austrian State Archives in Vienna with other Mansfeld’s letters.

³⁷² There is an obvious gap between the letters from December 1680 to May 1681. It was probably because of the Mansfeld’s financial situation. He did complain about a lack of funds. On that account he probably left France and went to Empire for another monetary resources.

CHAPTER V: MANSFELD AS A MEDIATOR

As a mere envoy, Mansfeld was not entitled to a ceremonial entry; only the first ceremonial audience concerned him as he described it in his letter of 21 September 1680. It took place on Thursday 19 September 1680 in Versailles (Mansfeld's predecessor Gottlieb von Windischgrätz had had his first official audience in Louvre).³⁷³ The reception was pompous, public and in a large hall with the participation of the court. Mansfeld spoke French, handed over peace assurances and the Emperor's personal letter. Louis XIV thanked him and assured him of his peaceful intentions, too. He further informed Mansfeld that if he wanted to solve something important, he should turn to de Croissy who was in charge of foreign affairs. The French king also expressed his joy that Mansfeld had arrived and praised him highly. The audience was held in a very friendly mood.³⁷⁴

After the audience with the king, Mansfeld was led to the dauphin. Unfortunately, the Imperial envoy was unable to hand the Emperor's letter to him because there was not used the expression "brother" in salutation as required. The audience did not last long, then. Having taken to the festive table, they were brilliantly hosted. Immediately after the banquet, Mansfeld was accompanied to the queen. She made many inquiries about her niece – the archduchess Maria Antonia of Austria (1669–1692) – the daughter of Leopold I. The queen was interested in her figure, height, age, and character. She greeted the Emperor, his wife, princes, and princesses nicely. Afterwards, Mansfeld went to the Dauphin's wife who expressed the same feelings. Finally, they took him back to Paris in a carriage, so he was not able to visit the king's brother and his wife that day, forced to request an audience with them the next day. Having visited by de Croissy the next morning, Mansfeld came to know from him how much Louis XIV had enjoyed the audience. De Croissy, too, assured him that the chief goal of France was to keep the peace.³⁷⁵

After the end of the official audience, Mansfeld requested a secret. Nonetheless, the problems continued to accompany Mansfeld on his French mission. Shortly after his arrival, he informed the Emperor that there was an infection at court and most of the people fell ill. Mansfeld himself became sick at the end of September, too.³⁷⁶ As he was suffering from fevers and was not feeling well, he started to go to the court as late as the very end of November. Right

³⁷³ J. KUBEŠ – A. ADAMČIKOVÁ, *Imperial Envoys*, p. 378.

³⁷⁴ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 21 September 1680, Paris.

³⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, 2 October 1680, Paris.

from the beginning, an Imperial envoy tried to open the main topics, which Leopold I mentioned in his instruction.³⁷⁷ However, as mentioned later, the French representatives and even Louis XIV neither wanted to hear his side of the story nor negotiate with Mansfeld any potential changes.

According to his missives, Heinrich Franz had applied for the secret audience five times between September and mid-December, when it was finally granted.³⁷⁸ He had even arranged it once, but the king fell ill.³⁷⁹ On 11 December in St. Germain, Louis XIV accepted him graciously to a secret audience, advising him on how to maintain his health. Mansfeld apologized, as he did not go to the court due to his chronic illness; eventually, he assured the king that the Emperor had always wanted to keep the peace, mentioning complaints from the Imperial Diet in particular. The French king explained to him he was justified in taking these necessary steps. Mansfeld also tried to raise the subject of the Duke of Lorraine, which was rejected immediately. The question of Further Austria was not actually presented. Mansfeld was aware of not getting any answers. He believed that the French were simply delaying the situation in order to see how things would develop in England, developments in Imperial recruiting, and to make a deal with the Hungarian Estates.

During his stay, Mansfeld negotiated mainly with Charles-François Colbert marquis de Croissy et de Torcy (1629–1696), the younger brother of Jean-Baptist Colbert (who is nowadays better known). De Croissy was responsible for the foreign affairs in France in the 1680s.

³⁷⁷ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 16 September 1680, Paris.

³⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, 11 December 1680, Paris.

³⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, 2 October 1680, Paris.



Figure 8: The Engraving of Charles Colbert, Marquis de Croissy³⁸⁰

In his letters, Mansfeld mentioned an encounter with the king only two times; namely at the king's official audience³⁸¹ and the one secret audience.³⁸² However, he in fact dealt with him at least six times. We are aware of an audience in February 1682, based on the correspondence from Johann Bílek who was in charge of Karl von Harrach during his Grand Tour;³⁸³ about other audiences (1681 and 1683) from the *La Gazette* press.³⁸⁴ On the other hand, he quoted twenty negotiations with de Croissy in his missives! Six meetings with the King are more than dismal in comparison with other Imperial envoys.³⁸⁵ We are able to deduce that even though Louis XIV gave the impression of being the most powerful, the most cultured, the most

³⁸⁰ Engraving by Gérard Edelinck, 1691, online source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6e/Charles_Colbert_de_Croissy-2.jpg/800px-Charles_Colbert_de_Croissy-2.jpg [2023-04-03].

³⁸¹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 21 September 1680, Paris.

³⁸² Ibidem, 11 December 1680, Paris.

³⁸³ Jiří KUBEŠ, *Karel z Harrachu ve městě nad Seinou (1681–1682): K roli pařížského pobytu ve výchově šlechty z habsburské monarchie ve druhé polovině 17. století* [Charles of Harrach in the City above the Seine (1681–1682): The Role of Parisian Stay in Raising Nobility from the Habsburg Monarchy in the Second Half of the 17th Century], in: Tomáš Jiránek – Karel Rýdl – Petr Vorel (eds.), *Gender history – to přece není nic pro feministky. Kniha, kterou napsali přátelé a studenti Mileny Lenderové u příležitosti jejího těžko uvěřitelného životního jubilea*, Pardubice 2017, p. 76.

³⁸⁴ *La Gazette*, Paris 1683, pp. 72, 96. Online source: <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k64417052> [2023-01-19].

³⁸⁵ For example, Franz Sigismund von Thun und Hohenstein as an Imperial envoy in England gained remarkably opposite experiences. He was negotiating with Charles II on a regular basis. For more, see Jiří KUBEŠ, *The Imperial Envoy Franz Sigmund Count von Thun and the Strategy of Dissimulation Used by the English King Charles II in the early 1680s*. I thank the author for lending an unpublished manuscript of the study.

highborn and the richest “world lord” with the most opulent, largest and best court far and wide, in reality, he really was, in the case of diplomats, not such a “participating monarch”.³⁸⁶ Heinrich Franz stated that Louis XIV often refused to negotiate with the diplomats and referred them to de Croissy, or that he, at least, tried to postpone the meetings. The Imperial envoy mentioned that the King of France was involved only when he wanted to make an alliance with the concrete representatives (for example, with the envoys of the Electors of Palatinate or Brandenburg). Even so, the correspondence shows that most meetings with foreign guests were arranged by de Croissy. Heinrich Franz had had even to remind Louis XIV of his secret audition five times before Louis granted him one.

Table 3: Audiences of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld with Louis XIV and Charles-François Colbert de Croissy³⁸⁷

Audiences	LOUIS XIV	CHARLES-FRANÇOIS COLBERT DE CROISSY
1680	21/9 and 11/12	16/9, 21/9, 2/10, 22/10, 28/10, 23/11, 2/12, 11/12, 18/12
1681	18/1	23/7, 7/8, 27/8, 12/9, 30/9, 1/12, 19/12
1682	16/2	5/1, 26/1, 9/2
1683	3/2 and 17/2	2/3
quantity	6	20

Although the negotiations with the king were always held in a friendly atmosphere, this was not often the case with his minister of foreign affairs. Initially, the negotiations were problem-free, yet Mansfeld soon understood that he was not getting answers to his questions. Having received the same answers, evasions, and empty promises, he had to cope with disregard. He was persistent, however. Nonetheless, the French side did not want to make it any easier for him.

After dealing with the French king and his ministers, Mansfeld was aware of his hopeless situation. The French enjoyed nothing but power; nothing would stand in their way, and that fact was yet another problem Mansfeld had to cope with. However, I already presented the beginning of his mission, including audiences and accreditations. Only after those could the diplomat perform the tasks assigned by the instruction. Now, let us look at how he managed to fulfil the orders he had received at the beginning of the mission.

³⁸⁶ Starkey determined two types of the monarchs based on their behaviour in the court society and with the foreign diplomats. Apart from “participating monarch” he also used the term as “distanced monarch”. See David STARKEY, *Introduction. Court history in perspective*, in: *The English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War*, ed. David Starkey, London–New York 1987, pp. 8–9.

³⁸⁷ Based on Mansfeld's correspondence, the aforementioned French newspaper *La Gazette*, and the correspondence of Hofmeister Bilek, which was used by J. Kubeš in the above-mentioned publication.

V/1 LOUIS VERJUS, COMTE DE CRÉCY AND HIS INSUFFICIENT CREDENTIALS

The replenishment of sufficient credentials for Louis Verjus de Crécy, who was the French envoy to the Imperial Diet in Regensburg, was the first matter that Mansfeld had to solve. Verjus did not have the appropriate credentials, so he could not negotiate. Nonetheless, it was most likely just another French attempt to delay the negotiations. As we know, his main task was not to discuss the Imperial issues, but to convince estates to become an ally of France against the Emperor. Heinrich Franz tried to look for a solution at his second audience with de Croissy (21 September). The minister explained in detail why comte de Verjus did not have sufficient credentials – allegedly this situation occurred because the Imperial Diet required certain terms that were not used in the credential’s letters. In the past, they were used only in the case of Abel Servien, marquis de Sablé and de Boisdaphin (1593–1659).³⁸⁸ A king was using the salutation “brother” in private letters to the Electors. However, such salutation was never required in the credentials. Yet de Croissy promised Mansfeld that he was going to talk to the king about it. Nonetheless, this was the last time Mansfeld mentioned this topic in his letter.³⁸⁹ Unfortunately, Mansfeld did not even mention if Louis XIV had provided appropriate credentials to Verjus. This was one of the first examples how the French court was lax to requests of the Imperial envoy. However, Verjus eventually spent long nine years (1679–1688) in Regensburg as a French envoy, so the problem was probably solved soon after.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁸ Abel Servien was a French diplomat and signatory of the Treaty of Westphalia. In 1629, Abel was appointed the *commissaire du roi* in Montferrat and, in 1630, as an *intendant de justice à Pignerol* and *président du conseil souverain de delà les monts*. He did act as a diplomat in Savoy. In 1643, Mazarin appointed him as a plenipotentiary and ambassador for negotiations in Münster and Hague; he worked great. In 1648, Abel was promoted to the *ministre d’État*. Despite being a member of the *noblesse de robe* (i.e. lower rank in the French court society), Abel was one of the closest persons of Cardinal Mazarin. For further information, see Guido BRAUN, *La connaissance du Saint-Empire en France du baroque aux Lumières 1643–1756*, Berlin 2010, p. 131; Ibidem, *La diplomatie française à Münster et le problème de la sûreté et de la garantie des traités de Westphalie*, in: Ibidem (ed.) *Asscuratio pacis: les conceptions françaises de la sûreté et de la garantie de la paix de 1648 à 1815*, Paris 2010, pp. 1–74 (online: https://perspectivia.net/receive/ploneimport_mods_00000505); Ibidem, *La mission d’Abel Servien à La Haye (janvier-août 1647). Essai d’une typologie de l’incident diplomatique*, in: Lucien Bély, Gérard Poumarède (eds.) *L’Incident diplomatique (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle)*, Paris 2009, pp. 171–196; Théophile LAVALLÉE, *Histoire des Français depuis le temps des Gaulois jusqu’en 1830*, vol. 3, Paris 1860, p. 177.

³⁸⁹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 21 September 1680, Paris.

³⁹⁰ L. BITTNER – L. GROß (eds.), *Repertorium*, p. 215.



Figure 9: The Engraving of Louis Verjus Comte de Crécy³⁹¹

V/2 ALSACE AND FURTHER AUSTRIA: THE COMPLAINTS OF THE IMPERIAL ESTATES

Mansfeld spent more time on the problem of the violation of peace in Alsace and Further Austria. France gained a large part of this territory in 1639 and the Peace of Westphalia adjudged the “Landgrave of Alsace” (which consisted of Upper Alsace, Lower Alsace, and Sundgau) to France. However, this plan was more than calculating, for France gained only the existing Habsburg rights over the territory but not its sovereignty.³⁹² The Habsburgs did hence resign over the ascendancy in Alsace, but still remained as a part of the Imperial fiefdom. France also had to confirm all the freedoms to the ecclesiastic, as well as the profane subjects so as that they were still subordinate to the Emperor.³⁹³ Nonetheless, France exacted the proviso which protected the King of France – the territory was the Imperial fiefdom, but simultaneously, it became a part of sovereignty of the French crown.³⁹⁴ France also gained the forts Breisach and Philippsburg on the right shore of Rhine. Nonetheless, Louis XIV continued with his expansion and conquered ten Imperial cities, including Freiburg (1677) and Kehl (1678) during the

³⁹¹ Engraving by Antoine Masson, 1695, online source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6c/Crécy_Verjus.jpg [2023-04-01].

³⁹² Derek CROXTON, *Westphalia, the Last Christian Peace*, New York 2013, p. 240.

³⁹³ Hermann SCHULZE, *Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes*, vol. 2, Leipzig 1886, p. 355.

³⁹⁴ D. CROXTON, *Westphalia*, p. 241.

Franco-Dutch War. After the conclusion of Peace of Nijmegen (Articles 4 and 5³⁹⁵), those two cities were devolved to France, but the Sun King had to give up on Philippsburg. In addition, thanks to gaining Franche-Comté, France had an immediate link with Alsace in the west.³⁹⁶




Figure 10: The Map of Territories of the “Landgrave of Alsace”, with the Crucial Fortresses and Cities.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ All text of the Nijmegen Peace is on the website https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Friede_von_Nimwegen [2023–06–7].

³⁹⁶ Oswald REDLICH, *Österreichs Grossmachtbildung in der Zeit Kaiser Leopolds I.*, Gotha 1921, s. 195.

³⁹⁷ For the source of the map, see: <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b10224840w/f1.item.zoom#> [2023–03–02]. The additional adjustments were made by me.

The situation in Alsace and Further Austria was far from “just complicated”, the Imperial Estates were sending complaints to the Emperor, so it was one of the main topics of Mansfeld’s negotiations. So, it is not surprising that this theme appeared more often in the correspondence. It was mentioned at the very first meeting with de Croissy (the letter on 16 September), who did not want to come to an agreement from the first hint of the conversation. He relied on the Peace of Nijmegen stating that Alsace was under French ascendancy, numbering the territories, from which the Emperor’s subjects were to withdraw due to the executive recession. Nevertheless, the Imperial envoy was not afraid to oppose, as France was supposed to vacate some territory on the grounds of the Peace of Westphalia. De Croissy acknowledged it, albeit saying it was only temporary because of a need of soldiers for the internal affairs of France. That was not true, again, because they had been ordered to do it by the Nuremberg recession. The Frenchman did not give up and still claimed that it was owing to the Fronde. The concurrence was thus not found on this meeting. De Croissy resolutely refused to address the complaints of the Imperial Estates.³⁹⁸

Mansfeld wanted to find an acceptable solution at the second rendezvous (21 September). This time he started from the other end – from the Estates’ complaints to the French actions against the Peace of Nijmegen and the Peace of Münster. However, de Croissy cut him off very quickly. It was said that Mansfeld concentrated too much on the main thesis and should rather want to discuss partial matters; he would not otherwise find a common ground with the king. Saying goodbye, Mansfeld left immediately.³⁹⁹

The next dialogue already had a fairly clear decision (2 October).⁴⁰⁰ Mansfeld was told that Alsace would never be surrendered by France for any price. De Croissy replied to the complaints that his king had not done anything to which he was not entitled as a sovereign. Mansfeld countered saying that the French were stealing wood from the Emperor in the vicinity of Breisgau.⁴⁰¹ Moreover, he also added the fact that the French demanded high taxes, and if residents did not meet the deadline, the French shut them down. De Croissy was taking notes since he supposedly did not know about these events: “*Dieses alles schiene, alß were es ihme unbewust gewest, verwunderte sich deßen sehr undt nahme alles schriftlich ad notam, undt gleich meinem vorigen propositionen in allen nur ad referendum ahn.*”⁴⁰² All in all, they did not

³⁹⁸ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 16 September 1680, Paris.

³⁹⁹ Ibidem, 21 September 1680, Paris.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibidem, 2 October 1680, Paris.

⁴⁰¹ *La Gazette*, Paris 1680, p. 16 mentioned that General Montclair went to Breisgau with cavalry already in 1679; he wanted to solve the rest of the charges.

⁴⁰² ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 2 October 1680, Paris.

reach an agreement again. A few days after this conversation, the assembled Sovereign Council (*Conseils Souverains*) in Breisach announced the new actuality: “*Tous les Estats d’Alsace qui ont esté citez au Conseil Souverain établi à Brisac pour y rendre hommage au Roy Tres-Chrestien, ont déclaré qu’ils estoient prests d’obeir aux ordres de Sa Majesté.*”⁴⁰³


The image shows a black and white scan of a historical document. The text is in French and reads: "Tous les Estats d'Alsace qui ont esté citez au Conseil Souverain établi à Brisac pour y rendre hommage au Roy Tres-Chrestien, ont déclaré qu'ils estoient prests d'obeir aux ordres de Sa Majesté. On a desja mis les Armes de". The text is arranged in five lines, with the first line starting with "Tous les Estats d'Alsace" and the last line ending with "Armes de". The font is a classic serif typeface.

Figure 11: The Excerpt from La Gazette 1683, p. 553

The matter was opened twice again at the end of October.⁴⁰⁴ Although Mansfeld had adumbrated the burning problem about excessive taxes, he did not receive any answer. Since then, de Croissy started to ignore him. The French minister did, however, know from other sources that the Diet had agreed with the king to extend the deadline. Despite the fact, Mansfeld wrote another request for a solution. Having received the answer by which nothing was resolved, Mansfeld tried to follow this point in the conversation with de Croissy after a break of a few weeks. But the minister resolutely pointed out that nothing would be solved by interfering with the king’s sovereignty: “...*die antwort aber, so er mir gegeben, ware, das wan ich des königs gerechtigkeiten undt seiner souverenitet zuwider ich was berühren würde, ich weder in der haubtsach, noch in anderen specialibus einige satisfaction von ihm nicht erlangen werde...*”⁴⁰⁵

A large part of the letter dated 11 December 1680 was dedicated to this conflict.⁴⁰⁶ De Croissy kept repeating the same thing over and over again – a well-known technique of all diplomats. Further, he said to Mansfeld that the Emperor made him ashamed to be the minister by constantly bringing up the same long-solved problem repeatedly. However, it was clearly said that the emperor had ceded all the territory of Alsace, including the bishoprics of Méty, Toul, and Verdun. Mansfeld bravely countered that nothing of the sort had been mentioned in the Nijmegen Peace. The more crucial part of this letter, however, is the one where he described the discussion with the king on a secret audience (11 December). Louis XIV did not even let him finish; he interrupted him by saying that he had already written to the Diet. The king expressed his hopes they were satisfied and would burden the Emperor no longer. Mansfeld

⁴⁰³ *La Gazette*, Paris 1680, p. 553.

⁴⁰⁴ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 22 and 28 October 1680, Paris.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, 23 November 1680, Paris.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, 11 December 1680, Paris.

later mentioned in his letter to the Emperor that the king was only trying to legitimize his actions in the given missive. Louis XIV also told him major information – it was not mentioned in the Nijmegen Peace because it was the “quiet transfer” of Alsace.⁴⁰⁷ The debate raged after that; it was said that the Imperial envoys wanted too much at the time, and there was a danger that the whole negotiation would turn out badly. Mansfeld countered that the Diet was only forced to agree to such a thing under threat of war. What they claimed was groundless, said Mansfeld, and had no more weight than a treaty signed by crowned heads. Moreover, French minister Robert de Gravel⁴⁰⁸ interpreted the issue in favour of the Empire. The king flatly refused these arguments by saying that he only wanted what was his property; he was looking after the crown for his successors. Further, Louis XIV and Mansfeld opened the question of the excessive taxes in Further Austria, too. The king’s answers were the same as de Croissy’s ones; it was hence clear that further negotiations on this theme would have been pointless. Therefore, there was probably no hope of reducing them, and further steps needed to be authorized by the Commissioner later.

In the last letter from 1680,⁴⁰⁹ this topic was mentioned briefly. Mansfeld informed the government councillor of Further Austria, Johann Philipp Sommervogel, that he was free to leave because nothing was resolved so far, and a commission would be convened. At the same time, he received a letter from Theodor Heinrich von Strattmann.⁴¹⁰ He described in it the events regarding the handover of Alsace. The same missive arrived at the court, the comments were drawn up and sent to the Emperor, as well as to the other Imperial diplomats: “*Indeßen ist der brieff, so auff E. K. M. allergnädigsten befelch mir von dem herren Stratman in puncto der erleüterung über die allhier praetendirte cession, so von E. K. M. gesandtschaftt zu Niemegen*

⁴⁰⁷ There is not actually a single mention of Alsace in the Peace of Nijmegen. Something unusual must have happened at the “peace talks”. The French side may have taken these backstage conversations seriously and the Imperial side openly opposed and appealed against it. On that account Mansfeld and the Emperor then requested the statement of the envoy Theodor Heinrich von Strattmann, who attended the conclusion of the Nijmegen Peace.

⁴⁰⁸ Robert de Gravel was born into a family with a long diplomatic tradition. He began his career in military service in Alsace and in the Holy Roman Empire. Having appointed as a French envoy at the Diet of Frankfurt, he obtained the instruction from Cardinal Mazarin in April 1656. Mazarin officially sent him to Frankfurt so he could keep an eye on the Peace of Westphalia, but the true reason was that de Gravel should discourage the Electors to vote for Leopold as the Emperor. In 1663, de Gravel was a representative of Louis XIV at the Imperial Diet in Regensburg. For further information, see Bertrand AUERBACH, *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France: depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française*, Paris 1912. Online: <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k11656p/f1.item> [2022–11–9].

⁴⁰⁹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 18 December 1680, Paris.

⁴¹⁰ Theodor Heinrich von Strattmann was a public official of the Habsburg monarchy. He began his career at the court of the Elector of Brandenburg, later he served at the Palatinate court. Then, Strattmann entered the Imperial service. In 1676, he was sent to the peace negotiations at Nijmegen. He also played a crucial role in many aristocratic weddings; for example, he was a mediator of the third Leopold’s wedding with Eleonore Magdalene von Neuburg in 1676. For further information, see Hanns SCHLITTER, headword: “Strattmann, Theodor von”, in: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* 36 (1893), online source: <https://www.deutschebiographie.de/pnd119316900.html#adbcontent> [2022–11–09].

über die souverainitet von dem ganzen Elsaß solle gemacht worden seye, zuegeschriben worden, nicht waiß ich durch was weeg sobaldt copeylich an allhiesigem hoff, alß bey mir selbsten erschienen, undt alsobalden darauff einige observationes verfaßt worden, welche E. K. M. zusambt erstangezogenem shreiben nicht allein allerunderthänigst hiebeyschließe, sondern auch erstobermelten E. K. M. herren herren gesandten zu ihrer ferneren direction in dieser erleüterung, so E. K. M. auff der versambleten reichsständt gethane instantien ihnen zu erstatten allergnädigst anbefohlen haben, überschike.” De Croissy commented on this as always – the French king had done nothing wrong and nothing to which he had not been entitled by right.

Besides, there were other complaints in the next year.⁴¹¹ For example, it was a case of the grievance of Johann Hugo von Orsbeck, the Elector of Trier about the French occupation of the County of Sponheim, as well as the demands of the French for the Elector’s subjects in Trarbach, Croneraich, and Winnigen. He also discussed these complaints with de Croissy, but to no avail. He always received the same answer – the French king had the authority to do so; however, no instruction for the seizure had allegedly been given.⁴¹²

By the end of October 1681, Louis ordered Monsieur de Gravel to make a treaty with the Swiss directly against Further Austria and Milan. He received a considerable amount of money for it.⁴¹³

This theme was of other great examples of the frequent tactic of the French court. It is evident that the negotiations moved nobody to action. Even though Mansfeld tried his very best, nothing changed. The French decision was unalterable, so de Croissy did not even take the trouble to make any excuses for the actions of Louis XIV. The intransigence of France on this issue was considerable. Mansfeld probably decided that there was no need to pursue it further; for that reason, he did not mention it in further correspondence.

V/3 THE ANNEXATION OF THE CITY OF STRASBOURG IN 1681

As Louis XIV knew, the city of Strasbourg was the main foothold and an “open gate” to Alsace, which had already proved in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), as well as in the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678). It was thus one of the significant reasons why the ruler of France openly wanted to acquire this city. The attempt to rescue the city of Strasbourg was one

⁴¹¹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 17 July 1681, Paris.

⁴¹² Ibidem, 23 July 1681, Paris.

⁴¹³ Ibidem, 31 October 1681, Paris.

of the last significant quests of Mansfeld. Louis XIV tried to gain multiple territories with his *Chambres de réunion*, and Strasbourg was one of the main targets. It was, again, an unprecedented intervention against the authority of the Emperor. As soon as the officers left for the new reinforcements and Mansfeld had a first hint of Louis's plan, he began to act and warn the Emperor.

At the beginning of November 1680, many officers left. They were supposed to buy horses for the artillery; preparations were directed towards Strasbourg. They may have wanted to seize the city since their unit of around 30,000 men stationed very close. However, Mansfeld did not believe that it would happen because there were problems with the Parliament in England. The Parliament was strongly anti-French, thus it was crucial for Louis XIV to calm the situation in England. By supporting the dissolution of Parliament, the French King played his hand. Charles II wanted to rule without the Parliament, he succeeded in his intent at the very end of his reign in 1681.⁴¹⁴ All in all, according to Mansfeld, the French king already had an infantry from France numbering 95,000, 25,000 of the Swiss, a light cavalry numbering 10,000 men, and 6,000 dragoons. He heard of it from a confidant who had seen them with his own eyes.⁴¹⁵ Mansfeld's confidants at court confirmed that Louis XIV wanted to rally troops and bought horses for the artillery; likely for the siege of Strasbourg. The French king was still cautious since the barrier of the French fortresses had not yet been completed, so he proceeded slowly. At the same time, in England, the progress of the Parliament was at a standstill. However, as Mansfeld stated in his letter, there was no doubt that Louis XIV decided to lay a siege to Strasbourg: “...sie versicherten mich zugleich, das der könig baldt anfangen werde, sich vorzusehen, undt wurde entlich nach langen vertraülichen discursen die belägerung der statt Straßburg declariret, an der sie nun nicht mehr zweiffeln,...”⁴¹⁶ Even the bishop of Strasbourg Franz Egon von Fürstenberg (in office 1663–1682) came to Paris in order to establish a contact with the Spanish ambassador, and with Mansfeld.⁴¹⁷ “Die statt Straßburg wirt nunmehr gantz öffentlich der belägerung betrohet; der herr bischoff von Straßburg ist hier ankommen, undt suechet absonderliche intrinsichezza mit dem Spanischen herrn pottscaffter,

⁴¹⁴ Clare JACKSON, *Charles II: The Star King*, London 2016, esp. pp. 43, 51; Ronald HUTTON, *Charles II: King of England, Scotland, and Ireland*, Oxford 1989, esp. pp. 376–401; John MILLER, *Charles II*, London 1991, esp. pp. 314–345.

⁴¹⁵ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 4 November 1680, Paris.

⁴¹⁶ Ibidem, 23 November 1680, Paris.

⁴¹⁷ This was quite unusual. Franz Egon von Fürstenberg belonged to the pro-French camp at the court of the archbishop of Cologne. During the war in the 1670s, he was even expelled from the Holy Roman Empire, and only the Nijmegen Peace (article 23) rehabilitated him.

undt mit mir zu machen, mit vorwandt, er komme seines bistumbs gerechtigkeit undt immedietät zu behaupten.”⁴¹⁸

For another half-year we have no information. As was aforementioned, due to a lack of finance Mansfeld probably had to leave the French court. In January, he went back to the Holy Roman Empire in order to procure financial funding; apparently, he had returned in mid-May. Nevertheless, his missives from Paris were stopped by the French, Mansfeld’s letters finally arrived at Vienna in the mid-July.

At the end of September 1681, Louvois was supposed to go to Strasbourg to negotiate with the city council, as did the Sun King.⁴¹⁹ The city was given an ultimatum that if it did not surrender, the French troops would attack and occupy the city despite the Congress of Frankfurt.⁴²⁰ Mansfeld responded immediately. Right away, he went to visit de Croissy where he demanded an explanation. The next day, de Croissy told him openly that Louis XIV would travel there to receive a tribute from the city of Strasbourg. Mansfeld opposed that the city could not do it because they would be breaking their oath to the Emperor. Hence, it was an open attack during a peacetime. De Croissy said that the king had to defend his sovereignty over Alsace and that Louis only wanted to assert what was rightfully his. Mansfeld countered that the Emperor and the whole realm had never agreed to this “secret treaty”, and that the King of France had promised to stop the Réunions till the end of the Congress of Frankfurt. De Croissy resisted that his ruler certainly did not promise to stop the Réunions. Having said that he would inform the Emperor about everything, Mansfeld left without giving any compliment: *“Dieses ist die substanz einer zimlich langen undt eyffrigen conversation, undt weilen diese sich vor stetigs mehr zwischen uns beeden erhitzte, alß fandte ich vor nothwendig, nachdeme ich meines sinns E. K. M. allerhöchste autorität, ohne diese doch wirklich zu impegniren, der möglichkeit nach erhalten, meinen abschiedt ohne weiteren compliment zu nehmen, ...”*⁴²¹ It was evident that Louis XIV was preparing for a universal war. They wanted to close a tight barrier of the fortresses, which would be difficult to break through in the foreseeable future.⁴²² They certainly

⁴¹⁸ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 2 December 1680, Paris.

⁴¹⁹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 30 September 1681, Paris.

⁴²⁰ In 1681 the Congress of the princes of the Holy Roman Empire took place in Frankfurt on the Main in order to stop “the French despotism” (the annexation of the city of Strasbourg and the policy of the Réunions). Unfortunately, the meeting had almost no result thanks to conflicts among diplomats, “but the Estates appreciated being given the opportunity to participate in international talks over the interests of the Reich, a role accorded to the Reichstag by the 1648 treaties”. J. WHALEY, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, vol. 2, p. 41, where a further literature is given.

⁴²¹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 30 September 1681, Paris.

⁴²² The architecture of baroque fortresses was popular at the age of Louis XIV, one of the most prominent architects was Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, who wanted (and did) give to the Kingdom of France a *ceinture de fer*. Being an expert on *poliorcétique*, he managed to design or improve the hundreds of fortresses. Owing to his brilliance,

had to make an agreement with the most powerful Imperial princes; the Imperial Estates were not allowed to help the city of Strasbourg.

Shortly after the visit of de Croissy, the French king left for Strasbourg with the whole court. Allegedly, if the Holy Roman Empire did defend itself, they would occupy and destroy the city of Trier. The city of Luxembourg (property of Spain) was also in a great danger. Some believed they were even targeting the cities of Koblenz and Ehrenbreitstein (property of Trier). Mansfeld also commented that they could take advantage of the disputes in Liège and occupy the city under the pretence of protection.⁴²³ At the end of October, Louis' ceremonial entry into the city took place in Strasbourg. The magistrate, already curiously friendly, welcomed the ruler of France in Breisach; Louis XIV liked it so much that he granted them the title of the free Imperial city. The royal court left Strasbourg on 27 October.⁴²⁴ The bishop in Strasbourg gave a canticle before Louis XIV. At the end, he gave the sceptre to the French king, and then Louis XIV returned it back – a sign that the bishop was subordinate to him in both secular and spiritual matters. This was an insult to the Pope; the bishop should have been excommunicated. Mansfeld asserted that the Emperor should deprive the bishop of his vote and the right to sit in the Imperial Diet at Regensburg.⁴²⁵

The Sun King informed all the diplomats that Strasbourg, as the capital city, was officially his as he controlled Alsace. The city did not crow with delight over the French possession over the city, but it did not repent of a secession from the Empire as well. On the other hand, Strasbourg did have an economic expansion anon.⁴²⁶

In September 1681, the confirming clauses were signed in Illkirch, which affirmed stipulated relations between France and the city of Strasbourg. The first four clauses were the most important:

France turned to the untouchable territory through the whole reign of Louis XIV. For further pieces of information, see Jean-Denis G.G. LEPAGE, *Vauban and the French Military Under Louis XIV*, Jefferson–North Carolina–London 2010, pp. 170–192; Paddy GRIFFITH, *The Vauban Fortifications of France*, Oxford 2006; Christopher DUFFY, *The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great 1660–1789*, vol. 2, London–Boston–Melbourne–Henley 1985, esp. pp. 63–97; James FALKNER, *Marshal Vauban: Louis XIV's Engineer Genius*, Philadelphia 2011, esp. pp. 32–56.

⁴²³ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 30 September 1681, Paris.

⁴²⁴ Ibidem, 24 October 1681, Paris.

⁴²⁵ Ibidem, 31 October 1681, Paris.

⁴²⁶ Heinz SCHILLING, *Höfe und Allianzen: Deutschland 1648–1763*, Berlin 1998, p. 239.

“Articles proposés par les Prêteurs, Consul et Magistrat de la Ville de Strasbourg, le 30 Septembre 1681.

I. La ville de Strasbourg à l'exemple de Mr. l'Évêque de Strasbourg. le Comte de Hanou, Seigneur de Flekenstain, & de la Noblesse de la Basse Alzace, reconnoist Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne pour son Souverain Seigneur & Protecteur.” [Recognition of Louis XIV as their sovereign king and protector.]

“II. Sa Majesté confirmera tous les anciens Privilèges, Droits, Statuts, & Coustumes de la Ville de Strasbourg; tant Ecclésiastique que Poliques, conformément au traité de Paix de Vvestphalie confirmé par celui de Nimègue.” [Louis XIV confirmed all the privileges, rights, statutes and customs of the city of Strasbourg; both ecclesiastical and political, in accordance with the Peace of Westphalia, confirmed by the Peace of Nijmegen.]

“III. Sa Majesté laissera le libre exercice de la Religion, comme il a esté depuis l'année 1624. Jusques à present, avec toutes les Eglises & Escolles, & ne permettra, à qui que ce soit, d'y faire des prétensions ny aux biens Ecclesiastiques, Fondations & Convents, à sçavoir l'Abbaye S. Estienne, le Chapitre de S. Thomas, S. Marc, S. Guillaume, aux Tous-Saincts & tous les autres compris et non compris: mais les conservera à perpétuité à la Ville & à ses Habitans.” [Louis XIV will leave freedom of religion as it has been in the city since the year 1624. He will not tolerate any threat to the Church Estates, he will keep it in the city and its inhabitants forever.]

“IV. Sa Majesté veut laisser le Magistrat dans le présent estat avec tous ses Droits, & libre élection de leur Collège, nommément celui de Treize, Quinze, Vingt & un, Grand et Petit Sénat, des Eschevins, des Officiers de la Ville & Chancellerie, des Convents Ecclésiastiques, l'Université avec tous leurs Docteurs, Professeurs et Estudians en quelque qualité qu'ils soyent, le Collège les Tribus & Maistrises, tous comme ils se trouvent à present, avec la iurisdiction Civile & Criminelle.” [Louis XIV would leave the municipality in its present state with all its rights, and the free election of their collegium, great and small senate, town councillor, city and chancery officials, ecclesiastical conventions, the university with all their doctors, professors, and students in whatever capacity, all such as they are in at present, with civil and criminal jurisdiction.]⁴²⁷

⁴²⁷ *La Gazette*, Paris 1681, pp. 615–620.

Although Louis XIV regarded Strasbourg as a rightfully acquired territory, this city remained a source of European conflict until the conclusion of the Peace of Utrecht (1713), when it was finally annexed to France.⁴²⁸




Figure 12: The Ground Plan of City of Strasbourg in 1680⁴²⁹



Figure 13: The Capitulation of Strasbourg in 1681⁴³⁰

⁴²⁸ Wolfgang ADAM – Siegrid WESTPHAL (eds.), *Handbuch kultureller Zentren der Frühen Neuzeit. Städte und Residenzen im alten deutschen Sprachraum*, vol. 3, Berlin–Boston 2012, p. 1836.

⁴²⁹ Ground plan by Johann Schilter, Josias Städel, Jean Adam Seupel, 1698, online source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/13/Strasbourg_en_1680.png/1200px-Strasbourg_en_1680.png [2023–04–01].

⁴³⁰ Author and dating unknown, online source: <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/09/Capitulation-de-Strasbourg-1681.jpeg/1200px-Capitulation-de-Strasbourg-1681.jpeg> [2023–04–01].

V/4 LORRAINE: AN EFFORT TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE FRENCH KING AND THE DUKE OF LORRAINE

The question of Lorraine was a very delicate issue as the French regularly occupied it alternately throughout the 17th and 18th century.⁴³¹ Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine, came out in anti-France mood since he supported Gaston, Duke of Orléans (1608–1660), against Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIII. As revenge in 1633, the French army invaded Lorraine. Despite the fact that Lorraine was theoretically submitted to the Holy Roman Empire and Emperor Ferdinand II (1578–1637), Charles IV had to make the concessions to France, and finally gave up the throne in favour of his brother – Nicholas Francis (1609–1670).

However, Nicholas Francis resigned after a few months. In 1635, Charles IV therefore tried to gain his duchy back with help of the Imperial army led by Mathias Gallas. Charles IV wanted to reconquest Nancy; nevertheless, his efforts were wrecked by plague.⁴³² The Duke of Lorraine tried to acquire his territories back in the following years as well, he even managed to capture the city of Épinal and beleaguered Lunéville. After a few unsuccessful battles in 1639, he went to Brussels, however.⁴³³

In 1641, Charles IV signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain by which he managed to gain his duchy back, but under the condition that the Duke would not enter any anti-French alliance; any infidelity to France would lead to annexation of the territories. Nevertheless, Charles IV still manifested his attitude against Cardinal Richelieu, and what is more, he fought directly against France in the Battle of Tuttlingen in 1643.⁴³⁴ The 1650s was interweaved with much confusion. In 1654, the Spanish court proclaimed permission to arrest Charles IV (at that time, the Duke with the Lorraine army joined to the Spanish forces and the Spaniards were afraid that Charles IV would betray them since they found out that the Duke of Lorraine had been in contact with Mazarin). The French took advantage of this uncertainty and convinced pro-French Duchess Nicole of Lorraine (the spouse of Charles IV; 1608–1657) in order to write a manifesto in which she would proclaim her as a regent in the absence of Charles IV. On that account, the

⁴³¹ Robert PARISOT, *Histoire de Lorraine (duché de Lorraine, duché de Bar, Trois-Evêchés)*, vol. 2: de 1552 à 1789, Paris 1921.

⁴³² William P. GUTHRIE, *The Later Thirty Years War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia*, Connecticut 2003, pp. 78–79.

⁴³³ Lothar HÖBELT, *Von Nördlingen bis Jankau: Kaiserliche Strategie und Kriegsführung 1634–1645*, Wien 2016, pp. 194–197.

⁴³⁴ Wolfgang MENZEL, *The History of Germany: From the Earliest Period to the Present Time*, vol. 2, London 1862, p. 389.

Lorraine commanders carried out her order and transferred their armies into French service. Even Duke Francis, with the rest of the Lorraine army, took the French's side in 1655.⁴³⁵

The twist came in 1661 when France withdrew from Lorraine, and Charles IV was finally able to come back to his homeland. Yet he was not able to enjoy it for long – in 1670, the Duchy was again occupied by Louis XIV.⁴³⁶ Charles entered the Imperial service and died in exile. His son, Charles V (1643–1690), lived in exile in Vienna.⁴³⁷ Just as his father, he tried to gain his Duchy back. The Peace of Nijmegen (1679), Article 12 says as follows: “12. *Weil der Herr Hertzog von Lothringen mit Ihre Käyserl. Maj. vereinigt ist / und in diesen gegenwärtigen Tractat hat wollen mit eingeschlossen werden / soll er vor sich / seinen Erben und Nachfolgern in die freye und völlige Besetzung derer Gebieth / Oerter und Güter wieder eingesetzt werden / welches sein Vetter / Hertzog Carl 1670. wie sie von den Waffen des AllerChristl. Königs sind eingenommen worden / besaß / außgenommen denen Vertauschung / welche in folgenden Artickeln sollen erkläret werden.*”⁴³⁸ It confirmed his entitlement as the Duke of Lorraine; however, there were changes of some parts of the duchy, which were subject of the articles 13–18. France ignored it and resisted the return of Lorraine back to Charles V (Louis XIV even occupied Strasbourg in 1681). Nonetheless, Charles V, attempted to make some kind of agreement with France by a diplomatic way.

⁴³⁵ Jonathan SPANGLER, *Court Faction Overwhelmed by Circumstance: The Duchy of Lorraine Torn between Bourbon and Habsburg, 1624–1737*, in: Rubén González Cuerva – Alexander Koller (eds.), *A Europe of Courts, a Europe of Factions: Political Groups at Early Modern Centres of Power (1550–1700)*, Leiden–Boston 2017, pp. 197–218.

⁴³⁶ The Emperor wanted to solve this matter immediately, thus he sent Mansfeld's predecessor, Count Windischgrätz, to the French court. He had the task of trying to achieve the restitution of Lorraine. Unfortunately, like Mansfeld, he did not achieve many results. For further information, see J. KUBEŠ – A. ADAMČIKOVÁ, *Imperial Envoys*, esp. p. 377–380.

⁴³⁷ E. William MONTER, *A Bewitched Duchy: Lorraine and its Dukes 1477–1736*, Genève 2007, p. 148.

⁴³⁸ All text of the Nijmegen Peace is on the website https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Friede_von_Nimwegen [2023–06–07].



Figure 14: The Portrait of Charles V, Duke of Lorraine⁴³⁹

For that reason, Mansfeld's task was to reopen the question of Lorraine. He did speak to de Croissy about the interests of the Charles V. Still, Heinrich Franz had to be extremely cautious, which was why he did not mention the Duke of Lorraine until December 1680.⁴⁴⁰ His speech took de Croissy by surprise since Lorraine was obviously – according to the king – a resolved matter. There was no need to talk about it anymore because this territory was considered to be as conquered. Afterwards, the duke received a generous offer, which he did not accept, thereby ceding the land to the king. Another solution would have been an excuse for new disputes only: *“er nahm es mit höchster verwunderung an, undt sagte mir, das sein könig dießes vor ein so außgemachtes werk hielte, daß er schwerlich mehr darvon werde wollen reden hören, undt ligeten die sachen nunmehr gantz nicht, wie ich sie vorstelle, maßen dieses, so bey des verstorbenen herzogs zeitten vorbegegangen, mit dem ietzigen die geringste gemeinschafft nicht habe, man considerire erstlichen Lottringen alß ein mit waffen conquistirtes landt, in*

⁴³⁹ Author unknown, circa 1665, online source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/10/Charles_05_Lorraine_1643_1690_young.jpg/800px-Charles_05_Lorraine_1643_1690_young.jpg [2023-04-01].

⁴⁴⁰ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 11 December 1680, Paris.

welchem man dem ietzigen hertzog selbstn fueß für fueß das terrain disputirt undt vor E. K. M. armee, so zu seiner defension er in capite commandirt erobert undt behauptet habe, über welches alles der könig so gnädig undt generose erklärung durch die anerbottene alternativam gethan habe, der hertzog aber durch seine nit acceptirung seinem könig das landt cediret, undt also einen so ruhigen possessorem gelaßen habe, daß er nicht sehe, auff was für einem fueß man alles dießes umbstoßen, und zur neüen unainigkeit undt mißverständnuß praetext geben wolle,..."⁴⁴¹

Heinrich Franz, on 11th December 1680, attempted to mention it in front of the king in St. Germain, being nevertheless immediately interrupted by him. The duke only wanted to disrupt the current peace, the king said. Hence, further negotiations were immediately out of the question. Mansfeld, however, did ask him for accepting the Emperor as a mediator; moreover, Heinrich Franz asked Louis XIV about accepting the duke's envoy. Mansfeld thus pointed out that he was not an enemy and only wanted to make a deal: "...das mehrbesagtes herrn hertzogens durchleucht nichtes höhers alß Ihre königliche gnadt zu erlangen, ganz aber nicht dero feindt, wie man ihne etwan zu seinem unglük Ihre Mayestät vorstellet, zu seyn verlange, gänzlich verhoffendt das solche auffrichtige submission Ihre königliche Mayestät zu ferneren gnaden..."⁴⁴²

Mansfeld tried to talk about this topic one more time, exactly one year later.⁴⁴³ To be more concrete, he asked whether they were to discuss this theme at the Frankfurt Congress. Not surprisingly, the answer was a resolute "No". It was the last time this point was mentioned in the correspondence.

This topic was surely one of the most sorrowful for the Imperial envoy because he knew from the instructions how crucial it was for Leopold I and the entire Holy Roman Empire. The French minister and King himself was very aware of the fact how crucial this topic was for the Emperor. Even *La Gazette* was attentively observing the negotiation between Duke Charles and Leopold I.⁴⁴⁴ Although he attempted to bring this theme to the table several times, the answer was always negative. Since the situation in Lorraine was uncertain, Mansfeld's wife was selling her property there as we know from Mansfeld's correspondence. In fact, Louis XIV possessed the authority to confiscate her possessions. It was hence safer to sell it; there was no time to lose.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴¹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 11 December 1680, Paris.

⁴⁴² Ibidem.

⁴⁴³ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 19 December 1681, Paris.

⁴⁴⁴ *La Gazette*, Paris 1680, e.g. pp. 516, and 659.

⁴⁴⁵ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 8 September 1680, Paris.

V/5 THE AFFAIRS OF MANTUA: THE FRENCH EFFORT TO GAIN CASALE AND FIND A NEW ALLY

Another task in Mansfeld's instruction was to stop Louis XIV from spreading his influence in the Duchy of Mantua; however, it was quite difficult as the French king felt that he had a right to do so since Casale had once been a part of the Kingdom of France.




Figure 15: The Map of Territories of the Duchy of Montferrato with the Fort Casale and the Duchy of Mantua⁴⁴⁶

France participated in Mantua affairs as early as 1628–1631, during the War of the Mantuan Succession.⁴⁴⁷ In December 1627, Vincenzo II Gonzaga (1594–1627)⁴⁴⁸ died as the last male heir of the main line of the Gonzaga's family. The war was mainly between France, which supported Charles III, Duke of Nevers and Rethel (future Charles I Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua and Duke of Montferrat),⁴⁴⁹ and Spain, which supported Ferrante II Gonzaga, Duke of Guastalla. The French side won, but the more significant fact was that France gained the

⁴⁴⁶ For the source of the map, see: <https://www.raremaps.com/gallery/detail/88203/the-mountains-of-the-alpes-in-which-are-sett-down-the-passag-berry> [2023–06–07]. The additional adjustments were made by me.

⁴⁴⁷ For further information, see Thomas F. ARNOLD, *Gonzaga Fortifications and the Mantuan Succession Crisis of 1613–1631*, in: *Mediterranean Studies*, vol. 4, Pennsylvania 1994, pp. 113–130.

⁴⁴⁸ Guido VIGNA, *Storia di Mantova*, Milan 1989, pp. 163–169 (for the years 1640–1700).

⁴⁴⁹ David PARROTT, *The Mantuan Succession, 1627–31: A Sovereignty Dispute in Early Modern Europe*, *The English Historical Review*, vol. 112/445, Oxford 1997, p. 21.

possession of Casale and Pignerol.⁴⁵⁰ Two greatly fortified cities, through which Louis XIII acquired the control of the pass through the Alps, as well as the reinforcement of the southern borders of the French Kingdom. On 7 November 1649, Charles II, Duke of Mantua and Montferrat (the son of Charles I) married Isabella Clara of Austria, daughter of Leopold V, Archduke of Further Austria (the younger brother of the Emperor Ferdinand II). By his marriage, he gained a family relationship to the Imperial family.

Isabella and Charles II had only one son – Ferdinando Carlo Gonzaga (1652–1708, reign 1665–1708). Ferdinando received the Imperial investiture on the Duchy of Mantua, thus becoming a fiefdom of the Holy Roman Empire. However, Louis XIV gave cause to the claims on these territories thanks to the victory of Louis XIII in the War of the Mantuan Succession. Ferdinando married in 1671 Anna Isabella Gonzaga from a minor line of the House of Guastalla, thus the Duchy of Mantua and the Duchy of Guastalla were united by this marriage. It was arranged by Ferdinando's aunt – the Dowager Empress Eleonora Gonzaga. Ferdinando seemed to be pro-Imperial. Yet a turning point came in 1678, when a treaty with France was secretly negotiated – that is “the Mattioli case”. The Sun King and Ferdinando had wanted to secretly agree on the sale of the Fort Casale, but the Mantuan adviser Ercole Antonio Mattioli⁴⁵¹ (1640–1694) revealed this secret treaty to the Imperial side. The King of France was furious, the deal failed, and Mattioli was arrested and imprisoned in the fortress of Pignerol, where he also died. The first attempt of Louis XIV to gain the Fort Casale felt through. He did not abandon the idea and the second try should come. The events of 1680–1681, therefore, did not come out of the blue.

⁴⁵⁰ Peter Hamish WILSON, *A History of the Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*, London 2009, p. 458.

⁴⁵¹ He was secretary to Carlo II Gonzaga as well as counsellor to Ferdinando Carlo, before entering the service of other Italian rulers.



Figure 16: The Engraving of Ferdinando Carlo Gonzaga⁴⁵²

The French king had two main goals: The short-term goal was to gain the fortress of Casale, the long-term goal was to win the duke's favour and secure a suitable heir of Mantua for the future. The fortress of Casale was mentioned in the letter from 2 October 1680 for the first time. After this first mention, the topic of Ferdinando Carlo Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua, began to appear frequently. Ferdinando Gonzaga was the last man of his lineage, therefore, according to Mansfeld, Cardinal César d'Estrées⁴⁵³ was charged to propose the conclusion of a favourable will to him, in which the territory would be forfeited in favour of the "Palatinate princess" – Anna Isabella Gonzaga (1616–1684): *"...allein vor sich selbst den herrn herzogen von Mantua dahin zu bewegen, auffdas er alß der letzte mannliche erb seines nahmens ein testament machen kan, undt solle, so umb soviel weniges werdte disputirt werden können, wan er es in favorem einer so nahen natürlichen erbin, alß wie die hiesige princesse Palatine*

⁴⁵² Author and dating unknown, online source: <https://www.venditastampeantiche.com/images/stories/archivio/stampa-antica-ferdinando-carlo-mantova-60.jpg> [2023–04–01].

⁴⁵³ For further information, see <https://cardinals.fiu.edu/bios1671.htm#Estrees> [2023–06–11].

ist,...”.⁴⁵⁴ They then wanted the Palatinate princess to transfer the wealth after death to her daughter – Anne Henriette of the Palatinate, who was married to Henri Jules, Prince of Condé – the prince of French royal blood. The first stop of Cardinal d’Estrées was to be at the Doge’s court in Venice, the next stop was planned in Mantua.⁴⁵⁵ Mansfeld in his letter of 11 December 1680 let the Emperor know that the French envoy was going to Mantua because Cardinal d’Estrées wanted to force the Archduchess Isabella Clara of Austria⁴⁵⁶ (1629–1685) to write a testament favourable to France. If she did so, the French king would give her grandson estates in France valued at a million livres and the territory be made a duchy.⁴⁵⁷ Nonetheless, it probably did not work out; therefore, the French king tried to realize at least the short-term goal, i.e. the gain of the fortress of Casale.

Despite the fact that the Duke of Mantua already had an envoy at the French court – Monsieur Bagliani, in the summer of 1681 Ferdinando Carlo sent the extraordinary envoy Marquis de Guerieri to the court of Louis XIV as well: “*Hier, le sieur Bagliani Envoyé du Duc de Montoüe, présenta au Roy le sieur Guerriéri Envoyé Extraordinaire de ce Prince. Ils furent conduits par le sieur de Bonneuil Introduceur des Ambassadeurs, qui avoit esté les prendre avec les carosses de Leur Majestez.*”⁴⁵⁸

Mansfeld immediately visited Marquis de Guerieri and offered to help him in his case and to find out what his task was to ensure. Guerieri’s task was to complain about the behaviour of abbot Morelli, the French ambassador in Mantua, who had left the Mantuan duke very impolitely without the last audience. But the marquis did not know if he would be allowed to have an audience when France recalled their envoy. The Mantuan extraordinary envoy also told Mansfeld that he had already arranged an audience at Fontainebleau. However, the audience would have no other topic but to express the submission of people of Mantua to the French king. Mansfeld, too, asked him whether he knew the issue of the Casale fortress and if the Duke of Mantua had tried to come to an agreement with the Emperor, or the King of Spain about the security of his subjects. Marquis de Guerieri replied that the fortress was well supplied, and that they did not wish to provoke the King of France by asking for help from a foreigner. Mansfeld answered that it was quite late for that: “*...ich meines erachtens sagte ihm finde, das*

⁴⁵⁴ Anna Isabella Gonzaga, known as “Princess Palatine”, a daughter of Charles I Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua. She gained her nickname since she married Edward of the Palatinate. It was her family ties – Gonzaga lineage – that made her a suitable adept for the inheritance.

⁴⁵⁵ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 2 December 1680, Paris.

⁴⁵⁶ She was the mother of the reigning duke, from 1671 on she lived as an Ursuline in a monastery (she was forced to live there due to the intervention of the Emperor).

⁴⁵⁷ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 11 December 1680, Paris.

⁴⁵⁸ *La Gazette*, Paris 1681, p. 492.

*dergleichen consideration etwas zu path seyen, da man die gesandte wirklich anocire, undt große anzahl trouppen schon vor dem thor stehen habe, ...”.*⁴⁵⁹

The Mantuan extraordinary envoy confidentially came to Mansfeld once again, his intention was to tell him how things really were in Milan and Turin (contrary to what was said at the French court). Most people at the French court believed that the effort to gain Casale may be interrupted by the unrest in Savoy, where there were troubles with the nobility.⁴⁶⁰

The Mantuan extraordinary envoy was soon rejected by Louis XIV. Marquis de Guerieri made a decent complaint about Abbot Morelli's behaviour. The king defended him, saying that he agreed with the action, even though he had never ordered him to leave. Ferdinando Carlo Gonzaga did not want to accept the proposal that the French king had sent him through the envoy. Yet Louis XIV sent Morelli back to Mantua. He did not return alone, though. According to Mansfeld, troops also arrived on the territory of Dauphiny (near Casale) – 18 battalions, 7 cavalry regiments, 4 dragoons in addition to a Fürstenberg regiment (infantry), and one cavalry from Catalonia; there were approximately 18,000 to 20,000 men. Morelli thus got back with an evident aim – to negotiate better conditions for France under the threat of war. A minister's confidant told Mansfeld that the French wanted to seize Casale by force, Louis XIV may have offered the duke to rent the fortress for France for a short period of time. With the army behind his back, it was quite possible that the duke would accept it. It was obvious that the French king had other plans on the Apennine Peninsula as well.⁴⁶¹

At the end of September 1681, Mansfeld saw a letter from Count di Saint Mauritio. The offer that Morelli had made to the Duke of Mantua was mentioned in it. The Sun King wanted to observe the treaty concluded by Mattioli. Moreover, he endeavoured to place his troops nearby in Montferrat and Mantua until the terms of the treaty were fulfilled. Having written to the Emperor, the Venetians, and the governor in Milan, Ferdinando Carlo Gonzaga informed them of everything. He offered them defence on condition that they provide him with an army. Abbot Morelli was allegedly informed about it because it was impossible to fulfil all in such a short period of time. By this hollow gesture the duke saved face, even though nobody eventually helped him.⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 7 August 1681.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibidem, 7 August 1681, Paris.

⁴⁶¹ Ibidem, 15 August 1681, Paris.

⁴⁶² Ibidem, 24 September 1681, Paris. The duke seems to have made a mistake when he – like his mother – had tried to practice policy of independency, neglecting the superpowers of his time. Unlike the Emperor, the French were riding high and forced the duke to join them.

At the end of September, Louis XIV announced that within a day or two the troops would occupy the fortress of Casale. The very night that Mansfeld learned this information, he received another message saying that the citadel of Casale had been sold to France for 100,000 pistoles and an annual pension of 100,000 livres to the Duke of Mantua. For that reason, Mansfeld met de Croissy in the next morning, on 30th September 1681, in order to inform him about declaring war on the Emperor by this action. The Duke of Mantua, as the Emperor's vassal, was not allowed to sell anything without Leopold's consent. De Croissy assured him that the French king would never break his own promise, and that everything would be fine: *“Er sagte mir, das sein könig zu Frankfurt, undt vor der ganzen welt seine gerechte procedur justificiren werde, undt weilen ihme Croissy seines königs gründtliche intention annoch nicht sattsamb bewust seyen, als wolle er sich dessen aigentlich informiren, versichere mich immittels doch noch einmahl, das nictes unterfangen werden”*⁴⁶³ Mansfeld attempted to find out what was in the contract for the purchase of the citadel in Casale.

There were allegedly three articles favourable to the duke and two to the French king. It was recommended that the Emperor act quickly and threaten the duke with an Imperial ban. Mansfeld also managed to find the information of the establishment of a new Réunion chamber in Pignerol. With the Réunions on the Apennine Peninsula, the French probably had the same action in mind as they had taken in the Holy Roman Empire and the Netherlands.⁴⁶⁴

By the end of October, it was already obvious that all the protests against the purchase of Casale were in vain.⁴⁶⁵ Mansfeld was nevertheless acquainted with five secret articles in the treaty between the French king and Ferdinando Carlo Gonzaga:

“Articoli Secreti trà il Ré Christianissimo et il Duca di Mantova.

- 1. Concede il Duca di Mantova Presidio francese in Casale di Sei milla huomini.*
- 2. Il Christinissimo restituisce al Duca tutti li beni liberi che hà in Francia.*
- 3. di più si obliga di farli restituire del Duca du Savoya quelli che Saranno di ragione*
- 4. di pagare aldetto Duca quanto avanza da Spagnuoli per raggione del presidio di Casale non pagato.*
- 5. di diffenderlo a spese proprie di qualunque Potentato Prencipe per qual sia causa.*

*NB: Resta ancora stabilita per vinti milla dopie a favore del Prencipe di Buozolo la cessione a francesi du tutte le raggioni di detto Prencipe sopra la fortezza di Sabioneta posseduta dal Duca di Medina de las torres, et guardata da Spagnuoli.”*⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶³ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 30 September 1681, Paris.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibidem, 10 October 1681, Paris.

⁴⁶⁵ Even the other diplomats considered this as a solved problem, or at least pretended it quite well. For example, the ambassador of Venice did congratulate to Louis XIV for the treaty with the Duke of Mantua: *Le 25, le sieur Foscarini ambassadeur de Venise, aussi conduit par le Sieur de Bonneuil, fit des compliments au Roy, sur la soumission de la ville Strasbourg à l'obéissance de Sa Majesté, & sur le Traité qu'Elle a fait avec le Duc de Mantoue pour la Citadelle de Casal. La Gazette, Paris 1681, p. 712.*

⁴⁶⁶ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 24 October 1681, Paris.




Figure 17: The Excerpt from the Secret Articles between Louis XIV and the Duke of Mantua

In the very end of October, a courier from Mantua arrived, but he did not stay long. He, together with the resident of Mantua, went to the court. The Duke of Mantua approved that 6,000 French soldiers might have remained in Montferrat over the winter. The city of Mantua may thus be occupied quickly and without any problems.⁴⁶⁷ The Mantuan extraordinary envoy visited the French court again. According to Mansfeld, the extraordinary envoy complained about the presence of more French troops at Montferrat than the duke and the French king had agreed on. De Croissy opposed that the dragoons would leave, as well as the cavalry.⁴⁶⁸ Eventually, the Mantuan extraordinary envoy had a secret audience with the Sun King; it was about ceremonial receptions.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁷ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 31 October 1681, Paris.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibidem, 16 November 1681, Paris.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibidem, 19 December 1681, Paris.

It is necessary to add that since French occupation of Fort Casale, the Duke of Mantua quite openly adopted a pro-French approach.⁴⁷⁰ However, it did not end well with him: During the Wars of Spanish Succession, he decided to join the French and accepted the title of General of the French Armies in Italy from Louis XIV. But, quite understandably, he was unable to face Eugen von Savoyen who led the Imperial Army. In 1706, the Duke of Mantua lost his possessions of Montferrat and, on 30 June 1708, all his possessions were confiscated for high treason. Ferdinando Carlo Gonzaga died in Padua the same year.⁴⁷¹

The matter of Mantua was again one of the crucial topics for the Emperor. As the France was still trying to take more and more territories, it became such a big problem for Leopold I and the rest of Europe. Above all Louis XIV infringed into the authority as the Duke of Mantua was vassal of the Emperor. That is why Mansfeld's reaction was so fast and harsh against de Croissy, after this conflict almost stopped any communication of the Imperial envoy with the French court. It was the last straw to the Mansfeld's faith into the French "fair intentions":
“...*diese sorg hat mich haubtsächlich die sach weiters zu impegniren, wie es etwan die that an sich selbst wohl erfordert hette, undt mich würklich von hier wek zu begeben abgehalten, im übrigen der tröstlichen hoffnung lebendt, das wegen dieser französischen untreü ich nicht werde einiger nachlässigkeit noch unverstandt können bezichtigt werden, indeme alle weitz undt auffmerksambkeit sehr fruchtlos, ia gar leicht eludirt ist, wo man ohne treü noch glauben tractiren, undt ohne dem geringsten fundament einiger gerechtigkeit regiren thuet.*”

⁴⁷⁰ For further information, see Guy ROWLANDS, *Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II and French Military Failure in Italy, 1689–96*, The English Historical Review, vol. 115, no. 462, 2000, pp. 534–569; Alessandro BIANCHI, *Al servizio del principe: diplomazia e corte nel ducato di Mantova 1665–1708*, Milan 2012.

⁴⁷¹ For further information, see Gino BENZONI, *Ferdinando Carlo Gonzaga Nevers, duca di Mantova e del Monferrato*, in: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 46, 1996, online source: https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/ferdinando-carlo-gonzaga-nevers-duca-di-mantova-e-del-monferrato_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ [2023–03–12].

CHAPTER VI: MANSFELD AS AN INFORMANT

The main issues, which were explicitly stated in the Mansfeld's instruction, were mentioned. As previously stated, Louis' effort to expand a territory was ubiquitous. On that account, one of Mansfeld's other tasks was to cooperate with other diplomats and sent a piece of information about how their negotiations were going back to Leopold I. The Emperor was mainly interested in the matters of Scandinavian countries since he made an alliance with Sweden, and, of course, of negotiations with the Imperial Electors, which would have been able to be even more dangerous for the Empire if the Electors were to make any sort of treaty with Louis XIV.

Unfortunately, Mansfeld failed in his main goals; he also did not visit the French court very often. Conversely, he was collecting valuable information mainly from other diplomats, and on the ground of his findings, he frequently warned Leopold I in many regards. By way of illustration, it is now useful to follow the main topics appearing at the court in the examined period of time.

Table 4: The List of the Selected Diplomats in the French Court during the Mansfeld's Mission⁴⁷²

England	Henry Saville	March 1679–March 1682
Spain	Don Gaspar Teves Córdoba y Guzman marqués de la Fuente	Jan. 1680–Dec. 1683
Venice	Sebastiano Foscarini	Oct. 1679–Dec. 1683
Brandenburg	Ezechiel von Spanheim	April 1680–Oct. 1684
Palatinate	Graf zu Sayn und Wittgenstein	7–26 Oct. 1681
Sweden	Nils Baron Bielke	April 1679–May 1682
The Netherland	Willem van Wassenaer heer van Starrenburg	Sept. 1680–Dec. 1688

VI/1 AFFAIRS WITH THE SPANISH KINGDOM

The relations between the Spanish realm and France were understandably strained,⁴⁷³ like those with the Emperor. The ruler of France was constantly trying to make the conflicts out of spite. Even so, the two kingdoms were in constant diplomatic, economic, and cultural contact with each other throughout the whole of the 17th century. However, this coexistence was rife

⁴⁷² The compilation of the table is based on L. BITTNER – L. GROß (eds.), *Repertorium*, pp. 37, 188, 358, 401, 491, 519, and 549. The most often mentioned diplomats in Mansfeld's missives are given.

⁴⁷³ Daniel SERE, *La paix des Pyrénées: vingt-quatre ans de négociations entre la France et l'Espagne, 1635–1659*, Paris 2007; Matthieu LAHAYE, "Louis Ier d'Espagne (1661–1700): essai sur une virtualité politique", in: *Revue historique* 3, 2008, pp. 605–626.

with mistrust, not surprisingly, because of all the wars, but also of diplomatic conflicts. Since Louis XIV wanted to have a priority over his Spanish neighbour, the conflicts over precedence were the daily bread of both monarchs and their diplomats. The King of France did succeed, or so he thought. In reality, the diplomats of both countries did their best not to meet each other in person.⁴⁷⁴



Figure 18: The Spain recognizing the Precedence of France⁴⁷⁵

As already stated, the Treaty of Pyrenees (1659) ended just a small chapter of the Franco-Spanish conflicts.⁴⁷⁶ Through this Treaty, which was one of the last masterpieces of Mazarin,⁴⁷⁷ France gained stability – at the same time it weakened Louis II de Conde, who was an inner-political opponent, and it also debilitated the Spanish crown. The contract stipulated that Louis XIV would marry Maria Theresa of Spain,⁴⁷⁸ but also the territorial gains. France

⁴⁷⁴ Michael ROHRSCHEIDER, *Das französische Präzedenzstreben im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV.: Diplomatische Praxis – zeitgenössische französische Publizistik – Rezeption in der frühen deutschen Zeremonialwissenschaft*, Francia – Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte, vol. 36, 2009, p. 148.

⁴⁷⁵ Painting by Charles le Brun, circa 1678–1685, online source: http://collections.chateauversailles.fr/?permid=permobj_0aaff657-dc8f-47a3-a8a3-ce48b27b42f6#62f275f3-8a66-41b2-b7f2-9d5f0a00cc33 [2023–04–01].

⁴⁷⁶ L. BÉLY, *La France*, p. 465.

⁴⁷⁷ L. BÉLY, *Les relations*, p. 201.

⁴⁷⁸ H. SCHILLING, *Höfe*, p. 213.

obtained Roussillon and the northern half of Cerdanya, Montmédy, but also a part of Luxembourg, Artois and several towns in Flanders.⁴⁷⁹ The War of Devolution was the second great conflict. Louis XIV, thanks to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668), gained several important cities from the Spanish Netherlands (Spanish Habsburgs); examples being Armentières, Bergues, Lille or Tournai.⁴⁸⁰ The Franco-Dutch War was the last conflict, in which, due to the Peace of Nijmegen (1678–79), France gained further territories in the Spanish Netherlands – Bailleul, Cassel, or Wervicq⁴⁸¹ from the Spanish king.⁴⁸² It was a clever step of Louis XIV. He wanted to avoid the Habsburgs enclosing France, so he also caused the wars as a preventative measure to weaken their realm.⁴⁸³ All the aforementioned demonstrated that the relations were obviously strained.

That was the situation in which Mansfeld found himself. The major collaborator of the Imperial diplomat was then the Spanish ambassador Don Gaspar de Teves Córdoba y Guzman marqués de la Fuente,⁴⁸⁴ whom Mansfeld received many pieces of information from. The Spanish ambassador was solving two main topics with Louis XIV (or better to say with de Croissy) during the time of Mansfeld's mission. Not surprisingly, the first one was in matter of precedence, the second one was over a tension in the border territory, and the French expansion.

The precedence-issue arose when the Sun King, again, tried to provoke the Spanish counterpart in this matter. In August 1681, Mansfeld wrote, that in the case of the navy, the ruler of France newly requested the priority right of salute to himself from the Spanish officers. He demanded the same right not only for his flagship, but for his second ship, too. If they did not so, he threatened to sink them anywhere at sea, as well as in the harbour: “...*ihr könig contentire sich nunmehr nicht nur in gleicher qualität der Spanischen flaken oder commandirenden officier allein der erste salutirt zu werden, sondern seye entschlossen furohin auch sein andertes schiff von der Spaniern ersten salutiren zu machen, im widrigen fall sie nicht allein in offenem meer zu verfolgen, sondern in ieglichem port, der sie zu refugiren unterstehen wurde, zu attackiren, undt in grundt zu richten.*”⁴⁸⁵ However, the Spanish sailors disobeyed to salute first, hence the French king, through his ambassador in Madrid, called (in September) for a severe punishment.⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁷⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Peace of the Pyrenees”, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Peace-of-the-Pyrenees> [2022–02–16].

⁴⁸⁰ L. BÉLY, *Louis XIV*, p. 122.

⁴⁸¹ A. HORNE, *La Belle France*, p. 164.

⁴⁸² H. SCHILLING, *Höfe*, p. 227.

⁴⁸³ *Ibidem*, p. 214.

⁴⁸⁴ L. BITTNER – L. GROß (eds.), *Repertorium*, p. 519.

⁴⁸⁵ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 27 August 1681, Paris.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, 5 September 1681, Paris.

The second issue underlay a tension in the border territory, as well as the French expansion. It was particularly noticeable in 1681, when Louis XIV began new military operations. In July 1681, de Croissy negotiated with the Spanish ambassador, whom he informed that as long as the Spanish troops were in the county of Chiny,⁴⁸⁷ the subjects of the Spanish king would nourish the French army.⁴⁸⁸ In November 1681, the Spanish ambassador, being in the conversation with de Croissy, requested the annulment of the blockades in Luxemburg as it was against the Peace of Nijmegen. De Croissy opposed that the Luxembourgers made a raid on the French camp; several people died, and the others were captured, including horses. Owing to these actions, Louis XIV did not want to change his statements and actions.⁴⁸⁹ The Spanish ambassador had another audience in January 1682, in which he complained about further French violence but received no response, again. The ambassador therefore concluded that he would receive no answer and went back to Paris (the royal court was at Saint Germain at the time); he was going to send a written complaint. One day later, he received a reply from de Croissy; however, it was not any better, the French justified or refused all objections again.⁴⁹⁰ No other news about Spain exist after January 1682; however, the Spanish ambassador, like Mansfeld, failed in pursuit of the negotiation with the French.

VI/2 THE AFFAIRS OF ENGLAND

The King Charles II (1660–1685) did incline to France since very beginning of his reign, in a way admitting Louis XIV as a monarch.⁴⁹¹ Both cousins cooperated in the beginning of 1660's; for example, in 1662, Louis XIV also bought Dunkirk from Charles II for 5,000,000 livres.⁴⁹² The funds formed a grand part in the Anglo-France relations; the secret Treaty of Dover⁴⁹³ (1670) is a great example – Louis XIV paid of Charles II to withdraw from the Triple Alliance. However, France was an advantageous ally for England. Charles II had to deal with a

⁴⁸⁷ Louis XIV had gained the territories of Yvois, Montmédy et Chauvency through the Treaty of Pyrenees (1659); the rest of the county of Chiny was acquired by him thanks to the *Chambres de réunion* in April 1681. On that account, Louis XIV did demand the King of Spain to nourish the French army since the Spanish army was on his territory. See Geoffrey TREASURE, *Louis XIV*, London-New York 2013 (1st Ed. 2001), p. 205.

⁴⁸⁸ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 23 July 1681, Paris.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibidem, 28 November 1681, Paris.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibidem, 16 January 1682, Paris.

⁴⁹¹ Antonia FRASER, *King Charles II*, London 2002, p. 349.

⁴⁹² Clyde Leclare GROSE, *Louis XIV's Financial Relations with Charles II and the English Parliament Author(s)*, *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1929, pp. 177–204, esp. p. 178.

⁴⁹³ For further information, see Ronald HUTTON, *The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668–1670*, *The Historical Journal*, vol. 29, no. 2, 1986, pp. 297–318.

difficult domestic political situation, the Parliament did not support his reign because he continued in the Anglo-Dutch wars against their will. Louis XIV relatively generously sponsored Charles II (Louis XIV subsidized Charles II after the dissolution of the Parliament in 1679 as well)⁴⁹⁴ in exchange of his loyalty. Nevertheless, Charles II was a master of dissimulation, so neither Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld nor Leopold I knew about this cooperation. Mansfeld had his suspicion, but the English diplomat Henry Savile played a double-role, complaining to Heinrich Franz about the outrageous manners of the French court, and trying to divert Mansfeld out of his inklings. However, Heinrich Franz captured his mixed feelings in his correspondence. He did uncover the confidential relations between the French and the English king at the end of 1681.



Figure 19: The Engraving of the King Charles II⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹⁴ C. L. GROSE, *Louis XIV's Financial Relations*, p. 199.

⁴⁹⁵ Engraving by William Sherwin, dating unknown, online source: <https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/V0048351/full/full/0/default.jpg> [2023-04-01].

As the Imperial envoy mentioned in his letter from August 1680, the French king had a somewhat disputable relationship with the English Kingdom. Louis XIV was waiting to see how the situation with the parliament would develop in England. He also had an ally there – James Scott, Duke of Monmouth.⁴⁹⁶ This was also one of the reasons why they did not comment on Mansfeld's letters and on presented problems for so long. They did not always treat the English ambassadors in a friendly manner, too. On the other hand, in December 1680, Mansfeld ascertained that France wanted to advance England a considerable amount of money; Colbert was under an obligation to take care of it: "*Es wirt in höchster eyl, mit zusammenrueffung aller wechßelherren undt partisanen, eine considerable rimessa nacher Engellandt auffgesuecht, ist bißdato aber noch kein mittel vorgeschlagen worden, alß das gelt in natura dahinzuschiken, monsieur Colbert is so eyffrig darumben bemühet.*"⁴⁹⁷ A very special role was played by the English envoy, Henry Saville, in the summer and autumn of 1681, when Spanish and Dutch diplomats complained about French advances in the southern Netherlands and the Luxembourg territory.

As Mansfeld stated in July 1681, Louis XIV committed iniquities on the Dutch territory and that is why the Dutch ambassador was to join with the English and the Spanish to press the Sun King over the violence in the Netherlands – requesting an audience and prepared memorials. The Dutch court wanted to maintain the barrier, the English as mediator, with the Spanish mainly dealing with their affairs. Mansfeld thought the negotiations would fall short of the expectations, despite all the other ambassadors praising the resolution. The French were not able to be defeated, except by force.⁴⁹⁸ The audience of the English and Dutch ambassadors did not take place for a while. They, therefore, began to ask de Croissy for a schedule, finally they received an audience. Louis XIV told to the Dutch ambassador that the King of Spain was to blame for everything. It was peculiar that they treated the English ambassador even more contemptuously, the French king did not let him speak, he only wanted a memorial and then he sent him away. The two diplomats also let their sovereigns know that.⁴⁹⁹ At the end of September 1681, the English and Dutch envoys gave Louis XIV a final decision on the matter of the memorial regarding the defence of the Spanish Netherlands.⁵⁰⁰ At the end of September, de Croissy replied to the English and Dutch memorials. The king said that he knew about the

⁴⁹⁶ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 2 August 1680, Paris.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibidem, 11 December 1680, Paris.

⁴⁹⁸ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 18 July 1681, Paris.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibidem, 23 July 1681, Paris.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibidem, 24 September 1681, Paris.

disputes but had nothing to add to it; however, he emphasized that nothing would cease him from getting what rightfully belonged to him.⁵⁰¹

Only at the end of November 1681, Mansfeld learned that the French and English sovereigns had confidential relations. For that reason, the negotiations of the Dutch envoy probably did not work out since the King of England promised Louis XIV that he would not impede the fall of Luxembourg: “...,*dan ich ganz gründtliche undt vertraute nachricht umbständtlichen also eingezogen habe, wie das man nemblichen des Holländ. abgesandten van Böninghen negociation in Engellandt im geringsten nicht apprehendire, der effect wirdt weilen, das er nicht allein die geringste verlangte cathgorische antwort nicht erhalten werde, sondern seye selbiger könig mit dem hiesigen in so vertraülichem vernehmen, das er den unevitirlichen fall der statt Luxemburg im geringsten nicht verhindern, sondern mit gewöhnlicher protraction, undt den allyrten stetigs gebenden guten hoffnung befürderen werde, mit dieser zueversicht, das der christlichste könig alsdan alles fernerer progresses in denen Spanischen Niederlanden sich enthalten, undt aller übrigen praetensionen allda begeben werde, deßen hat sich hiesiger könig nicht allein ercläret, sondern will in ansehen deßen den krieg alsogleich so entfernet, als obengemelt, erscheinen machen, das man hierdurch die Holländer, undt das Römische reich selbsten einzuschläffern, das durchlaüchtigste ertzhauß aber in particular krieg einzuführen gänzliche hoffnung hat.*”⁵⁰² In the final week of December 1681, Mansfeld found out Louis XIV had sent a huge sum of money to the King of England, who should not convene the Parliament.⁵⁰³ The French still supported the King of England not to call the Parliament, for only the Parliament could issue important resolutions, which could make difficulties with submitting the French proposals at the Congress in Frankfurt.⁵⁰⁴

In the second half of January 1682, Mansfeld noticed other unusualness. The ambassadors of England and of Dutch requested an audience with the French king. They wanted to have an audience at the same time, but de Croissy said that it was not regular, and that Louis XIV did not agree to it. Allegedly, it was planned this way by the King of England. The English envoy knew that the Sun King would not accept them both at once, but he had pretended that it was news.⁵⁰⁵ So evidently, it was a delaying tactic. A courier arrived for the English envoy and

⁵⁰¹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 30 September 1681, Paris.

⁵⁰² Ibidem, 28 November 1681, Paris.

⁵⁰³ Ibidem, 29 December 1681, Paris.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibidem, 16 January 1682, Paris.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibidem, 16 January 1682, Paris.

the Dutch ambassador with instructions that they should accepted an audience separately. Both had already requested an audience.⁵⁰⁶

As Heinrich Franz thought, both really did not receive any answer. There was, however, again a slight difference in behaviour – the Dutch ambassador was seen off seriously, the English envoy with a laugh. It was obvious that there was some sort of agreement between France and England: “*Die gewöhnlich umbstehende bey gedachten audienzen haben allein so viel unterschied vermerkt, das der holländische pottscaffter von dem könig ganz serio, der Englische aber mit lachen in vertraulichkeit verbeschieden worden ist ... durch alle diese andamenti wirt die so oft schon erchienene, undt zwischen hiesigem, undt dem englischen könig in guetem vertrauen concertirte protaction... becräftiget.*”⁵⁰⁷ Both diplomats already received the answers, but it is more than obvious that the French ambassador in England had made another offer to pull the fortification of Luxemburg down. However, it was still not certain what would happen.⁵⁰⁸

The relations between France and England were, for appearances’ sake, neutral. But, as we know, they played the cards they had been dealt – as already mentioned – and Louis XIV made an alliance with Charles II, so the negotiations with the Dutch were predestined to the end.

VI/3 AFFAIRS OF THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

The end of the 17th century was in an atmosphere of “friendly” relations between the Habsburg realm and Sweden. This “friendship” started with the diplomatic mission of Adolph Wratislaw von Sternberg in 1673.⁵⁰⁹ Despite the fact, he did not fully succeed in his goals; the Swedish court still had a pro-French attitude and he did diversify the network of his contacts. He had mainly good mutual sympathies with the Swedish royal family. A diversion from the Kingdom of France was caused, as the Swedish court was looking for someone to blame for an abortive campaign against Brandenburg and Denmark. The chief minister Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie (1622–1686)⁵¹⁰ and the pro-French courtiers were accused of this failure.⁵¹¹ This twist played into the Emperor’s hands. The new pro-Emperor’s attitude was led by the new head of

⁵⁰⁶ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 26 January 1682, Paris.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibidem 2 February 1682, Paris.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibidem, 9 February 1682, Paris.

⁵⁰⁹ M. BAKEŠ, *Diplomatem*, p. 83.

⁵¹⁰ Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Magnus Gabriel, count de la Gardie”, online: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Magnus-Gabriel-Greve-De-la-Gardie> [2023– 01–02].

⁵¹¹ M. BAKEŠ, *Diplomatem*, p. 87.

the chancellery and diplomat Bengt Gabrielsson Oxenstierna (1623–1702).⁵¹² Two decades of great relations between Leopold I and the Kingdom of Sweden began, both monarchies exchanged diplomats – Michael Wenzel von Althann was sent to Stockholm, and Gabriel and Carl Gustav Oxenstierna were sent to Vienna.⁵¹³ The long-standing alliance with the French was officially ended by the Treaty of The Hague in 1681 among Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Holy Roman Empire.

One of Louis XIV's plans was to make an agreement with Sweden and Denmark because he wanted to forestall the development of alliance between the Scandinavian countries and the Emperor. However, the French intentions were advantageous for France, but not so for the other side. On that account, neither Sweden nor Denmark wanted to have any dealings with Louis XIV as will be evident in the following text.

At the beginning of his mission, Mansfeld found out the information that the Swedes and the Danes were discussing the conclusion of an alliance with France. However, they did not want to be unite with them at the same time because either of them had different interests.⁵¹⁴ Still, the Danes and the Swedes told him soon that they had not formed an alliance. The Swedish ambassador, Baron Nils Bielke, informed de Croissy that they had concluded an economic treaty with the Dutch; this disappointed both the French king and his minister. Louis XIV was surprised that he had not received any word concerning a negotiation with the Dutch.⁵¹⁵

The relations between France and Sweden as well as Denmark gradually worsened during 1681. The Scandinavian powers hated the French rapprochement with the Elector of Brandenburg the most. Mansfeld was sure that the Scandinavians had to act; he was hence going to find out their plans. An alliance between the Brandenburg Elector and France may have led to the union of Sweden with Denmark, or even to the union of both Scandinavian powers with the Emperor. Mansfeld noticed that the confidence of the Swedish ambassador was declining: *“Obbenennter zweyer nordischer cronen gründtlich dissegni zu erforschen, dan diese apparente allianz mit dem churfürsten [Brandenburg; A.A.] ein mittel seyn köndte, sie nicht allein solide miteinander zu vereinigen, sondern in E. K. M. parthey eindretten, undt dero protection suechen zu machen, zu welchem ich Schweden absonderlich umb so viel mehr inclinirter glaube, alß ich sehe, daß an hiesigem hof das vertrauen gegen ihnen sehr abnehme.”*⁵¹⁶

⁵¹² Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Bengt Gabrielsson, Count Oxenstierna”, online: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Bengt-Gabrielsson-Greve-Oxenstierna> [2023–01–03].

⁵¹³ M. BAKEŠ, *Diplomatem*, p. 87.

⁵¹⁴ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 2 October 1680, Paris.

⁵¹⁵ Ibidem, 11 December 1680, Paris.

⁵¹⁶ Ibidem, 18 December 1680, Paris.

In September of 1681, the French court found out that the Emperor was negotiating an alliance with the Danes. The French therefore stated to offer very favourable contracts to the Swedish ministers, as well as trying to make a treaty with the Danes. The French wanted to offer them a more favourable proposal than the Emperor. Mansfeld was frequently asked of whom the Emperor was supposed to send to Sweden.⁵¹⁷ The French king attempted to sow the seed of discord between the Emperor and the Swedish king; to achieve this, he made up lies. The Swedish ministers (mainly Nils Lillieroot) even asked Mansfeld whether it was true that the Emperor had ordered his envoy at the Hague to withdraw his signature on the already ratified the treaty of alliance. Mansfeld obviously explained the whole event to the Swedish ministers and assured them of the contrary.⁵¹⁸

This conversation between Mansfeld and Swedish ministers was the last mention of the Northerners in the correspondence. As the ruler of France could not make any agreements with them, he at least attempted to make the negotiations unpleasant for Leopold I. However, an Imperial alliance with Sweden was still a thorn in Louis's XIV side.

VI/4 AFFAIRS OF THE IMPERIAL ELECTORS

As the alliance of France did not work out with the Scandinavian countries, Louis XIV was forced to find another ally, primarily within the Holy Roman Empire. Louis masterfully negotiated with the Electors, he also made several alliances which were directly against one another; for example, with Brandenburg and Saxony (which was against the Elector of Brandenburg) at the same time. Besides that, he even managed to secure votes of the Prince-Electors for pro-French candidates.⁵¹⁹ Thus, it could cause huge problems for Leopold and the Habsburgs overall. Unsurprisingly, Heinrich Franz kept an eye on these matters.

First, the "Great Elector" Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg (1640–1688), felt betrayed after the conclusion of the Peace of Nijmegen. The Elector of Brandenburg had to return all his territorial gains in the West Pomerania to Sweden, and the Emperor did not help him to divert this judgment (Sweden was an ally of France at that time, and on that account, the French king did help them to obtain their territories back). Then, the Elector of Brandenburg diverged from the Emperor and, at least, secretly joined the French side. On 25 October 1679, there was concluded a first treaty of alliance between Brandenburg and France.⁵²⁰ Based on

⁵¹⁷ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 5 September 1681, Paris.

⁵¹⁸ Ibidem, 9 February 1682, Paris.

⁵¹⁹ H. SCHILLING, *Höfe*, p. 230.

⁵²⁰ Ibidem, pp. 229–230.

Heinrich Franz's correspondence, it is however evident that he did not know about this alliance. However, there was a hint that something was going on in the letter from 2 December 1680. Mansfeld mentioned that there was a great reaction on the gift from the Brandenburg Elector, yet he also referred that Louis XIV gave an even more splendid and valuable gift back to the Elector: "*Des herrn churfürsten von Brandeburg hieher geschiktes praesent ist mit großer ostentation bey hoff gewiesen worden, so ein spiegel ist in einer agsteinenen rahm eingefaßt, woran die arbeit gar hoch ist aestimirt, das aequivalens aber im werth von denen köstlichen kleinodien, so hiesiger könig vorhero dahin verehrt hat nicht gefunden worden*"⁵²¹

In December 1680 Mansfeld informed the Emperor that the chamberlain of the French ambassador in Brandenburg had arrived and de Croissy immediately sent him back with an enormous amount of money. Mansfeld spoke directly to the Brandenburg minister Franz von Meinders,⁵²² but he told him he could not say anything crucial because he himself did not know whether the contract had already been signed. The French did not trust him yet, as he was still a newcomer; but what he heard was mainly focused on a potential danger from Sweden.⁵²³ This was another great example of the art of dissimulation by Meinders. He could not tell Mansfeld the truth – he simply lied. Nonetheless, both Scandinavian powers strongly opposed it.⁵²⁴ Only from the correspondence of the second half of December, the alliance between the French king and the Elector of Brandenburg came to light. This fact upset the ambassadors of both Nordic crowns and the United Provinces: "*Nunmehr erschallet an hiesigem hoff eine auffgerichte allianz zwischen dem könig undt chur Brandeburg, dieses hat absonderlich denen zweyen nordischen cronen, wie nicht weniger der general staaden anwesenden herrn: pottschafter große gelosien verursacht...*"⁵²⁵

As we already know, the Sun King and Frederick William broadened the treaties of alliance in 1681 and 1682. The Elector of Brandenburg believed that Louis XIV would help him with maintaining the city of Stettin, which he conquered in the Scanian War. Nonetheless,

⁵²¹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 2 December 1680, Paris.

⁵²² Georg HILTL, *Der große Kurfürst und seine Zeit*, Bielefeld 1880, p. 372.

⁵²³ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 18 December 1680, Paris. "...*ich habe meines orths mit dem chur Brandenburgischen ministro allhier in vertrauen von allem diesem umbständlich geredt, auß dem ich endtlich so viel gebracht habe, daß er nichts gründtliches sagen könne, noch das ein tractat vorhanden seye, noch dieses verneinen, so viel seye gewiß, daß wan etwas tractirt seye worden, daß es nicht durch seine handt gegangen seye, weilen er noch gar zu neu in diesen diensten seye, undt man ihm etwan dergleichen arcana noch nicht eröffnet, er glaube auch nicht, das wegen solcher allianz sein churfürst verhindert wurde, zu erhaltung undt ruhe des vatterlandts alles, wie er vorhin gethan, contribuiren zu können, undt so vil er von dieser sach habe reden gehört, so möchte es nur einige mesures concerniren so er wider die beförchtliche rach der Schweden mit hiesigem könig genommen habe...*"

⁵²⁴ Ibidem.

⁵²⁵ Ibidem.

the French King did not support him. On that account, Frederick William changed sides. In 1683, he sent his troops to defend the city of Vienna against the Turks. He invited the Huguenots, which were persecuted in France since Louis XIV cancelled the Edict of Nantes (1685), into the Brandenburg with the Edict of Potsdam. He even formed an alliance with the Emperor in 1686 in order to support the re-conquest of Hungary.⁵²⁶

Apart from the Elector of Brandenburg, the Elector of Cologne was an ally of Louis XIV, too. The House of Wittelsbach was present also in north-west of the Empire as the Electors of Cologne. The Elector of Cologne, Maximilian Henry of Bavaria (reign 1650 – 1688), asserted a pro-French attitude in Cologne and even tried to weaken the Emperor Leopold I as much as possible. What we have already seen in the case of his powerful adviser, the Strasbourg Bishop Franz Egon von Fürstenberg. In 1658, Maximilian Henry joined the League of the Rhine and temporarily accommodated Cardinal Mazarin. The Elector of Cologne concluded several treaties of alliance with France in 1666, 1671, and 1672.⁵²⁷ However, based on the correspondence, Heinrich Franz was not sure if the Elector of Cologne had already made any new alliances.

In August 1681, the Cologne envoy was granted an audience with the Sun King. Mansfeld was instructed to superintend this negotiation, yet it was not forthcoming because he did not reach the court at all; furthermore, he did not even meet any of the most influential men. The Imperial envoy had to be careful not to worsen the relationship between the Emperor and the Elector of Cologne, who could easily ally with France. Mansfeld thought that Louis XIV and the Elector of Cologne wanted to settle the matter of the unstable Liège.⁵²⁸

In the middle of September, the Cologne envoy secretly left the court; he also secretly acted for the whole time. Besides, Mansfeld attempted to find out from de Croissy what they had discussed – It was probably Liège affairs. Mansfeld said to them that the Emperor was already dealing with it; that is why the Emperor had sent the Imperial Court Councillor Johann Christoph Jodoci there.⁵²⁹

At the end of October, a person (Mansfeld did not specify who it was) from Cologne arrived telling Mansfeld that there were the large stores of grain, barley, straw, hay, armour, and weapons in the city of Cologne. The French had started to collect it there a year after the

⁵²⁶ Gerhard OESTREICH, headword: “Friedrich Wilhelm (Großer Kurfürst)”, in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 5 (1961), <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd11853596X.html#ndbcontent> [2023–02–14].

⁵²⁷ Günter CHRIST, headword: “Maximilian Heinrich, Herzog von Bayern”, in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 16 (1990), <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd10030673X.html#ndbcontent> [2023–02–14].

⁵²⁸ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 15 August 1681, Paris.

⁵²⁹ *Ibidem*, 12 September 1681, Paris.

conclusion of peace, and the price of items rose. Nonetheless, they did not sell anything. Further, over 1,000 French officers and soldiers served in the local garrison; that was a danger for the Emperor. Mansfeld warned Leopold I that a war could break out and if he would not help Cologne, he would lose the city.⁵³⁰

The French king also tried to use of the opportunity that Leopold I had a dispute with the Elector of Cologne and attempted to intensify the relationship with Cologne. However, Heinrich Franz reminded the Emperor of the danger in Cologne and Liège again in January 1682. The French troops were still under the pretence of a blockade of Luxembourg near Liège. The municipality of Cologne was mostly made up of friends of the House of Fürstenbergs, and there was a large warehouse of supplies in the city. Mansfeld counselled to Leopold I that an Imperial or Dutch garrison should be sent there, otherwise there was a danger that the municipality of Cologne would transfer to the French side as Strasbourg had done.⁵³¹

Needless to say, Mansfeld's effort in this case was, again, pointless. The Elector of Cologne applied the same pro-French approach in the following years as well; in addition, Maximilian Henry even concluded more treaties of alliance with France in 1683 and 1687.⁵³²

Nonetheless, Heinrich Franz did not focus on the French king's dealings with related electors, but, too, reflected Louis XIV's contacts with the Palatine Elector, who was eventually not an ally of the French realm. After the Peace of Westphalia, the Elector of Palatinate, Charles I Louis (1649–1680), lost the Upper Palatinate in favour of the Bavarian electorate. At this moment, Charles I slowly began to side with the French, deciding to cooperate with France through royal marriage. His daughter Elizabeth Charlotte (1652–1722) married Philippe I, Duke of Orléans, the younger brother of Louis XIV. This marriage was supposed to strengthen the Palatinate position and may have even helped with a potential restitution of the lost territories in 1648. The Elector of Palatinate hoped that the royal wedding would prevent the Palatinate from being attacked by Louis XIV.⁵³³ In the 1670s, the relations between the Palatinate and

⁵³⁰ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 24 October 1681, Paris. *„Eine gar neulich aus Cöllen anhero gelangte person sagt mit, das in dieser statt unbeschreiblich große magazinen an getraid, haber undt heu, auch allen nothwendigen ober- undt untergewehr auffgerichter sich befinden, denen benachbarten aber alle jalousie zu benemen, hetten die Franzosen solche gleich das iahr nach dem friden failgeschlagen, beinebens aber dermaßen im wehrt gestaigert, das nicht allein das geringste darvon nicht hette können gekaufft werden, sondern wurden gedachte magazinen unter der handt in allen stuken vermehret, undt findeten sich unterm vorwandt dieser inspection undt anderen praetexten würrklich über 1000 franzosen, officier undt gemaine allda, deren einige anzahl würrkliche dienst in der statt guarnison genomen, diese statt also, wan man nicht zeitlich rettete, bey der ersten bewegung in höchster gefahr ihres verlust stünde.“*

⁵³¹ Ibidem, 5 January 1682, Paris.

⁵³² Günter CHRIST, headword: “Maximilian Heinrich, Herzog von Bayern”, in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 16 (1990), <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd10030673X.html#ndbcontent> [2023–02–14].

⁵³³ H. SCHILLING, *Höfe*, p. 167.

France deteriorated as the Palatinate hesitated to side with France in the war. The French then invaded the Palatinate (1674); after the war in 1680 they applied the policy of Réunions to the part of the Palatinate territory and took the city of Germersheim.⁵³⁴ Successor to the Palatinate throne, Charles II, therefore went to England to seek help. Unfortunately, he did not succeed; but his father died in the summer of 1680 and Charles II became the Elector.

Mansfeld went to France at the time when the Elector of the Palatinate had died, and this influenced the beginning of his mission. The French court was in mourning, so Heinrich's first public audience in September was postponed: "*Die eingefallene traur durch des Churpfalz tödtlichen undt wie ich verspührehier zimblich erfreülichen hindritthat meine Audienz in etwas verschoben*".⁵³⁵ Nonetheless, Heinrich Franz noticed, and let the Emperor know in his letter from October 1680, that Louis XIV had attempted to establish a close relation with the new Elector Charles II (1680–1685). The Sun King offered him tax reliefs and a change in the resolution on the fortress of Germersheim.⁵³⁶ A mid-November 1680 missive is saying that the close relationship between the French king and the Elector of the Palatinate did not continue. The Elector claimed the possession of the town of Kreußenach as part of the County of Sponheim; he was afraid that the French king wanted to take it from him by force if he did not give it voluntarily. On that account, Mansfeld believed that none of the meetings would create an alliance.⁵³⁷ The Elector of the Palatinate did not accept the offer of the French court as the French threatened the Palatinate Minister to face military execution if he did not pay the overdue taxes immediately.⁵³⁸ That was positive information for the Emperor, as the Elector of the Palatinate suspected that Louis XIV wanted to attack him; he thus asked the other princes for help. They assured him of their loyalty; Mansfeld, however, assumed that the Elector would be left behind.⁵³⁹

This development of the events, of course, pleased Mansfeld and his Emperor. Even though the ruler of France did not make any alliance with the Palatinate, the electorate of Palatine played one of the main roles in 1685. Elector Charles II died in 1685 and his younger stepbrothers from the marriage of his father with Marie Luise von Degenfeld were not suitable as the inheritor since the marriage was morganatic. Louis XIV made a claim to inherit the territory of Palatine through the marriage of his brother – Philippe I, Duke of Orléans. This

⁵³⁴ Karl HAUCK, *Karl Ludwig, Kurfürst von der Pfalz (1617–1680)*, Leipzig 1903, p. 157.

⁵³⁵ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 21 September 1680, Paris.

⁵³⁶ Ibidem, 4 November 1680, Paris.

⁵³⁷ Ibidem, 18 November 1680, Paris.

⁵³⁸ Ibidem, 18 December 1680, Paris.

⁵³⁹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 23 July 1681, Paris.

demand of the French king was the match in the powder barrel to establish the Grand Alliance, which led directly towards the Nine Years' War (1688–1697).⁵⁴⁰



Figures 20–22: Portraits of Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg;⁵⁴¹ Maximilian Henry of Bavaria,⁵⁴² the Elector of Cologne; and Charles II, the Elector of Palatinate⁵⁴³

As follows from the aforementioned, Mansfeld had to rely on information that came to him outside of the official conversations. Any communication with other diplomats became crucial for Mansfeld soon. Thanks to them, he obtained information about events in both the French and non-French territories. Almost every missive mentioned a piece of information that was unofficially carried around the court. It was thus his main source of information. The French court was not particularly kind to him, but he was not alone in being treated this way. The French often treated the envoys of other courts with haughtiness. It is therefore not unsurprising that a relatively close bond arose between the representatives. In the case of Mansfeld, it is understandable that he mostly cooperated with the Spanish ambassador; they oft let each other know if they learned something that might be of interest to the other. For example,

⁵⁴⁰ H. SCHILLING, *Höfe*, p. 168.

⁵⁴¹ Painting by Gedeon Romandon, between circa 1687 and circa 1688, online source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/00/Kurfürst_Friedrich_Wilhelm_von_Brandenburg_4.jpeg/220px-Kurfürst_Friedrich_Wilhelm_von_Brandenburg_4.jpeg [2023–04–01].

⁵⁴² Author unknown, 1667, online source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/21/Maximilian_Heinrich_von_Bayern_lebensgroß.jpg/220px-Maximilian_Heinrich_von_Bayern_lebensgroß.jpg [2023–04–01].

⁵⁴³ Author unknown, between circa 1675 and circa 1699, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b7/Portrait_of_Karl_von_Pfalz-Simmern_%281657-1685%29.jpg/800px-Portrait_of_Karl_von_Pfalz-Simmern_%281657-1685%29.jpg [2023–04–01].

Mansfeld informed the Spanish ambassador when he found out that the protector of Fort Pignerol had informed the French king that Alexandria was unprotected.⁵⁴⁴

Mansfeld also maintained close relations with the Italian princes. He often directly advised the Emperor that it would be a good idea to promise them a support against France.⁵⁴⁵ The Italian princes suggested several times whether an alliance could be concluded with the Emperor. Mansfeld also had beneficial friends in the Venetians; at Mansfeld's request, the representatives of the Republic of Venice even helped to end the Hungarian rebellions. Thanks to their relations with Turkey, the Venetians were able to ensure that the Turks learned through their ambassador at Porta that the best way to annoy the French would be to stop support of the Hungarian rebels, and to order their allies in Transylvania and Moldavia to do the same.⁵⁴⁶

Mansfeld also had very friendly relations with the representatives of Sweden and the United Provinces – The Emperor even entered an alliance with them. The Imperial envoy also suggested a way to accept the rulers in present-day Italy into this alliance with the Swedes and the Dutch. He believed that a general alliance against France could also be achieved from this.⁵⁴⁷

Heinrich Franz was in a regular touch with the Imperial envoy in the Hague Johann Kramprich von Kronenfeld⁵⁴⁸ as well. Mansfeld often let the envoy in The Hague know what happened or if there was any threat. Further, Heinrich Franz informed the envoy in The Hague on 31 November 1681 that the city of Cologne was in danger; the envoy in The Hague should let the General Estates know immediately.⁵⁴⁹

Mansfeld also tried to maintain relations with others – such as the envoy from Cologne, for instance. Despite the fact that the Emperor did not have “great relations” with the Elector of Cologne, Mansfeld still managed to obtain a piece of information that could help further

⁵⁴⁴ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 24 October 1681, Paris. “*Ich hab solche alsogleich dem Spanischen potschaffter zu communiciren vor nöthig erachtet, beynebens auch ihne zu erinnern, das ich einen brieff von gubernator zu Pignerol geschriben, gelesen hab, in welchem er mit diesen worthen hiesigen hoff benachrichtiget, das Alexandria annoch ganz offen seye, man arbeite aber eine zeithero zimblich stark daran, seye also zu besorgen, das, wan man den Spaniern nochmehr zeit gebe der könig in Frankreich dieses plazs sich nicht soleicht mehr bemächtigen würde können.*”

⁵⁴⁵ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 27 August 1681, Paris.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibidem, 31 October 1681, Paris. “*...ich ermangle nicht meines geringen orths hiesigem Venedischen pottschaffter, weilen er abwesendt, auch schrifflichen zu widerholen, wie großen nutzen die Republic zu dem gemainen, undt ihrem eigenen besten schaffen könnte, wan sie durch ihren pottschaffter bey der porten anbringen laßen wolte, wie das die Türken hiesiger cron keinen größeren abbruch noch mißfallen, alß mit eigener abandonnirung sowohl der Ungarischen rebellen, alß mit scharpfem befelch an ihre gehuldigte Siebenbürgisch undt Moldauische fürsten ein gleiches zu thuen, erweisen könten.*”

⁵⁴⁷ Ibidem, 1 December 1681, Paris.

⁵⁴⁸ He was an Imperial diplomat in The Hague between 1679–1687. For further information, see M. BAKEŠ, *Diplomatem*, p. 129.

⁵⁴⁹ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 31 November 1681, Paris.

negotiations. On 11 December 1680, he even contacted the envoy Absolon from Transylvania after they had come from a secret audience with the King of France.⁵⁵⁰

VI/5 FURTHER INFORMATION

It was quite common that people came to Mansfeld because they wanted to join the Imperial services, or simply wanted to express their devotion to the Emperor, especially in the first year of his mission. The first such man, Georg Ludwig von Braunschweig-Lüneburg (1660–1727), future George I of Great Britain, was the eldest son of Osnabrück Lutheran Bishop and Duke of Hanover, Ernest Augustus. In 1676, he did participate in the siege of Maastricht, he spent the following years in the Rhineland where he made contacts and extended his social network, he also finished his formal education, being fluent in French, German, Latin, and commanding some Dutch and Italian.⁵⁵¹ When he arrived at the French court, Louis XIV almost immediately tried to make a deal with him. Despite having received tempting offers from the French, Georg Ludwig remained loyal to the Emperor. His pro-Imperial attitude stayed with him in following years as well; in 1683, he even took part in the battles near Vienna against the Turks.

In September 1680, Georg Ludwig intentionally met Mansfeld in the theatre, where he confirmed his loyalty to the Emperor: *“Ich habe im übrigen meiner höchsten schuldigkeit zu seyn erachtet E. K. M. annebens zu benachrichtigen, dass das Seiner bischöflichen gnaden zu Osnabrugg dhlt ältister herr sohn, welcher allem ansehen nach der rechtmäsige successor des Lüneburgischen hauses völliger lände seyn wirdt, sich am hiesigen hof befinde, undt vom demselben sehr caressiret werde, er aber ganz keine vasallen, wie andere gethan, dahier agiren wollen, noch weniger allen dem versuechungen, so ihme vielfeltig geschehen seindt, gehör geben, auss solche eingezogene nachricht gedunkte mich E. K. M. dienst zu seyn, dass in dero allerhöchstem nahmen ich ihme einige höfliche undt ganz gedinge expressione machen solte, zu welchem ende er mich an ein drittes orth undt zwar in die comedi beschieden hat, allwo ich nach vergnüegen mein intent habe erwichen könne, er hat alles nach wuntsch auffgenommen, allerunderthanigster treu gegen E. K. M. undt das Reich versichert, ich habe ihn ferner bewogen, wie angenehm E. K. M. dieses aus seinem aigenem mundt zu hören sein mögte undt das er von der rais nacher Wien noch wohl so content, als von der Pariserischen nacher haus*

⁵⁵⁰ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 11 December 1680, Paris.

⁵⁵¹ Ragnhild HATTON, *George I. Elector and King*, London 1978, no pages, in a PDF format p. 38.

kehren wurde, der könig, von deme er sich schon beurlaubet, hat ihme heut mit einem gar köstlichen mit diamant veretzten degen beschenket.“⁵⁵²




Figure 23: The Mention about Georg Ludwig in the Mansfeld’s Correspondence.



Figure 24: The Engraving of Georg Ludwig von Braunschweig-Lüneburg⁵⁵³

⁵⁵² ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 21 September 1680, Paris.

⁵⁵³ Engraving by Johann Christoph Weigel, dating unknown, online source: <https://image.invaluable.com/housePhotos/kiefer/77/708577/H2631-L266050270.jpg> [2023-04-01].

More and more people gradually came to visit Mansfeld, such as the field marshal Schönberg, who wanted to join the Emperor's service.⁵⁵⁴ The others came one after the other – for instance, the Irish Earl of Muskerry, or Monsieur de Salin from Lorraine. According to Mansfeld, both were pressured to enter the French service, but they refused; on the contrary, they wanted to join the side of the Emperor,⁵⁵⁵ as was true for many officials, the Huguenots, wanting to enter the Imperial service. They left the territory of France since the Sun King had allegedly threatened them with the death penalty. If the official could support themselves, Louis XIV allowed them to go to Brandenburg at the most.

Heinrich Franz also played a role of intermediary as he received the offers for the Emperor from the other diplomats. Apart from those asking for entering the Imperial service, there were often proposals for a marriage. For instance, after a visit of the Duchess of Mecklenburg at the Hanoverian court, Ernest Augustus, the future Elector of Hanover, and the duchess requested Mansfeld in order to ask Leopold I to assume the patronage of the marriage of Maximilian II Emanuel, the Bavarian Elector, with the Hanoverian princess Sophia Charlotte of Hanover.⁵⁵⁶ The Imperial envoy should let know a Bavarian envoy, for he could make the appropriate steps.⁵⁵⁷ The Hanoverians were not afraid of reminding themselves in this matter.⁵⁵⁸ Mansfeld reminded Leopold I of this matter in the beginning of 1682 as well.⁵⁵⁹

The Imperial envoy did not cope with political matters only – he informed the Emperor about the health of the Sun King, but mainly about the health of Dauphin and his wife. It nicely shows the multiple roles of our diplomat. On one hand, Mansfeld was the Mediator, on the other hand, he was the representative of the Emperor in the family matter, too. Both monarchs were related to each other, so it is quite understandable that they showed an interest in the health of their family members, even if they disagreed. In addition, the health issues also meant that there could potentially be some political advantages.

Mansfeld captured in his missive that Dauphin and his wife (Maria Anna Victoria of Bavaria) suffered high fevers and diarrhoea. Dauphin's wife had a severe fever and was under the care of doctors. She wanted to use the services of an English doctor who had experience

⁵⁵⁴ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 4 November 1680, Paris.

⁵⁵⁵ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 10 October 1681, Paris.

⁵⁵⁶ As we already know, nothing came of it. In 1684, Sophia Charlotte married Frederick of Hohenzollern (a son of Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg), who lately became the first king of Prussia – Frederick William I of Prussia. In 1685, Theodor von Strattman, already as a *Hofkanzler*, arranged the marriage of Maximilian II Emanuel with Leopold's oldest daughter, Maria Antonia of Austria. Maximilian believed that he could possibly gain entitlement to the Spanish throne by this marriage.

⁵⁵⁷ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 5 September 1681, Paris.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, 16 November 1681, Paris.

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, 26 January 1682, Paris.

with it. However, as Heinrich Franz mentioned (on 4 November 1680), it was rejected at the Court by saying that it was not needed yet: “...die Delphinin ligt ingleichen an einem hitzigen fieber gar schwehr dahin, die medici sorgen sich ihres auffkommens, anfänglichlichen war ihr zustandt allein ein dreytägiges sieber, undt weilen dahier ein Englischer medicus sich einfindet, so alle diese febres intermittentes gleich an der stell zu stillen waiß, hat sie ihn verlangt zu haben, undt sein mittelzu gebrauchen, welches ihr abgeschlagen worden , aus ursachen diese artzney ohne augenscheinliche gefahr unfruchtbar zu worden, nicht kan gebraucht seyn...”.⁵⁶⁰ Nevertheless, in the next letter (18 November) Mansfeld let the Emperor know that Dauphin and his wife were out of danger to their lives. The Imperial envoy continued to observe the health of the Royal family. After Dauphin’s problems returned, he stated in a letter that his stomach was completely destroyed: “...ein medicus aber sagt mir, das diese seine dissenterie ihnen noch vil zu schaffen geben werde, indeme sie es für ein altes, undt habituirtes übel halten, so von einem völlig destruirten magen herrühre.”⁵⁶¹ Heinrich Franz also informed Leopold about the pregnancy of Maria Anna Victoria of Bavaria. In the letter from 1 December 1681, he mentioned that the Court was cheerful since Maria Anna seemed to be pregnant; nonetheless, he added nothing would come out of it.⁵⁶² Later that month, Mansfeld apprised the rumours that Maria Anna had a miscarriage, and how these gossips were disproved. The French court started celebrating again since Dauphin’s wife was supposed to be in her second month.⁵⁶³

⁵⁶⁰ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 24, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 4 November 1680, Paris.

⁵⁶¹ Ibidem, 23 November 1680, Paris.

⁵⁶² ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 1 December 1681, Paris.

⁵⁶³ Ibidem, 19 December 1681, Paris. “Die iüngsthin erschienene geringe zaichen, so an der Delphinin schwangerheit einigen zweifel erweket haben, becräftigen beyglücklich, undt ohne geringsten zustandt nunmehr vorbegebrachten anderten monaths solche unfehlbare hoffnung anietzo umb soviel verläßlicher, worüber der ganze hoff in sonderbaren freüden stehet.”

CHAPTER VII: THE CLOSE OF MANSFELD'S MISSION

Mansfeld's mission was extended twice because of the Congress in Frankfurt. However, after several arguments with de Croissy, Mansfeld had not attended the court since the end of October 1681. The arguments between the minister and him were mainly over the inappropriate demands of Louis XIV. Examples such as the ruler of France wanting to buy the Fortress of Casale, to conquer the city of Strasbourg etc. After this incident, the other diplomats and courtiers were waiting on Mansfeld's reaction. That was why he decided not to be active at the French court anymore. At this point, Mansfeld was already aware of his next mission to Spain, hoping that it could be his excuse why he did not take a part in the court's festivities. At the end of October 1681, Mansfeld even asked the Emperor for permission to temporarily leave France without completely terminating his mission.: "*...alß ist wohl zu vermuten, mit was großen absehen aller augen auff meinen widerumb ersten eindritt nach hoff, und fernerer conduitte warten werden, weßentwegen ich auch dazumalen allein die künheit genomen, E. K. M. meine interims abforderung ohne völliger interruption doch dero abgesandschaft /: deßen allhier gebräuchliche, undt in diesem casu selbsten practicirte exempel auch allegirt habe :/ allerunderthänigsten vorzuschlagen; wohl wißendt, zu was nutzlichem exempel eines theils dieser passus gedienet, anderterseits auch E. K. M. allerhöchsten intention nicht wohl zuwider hette fallen können, maßen in omnem eventum zu fernerer negociation hierdurch die thüer offen were erhalten worden.*"⁵⁶⁴

On 1 December 1681, Mansfeld visited de Croissy again, saying that the Emperor had enjoined him to be the Imperial ambassador in Spain: "*...das ich ihm E. K. M. an mich ergangenen allergnädigsten befelch, auff das ich mich zur Spanischen rais unverzogens einrichten solle,...*"⁵⁶⁵ However, later that month, the situation escalated quickly. Mansfeld indeed refused to attend the court and visited de Croissy in his private house instead. In the end of December, de Croissy asked Heinrich Franz, if he would leave for his next mission in the winter. As Mansfeld did not receive any response from Leopold I, he just mentioned he was waiting for the Emperor's order. Moreover, Heinrich Franz said to de Croissy he wanted to make a journey in his personal matters hoping that the Emperor would give him permission.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁴ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 31 October 1681, Paris.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibidem, 1 December 1681, Paris.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibidem, 19 December 1681, Paris. "*Er fragte mich zum beschluß, ob meine raiß nach Spanien diesen winter noch fortgehen sollte, ich antwortete ihm, das ich hiezue zu allen stunden mich bereit finde, doch der tröstlichen hoffnung lebe, das im fall es E.K.M. allerhöchsten dissegnii nicht zuwider seye, ich eine kleine rais in meinen aigenen geschäften thun zu können allergnädigste erlaubnuß erhalten werde,...*"

Yet in the beginning of 1682, Mansfeld was trying to put the pressure on de Croissy for the violence Louis XIV was committing within the Holy Roman Empire. Mansfeld was of the opinion that the French should know that the Emperor would not let it be without consequence.⁵⁶⁷ Eventually, Leopold I allowed Mansfeld to leave to Central Europe and to prepare for his Spanish mission. Eventually, these “preparations” took the whole year!

The Imperial envoy attended official audience before his departure to Central Europe in February 1682. The young Karl of Harrach was also present, whom Heinrich Franz introduced to the king and court.⁵⁶⁸ Chassignet, secretary of legation, became head of the mission; however, he did not fare well. He was soon imprisoned in the Bastille. Mansfeld left behind his pregnant wife, Marie Louise d’Aspremont, who was taking care of their two-year-old daughter Maria Anna in Paris.⁵⁶⁹

In early March 1683, Mansfeld came back to Paris to say goodbye to de Croissy and to officially end his French mission. This last meeting contained one of the biggest arguments between both representants. The disagreement was about the salutation of the Queen of France in the correspondence – Leopold’s daughters entitled her as a “*muy affeta hermana y prima*”, which was unacceptable for the French court, and that is why they refused to answer to this letter. Mansfeld said that he did not understand what the problem was; the archduchess wanted to please the Queen. Moreover, Dauphin addressed the Emperor in a familiar way. Leopold I, too, was of the opinion that it was not such a big deal because they were all closely related. De Croissy opposed that it certainly was not the same thing since the archduchess was a daughter of the elected Emperor, but Dauphin was a son of the hereditary king: “*Dieser hitzige kopf [de Croissy] antwortet es gleich mit gewöhnlicher ungestimigkeit, dis seye warhaftig eine sehene gleichnuß, die ich zwischen dem delfin undt der erzherzogin machte; er extendirte sich mit aller unbeschaidenhaidt über; daß diese eine tochter eines eletiven kayßerß, jener ein sohn eines Erbkönig in Frankreich, dieser also dessen necessarius heres, eine khaum presumtiva der erblande seye, in ansehen noch zwey erzherzogen in leben sich befinden.*” However, Mansfeld

⁵⁶⁷ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 26 January 1682, Paris. “...*das man das werk eines theils nicht vor eine stillschweigende approbation, anderestheils aber auch nicht vor ein solches mißfallen außdeüten könne... das man französ. seits ganz kein stillschweigende approbation prasumiren, noch weniger eine extremität oder kriegs erklärung hierauß erzwingen kan, ...*”

⁵⁶⁸ Harrach had difficulties to get to the French court. His *hofmaister* Bílek blamed Mansfeld for this, whom he criticized, among other things, for laziness and failure to handle diplomatic duties. After studying Mansfeld’s correspondence, however, it seems that the Hofmeister judged the Imperial envoy unfairly – he did not know all the consequences. Mansfeld’s actions were understandable at the time. For Harrach’s stay in Paris, see J. KUBEŠ, *Karel z Harrachu*, pp. 69–81.

⁵⁶⁹ J. KUBEŠ – A. ADAMČIKOVÁ, *Imperial Envoys*, p. 385.

turned this conflict into the mockery since he bitterly thanked de Croissy for such a great explanation.⁵⁷⁰

It is magnificently evident how significant it was to use the accurate title. Disrespecting of the titles could, and surely would, lead to the further conflicts which could cause another delay of the negotiations. However, it was not only a conflict between the Emperor and the King of France, as these disputes over the precedence and the priority in the hierarchy of the Christian rulers were quite regular. The French king did emphasize and was always using the same argument that the Emperor was elected, and, on that account, he was not able to be more significant than the French king. Louis XIV also believed that he was the only one true inheritor of Charlemagne. However, a disagreement of this sort was also between the Emperor and the King of England. The King of England demanded the salutation as Majesty (*Maiestas*); nonetheless, the Emperor addressed him as Serene Highness (*Serenitas*). The English kings had been complaining of their incorrect salutation since the negotiations in Nijmegen; this conflict became substantial as time passed. Nevertheless, as soon as George I acceded to the throne, this disagreement calmed down.⁵⁷¹

The Imperial envoy also mentioned a lax approach of the French side in his last two letters. Mansfeld obtained the answers for the Emperor from Louis XIV, the Queen and Dauphin. The letter from the ruler of France was correct, but those from the Queen and Dauphin were with the wrong salutation; Heinrich Franz hence returned them. Owing to these wrong letters, the Imperial envoy had to prolong his stay at the French court; nonetheless, even after the second correction, the letter from Dauphin was still improper. Mansfeld was forced to return it again. Eventually, he had to leave for Madrid to start his next mission. Before his departure, Heinrich Franz did send an enormous extensive letter to Leopold, in which he summarized the overall situation of the Emperor's issue at the French court. He mentioned, for instance, that Louis XIV was afraid of a rising alliance of his enemies and that the Sun King wanted to divide and antagonize both branches of the Habsburg House at all costs: “...,so ser sie einen ieglichen besonderß undt auß der general bindnuß zertrenten mitgliedt in allen uberlegen sein; derenthalben sie durch alle mitel undt weg dise ihnen so nöthige zertrennung absonderlich daß hochlöb. ertzhauß beder linien, mit hechster aplication sich angelegen sein lassen, undt dise vorgeschutzte undt der gantzen welt so fridtsamb scheinente congressen zu Franckhfurth undt

⁵⁷⁰ ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 2 March 1683, Paris.

⁵⁷¹ Jiří KUBEŠ, *Imperial Envoys at the English and British Court (1660–1740): Reception Ceremonies and Disputes over Titles*, Court Historian, vol. 27, no. 1, 2022, pp. 53–56.

*Courtray sein in sich selbstn nichtes alß zur erwintchten disunion gelegte falstrickh geweßen, ...*⁵⁷²

It is symptomatic that Mansfeld's mission did end with the largest conflict throughout his whole mission. In fact, further relations between France and the Emperor were becoming colder in the following years. Count Johann von Althann did come to Paris on 16 October 1683, however, it was only the courtesy visit to express the deepest condolences to the death of Queen. La Gazzete mentioned this as follows: "*Le mesme jour [25 October], le Comte d'Alheim Envoyé Extraordinaire de l'Empereur; eut à Versailles audience du Roy, de Monseigneur le Dauphin, de Madame la Dauphine & de Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne, & il fit les compliments de condoléance sur la mort de la Reine.*"⁵⁷³




Figure 25: The Excerpt from La Gazzete 1683, p. 672

The secretary of Mansfeld's legation, Chassignet, stayed in Paris until January 1685. Longer lasting missions in France, however, were those of Johann Friedrich Seilern (January – September 1685) and of Wenzel Ferdinand Poppel von Lobkowitz (October 1685 – June 1688). Nevertheless, historians almost did not pay attention to these missions.⁵⁷⁴

La Gazzete was also informing about Mansfeld's mission to Spain; for example, on 17 August 1682, they announced that Heinrich Franz already had sent his suitcases to the embassy in Spain, they even noticed when the suitcases arrived there. Further, they reported about Mansfeld's departure to Spain on 2 October 1682.⁵⁷⁵ They keep referring to him in 1683, for instance, they apprised that he went in Frankfurt at the very end of December 1682.⁵⁷⁶ La

⁵⁷² ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, Frankreich, cart. no. 25, Mansfeld to the Emperor, 11 March 1683, Paris.

⁵⁷³ La Gazzete, Paris 1683, p. 672.

⁵⁷⁴ For further information, see J. KUBEŠ – A. ADAMČIKOVÁ, *Imperial Envoys*.

⁵⁷⁵ La Gazzete, Paris 1682, pp. 545, and 693.

⁵⁷⁶ La Gazzete, Paris 1683, pp. 30, and 72.

Gazzete mentioned that Heinrich Franz returned to France in the beginning of February 1683 and had an audience with the king and queen, with Dauphin and his wife, and with the Duke de Bourgogne. There is obviously a mention about Mansfeld's last official audience on 17 February; it was the last mention of his French mission. In further months, they monitored him as well; however, they already stated that he was the "*Ambassadeur de l'Empereur à Madrid*".⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁷ La Gazzete, Paris 1683, for example, pp. 222, 246, and 271.

CONCLUSION

Count Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld hailed from the Bornstedt branch of the family that was based primarily in Saxony but also in Bohemia where Mansfeld's brother owned the Dobříš domain. Heinrich Franz entered the Habsburg military service and soon rose through officer ranks; he was appointed as a colonel in 1675 and as an *Oberstfeldwachtmeister* four years later. He gained his first diplomatic experience during a short mission in Kassel (1677), and subsequently married Marie Louise, née Countess d'Aspremont, the widow of Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine (1679). Perhaps this wedding, his wife's perfect command of French or her family relations, spoke in favour of Mansfeld when Vienna considered sending a new envoy to France as Mansfeld's significant diplomatic credit was yet to come. On the other hand, the family relation to the Duke of Lorraine might have caused difficulties to him.

Times were bad for travelling, the plague was spread in Europe, and Mansfeld therefore reached Paris after almost a half year. He was warmly welcomed at the court of Louis XIV, but he seldom encountered the French king. In the first year he regularly met with his minister de Croissy, which needs to be stressed; however, the Imperial envoy did disassociate from visiting the French court from October 1681 onwards.

As an envoy at the French court, he was instructed to defend the current interests of the Emperor and the *Reich* because of increasing complaints about the French king breaching the stipulations of the Peace of Nijmegen and the Peace of Westphalia. Moreover, Leopold I and his advisors feared Louis XIV's intention to expand further, to prepare for a new war, and to gain at least the Casale Fortress in the Imperial fiefdom Monferrato, North Italy. Mansfeld was charged to resolve the Imperial complaints and disputes in Further Austria (Freiburg) regarding the disproportionately high taxes imposed on this area by the French administration. The Lorraine issue filled one third of the instruction; the count – who, as mentioned before, married the Duke of Lorraine's widow – received vast instructions to defend the interests of Charles V, the new Duke of Lorraine, and Emperor's brother-in-law, did not accept the terms of the Peace of Nijmegen and instead wanted to make a separate agreement with the French king; however, the latter refused to accept Lorraine diplomats. Ideally, Mansfeld was to mediate this communication but with great caution; he was ordered to mention only the crucial information without explicitly pressurising the restitution of Lorraine, although it naturally was the Emperor's main goal.

Mansfeld's entire mission was led in a rather careful mode. The instructions were clear – no unnecessary pressure and tactful negotiations; in case of impending conflict, he was

instructed to withdraw and use a more conciliatory tone. He absolutely should have talked the duke out of the war with France and to instead satisfy him with an offer to enter the Imperial service where he would be treated with relevant respect. Mansfeld also gave to Leopold I the latest information about the movement of the French troops in and out of the Kingdom of France, which was quite frantic at that time. Nevertheless, these pieces of information were, in fact, not as important as they pretended to be.

The analysis of the diplomatic reports of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld in France in 1680 to 1682 clearly shows that his mission cannot be labelled as “successful”. As it proceeds from another source, he failed again to come to the court for many months at the end of 1681. From November, Karl von Harrach and his steward Bilek visited the city above the Seine as part of the Grand Tour. They expected the envoy to introduce them to the court, but the effort was in vain. Yet, he eventually introduced Harrach to the king and the royal family members. A success of a mission of an early modern diplomat, however, cannot be judged by apparent results corresponding with the tasks written in his instruction only. Each diplomat had other, less obvious, goals, such as making contact among the rulers, ceremonial visits, and developing stories. Of the last two tasks, Mansfeld was successful. Unlike Count Czernin in Warsaw in 1695, Mansfeld never had problems with his audiences, he simply faced issues dealing with a proper appellation in his diplomatic letters. He also carried out his duties as a “diplomatic reporter” excellently, warning that the city of Strasbourg would be attacked. Moreover, he progressively unmasked the English and Brandenburg diplomats.

However, in comparison with other Imperial envoys after 1650 at the French court, he was doing as “nicely” as the others – All envoys struggled with similar difficulties and challenging tasks. Louis XIV effectively refused to concern himself with the complaints of the Imperial Estates, was hostile to the restitution of Lorraine (it was eventually accomplished during the Palatinate Campaign and owing to weapons, not negotiations), and many times postponed public and secret audiences to avoid regular meetings with Imperial diplomats. He rejected their written memorials and verbally trivialised most of the issues. It might appear that being appointed an Imperial envoy to France was a punishment that could not benefit the aforementioned noblemen. The opposite is true. From Mansfeld’s correspondence, we can clearly see his mounting self-confidence as he started to perform as an expert in French policy; he did not even hesitate to put forward own proposals. Eventually, Mansfeld openly advised his Emperor what to do, what solution could better?!

Mansfeld suspended his mission two times – first, due to lack of money (January to May 1681), again, owing to a planning of another mission, as well as for tense relations with Louis

XIV. In Mansfeld's absence, his qualified secretary of legation acted for him. Such "breaks" are not usual in the case of early modern diplomats.

Mansfeld was not in France alone. His wife stood by his side, one child was present at the French court and another child was born and raised there.

Although Mansfeld's mission evidently fell short of the Emperor's expectations, he did not hear any crucial reproaches, just like Windischgrätz (envoy in October 1670 to April 1671), and it did not hinder the count's career advancement. Before long, he was appointed as the ambassador to Spain (1683–1690), the Emperor nominated him to be the *Feldmarschall*, he was awarded the Order of the Golden Fleece in Spain, and, after his return to Vienna, he attained the highest positions at the Imperial court as the *Obristhofmarschall*, from 1694 on, President of the *Hofkriegsratpräsident*, from 1701 on, and the *Obristhofmeister*, from 1703 on. However, he was removed from the latter position after the death of Leopold I.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: The Portrait of Leopold I.....	20
Figure 2: The Portrait of Louis XIV	22
Figure 3: The Signing of the Peace of Nijmegen between France and Spain on 17 September 1678	34
Figure 4: Bruno von Mansfeld.....	51
Figure 5: Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld as an Imperial Feldmarchal	53
Figure 6: The Excerpt from Mansfeld’s Letter to General Montclair.....	66
Figure 7: The Map with the Highlighted Itinerary of Mansfeld’s Journey in 1680.....	67
Figure 8: The Engraving of Charles Colbert, Marquis de Croissy	71
Figure 9: The Engraving of Louis Verjus Comte de Crécy.....	74
Figure 10: The Map of Territories of the “Landgrave of Alsace”, with the Crucial Fortresses and Cities.	75
Figure 11: The Excerpt from La Gazette 1683	77
Figure 12: The Ground Plan of City of Strasbourg in 1680.....	84
Figure 13: The Capitulation of Strasbourg in 1681	84
Figure 14: The Portrait of Charles V, Duke of Lorraine	87
Figure 15: The Map of Territories of the Duchy of Montferrato with the Fort Casale and the Duchy of Mantua	89
Figure 16: The Engraving of Ferdinando Carlo Gonzaga.....	91
Figure 17: The Excerpt from the Secret Articles between Louis XIV and the Duke of Mantua	95
Figure 18: The Spain recognizing the Precedence of France.....	98
Figure 19: The Engraving of the King Charles II	101
Figures 20–22: Portraits of Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg;.....	111
Figure 23: The Mention about Georg Ludwig in the Mansfeld’s Correspondence. ..	114
Figure 24: The Engraving of Georg Ludwig von Braunschweig-Lüneburg.....	114
Figure 25: The Excerpt from La Gazette 1683	120

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: The List of the Imperial Diplomats in France and the French Diplomats in the Holy Roman Empire between 1679 and 1689	29
Table 2: The Itinerary of Diplomatic Journey of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld to France (1680–1682/1683).....	68
Table 3: Audiences of Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld with Louis XIV and Charles-François Colbert de Croissy.....	72
Table 4: The List of the Selected Diplomats in the French Court during the Mansfeld's Mission	97

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SOURCES

La Gazzete, Paris 1680–1683. Online:

<https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6458075r/f3.item.texteImage>. [10. 1. 2023].

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv

Staatenabteilungen, Frankreich, cart. n. 20, Mansfeld's instruction.

Staatenabteilungen, Frankreich, cart. n. 24, Mansfeld's reports from 1680.

Staatenabteilungen, Frankreich, cart. n. 25, Mansfeld's reports from 1681–1683.

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv

Hofzahlamtsbücher, books 109–137, financial payments to Mansfeld, his secretary of legation and other diplomats of Emperor Leopold I.

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Kriegsarchiv

Zentralstellen, Wiener Hofkriegsrat, Sonderreihen, Bestellungen und Vormerkprotokolle, book 2, Repertorium, 1639–1685, n. 1938. To the *Oberst-Patent* of Mansfeld.

EDITIONS

HARRACH, Ernst Adalbert von: *Die Diarien und Tagzettel des Kardinals Ernst Adalbert von Harrach (1598–1667)*, eds. Alessandro Catalano – Katrin Keller, vol. 7: Tagzettel 1661–1667, Wien–Köln–Weimar 2010.

Louis XIV: *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'Instruction du Dauphin*, ed. by Charles Dreyss, vol. 2, Paris 1860.

SOREL, Albert (ed.): *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les Traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française – Autriche*, Paris 1884.

WEIGLE, Fritz (ed.): *Die Matrikel der deutschen Nation in Siena (1573–1738)*, Band I, Tübingen 1962.

LITERATURE

ADAM, Wolfgang: – WESTPHAL, Siegrid (eds.): *Handbuch kultureller Zentren der Frühen Neuzeit. Städte und Residenzen im alten deutschen Sprachraum*, vol. 3, Berlin–Boston 2012.

ANDERSON, Matthew Smith: *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919*, London–New York 2013.

AUERBACH, Bertrand: *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France: depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française*, Paris 1912.

BAILLIE, Hugh Murray: *Etiquette and the Planning of the State Apartments in Baroque Palaces*, *Archaeologia* 101, 1967, pp. 169–199.

BAKEŠ, Martin – KUBEŠ, Jiří: *Imperial Chapels and Chaplains: A Comparative Study of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Dresden in the Later Seventeenth Century*, in: Robert Anderson – Charlotte Backerra (eds.), *Confessional Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe* (= Routledge

- Studies in Renaissance and Early Modern Worlds of Knowledge), London–New York 2021, pp. 200–221.
- BAKEŠ, Martin: *Diplomatem v půlnoční zemi: Zástupci Habsburků ve Švédském království mezi lety 1650–1730* [Diplomat in the Country of the Midnight Sun. Representatives of the Habsburgs in the Kingdom of Sweden (1650–1730)], Praha 2020.
- BAKEŠ, Martin: *Diplomatická mise jako nejistá investice. Antonín Jan z Nostic u stockholmského královského dvora (1685–1690)* [The Diplomatic Mission as a Non-guaranteed Investment. Antonín Jan of Nostitz at the Stockholm Royal Court (1685–1690)], Český časopis historický 113, 2015, no. 3, pp. 714–747.
- BAUMGARTNER, Frederic J.: *Henry II King of France, 1547–1559*, Duke 1988.
- BÉLY, Lucien: *Les relations internationales en Europe, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles*, Paris 1992.
- BÉLY, Lucien: *Louis XIV: le plus grand roi du monde*, Paris 2005.
- BÉLY, Lucien: *La France au XVIIe siècle Puissance de l'État, contrôle de la société*, Paris 2009.
- BÉLY, Lucien: *Objectifs et conduite de la politique extérieure*, ed. by Jean-Christian Petitfils, Le siècle de Louis XIV, Paris 2017.
- BENCZÉDI, László: *Hungarian National Consciousness as Reflected in the Anti-Habsburg and Anti-Ottoman Struggles of the Late Seventeenth Century*, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 10, n. 3/4, 1986, pp. 424–437.
- BÉRENGER, Jean: *Louis XIV, L'Empereur et l'Europe de l'Est, XVIIe siècle: bulletin de la Société d'étude du XVIIe siècle*, vol. 123, Année 31, N. 2, 1979, pp. 173–194.
- BÉRENGER, Jean: *Turenne*, Paris 1987.
- BÉRENGER, Jean: *Le Conflit Entre les Habsbourg et les Bourbons (1598–1792)*, Revue d'histoire diplomatique, vol. 116, 2002/3, pp. 193–232.
- BERTIÈRE, Simone: *Mazarin: le maître du jeu*, Paris 2007.
- BITTNER, Ludwig – GROß, Lothar (eds.): *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648)*, vol. 1 (1648–1715), Berlin 1936.
- BLOCKMANS, Willem Pieter: *Emperor Charles V 1500–1558*, Oxford 2002.
- BODART, Gaston: *Losses of Life in Modern Wars, Austria-Hungary*, Oxford 1916.
- BOIS, Jean-Pierre: *Louis XIV, roi de paix?*, Revue historique des armées, 263, 2011, pp. 3–11.
- BRAUBACH, Max: *Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV. bis Kaunitz. Die Vorstadien der diplomatischen Revolution im 18. Jahrhundert*, Bonn 1952.
- CARMONA, Michel: *Marie de Médicis*, Paris 1981.
- CARSTEN, Francis Ludwig: *The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 5 The Ascendancy of France 1648–88*, Cambridge 1961.
- CÉNAT, Jean-Philippe: *Le roi stratège: Louis XIV et la direction de la guerre, 1661–1715*, Rennes 2010.
- COBANOGLU, Dominik: *Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen den Osmanen und den Habsburgern im 17. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Großbotschaft von Graf Walter von Leslie im Jahre 1665/1666*, BA thesis, Wien 2017.
- COGNY, Pierre: *La France de Louis XIV 1650–1715*, Paris 1970.
- CROXTON, Derek – TISCHER, Anuschka: *The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical Dictionary*, Westport 2001.
- CROXTON, Derek: *Westphalia, the Last Christian Peace*, New York 2013.
- DELANO, Lucile Kathryn: *Charles de Lannoy: Victor of Pavia*, Springville 1984.
- DUSSIEUX, Louis: *Les grands généraux de Louis XIV: notices historiques*, Paris 1888.
- DYER, Thomas Henry: *The Supremacy of France and the Wars of Louis XIV*, San Diego 2015.
- FALCKE, Jeannette: *Studien zum diplomatischen Geschenkwesen am brandenburgisch-preußischen Hof im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 2006.
- FALKNER, James: *The War of the Spanish Succession 1701–1714*, Barnsley 2015.

- FELLNER, Thomas: *Anhang, Verzeichnis der Inhaber der obersten Hofwürden und der Vorstände der Zentralbehörden 1526–1749*, Wien 1907.
- FICHTNER, Paula Sutter: *Emperor Maximilian II*, Yale 2001.
- FRASER, Antonia: *King Charles II*, London 2002.
- FUBINI, Riccardo: *Diplomacy and government in the Italian city-states of the fifteenth century (Florence and Venice)*, in: *Politics and diplomacy in early modern Italy: the structure of diplomatic practice, 1450–1800*, Cambridge 2000, pp. 25–48.
- GEMMA, Allen: *The Rise of the Ambassadors: English Ambassadorial Wives and Early Modern Diplomatic Culture*, in: *The Historical Journal* 62/3, Cambridge 2019, pp. 617–638.
- GEYL, P.: *Johan de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1653–72*, *History*, vol. 20, no. 80, 1936, pp. 303–319.
- GIVEN-WILSON, Chris: *Henry IV*, Yale 2016.
- GONZÁLEZ CUERVA, Rubén – MAREK Pavel: *The Dynastic Network between the Imperial and the Spanish Courts (1556–1619)*, *A Europe of Courts, a Europe of Factions*, vol. 12, 2017, pp. 130–155.
- GROSE, Clyde Leclare: *Louis XIV's Financial Relations with Charles II and the English Parliament Author(s)*, *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1929, pp. 177–204.
- GUTHRIE, William P.: *The Later Thirty Years War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia*, Connecticut 2003.
- HATTON, Ragnhild: *George I. Elector and King*, London 1978.
- HAUCK, Karl: *Karl Ludwig, Kurfürst von der Pfalz (1617–1680)*, Leipzig 1903.
- HELMERS, Helmer: *Public Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe: Towards a new history of news*, *Media History*, 22 (3–4), 2016, pp. 401–420.
- HÖBELT, Lothar: *Ferdinand III. Friedenskaiser wider Willen (1608–1657)*, Graz 2008.
- HÖBELT, Lothar: *Von Nördlingen bis Jankau: Kaiserliche Strategie und Kriegsführung 1634–1645*, Wien 2016.
- HORNE, Alistair: *La Belle France*, New York 2005.
- HRBEK, Jiří: *Cesty evropské historiografie k diplomacii raného novověku* [Ways of European Historiography to the Diplomacy of Early Modern Period], *Theatrum historie* 13, 2013, pp. 7–30.
- HUTTON, Ronald: *The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668–1670*, in: *The Historical Journal* 1986, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 297–318.
- HYDEN-HANSCHO, Veronika: *The cultural role of diplomats in an age of war: French fashion in Vienna under Leopold I*, in: *The Seventeenth Century* vol. 36, no. 3, 2021, pp. 485–507.
- CHALINE, Olivier: *Chronologie, Dix-septième siècle*, vol. 3, no. 240, 2008, pp. 529–533.
- CHAUVET, Michèle: *Introduction à l'histoire postale*, Paris 2002.
- CHEVALLIER, Pierre: *Louis XIII, roi cornélien*, Paris 1979.
- INGRAO, Charles W.: *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618–1815*, Second edition, Indiana 2019 (1st Ed. 2000).
- KAMEN, Henry: *Philip V of Spain*, Yale 1999.
- KARAGÖZ, Hakan: *Der Habsburgisch-Osmanische Krieg von 1663/64 und der Friede von Eisenburg/Vasvár aus osmanischer Sicht*, *Burgenländische Forschungen: Die Schlacht von Mogersdorf/St. Gotthard und der Friede von Eisenburg/Vasvár 1664*, vol. 108, 2016, pp. 121–133.
- KAUZ, Ralph – ROTA, Giorgio – NIEDERKORN, Jan Paul (eds.): *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der Früher Neuzeit*, Wien 2009.
- KNECHT, Robert Jean: *Francis I*, Cambridge 1982.

- KRISCHER, André J.: *Souveränität als sozialer Status: zur Funktion des diplomatischen Zeremoniells in der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Wien, 2009, pp. 1–32.
- KUBEŠ, Jiří – ADAMČIKOVÁ, Anna: *Imperial Envoys in France in the Second Half of the 17th Century*, in: Petr Pavelec – Martin Gaži – Milena Hajná (eds.), *The Nobility of the Czech Lands on the Chessboard of European Diplomacy*, České Budějovice 2022, pp. 374–391.
- KUBEŠ, Jiří: *Trnitá cesta Leopolda I. za římskou korunou (1657–1658). Volby a korunovace ve Svaté říši římské v raném novověku* [The Thorny Path of Leopold I for the Roman Crown (1657–1658). The Elections and Coronations in the Early Modern Holy Roman Empire], České Budějovice 2009.
- KUBEŠ, Jiří: *Náročné dospívání urozených. Kavalírské cesty české a rakouské šlechty (1620–1750)* [The Difficult Maturing of the Nobles. The Grand Tours of the Bohemian and Austrian Nobility (1620–1750)], Pelhřimov 2013.
- KUBEŠ, Jiří: *Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz' Diplomatic Mission in Warsaw in 1695. A Contribution Towards the Travel Arrangements of Imperial Diplomats*, *Theatrum historiae* 19, 2016, pp. 171–203.
- KUBEŠ, Jiří: *Misja Dyplomatyczna Hermana Jakuba Czernina z Chudenic w 1695 R. Cesarski Ambasador i Rzeczpospolita u Schyłku Panowania Jana III Sobieskiego*, in: *Kronika Zamkowa* 3, no. 69, 2016, pp. 131–156.
- KUBEŠ, Jiří: *Karel z Harrachu ve městě nad Seinou (1681–1682): K roli pařížského pobytu ve výchově šlechty z habsburské monarchie ve druhé polovině 17. století* [Charles of Harrach in the City above the Seine (1681–1682): The Role of Parisian Stay in Raising Nobility from the Habsburg Monarchy in the Second Half of the 17th Century], in: Tomáš Jiránek – Karel Rýdl – Petr Vorel (eds.), *Gender history – to přece není nic pro feministky. Kniha, kterou napsali přátelé a studenti Mileny Lenderové u příležitosti jejího těžko uvěřitelného životního jubilea*, Pardubice 2017, pp. 69–81.
- KUBEŠ, Jiří (ed): *V zastoupení císaře: Česká a moravská aristokracie v habsburské diplomacii 1640–1740* [On Behalf of the Emperor: Bohemian and Moravian Aristocracy in Habsburg Diplomacy 1640–1740], Praha 2018.
- KUBEŠ, Jiří: *Imperial Envoys at the English and British Court (1660–1740): Reception Ceremonies and Disputes over Titles*, *The Court Historian* 27, no. 1, 2022, pp. 42–60.
- KUBEŠ, Jiří: *The Imperial Envoy Franz Sigmund Count von Thun and the Strategy of Dissimulation Used by the English King Charles II in the early 1680s* (an unpublished manuscript of the study).
- KUGELER, Heidrun R.I.: *'Le Parfait Ambassadeur'. The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the Century following the Peace of Westphalia*, Oxford 2006.
- LE GOFF, Jacques: *Is politics still the backbone of history?*, *Daedalus* 100, 1971, pp. 1–19.
- LEO Heinrich, *Zwölf Bücher niederländischer Geschichten. 2: Enthaltend die letzten sechs Bücher oder Die Geschichte der Niederlande vom Beginn der Herrschaft des Hauses Burgund bis 1830*, Hale 1835, p. 865.
- LYNN, John: *The Wars of Louis XIV 1667–1714*, London 1999.
- MACINTOSH, Claude Truman: *French Diplomacy during the War of Devolution, the Triple Alliance and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle*, Ohio 1973.
- MATTINGLY, Garrett: *Renaissance diplomacy*, Boston 1955.
- MENZEL, Wolfgang: *The History of Germany: From the Earliest Period to the Present Time*, vol. 2, London 1862.
- MÉTHIVIER, Hubert: *Le siècle de Louis XIV*, ed. Pierre Thibault, 2nd ed., Paris 1994.
- MÉTHIVIER, Hubert: *L'Ancien Régime en France, XVIe-XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles*, Paris 2003.
- MICHELS, Georg B.: *The Habsburg Empire under Siege: Ottoman Expansion and Hungarian Revolt in the Age of Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü (1661–76)*, Montreal 2021.

- MIKULEC, Jiří: *Leopold I. život a vláda barokního Habsburka* [Leopold I: The Life and Reign of a Baroque Habsburg], Praha-Litomyšl 1997.
- MILTON, Patrick: *The Mutual Guarantee of the Peace of Westphalia in the Law of Nations, and Its Impact on European Diplomacy*, *Journal of the History of International Law* 22, 2020, pp. 101–125.
- MONTASSIER, Gérard: *Mazarin: l'étranger qui a fait la France*, Paris 2015.
- MONTER, E. William: *A Bewitched Duchy: Lorraine and its Dukes 1477–1736*, Genève 2007.
- MORRIS, Richard L.M.: *Triumphal entries, ambassadorial receptions and banquets*, in: Erin Griffey (ed.), *Early Modern Court Culture*, London – New York 2022, pp. 231–244.
- MÜLLER, Klaus: *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden: (1648–1740)*, Bonn 1976.
- MURAT, Inès: *Colbert*, Paris 1980.
- NIEDERKORN, Jan Paul: *Diplomaten-Instruktionen in der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: Anita Hipfinger et al. (eds.), *Ordnung durch Feder und Tinte? Genese und Wirkung von Instruktionen im zeitlichen Längenschnitt vom Mittelalter bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Wien 2012, pp. 73–84.
- NIEMANN, Ludwig Ferdinand: *Geschichte der Grafen von Mansfeld*, Aschersleben 1834.
- NIMWEGEN Olaf van, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions 1588–1688*, Woodbridge 2010.
- NOLAN, Cathal J.: *Wars of the Age of Louis XIV, 1650–1715: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization*, Greenwood 2008.
- OLIVÁN SANTALIESTRA, Laura: *Judith Rebecca von Wrabna and Maria Sophia von Dietrichstein: Two Imperial Ambassadors from the Kingdom of Bohemia at the Court of Madrid (1653–1674)*, *Theatrum historiae* 19, 2016, pp. 95–117.
- OLLARD, Richard: *Pepys: a Biography*, Oxford 1974.
- PALADILHE, Dominique: *Le Grand Condé: Héros des armées de Louis XIV*, Paris 2008.
- PARISOT, Robert: *Histoire de Lorraine (duché de Lorraine, duché de Bar, Trois-Evêchés)*, Tome II: de 1552 à 1789, Paris 1921.
- PARROTT, David: *The Mantuan Succession, 1627–31: A Sovereignty Dispute in Early Modern Europe*, *The English Historical Review*, vol. 112/445, 1997, pp. 20–65.
- PARROTT, David: *1652 The Cardinal, the Prince, and the Crisis of the Fronde*, Oxford 2020.
- PATTON, Steven: *The Peace of Westphalia and its Effects on International Relations, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, *The Histories*, vol. 10, issue 1, 2019, pp. 91–99.
- PÉRINI, Édouard Hardÿ de: *Batailles françaises*, vol. 5, Paris 1896.
- PFANDL, Ludwig: *Karl II. Das Ende der spanischen Machtstellung in Europa*, München 1940.
- POHLIG, Matthias: *Gender and the Formalisation of Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe*, in: *The International History Review*, vol. 44, no. 5, 2021, pp. 1062–1076.
- RANUM, Orest – RANUM, Patricia: *The Century of Louis XIV*, London–Basingstoke et al. 1972.
- RANUM, Orest: *Paris in the Age of Absolutism*, Pennsylvania 2002.
- REDLICH, Oswald: *Österreichs Grossmachtbildung in der Zeit Kaiser Leopolds I.*, Gotha 1921.
- REDLICH, Oswald: *Weltmacht des Barock: Österreich in der Zeit Kaiser Leopolds I.*, Wien 1961.
- RICHARDT, Aimé: *Louvois le bras armé de Louis XIV*, Paris 1998.
- RICHES, Daniel: *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture Brandenburg-Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, Leiden–Boston 2013.
- ROHRSCHEIDER, Michael: *Das französische Präzedenzstreben im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV.*, *Francia – Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte* 36, 2009, pp. 135–179.
- ROOSEN, William James: *Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach*, *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 52, no. 3, 1980, pp. 452–476.

- ROOSEN, William James: *The Functioning of Ambassadors under Louis XIV*, French Historical Studies, vol. 6, no. 3, 1970, pp. 311–332.
- ROOSEN, William James: *The age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, London–New York 2017.
- ROWEN, Herbert H.: *John de Witt and the Triple Alliance*, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 26, no. 1, 1954, pp. 1–14.
- SABATIER, Gérard: *Les itinéraires des ambassadeurs pour les audiences à Versailles au temps de Louis XIV*, in: Ralph Kauz, Giorgio Rota, Jan Paul Niederkorn (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der Früher Neuzeit*, Wien 2009, pp. 187–211.
- SANDLER, Stanley: *Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia*, vol. 1, Santa Barbara 2002.
- SCHILLING, Heinz: *Höfe und Allianzen: Deutschland 1648–1763*, Berlin 1998.
- SCHULZE, Hermann: *Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes*, vol. 2, Leipzig 1886.
- SIENEL, Stefan: *Die Geheime Konferenz unter Kaiser Leopold I.: personelle Strukturen und Methoden zur politischen Entscheidungsfindung am Wiener Hof*, Frankfurt am Main–Berlin–Bern–Bruxelles–New York–Oxford–Wien 2001.
- SONNINO, Paul: *Mazarin's Quest – The Congress of Westphalia and the Coming of the Fronde*, London 2008.
- SOREL, Albert (ed.): *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les Traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française – Autriche*, Paris 1884.
- SOWERBY, Tracey Amanda: *Diplomats*, in: Erin Griffey (ed.), *Early Modern Court Culture*, London–New York 2022, pp. 109–122.
- SOWERBY, Tracey Amanda– HENNINGS, Jan (eds.): *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c.1410–1800*, London 2017.
- SPANGLER, Jonathan: *Court Faction Overwhelmed by Circumstance: The Duchy of Lorraine Torn between Bourbon and Habsburg, 1624–1737*, in: Rubén González Cuerva – Alexander Koller (eds.), *A Europe of Courts, a Europe of Factions: Political Groups at Early Modern Centres of Power (1550–1700)*, Leiden–Boston 2017, pp. 197–218.
- STARKEY, David: *Introduction. Court history in perspective*, in: *The English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War*, ed. Ibidem, London – New York 1987, pp. 1–24.
- STEINER, Philip: *Die habsburgische Großbotschaft unter Walter Leslie anhand des Reiseberichts des jesuitischen Gesandtschaftskaplans Paul Tafferner (1665/66)*, in: Karin Sperl – Martin Scheutz – Arno Strohmeyer (eds.), *Die Schlacht von Mogersdorf/St. Gotthard und der Friede von Eisenburg/Vasvár 1664. Rahmenbedingungen, Akteure, Auswirkungen und Rezeption eines europäischen Ereignisses*, Eisenstadt 2016, pp. 233–268.
- STOYE, John: *The Siege of Vienna: The Last Great Trial Between Cross & Crescent*, New York 2007.
- STRADLING, Robert Arthur: *Philip IV and the Government of Spain 1621–1665*, Cambridge 1988.
- THIESEN, Hillard von: *Diplomatie und Patronage. Die spanisch-römischen Beziehungen 1605–1621 in akteurszentrierter Perspektive*, Epfendorf 2010.
- THIESEN, Hillard von: *Diplomatie vom type ancien. Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens*, in: *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen, Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, vol. I, Köln – Weimar–Wien 2010, pp. 471–504.
- TISCHER, Anuschka: *Französische Diplomatie und Diplomaten auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß: Außenpolitik unter Richelieu und Mazarin*, Münster 1999.
- TÓTH, Hajnalka: *The Circumstances and Documents of the Peace of Vasvár*, Archivum Ottomanicum, vol. 34, 2017, pp. 243–256.
- TREASURE, Geoffrey: *Louis XIV*, London–New York 2013 (1st Ed. 2001).

- TROOST, Wouter: *Leopold I, Louis XIV, William III and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession*, History, vol.103, no. 357, 2018, pp. 545–570.
- VIGNA, Guido: *Storia di Mantova*, Milan 1989.
- VLČEK, Pavel: *Ilustrovaná encyklopedie českých zámků* [Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Bohemian Castles], Praha 1999.
- WEIGLE, Fritz (ed.): *Die Matrikel der deutschen Nation in Siena (1573–1738)*, vol. 1, Tübingen 1962.
- WHALEY, Joachim: *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, vol. 2: *From the Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich 1648–1806*, Oxford 2012.
- WICQUEFORT Abraham Van, *L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions I–II*, Cologne 1715.
- WILSON, Peter Hamish: *Europe's Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years War*, London 2009.
- WOLF, Adam: *Fürst Wenzel Lobkowitz, erster geheimer Rath Kaiser Leopold's I. 1609–1677. Sein Leben und Wirken*, Wien 1869.
- WOLF, John Baptist: *Louis XIV*, Gollancz 1968.
- WURZBACH, Constantin: *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Österreich – Sechzehnter Teil – Londonia – Marlow*, Graz 1867.
- YOUNG, William: *International Politics and Warfare in the Age of Louis XIV and Peter the Great*, Lincoln 2004.
- ZEDLER, Johann Heinrich: *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, Leipzig 1739.
- ZINNER, Harald: *Das Gartenpalais Mansfeld-Fondi-Schwarzenberg. Genese eines barocken Gartenpalais unter Einbeziehung des Milieus der Wiener Adelsarchitektur*, MA thesis, Wien 2011.

ONLINE SOURCES

Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias, headword: “Öküz Kara Mehmed Pasha”, online source: <https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/2045079.html> [2022–09–02].

Alfred STRNAD, headword: “Margarethe”, in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 16 (1990), <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118730991.html#ndbcontent> [2022–09–02].

Dorothea BERGSTRAESSER, headword: Herberstein, Sigmund Freiherr von (Reichsfreiherr 1537), in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 8, online source: <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118710656.html> [2022–10–03].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Abraham de Wicquefort“, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abraham-de-Wicquefort> [2022–10–03].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Bengt Gabrielsson, Count Oxenstierna”, online: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Bengt-Gabrielsson-Greve-Oxenstierna> [2023–01–03].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Charles IX. (King of France)”, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-IX-king-of-France> [2022–09–19].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Frederick William of Brandenburg”, online: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-William-elect-of-Brandenburg> [2022–11–09].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa”,
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Koprulu-Fazil-Ahmed-Pasa> [2022–09–02].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Luis Méndez de Haro“,
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Luis-Mendez-de-Haro> [2022–09–20].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Magnus Gabriel, count de la Gardie”, online:
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Magnus-Gabriel-Greve-De-la-Gardie> [2023– 01–02].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Peace of the Pyrenees”,
<https://www.britannica.com/event/Peace-of-the-Pyrenees> [2022–02–16].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Armand I de Bourbon, prince de Conti”,
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Armand-I-de-Bourbon-prince-de-Conti> [2022–09–14].

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Caesar, duc de Choiseul”,
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Choiseul,_César [2022–09–15]

Encyclopaedia Britannica, headword: “Henri II d’Orléans, duke de Longueville”,
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henri-II-dOrleans-duc-de-Longueville-duc-de-Coulommiers>. [2022–09–14].

Felix STIEVE, headword: “Mansfeld, Bruno III. Graf von“, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 20 (1884), online source: <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd137124627.html#adbcontent> [2022–05–20].

Felix STIEVE, headword: “*Mansfeld, Bruno III. Graf von*“, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 20 (1884), online edition: <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd137124627.html#adbcontent> [2022–05–20].

Franz Maximilian Mansfeld (1639–1692), in: Kaiser und Höfe, Personendatenbank der Höflinge der Österreichischen Habsburger in der Frühen Neuzeit, online source: <https://kaiserhof.geschichte.lmu.de/14068> [2022–11–27].

Gerhard OESTREICH, headword: “Friedrich Wilhelm (Großer Kurfürst)”, in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 5 (1961), <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd11853596X.html#ndbcontent> [2023–02–14].

Günter CHRIST, headword: “Maximilian Heinrich, Herzog von Bayern”, in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 16 (1990), <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd10030673X.html#ndbcontent> [2023–02–14].

Hanns SCHLITTER, headword: “Strattmann, Theodor von”, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 36 (1893), online source: <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd119316900.html#adbcontent> [2022–11–09].

Heinrich Franz Mansfeld (1641–1715), in: Kaiser und Höfe, Personendatenbank der Höflinge der Österreichischen Habsburger in der Frühen Neuzeit, online source: <https://kaiserhof.geschichte.lmu.de/14069> [2022–11–10].

Jochen VÖTSCH, headword: “Bruno III. von Mansfeld-Bornstedt“, in: Sächsische Biografie, hrsg. vom Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V., online source: <http://www.isgv.de/saebi/> [2022–05–18].

Jochen VÖTSCH, headword: “Heinrich Franz I. von Mansfeld-Bornstedt“, in: Sächsische Biografie, hrsg. vom Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V., online source: [https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich%20Franz%20I.,%20Fürst%20von%20Mansfeld-Bornstedt%20\(1641-1715\)](https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Heinrich%20Franz%20I.,%20Fürst%20von%20Mansfeld-Bornstedt%20(1641-1715)) [2022–04–25].

Karl Friedrich Hermann ALBRECHT, headword: “Karl, Herzog von Lothringen“, in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 15 (1882), online source: <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118720902.html#ndbcontent> [2022–09–02].

Karl SOMMEREGER, headword: “Mansfeld-Fondi, Heinrich Franz Fürst von“, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 52 (1906), online source: <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd121795063.html#adbcontent> [2022–11–10].

Randall LESAFFER, *The Wars of Louis XIV in Treaties (Part II): The Peace Treaty of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) (2 May 1668)*, online source: <https://opil.ouplaw.com/page/Peace-Treaty-of-Aachen> [2022–07–15].

Randall LESAFFER, *The Wars of Louis XIV in Treaties (Part IV): The Second Peace of Westminster (19 February 1674)*, online source: <https://opil.ouplaw.com/page/second-peace-westminster> [2022–07–15].

Randall LESAFFER, *The Wars of Louis XIV in Treaties (Part V): The Peace of Nijmegen (1678–1679)*, online source: <https://opil.ouplaw.com/page/peace-of-nijmegen> [2022–07–15].

Samuel PEPYS, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, ed. by Richard Le Gallienne, New York 2003, p. 81, online source: <https://www.pepysdiary.com/diary/1661/09/30/> [2022–09–19].