

THE UNIVERSITY OF PARDUBICE

Faculty of Arts and Philosophy

**Otherwise than Anthropocentrism:
Levinas Face-to-Face with the Animal**

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Doctoral Dissertation

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Mira Reyes b.o.h.

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Mira T. Reyes'.

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ANNOTATION

This work cultivates further the path opened by Levinasian scholars trying to explore if the ethics of the face of Levinas, considered by many philosophers as an original vision that is a turning point in the history of ethics, and putting at the forefront the holocaust as a major paradigm for all kinds of societal discrimination, as a possible philosophical path for giving moral consideration and dignity to the plight of the nonhuman animal.

My particular thesis problem is stated as thus: could Levinas's ethics serve the interests of animal ethics? I approached the problem by: *first*, exonerating Levinas from the charges of anthropocentrism as defined scholarly in the field of animal ethics; *second*, by identifying two guiding principles that serve as standard if my application of Levinasian ethical concepts would keep fidelity with Levinas's ethical agenda; *third*, by applying Levinas's concepts of *il ya* and nausea, face and other, eros and filiation to the central problems in animal ethics; and *fourth*, by concluding in what ways Levinas makes a contribution to the discourse of animal ethics which confirms that Levinasian ethics does advance the interest of animal ethics to uphold the dignity of animals.

KEYWORDS

Levinas, ethics, animal ethics, ethics of the face of the animal, otherness of the nonhuman animal, anthropocentrism, animal care ethics, anthropogenic climate change, animal as significant love

ANOTACE

Tato práce dále rozvíjí cestu, kterou otevřeli levinasovští badatelé, snažící se prozkoumat, zda etika Levinasovy tváře, kterou mnozí filosofové považují za originální vizi, jež je přelomem v dějinách etiky a která staví do popředí holocaust jako hlavní paradigma pro všechny druhy společenské diskriminace, je možnou filosofickou cestou, jak dát morální ohled a důstojnost osudu nelidských zvířat.

Problém mé konkrétní teze je formulován takto: Mohla by Levinasova etika sloužit zájmům etiky zvířat? K tomuto problému jsem přistoupil takto: *Za první*, zbavil jsem Levina obvinění z antropocentrismu, jak je odborně definován v oblasti etiky zvířat; *za druhé*, určil jsem dva hlavní principy, které slouží jako standard, pokud by moje aplikace Levinasových etických konceptů zachovala věrnost Levinasovu etickému programu; *za třetí*, aplikací Levinasových pojmů *il ya a nevolnost*, *tvář a druhý*, *eros a synovství* na ústřední problémy etiky zvířat; a *za čtvrté*, závěrem, jakým způsobem Levinas přispívá k diskurzu etiky zvířat, který potvrzuje, že levinasovská etika skutečně podporuje zájem etiky zvířat na zachování důstojnosti zvířat.

KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA

Levinas, etika, etika zvířat, etika tváře zvířete, jinakost nelidského zvířete, antropocentrismus, etika péče o zvířata, antropogenní změna klimatu, zvíře jako významná láska.

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Chapter 1

Otherwise than Anthropocentrism

1.1 INTRODUCTION

I consider this thesis a soulwork that merges these two passions: Levinas and animals. It is sparked by a rather peculiar story of the Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1995), during WW II when he was drafted to the French army fighting on the frontlines. In 1939, Levinas, born in Lithuania but educated in France, was granted French citizenship because of his intellectual achievements. He fought the Germans under the flag of France. The tenth army to which he belonged lost in the battle of Somme and surrendered on June 18, 1940. He was then taken as prisoner-of-war along with the other members of his troops but they were protected under the Geneva Convention, even if they happen to be Jews. Levinas was later moved to a camp in Fallingsbostel, deployed into Stalag XIB, and forced to do hard labor cutting timber in the forest. It was those times that Levinas met the dog, Bobby¹. From his essay *The Name of the Dog, or Natural Rights* which appears in the book *Difficult Liberty*, Levinas relates this story:

And then, about halfway through our long captivity, for a few short weeks, before the sentinels chased him away, a wandering dog entered our lives. One day he came to meet this rabble as we returned under guard from work. He survived in some wild patch in the region of the camp. But we called him Bobby, an exotic nam, as one does with a cherished dog. He would appear at morning assembly and was waiting for us as we returned, jumping up and down and barking in delight. For him, there was no doubt that we were men.²

In the above essay, Levinas initially sets a stage of abhorrence for the beast, citing *Exodus* 22:3 wherein it is said that God instructs the consecrated race of Israel not to eat from the flesh torn by beasts, mentioning the carnivorous struggles between wild animals and the

¹ MALKA, Salomon. *Emmanuel Levinas: His life and legacy*. Translated by Michael KIGEL. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 2006, pp. 65, 67, 71.

² LEVINAS, Emmanuel The name of the dog or Natural Rights. Translated by Sean HAND. *Difficult freedom: Essays on Judaism*. Maryland: The Athlone Press, 1990, p. 153.

despicable fate of stray animals. Then, he redeems the face of the beast and makes a powerful reversal in the character of Bobby. This happy dog becomes the modern prefiguration of the dogs of Israel in Exodus 11:17, who recognized the consecrated people of God by keeping silent and refraining from howling during that fatal night "when the Angel of Death passed and killed all the Egyptian first-borns. Bobby is supposedly a dog owned by the Germans, but then he was not Nazi. Bobby knew how to recognize the humanity of the inmates by greeting them with barks of joy. Upon this, Levinas invests Bobby the title of being the 'last Kantian in Nazi Germany' and exalts the subjectivity of the dog: [. . .] the dog will attest the dignity of its person. This is what the friend of man means. There is a transcendence in the animal!"³

This transcendence in the animal in the thought of Levinas is the interest of this thesis.

1.1.1 Statement of the Problem and Objectives

The problem is stated as thus: could Levinas's ethics serve the interests of animal ethics? If so, how? Starting with the end in mind, this question would be satisfactorily addressed if this thesis would be able to meet these four essential demands:

1. To present the charges of anthropocentrism against Levinas's ethics by recent Levinasian scholars, to clarify their stand and that of Levinas;
2. To draw from the core of Levinas's philosophy some guiding principles that would serve as standard in determining if the interpretation and application of his significant ethical concepts to the current problems in animal ethics exhibits fidelity to the framework and current of Levinasian ethics;
3. To articulate and apply the significant ethical concepts in Levinas's thought that would address and enlighten the current problems in animal ethics;
4. To determine the unique contribution of Levinas's thought to the contemporary animal ethics discourse.

³ Ibid., p. 152.

The following parts in this introductory chapter will respond to the first two items: the recent academic discussions on the problem of anthropocentrism in Levinas and the demand for finding some interpretive guidelines in applying Levinas's ethical concepts to animal ethics. These would not only refine the aims and trajectory of this thesis but will also clarify the basis for determining if the employment of Levinas's ethical concepts would keep fidelity with the substantial aims of Levinas's ethics. The ensuing chapters would employ Levinas's major moral concepts to deal with the blind spots in the interrogations of animal ethics and these are: the *il y a*, the face, eros, and filiation. The task of the terminal concluding chapter is to demonstrate how the flow of the discussion demonstrates fidelity to the framework of Levinas's ethics and to determine the unique endowment of Levinasian philosophy to animal ethics.

1.1.2 Scope and Limitations

To delineate the limits of this project, the scope will cover only the issues involving animal ethics and will not take up problems that concern the plant kingdom, the abiotic environment, the non-sentient animals, i. e., sponges, corals, anemones, hydras, etc., and the microbiological world. The motive is not to discriminate against other species, as this research is well cognizant of the cyclical dependence of all forms of life on each other. It is simply to acknowledge the limitations of the scope of the problem and to focus for a more defined, cohesive, and effective discussion in showing that Levinas's ethics has the capacity for considering the animal as face and other that could resist the centripetal force of the egoism of the human species: ideology we ascribe the term 'anthropocentrism.'

1.1.3 Usage of Terms

The use of terms also need to be laid down. I am aware of the preference of animal ethicists to use the politically-correct term 'nonhuman animals' when referring to them. It is acknowledged as a scientific fact that humans are animals, too. Following Levinas's vision that the origin of language is responsibility for the other and my belief that the critical use of

language in animal ethics would rehabilitate the image of the animal, I would like to use the term ‘nonhuman animal’ but I would prefer to abbreviate it to ‘nh animal’ to save space and avoid the tediousness of repeating ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman animal’ all the time.

Since this thesis affirms the subjectivity of nh animals, the gender preposition that I intend to use for a nh animal is ‘he,’ and, for the human person, ‘she,’ that is, to offset the too prevalent identification of vulnerability in animals with the feminine gender, and inversely, the identification of the human person in philosophy with the masculine gender.

In Levinasian scholarship, the use of the terms ‘Face’ and ‘Other’ are used in small and big cases, and it is not clear what they mean. According to Dino Galetti, there is a mayhem among Levinasian scholars involving the meaning of the Levinas’s usage of four terms: *autre/Autre* and *autrui/Autrui*. He says that Lingis, a prominent translator of Levinasian works, renders *l’autre* as ‘the other’, and *autrui* as ‘the Other.’⁴ He also notes that Edith Wyschogrod uses ‘the other’ and ‘the Other’ to mean *Autre* and *Autrui*.⁵ Adrian Peperzak admits the difficulty in the translation of the four terms but from the similarities in practices between Levinasian scholars, the ‘other’ is employed to mean anything, like a thing or a person. The ‘Other’ is used to refer to the human person.⁶ I will not anymore join the fray considering that this research is not an exclusive study on Levinasian philosophy but an application of central ethical concepts on problems in animal ethics. I prefer to simply employ ‘other’ and ‘face’ in small case to refer to a persona whether human or nh animal and the entire realm of otherness as an abstract conceptual dimension of what could be otherwise.

1.2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

It would do well to begin by presenting the review of philosophical literature that surrounds the theme and title: what does it mean to search for the otherwise of anthropocentrism?

⁴ GALETTI, Dino. The grammar of the other, Other, *autrui*, *Autrui*: Addressing translation conventions and interpretation in English-language Levinas Studies and a response. *South African Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34 (2015), nr. 2, pp. 199-120.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁶ *Ibid.*

This question will be answered in three segments: *one*, defining anthropocentrism in the current discourse of animal ethics and determining what kind of anthropocentrism is charged against Levinas; *two*, reviewing the philosophical arguments that hold down Levinas for anthropocentrism and responding to each of them in defense of his thought; and, *three*, drawing up some principle guidelines that would determine if the application of the significant ethical concepts of Levinas would still be loyal to the essence of his ethics and would serve Levinas's ends. The caution exercised here serves the reason of respecting Levinas, ensuring that his philosophical concepts should not run contrary to the cause of his philosophy. These guidelines would posit spearhead questions that would direct the flow of discussion in the next chapters in ferreting out a Levinasian approach to animal ethics.

In short, this thesis makes a claim that Levinas's ethics could serve the interests of animal ethics. This could be accomplished if the focus is made on the employment of his central ethical concepts on significant problems of non-human animals instead of 'nitpicking' on Levinas's ambivalent anthropocentric remarks on non-human animals.

1.2.1 Anthropocentrism, Humanism and Speciesism

This part will discuss the central issues regarding the charges of anthropocentrism against Levinas's ethics. The idea is that if Levinasian ethics is hard-core anthropocentric, then it is futile to use his framework for animal ethics and so this thesis is null and void. If he is not, then the job is to find a way to explain how his ethics may be used as an approach to the problems of animal ethics.

It is imperative to define initially what is anthropocentrism and its entanglements with humanism and speciesism. Adam Weitzenfield and Melanie Joy define anthropocentrism as thus:

Anthropocentrism is a belief system, ideology of human supremacy that advocates privileging humans (and those who approximate humanity). Anthropocentrism, as an ideology, functions to

maintain the centrality and priority of human existence through marginalizing and subordinating nonhuman perspectives, interests, and beings.⁷

I understand ‘ideology’ here to mean in the sense of Louis Althusser to refer to ”an imaginary relationship of individuals to their conditions of lived existence.”⁸ It is not so much a political propaganda as it is more of an unconscious belief system that catalyzes a system of representations which transform the living subject through social practices and personal rituals as prompted by the ideological apparatus. An ideology is less of a belief with conviction as it is more of an imagined system of representations imputed on the material body to live out a set of habitual practices and performances by the subject that slowly makes her feel at home within the ideological agenda.⁹ What is at stake in the ideology of anthropocentrism is not so much a conscious egoism that humans assert being the center of the universe but that they indulge in unconscious and habitual actions that are detrimental and harmful to the beings of the nh environment.

Weitzenfield and Joy explain that the discourse on anthropocentrism had been conveyed by humanism, the worldview that defines the human as ontologically free based upon her essence as a rational being who has the privileged claim to being the source of truth and value. Humanism had been present since the time of the early Greeks, with Protagoras who had been noted for saying, ”Man is the measure of all things.” The age of Enlightenment in the 18th century hoisted the power of reason to dispel the supernaturalism of the dark ages through the institutionalization of science and the belief of the ‘right to rule’ in monarchy through the establishment of democratic forms of government.¹⁰

According to Mark Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, humanism became a ‘humanist anthropocentrism’ when the project of the Enlightenment conspired at a total domination on

⁷ WEITZENFIELD, Adam and JOY, Melanie. An overview of anthropocentrism, humanism, and speciesism in critical animal theory. *Counterpoints*, vol. 224 (2014), p. 4.

⁸ ALTHUSSER, Louis. Ideology and ideological state apparatus. In: ALTHUSSER, Louis, ed., *Lenin and other essays*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971, p. 162.

⁹ Ibid., p. 166-167.

¹⁰ WEITZENFIELD, Adam and JOY, Melanie. An overview of anthropocentrism, humanism, and speciesism in critical animal theory. *Counterpoints*, vol. 224 (2014), p. 5.

nature.¹¹ They said, "Throughout European history, the idea of the human being has been expressed in contradistinction to the animal. The latter's lack of reason is the proof of human dignity."¹² This domination operated in two modes: the external, the subjugation of all animal nature¹³ when the *homo sapiens* has been placed on top of the hierarchy of biological beings and made colonizer of all biotic and abiotic matter; and, the internal, the subjugation of lower psychic sensibilities identified with the animalistic, i.e., to be rational is to control the irrational drives.¹⁴ Thus, the alienation from the nh animal and from the estrangement of instinct from reason are two sides of the same domination.

As the standard reference of all species to which the nh animal is defined, the human being became the exclusive possessor of the higher agencies of reason and freedom that gave her autonomy to become a self-determining and self-realizing being. This autonomy established her as having inherent value and dignity which nh animals do not have. The effect of this worldview is a full-scale violence toward nh animals. They are objectified and oppressed, regarded as mere objects and possessions, having no rights, interest, nor intrinsic value since they do not possess enough of the standard human mind to imagine that their lives could be otherwise. They have an enslaved status in which their sole worth is their utility to humans as laborers and natural resources.

Giorgio Agamben calls 'anthropological machine' the societal apparatus that works for the purification of the *anthropos* by drawing an ontological and ethico-political boundary between species who are considered to belong 'inside' and 'outside.' The anthropological machine does not only segregate between human beings who are the privileged insiders and animals who are the abominable outcasts; it also works in a hybrid of sorts, i.e., welcoming inside domestic pets who are humanly-civilized animals and casting out human criminals who

¹¹ HORKHEIMER, Max and ADORNO, Theodor. *The dialectic of enlightenment*. California: Stanford University Press, 2002, pp. 19-20.

¹² Ibid., pp. 203-204.

¹³ Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 31.

act like nh animals.¹⁵ The anthropological machine operates four forms of violence: *one*, the violence of alienating humans from their ‘animal-selves’ and from their fellow nh animals in the environment; *two*, homogenizing all nh animals in a general category in contradistinction to the human which ignores the uniqueness of each species; *three*, the creation of the binary between a human life which has dignity and integrity and thus non-expendable in contradistinction to the nh animal life which is stripped to the bare necessities, making nh animals usable and expendable; and *four*, the institutionalization of a non-criminal management of the abuse and sacrifice of nh animal life.¹⁶

Philosophy did not spare the nh animal from denigration. Jacques Derrida writes that from Aristotle to Lacan, nh animals do not respond.¹⁷ In Aristotle, nh animals do not have reason. Rene Descartes described the nh animal as organic automatons without inner agencies of self-representation that ascertain the existences of things.¹⁸ In Immanuel Kant, the nh animal is not self-conscious, and therefore, a means to an end and not an end in itself. For this reason, the nh animal could not enjoy a moral status because he does not have reason nor autonomy. Harming animals, for Kant, is not demeaning for the nh animal but for human dignity because it manifests a cruelty in human nature.¹⁹ In Friedrich Nietzsche, humans and nh animals share the biological basis of life. Nh animal nature has a plenitude of a will-to-power that is life-affirming and true-to-self.²⁰ Nevertheless, it is still from the human race that the overman will be bred. Martin Heidegger states that the nh animal is ”poor in world,” trapped in a disinhibiting ring, a being that lives in a natural environment but does not have a world. In

¹⁵ AGAMBEN, Giorgio. *The open: Man and animal*. California: Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 37; WEITZENFIELD, Adam and JOY, Melanie. An overview of anthropocentrism, humanism, and speciesism in critical animal theory. *Counterpoints*, vol. 224 (2014), p. 8; WOLFE, Cary. *Animal rites: American culture, the discourse of species, and posthumanist theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 101.

¹⁶ WEITZENFIELD Adam. & JOY, Melanie. An overview of anthropocentrism, humanism, and speciesism in critical animal theory. *Counterpoints*, vol. 224 (2014), p. 8; BELL, Aaron. The dialectic of anthropocentrism. In: John SANBOMATSU. ed., *Critical theory and animal liberation*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011, p. 166.

¹⁷ DERRIDA, Jacques. *The animal that therefore I am*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, p. 32.

¹⁸ DESCARTES, Rene. *Discourse on method and Meditations on first philosophy*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Corporation, 1998, p. 32.

¹⁹ KANT, Immanuel. *Lectures on ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 27:373, p. 147.

²⁰ NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *Daybreak: Thoughts on the prejudice of morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 20.

contrast, the Dasein is a being-in-the-world and is world-forming.²¹ Jacques Lacan had conceded to the idea that nh animals could reason, feel, and to some extent, communicate but he denied them the power to respond. Nh animals subscribe to images to understand the world they live in but strictly speaking, they do not possess a language.²² The sounds they produce are expressive of their feelings but these are not words from an abstract system of representation.

It is worth understanding the intricate relation between anthropocentrism and speciesism; they are not exactly synonymous. What is speciesism? This term is first coined by Richard Ryder who used the word in a private leaflet printed in 1970 that contains his protest statement against animal experimentation:

The 1960s revolutions against racism, sexism and classism nearly missed out the animals. This worried me. Ethics and politics at the time simply overlooked the nonhumans entirely.

Everyone seemed to be just preoccupied with reducing the prejudices against humans. Hadn't they heard of Darwin? I hated racism, sexism and classism, too, but why stop there? As a hospital scientist I believed that hundreds of other species of animals suffer fear, pain and distress much as I did. Something had to be done about it. We needed to draw the parallel between the plight of the other species and our own. One day in 1970, lying in my bath at the old Sunningwell Manor, near Oxford, it suddenly came to me: SPECIESISM!²³.

Peter Singer, deemed by many as the father of the animal rights movement, picks up the term 'speciesism' and popularizes it in the animal ethics discourse. Singer's argument is based upon the modern utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham: "The question is not, can they reason? nor can they talk? But can they suffer?"²⁴ The interest of nh animals not to suffer should be given equal consideration along with the human species and not to do so is to discriminate them. Peter Singer says, "I would call 'speciesists' [those] who give greater weight to the

²¹ HEIDEGGER, Martin. *The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: World, finitude, solitude*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1995, p. 177.

²² LACAN, Jacques. *Écrits*. London: Routledge, 1977, pp. 62-63.

²³ RYDER, Richard. Speciesism again: The original leaflet. *Critical Society*, vol. 2 (2010), pp. 1-2.

²⁴ BENTHAM, Jeremy. Limits between private ethics and the art of legislation. In: *The principles of morals and legislation*. London: T. Payne & Son, 1780, Sec. 1:4 footnote, p. cccix.

interests of members of their own species when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of other species.”²⁵

Oscar Horta, an animal activist and moral philosopher, is the animal ethicist noted for his rigor in ferreting out an adequate definition of speciesism. He defines it as thus:

[. . .] Speciesism is the unjustified comparatively worse consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species (or group of species) whose members are favored, or who are classified as belonging to a certain species (or group of species whose members are disregarded).²⁶

Horta explains that what is common to all kinds of discrimination are three features: being compared as worse to someone, a discriminative action lacking justification; and, interests of discriminatees not being given consideration or treatment.²⁷ He claims that the aforementioned definition would be wide enough to cover ambiguities regarding: cases of discriminations between species that are not *homo sapiens*, i.e., a bird aficionado who discriminates against pigs; cases of discrimination premised on natural group empathy for conspecifics; and, cases of biological confusions about species’s classifications according to natural configurations. He also claims that the above definition suits both wide definitions of speciesism that are ”carried out for reasons different from those verifiable individual capacities” and narrow definitions that state ”speciesism is based on mere species membership.”²⁸

It also works against other ways in which ”unequal consideration for beings of different species may be defended” such as: the claim to membership to a particular species that makes them worthy of respect over others; the claim for morally relevant attributes, i. e., possession of language, cognitive capacities, or of attributes even if they cannot be empirically verified, i.e., possession of a soul; and, the claim to treat worse those animals with whom there is no special relationship of sympathy (conspecific membership) because they do not possess the same cognitive attributes as humans.

²⁵ SINGER, Peter. *Practical ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 50-51.

²⁶ HORTA, Oscar and ALBERSMEIER, Frauke. Defining speciesism. *Philosophy Compass*, vol. 15 (2020) nr. 11, p. 4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Having clarified what speciesism is, I now turn to its entanglement with anthropocentrism. On the question if there would be a discrimination of a non-human animal species in favor of another non-human animal species by a human, would this be speciesist but not anthropocentric?

Horta makes a distinction between speciesism and anthropocentrism.

The term "anthropocentrism" should be clearly distinguishable from "speciesism." These two words are not synonyms. "Anthropocentrism" denotes, in general, the view that humans are central. Given this, it can be used in the moral arena to indicate the view that considers the satisfaction of human interests as central. But this is a vague description. There is another clearer way in which we can define this term, in terms similar to those we have been considering so far to characterize speciesism:

Anthropocentrism is the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members (or who are not considered members) of the human species.²⁹

Horta notes that in the above definition that he proffers, he does not use the word unjustified (or justified), saying that whichever way is irrelevant; it would still be anthropocentrism. For this, I take it that the difference between anthropocentrism and speciesism is that for the former, it is simply a disadvantageous treatment of another species (whether justified or unjustified) whereas for the latter, it is an unjustified disadvantageous treatment. The aspect of justification here, as I understand it, concerns the aspect of critical reflection. It makes a difference if the bias is reflected upon or naïve.

For this, Horta draws a further distinction between what is anthropocentric and what is anthropocentrist. An anthropocentric premise is one that instinctively favors humans over non-human animals based upon a naïve attitude of being more empathetic with conspecifics; an anthropocentrist premise "is one that had been accepted at some point with the intention of defending such a position."³⁰ In short, being anthropocentric is a naïveté whereas being anthropocentrist carries a moral argument for favoring humans over non-human animals.

There are two kinds of anthropocentrist positions advanced by Catia Faria and Eze Paez: the epistemic anthropocentrism and moral anthropocentrism. According to them:

²⁹ HORTA, Oscar. What is speciesism? *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, vol. 23 (2010) nr. 3, p. 258.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

Suppose that someone tried to defend speciesism by saying that

”Humans cannot help being humans. Therefore they are morally justified in favouring human beings over nonhumans.”

This is the claim that, because it is not possible for us to cease to be anthropocentric (in some sense), then speciesism (or this particular kind of speciesism) must be justified.

[. . .]

Presented as an argument, this view can be made more intelligible:

- (i) Because anthropocentrism is inevitable, it is justified;
- (ii) Speciesism is implied by anthropocentrism;
- (iii) Therefore, speciesism is justified.

Regarding premise (i), in it “anthropocentrism” relates to the fact that human beings are epistemically determined to understand the world anthropocentrically. That is, human beings are such that the limits and form of their knowledge necessarily takes a human reference. This cognitive condition can be called epistemic anthropocentrism. This being so, it seems true that humans cannot help but think “humanly”. With the further assumption that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, this sort of anthropocentrism is justified.³¹

Epistemic anthropocentrism refers to the defense of a necessary condition of being biased in understanding animals because of the limits of a given cognitive apparatus. In other words, we cannot help but understand a bat from the point of view of being human because we are not bats. Moral anthropocentrism is a normative moral position in that since humans cannot but think ‘humanly,’ then being anthropocentric is justified.³² The position of Paez and Faria is that ”moral anthropocentrism cannot follow from epistemic anthropocentrism.” Cognitive constraints in understanding the other animal species is not sufficient reason to give them less moral consideration.

Horta extends this to a relational anthropocentrism in that we are bonded closer to conspecifics with whom we share similar ways of cognition. In Horta’s assessment, conspecific ties may be considered anthropocentric.

³¹ FARIA, Catia and PAEZ, Eze. Anthropocentrism and speciesism: Conceptual and normative issues. *Revisita de Bioetica y Derecho*, (2013) nr. 32, p. 100.

³² Ibid.

There is a lot of contention on epistemic anthropocentrism in the realm of animal ethics. Misunderstanding is not just an occurrence between interspecifics but also conspecifics. To idealize that understanding could only be possible if it is an understanding in exactly the way the other sees it is a null prospect. Even between conspecifics, misunderstandings could still occur because of the uniqueness of each individual's history and horizon of experience. Inversely, between interspecifics, there are some humans who claim that they understand their companion dogs more than some other irascible people.

In Thomas Nagel, reductionism (to the biological) cannot be a way to understand the connection between mind and body. Although there is some sense in saying that we cannot understand a bat in the human subjective sense, having no sonar echolocation apparatus, there is a way to consider the nonhuman animal's phenomenal behavior on an objective field for so long as observations are shared experiences between people and their interpretations can be agreed upon a common level of language.³³

Besides this, current ethology has already pointed many approaches to the study of animal behavior in that while it makes sense to say that it is difficult to understand other species with great precision, i. e., a dog's joy is not human joy and an elephant's grief is not human grief, all scientific investigations are initiated by musings from common sense experience. Methods of investigation are also partly fed and sustained by the commonsensical experiential field. The biological, behavioral, and social anatomy of a dog's joy would definitely be different from that of the human but the investigation always starts from the common sense of the concept of joy. The barking and leaping of a dog which are similar to that of children's behavior when the human parent arrives home could be safely assumed as some kind of 'joy.' When one beats a monkey and he screams, it is lying to oneself to be asking if this is pain and that a thorough scientific investigation is needed to ascertain this feeling. Marc Bekoff avers:

Science shouldn't assume omniscience. Science is a belief system like other belief systems, with its own assumption, limitations, and promises. It's important to blend "science sense" with common sense. We also need to give serious consideration to the question "What does it mean to "know" something?" I maintain that we know that some nonhuman animals feel something some of the time, just as do human animals. It is nonsense to claim that we don't know if dogs or pigs or cows or chickens feel pain or have a point of view about whether they like and don't like being exposed

³³ NAGEL, Thomas. What is it like to be a bat? *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 83 (1974) nr. 4, p. 442.

to certain treatments. And the same goes for the live cats and dogs who are used as shark bait on the island of Réunion (Mott, 2005). Who are we kidding? Frankly, I think we're kidding ourselves.³⁴

What defends and supports epistemic anthropocentrism is anthropomorphism. Fisher is especially critical of categorical anthropomorphism. Categorical anthropomorphism states that it is an error to project to animals the subjective states of the human. He criticizes this by saying that such position is motivated by the anthropocentric intention to preserve the distinctive privilege that humans have over nh animals. According to Fisher, there is no clearly cut line of separation between nh animals and humans to claim categorical anthropomorphism. He says that when categorical anthropomorphism criticizes that humans should be very cautious about projecting their emotions onto nh animals, this attitude is really reinforced by its suspicion if emotional states in nh animals could ever exist at all.³⁵

It is not impossible to understand (roughly) some emotional states of a nh animal even while being in the human cognitive apparatus. For example, for a broad spectrum of sentient animals, one could safely assume the human experience of pain in a rat when harmed. If one would pierce the body of a rat with an ice pick and his blood spurts, his face cringes, his body twitches, with feet stretching out, that person would be fooling oneself by muttering: “Do you think the rat is hurt? Do you think he suffers?” This is because the behavioral reaction to pain is the same as with humans under the same situation. Similarly, a safe projection of pleasure could be made when one pets a dog and he closes his eyes and nestles his head onto the palm of the person petting. It is safe to interpret that there must be some pleasure in that caress, otherwise, the dog would reject the gesture and run away.

Fisher makes a distinction between imaginative anthropomorphism and interpretive anthropomorphism.³⁶ Imaginative anthropomorphism is a production of representations of fictional animals that act like humans such as those in cartoons. Interpretive anthropomorphism is at work when we say, for example, that ‘birds sing’ and that ‘goats play.’

³⁴ BEKOFF, Marc. Animal passions and deadly virtues: Cognitive ethology as the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals. *Human Ecology Review*, vol. 13 (2006) nr. 1, p. 41.

³⁵ FISHER, John Andrew. The myth of anthropocentrism. In: Marc BEKOFF and Dale JAMISON, eds., *Readings in animal cognition*, 1996, p. 12.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

But even for such expressions, it is clear to us that when birds are singing or that when goats play, they are not singing or playing in the subjective way that humans sing or play. It is simply an expression to arrive at an approximation of such behavior. Fisher also defines situational anthropomorphism to refer to the misinterpretation of a nh animal's behavior in situations that are not fitting, i. e., when chimps bare their teeth, they may seem angry and may be misinterpreted as being angry even when they are in a situation wherein nothing incited their anger.

Interpretive and situational anthropomorphism could be clarified and corrected by various kinds of methods of observing and interacting with animals that are utilized by cognitive ethology. But in order for a cognitive ethologist to proceed with her investigations, she still needs to begin with all kinds of anthropomorphic projections, while being critical of them. In the end, when she makes her conclusions, for example, that elephants grieve for another dead elephant by going around the dead body of their companion elephant, this is still ultimately an interpretive anthropomorphic projection: that elephants grieve. Again, we do not have to say that their grief is the human grief but that it is 'somewhat that' to a great respect. What Fisher antagonizes is the categorical anthropomorphism that proceeds from the epistemic anthropocentrism that humans and animals are so categorically different that it is not possible for the former to understand the latter, and even vice-versa, for many nh animals.

Yet, it is not possible to dismiss epistemic anthropomorphism that easily because differences in epistemic scaffoldings between humans and nh animals do give rise to serious moral concerns. Cognitive ethology, in spite of its gigantic strides in the research of behavioral language meanings of different species of animals, still cannot bridge the communicative gap between many animals and humans. For example, when nh animals are harmed in ways that are not yet known commonly known, i.e., that crabs are hurt when you tickle their carapaces. These crabs cannot complain to humans, not in the same way that humans would air out racist or sexist slurs and demand political compensation for it.

I would respond to the above in this way: precisely, the campaign of cognitive ethology suggests how much we do not know about animals which we are continually discovering, and so all the more, the moral status of many animals must be kept an open argument. For example, it is only in 2021 that the UK government recognized that crustaceans such as

lobsters, crabs and octopuses are sentient animals and would be given protection under national policy.³⁷ On this token, the moral direction should actually be that the greatest care be taken in the positive duty not to harm all animals. This translates to the *laissez-faire* attitude: not to touch unless informed that certain actions are beneficial to the nh animal or not.

We proceed now to moral anthropocentrism. Moral anthropocentrism refers to the normative evaluation that for a certain reason, human beings deserve a greater moral consideration than animals. Since a normative evaluation requires reflection, it is not naïve. Horta says that this anthropocentrist position carries the intention of delineating a moral difference between humans and animals.³⁸ In short, an anthropocentrist position has a moral assertion. The question that springs here is: could we use the epistemic excuse to justify moral anthropocentrism? Horta says no for three reasons.

The *first* reason is the argument from species overlap. There is no singular characteristic that divides cleanly between animals and nh animals in that it could be said with precision that the latter are totally foreign and that there is absolutely no way to understand them.³⁹ There is a deluge of current research materials in ethological research that present approaches to understanding nh animal cognition.

For example, to say that so called ‘lower animals’ do not have reason is bogus. A way to prove reason is problem-solving. The research of Eileen Crist cites Darwin’s observations that earthworms, based upon the intricate construction of their burrows, use judgment on what kind of leaves and petioles to plug their burrows effectively to keep them free of water and dirt and to protect them from predators.⁴⁰

Even insects do problem-solving. Stim Wilcox and Robert Jackson studied the deceitful moves of the jumping spiders of the genus *Portia* in order to obtain their prey. One trick is to

³⁷ HUNT, Katie. Lobsters and crabs are sentient beings and shouldn’t be boiled alive [online]. *CNN*. 22 Nov. 2021 [viewed 5 Oct. 2022]. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/22/europe/uk-sentient-beings-crabs-octopus-and-lobsters-scen/index.html>

³⁸ HORTA, Oscar. What is speciesism? *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, vol. 23 (2010) nr. 3, p. 259.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 262-263.

⁴⁰ CRIST, Eileen. The inner life of earthworms: Darwin’s argument and its implications. In: Marc BEKOFF, Colin ALLEN and Gordon BURGHARDT, eds., *The cognitive animal: Empirical and theoretical perspectives on animal cognition*. London: MIT Press, 2002, p. 3.

mimic the love signals of a male resident spider so that the prey spider may be invited to come near. Attacks are well-ruminated. For example, to avoid the attacks of spitting spiders, they approach them from behind. Another way to ambush is to climb on a rocky area atop the web, anchor on a rock, and dangle from a silk dragline to sink fangs directly on top of the bodies of victims.⁴¹

To say that animals do not have language is also bogus because animals do have vocalizations that are a language of their own, communicating to each other. Prairie dogs are preys of coyotes, hawks, foxes, badgers, golden eagles, etc. and they utilize a complex alarm system to warn each other of predator presence. Con Slobodchikoff did observations of the Gunnisson's prairie dogs (*Cynomys gunnisoni*) and recorded their acoustic sounds by audiotapes upon the appearances of these predators. He observed regular patterns of barks pertaining to each predator.⁴² To argue, as Lacan did, that animals cannot learn human language, the famous lifelong research of Irene Pepperberg suggests otherwise. Her African Grey parrot, Alex, understands the concepts of objects including hues, materials, and shapes. She would ask the parrot questions like 'what color is this?' or 'what shape is this?' and each time. Alex would answer correctly even if new objects are introduced.⁴³

Pär Segerdahl recounts the experience of a co-researcher Sue Savage-Rumbaugh who ventured to teach chimpanzees American Sign Language (ASL) by the use of lexigrams, printed word symbols pointed at by apes to communicate. When she was teaching a captive adult Bonobo named Matata, her adopted son Kanzi, who supposedly had been observing the activity closely, suddenly pointed at the lexigram 'CHASE' and started to run away. "Without having been specially trained, Kanzi seemed to have become someone who could face a person and say: chase me. That [...] was how Sue responded to him, for she did chase him."⁴⁴

⁴¹ WILCOX, Stim and JACKSON, Robert. Jumping spider tricksters: Deceit, predation, and cognition. In: Marc BEKOFF, Colin ALLEN and Gordon BURGHARDT, eds., *The cognitive animal: Empirical and theoretical perspectives on animal cognition*. London: MIT Press, 2002, p. 27-28.

⁴² SLOBODCHIKOFF, Constantine. Cognition and communication in prairie dogs. In: : Marc BEKOFF, Colin ALLEN and Gordon BURGHARDT, eds., *The cognitive animal*. London: MIT Press, 2002, p. 257.

⁴³ PEPPERBERG, Irene. In: Marc BEKOFF, Colin ALLEN and Gordon BURGHARDT, eds., *The cognitive animal*. London: MIT Press, 2002, p. 249.

⁴⁴ SEGERDAHL, Pär. Humanizing nonhumans: Ape language research as critique of metaphysics. *Language, ethics, and animals life*. In: Niklas FORSBERG, and Nora HÄMÄLÄINEN, eds., 2014, p. 22.

At another time, Segerdahl was talking to a previously employed caretaker who was looking for the lexigram keyboard because the latter wanted to talk to Panbanisha, a mother Bonobo. Segerdahl broke an administrative instruction to be quiet and talked to the caretaker where he thought the keyboard could be found. But the keyboard was actually already with Panbanisha. The Bonobo looked displeased with Segerdahl and pointed to the word 'QUIET.' After a while, Segerdahl played with Panbanisha's two sons. One of them is named Nathan. The game was peek-a-boo through the window. Under the window is a hole through which Nathan stretched his arm and through which Segerdahl, again breaking protocol not to touch the apes, touched him. Nathan retrieved his arm immediately and ran to his mother, Panbanisha. The mother responded by barging into the room, hitting the window with his fist, and pointing at the sign 'MONSTER.' Later on, Rumbaugh informed Segerdahl how Panbanisha learned the meaning of the word. In the past, Rumbaugh wanted to teach the apes to be wary of climbing the roof where there were high voltage wires. So she had a caretaker dress up in a gorilla suit running around the roof and she associated this terrifying figure from the lexigram as 'MONSTER.'⁴⁵

In the view of the argument of species overlap, it still cannot be contended that even if many animals have intelligence, humans are still more intelligent than animals, and presuming that they suffer more than them, deserve more moral consideration than nh animals. If this contention would win, it would put into disadvantage human beings with brain disorders whose moral concerns cannot be devaluated just because of that condition. Similarly, the moral concerns of nh animals cannot also be devaluated.

The *second* reason why the epistemic excuse cannot be used to justify moral anthropocentrism is the weakness of the argument of species bond. This proceeds from epistemic anthropocentrism. Given that humans could understand the behavioral language of many nh animals despite differences in epistemic scaffoldings, it is still only natural, that humans are more emotionally bonded with their kind and this operates in various moral scenarios. For example, confronting peril wherein humans have to choose between saving a nh animal or another human, considering that they are not related intimately to both, humans would naturally choose the human over the nh animal and this is morally acceptable.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 45-46.

An example of the argument of species bond that morally justifies a preference for the human species is that proffered by Mary Midgely. Species bond is not unjust because it should be understood on the emotional plane, not on any rationalist and abstract formula.⁴⁶ She said: “We are bond-forming creatures, not abstract intellects.”⁴⁷ For this reason, the prejudice that parents have for their own children is not discriminatory nor the act of rescuing first those whom we are related with in perilous situations. On the same token, countries which would grant more labor access to nationals than foreigners is not discriminatory.

She explains that species bond is natural and runs deep and must not be understood on the same plane as ‘racism.’ She writes:

Race in humans is not a significant grouping at all, but species in animals certainly is. It is never true that, in order to know how to treat a human being, you must first find out what race he belongs to. (Cases where this might seem to matter always really turn on culture.) But with an animal, to know the species is absolutely essential. A zookeeper who is told to expect an animal, and get a place ready for it, cannot even begin to do this without far more detailed information.⁴⁸

I interpret the above to mean that bonding between humans is part of the pre-reflective world which means that it is instinctive and is a more fundamental layer than race-bonding. The lived world and consciousness of separation between humans and non-human animal species is more prominent than the division between races or cultures, assuming that we lived more closely with humans than with non-human animals. In other words, we cannot blame preference for humans over non-human animals in many circumstances because humans are born, lived, and developed more closely social relationships with fellow humans and that has strengthened their species bond. This has more weight than the human-non-human animal bond.

The idea of Midgely is supported by Cora Diamond who agrees that the argument for animal rights, such as those theories advanced by Singer and Regan, cannot be waged simply on the abstract formula of equality. She said that animal rights is a wrong way of discussing the morality of vegetarianism because it ignores central facts such as: why we not eat our dead

⁴⁶ MIDGELY, Mary. *Animals and why they matter*: Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1983, p. 104.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

when they die and why we do not eat amputated human limbs.⁴⁹ The central fact is that a world wherein nh animal meat is eaten and people are not eaten emerge from a vast world of social meanings that we have grown up in and cannot readily forgo of even on the grounds of equality. This lived world of social meaning is also responsible for the species bond. Midgely never supported the animal rights movement nor the vegetarianism ethic; Diamond, is, however, a vegetarian.

Horta would respond to the argument of species-bond in the following statement:

Consider the claim that bonds of sympathy or solidarity justify partiality. If this is so, anthropocentrism cannot be justified, given that many humans do not have such feelings for the rest of humanity, and that many humans actually have no one to care for them (in fact many humans have stronger relations of this sort with some nonhuman animals). This has been often ignored in the literature on the issue. In fact, it is usually believed that those defenses of anthropocentrism that appeal to capacities and those that refer to relations have to be examined differently. Mark Bernstein has assumed this, and has used the term “neo-speciesism” when he speaks of those defenses of anthropocentrism based on relations (2004, in particular p. 381). Note, though, that there is no reason why those arguments that appeal to capacities should take precedence over those that appeal to relations.⁵⁰

I take it from the above to mean that Horta disagrees with the claim of Midgely that consciousness of species membership is a significant grouping that explains people’s anthropocentric preferences. Horta claims that such consciousness for species membership is not the determinant when people make certain decisions between nh animals and humans or even between human individuals. In short, it is an ethical decision based upon individual personal history. These decisions are based upon the intensity of personal relations. For example, there are people who would choose to live with a companion animal rather than a human partner. Similarly, in perilous situations, there are individuals who would rather perish than leave their nh animals behind as shown in many news articles during the 2022 war in Ukraine. There are even humans who would choose to save their companion animal than another human stranger or an abusive spouse in a lifeboat situation.

⁴⁹ DIAMOND, Cora. Eating meat and eating people. *Philosophy*, vol. 53 (1978) nr. 206, p. 467.

⁵⁰ HORTA, Oscar. What is speciesism? *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, vol. 23 (2010) nr. 3, pp. 262-263.

The *third* reason in Horta why the epistemic bias cannot be used to justify moral anthropocentrism is the argument from relevance. This means that the possession of certain traits in a species of animals could be relevant to the moral determination whether to harm them or not. Horta wonders if there is really indeed any relevant characteristic in animals that would justify harming them that humans do not possess, given the argument of species overlap.⁵¹

Horta's presents his criticism of the argument of relevance in two claims:

[. . .] how value relevance is different from moral relevance . . . and that value relevance should determine, directly or indirectly, moral relevance [. . .]

Given what the main themes of wellbeing imply regarding what entities can be recipients of value, sentience is both a sufficient and a necessary criterion for full moral considerability.⁵²

The idea of relevance is that for a decision to be made, there are some items that are relevant to that decision and others that are not.⁵³ There are two types of relevance: what "we would call 'moral relevance' *stricto sensu* and value relevance which is prescription-dependent."⁵⁴ Moral relevance considers the reasons for the rightness and wrongness of a decision. A decision is said to be morally relevant to such and such reasons or principles.

But there is another type of relevance which philosophical literature calls 'value relevance.' This means that "some circumstances S are value relevant for dis/value V if they are a necessary condition for (even if not a sufficient one) for V to occur."⁵⁵ Moral relevance is necessarily linked to value relevance in the sense that a component of a moral principle is value; that value is a condition for such moral principle to make sense. For example, the elimination of the death sentence in a country has moral relevance to the value preferred by the state which is that of its being responsible for the education and protection of its citizens. Thus, the state cannot put to death a criminal, no matter how bad she has turned out to be,

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 263.

⁵² HORTA, Oscar. Moral considerability and the argument of relevance. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, 2018, 23, p. 1.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 5.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

given that the state has somehow cooperated in the societal production of that bad character. This reason is the value relevance. The inalienable right of the criminal to live despite a horribly bad character is a moral value because of the value relevance of the state that it should ensure that every citizen becomes morally educated.

The idea of Horta is that moral relevance depends directly and indirectly upon value relevance. Teleological consequentialist theories only include prescriptions wherein there is a direct relation between moral relevance and value relevance.⁵⁶ For example, not feeding wild animals becomes morally relevant because of its consequence that they do not become dependent on humans to feed them. So, independence in wild animals is a value relevant to the morality of not feeding wild animals.

Other non-consequentialist theories, i.e., deontological and character-based theories that are not dependent on consequence still maintain an indirect relation between moral relevance and value relevance. For example, it is a moral value not to torture someone even if the torture of that someone would ultimately yield the consequence of the salvation of all. This moral good has a value relevance to the principle that an individual that cannot be weighed down by the majority (which is a preferred cultural value; not all cultures consider this as a value).

Horta finds it necessary to bind the meaning of moral relevance to value relevance in order to win moral considerability for as many animals as possible. When the question is posed: are there any relevant criteria in which we could distinguish between humans and non-human animals on the question of moral considerability? When this is answered exclusively on the plane of moral relevance, it could swagger toward a whole range of reasons such as: the biblical injunction that the human is given dominion over animals, that humans possess higher intellectual and linguistic faculties, that non-human animals cannot be moral agents and so how could any moral apply to them?

But when the question is answered on the plane of value relevance, Horta finds a strategic advantage because it pegs itself not only on the identification of the values that are relevant to a moral decision but implies, most importantly, the stakeholders who will be affected by this value. Who are the value stakeholders? The value stakeholders are bypassed in discussions of

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

moral preference because they are principle-based. Value relevance includes the component: to whom do these values matter or are relevant to? He is after defining and grounding the notion of value relevance not in terms of specific agencies in nh animals but in a neutral sense of ‘being a recipient of value.’ He says: “Being a recipient of value means being an entity that can either have value or enjoy valuable things and/or suffer disvaluable things, whatever they are.”⁵⁷ He explains that “[. . .] moral consideration is not about the enjoyment of some value in particular, but of any possible values an individual can receive. Value relevance means not whether one can receive a particular value but whether one can be a recipient of value at all.”⁵⁸ He identifies this neutrality in ‘being a recipient of value’ in the aspect of sentience, an aspect that includes many species of animals.

The above strategy works well in determining who are the value stakeholders within the circle of moral considerability. The idea is that moral considerability implies wellness of being. The very notion of wellness necessitates sentience. This means that if the argument is based on value relevance, it takes into consideration for whom this wellness matters: the stakeholders for wellness of being are all sentient beings.

Central to moral consideration for all living beings is the aspect of wellness, and wellness in its very basic and universal sense, is pertinent to pain. While it is true that wellness as a quality may be evaluated on different planes as value relative for different species of animals, the basic denominator of sentience that is present in all qualities of wellness will make it hard to ruminate this way: which beings have a higher kind of happiness? or lower happiness – could these beings be eaten? We know that the basic ingredient of any kind of happiness is first to be free of sensual pain. Therefore, even if there are animals who cannot measure up to a vague notion of ‘higher happiness’ they could be included among those beings who cannot be eaten on the basic premise of sentience as an essential ingredient even for the lowest measure of happiness.

Furthermore, it will be hard to ruminate on delineations for partialities in moral consideration based upon gradations of capacities for wellness given that science is forever on the train of

⁵⁷ Ibid., footnote.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

discovering how deep the interior lives of animals could be. For example, for a long time, we never knew crustaceans could actually feel pain. Recent laws in the UK and Switzerland have ruled out cooking crustaceans directly in hot water for the reason that they have recently been found to be sentient.⁵⁹ Switzerland have also considered guinea pigs as the newest inclusion among ‘social animals’ along with parrots, etc., in its animal welfare laws and this rules out the possibility of owning them in singular numbers, meaning, they always have to be kept at least in pairs.⁶⁰

To summarize, according to Horta, due to the arguments of: species overlap, weakness of species-bond, and relevance, it is not tenable to say that epistemic anthropocentrism could be used to justify moral anthropocentrism. Species overlap dictates that there are continuities between humans and nh animals in terms of cognitive and communicative agencies (and with the aid of imaginative and interpretive anthropomorphism) that will allow the former to understand the latter. Species bond that is said to be made strong by the lived experience of togetherness and epistemically shared concepts is put to question by the contention of affective preferences of humans that depend on personal histories and not influenced by a feeling of being bound to a species. In the argument from relevance, the principle of moral consideration is based upon wellness and wellness is a value relevant to all sentient species. This qualifies many nh animals as recipients of this value, and as recipients of wellness, they should be given full moral consideration.

Given that the above three stances of moral anthropocentrism are not justified, Horta ultimately declares that moral anthropocentrism is unjustified and for that reason, is speciesist; although, being speciesist does not necessarily imply anthropocentrism: “Given this, we must conclude that no defense of anthropocentrism is justified. Hence anthropocentrism must be considered an instance of speciesism. To put it another way, anthropocentrism is a synonym of anthropocentric speciesism.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ HORTON, Helena. Boiling of live lobsters could be banned in UK under proposed legislation, *The Guardian* [online]. 19 November 2021 [viewed date: 15 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/19/boiling-of-live-lobsters-could-be-banned-in-uk-under-proposed-legislation>

⁶⁰ ANDREI, Mihai. Why it’s illegal to own one guinea pig in Switzerland. *ZME Science* [online]. 29 January 2021. [viewed date: 15 Oct 2022]. Available at: <https://www.zmescience.com/ecology/animals-ecology/guinea-pig-switzerland/>

⁶¹ HORTA, Oscar. What is speciesism? *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, vol 23 (2010) nr. 3, p. 264.

To simplify this long tedious discussion on anthropocentrism, there is a ‘soft’ anthropocentrism and a ‘hard’ anthropocentrism. The ‘soft’ anthropocentrism is an outlook that is naïve, discriminating against non-human animals in spontaneous acts of benevolence due to the difficulties of the epistemic bias. The ‘hard’ anthropocentrism is critical because it makes an argumentative stand to defend that non-human animals cannot receive full moral consideration for given reasons.

What is expected in the next part is to find out where does Levinas stand between soft and hard anthropocentrism, and upon what reasons.

1.2.2 Is Levinas a Moral Anthropocentrist?

This question is significant in the discourse of the third wave of Levinasian scholarship, specifically, those who wish to extend Levinas’s ethics to animal ethics. Consider for example, the following texts from Levinasian scholars who consider his philosophical views anthropocentric:

Levinas’s ethics is unabashedly anthropocentric. . . For Levinas, there are simply no other possibilities to be ethical independently of the relationship between man and man. Every other endeavor or action-knowledge, art, politics, science, and so on-can be traced back to the ethical relation in some way. When Levinas’s ethics is smoothed out in this manner, the whole outlook is anthropocentric: man is the measure of all things. But it is also one sided and leaves out the question of our moral responsibility to animals.⁶²

Levinas’s remarks on the animal are deeply anthropocentric and arguably speciesist. Nevertheless, they raise some important questions regarding the relational possibilities between human beings and particular forms of animal life.⁶³

In other words, Levinasian ethics conceives of ethics on a fundamentally anthropocentric model that belongs to “a world where sacrifice is possible and where it is not forbidden to make an attempt on life in general, but only on human life.” Levinasian ethics, then, participates in one of the founding gestures of the anthropocentric tradition, namely, that of maintaining a zone for

⁶² ATTERTON, Peter. Levinas’s humanism and anthropocentrism. In: Michael MORGAN, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Levinas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 2.

⁶³ PLANT, Bob. Vulnerable lives: Levinas, Wittgenstein and ”Animals.” In: ATTERTON Peter and Wright, Tamra eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 31.

killing with impunity, “for a non-criminal putting to death” (EW, 278)⁶⁴ of animals and others deemed to be nonhuman.⁶⁵

The questions for this part are twofold. *First*, is Levinas a moral anthropocentrist? If so, what form of moral anthropocentrism is this in Horta’s sense? *Second*, if he is morally anthropocentrist, then does this render his ethics inappropriate to be applied to animals? If not, then, in what sense could it still be applied to animals?

To respond to the *first* question if Levinas is a moral anthropocentrist and what form of moral anthropocentrism is this in Horta’s sense, I would follow this procedure: for the above quotes from Peter Atterton, Bob Plant, and Mark Calarco, I would each present the background of their arguments upon what reasons they consider Levinas as anthropocentric. I would move on to comment if these reasons qualify Levinas as a moral anthropocentrist based upon Horta’s definition of what moral anthropocentrism is.

To work on this task, it is imperative to recall to the scene Levinas’s most significant text to animal ethics. There is a transcript from an interview of Levinas by three graduate students from the University of Warwick, namely, Alison Ainley, Peter Hughes, and Tamra Wright. The questions had been sent to Levinas in advance so it could be safely presumed that the philosopher pondered well over his responses. The interview took place in Levinas’s Parisian home during the summer of 1986. The students broached the issue of applying the face-to-face ethics on the animal. This interview initially appeared as the article entitled *The Paradox of Morality* in the book *The Provocation of Levinas* edited by Robert Bernasconi and David Wood.⁶⁶ However, there is a newer and more updated transcription by Atterton and Wright in a compilation of essays by Levinasian animal ethicists. The book is entitled *Face to Face with Animals: Levinas and the Animal Question*.

⁶⁴ Error. The EW is not listed in the abbreviations list in the book of Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, where Calarco’s article, “Ecce Animot: Levinas, Derrida and the other animal,” appears. But I surmise the EW refers to the text of DERRIDA, J. “Eating well,” or the calculation of the subject: An interview with Jacques Derrida. In: Eduardo Cadava, Peter CONNOR and Jean-Luc NANCY, eds. *Who comes after the subject*. New York: Routledge, 1991, pp. 96-119. But the page 279 that appears in the above quote as indicated by Calarco does not correspond to the paging of the text of Derrida.

⁶⁵ CALARCO, Marc. Ecce Animot: Levinas, Derrida and the other animal. In: Peter ATTERTON and Tamra Wright, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 124.

⁶⁶ WRIGHT, Tamra. HUGHES, Peter. and AINLEY, Alison. The paradox of morality: An interview with Emmanuel Levinas. In: Roger BERNASCONI and David WOOD, eds. *The provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other*. London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 168-180.

The following text presents this updated version of the interview which I numbered per paragraph for easier reference in the ensuing discussion:

Q. If animals do not have faces in the ethical sense, do we nevertheless have obligations toward them? And if so, where do they come from?

(1) E.L.: One cannot entirely refuse a dog the face. It is in terms of the face [that one understands] the dog . . . It is not in the dog that the phenomenon of the face is in its purity.

(2) You can become a vegetarian . . . not at all because of respect for the life of something resembling a fellow [human being], as though you don't eat man . . . You are not a cannibal when you eat meat. The parentage of this phenomenon of the face is not at all in the dog . . . It is not because you recognize the human face that you see the face of the dog. . . The wisdom of the face does not begin in the dog. There are some who prefer the dog to men. On the contrary, in the dog, in the animal, there are some phenomena. For example, that force of nature—it is pure vitality. That which characterizes above all the dog [is] its vitality—yet there is also a face.

Q. Can the face of the animal be considered also as the other who must be welcomed? Or is the possibility of speech necessary in order to be a "face" in the ethical sense?

(3) E.L.: I don't know. I cannot tell you at what moment you have the right to be called "face." What an insuperable line! The human face is an altogether different thing, and we rediscover [only] afterward the face in the animal. I do not know whether one finds it in the snake! [laughter] I do not know how to answer that question, since more specific analyses are needed. Not in the flea, for example. The flea! It's an insect, which jumps, eh? [laughter] But, with respect to what you were saying earlier, there is [something] in our attraction, in a complex regard, in regard to an animal, an animal that is beautiful— myself, I don't have much to do with animals—but, there are those who love the dog, for example, and what they love in the dog is perhaps its childlike character. As though it were strong, cheerful, powerful, full of life, but [also] because it doesn't know everything. And, consequently, on the other hand, there is certainly there in regard to the animal, pity, is that not so? A wolf that does not bite—it is like that. One always loves in the animal, the wolf, the memory of the wolf, the memory of the lion, the dog, I don't know. In any case, there is there the possibility of a specific phenomenological analysis, which cannot be used when things are understood from the beginning. There are some forms of animal. A child is often loved for its animality, no? It is not suspicious of anything; it jumps, walks, runs, bites. It's delightful. I also think that quite clearly, even if it is not as simple as that, even if animals are not considered human beings, the ethical extends to living beings. I really think so . . . We do not want to make an animal suffer needlessly, etcetera. But the prototype of this is human ethics. [Even] if animals do not have a face in the ethical sense, we have an obligation toward them . . . There are certainly, I don't know, vegetarians—those who [are in] the animal protection league; that exists. Clearly, one [approach to] ethics is the transference of the idea of suffering to an animal, certainly. The animal suffers. It is because we as men know what suffering is that we can also have this obligation.

(4) Why do these problems especially interest us? Because there are people who will tell you, on the contrary, that it is in life that there is a certain sympathy regarding our life and that ethical morality is a development of a purely biological phenomenon— that’s it. I would turn the matter around completely. It is a widespread thesis saying ultimately the human is but the culmination of the animal. I myself say, on the contrary, that in relation to the animal, humanity is a new phenomenon. And this leads me already to the question you asked me: At what moment does one become a face? I do not know at what moment the human appears, but what I am going to underline is that the human breaks with pure being, which is always persistence in being. That is my principal thesis. A being is something attached to being, to its being. That is the idea of Darwin. The animal being is a struggle for life, a struggle for life without ethics. Is that not true? It is a question of might, no? Darwinian morality. When I began reading Heidegger, you know, when Heidegger says at the beginning of *Sein und Zeit* that Dasein is a being that in its being is concerned for this very being. . . Do you know this Heideggerian formula? *Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes—Do you know a little German?—dem es in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht.* Dasein is a ”being” [English in the original] that in its being—in its ”to be” [English in the original]—is concerned for this very ”to be” [English in the original]. The only aim of being is to be. Do you know this formula? This is the beginning of *Sein und Zeit*, this formula, well, no matter, you know what Dasein is. Now that is the idea of Darwin: the living being struggles for life. The aim of life is life itself. However, with the appearance of the human—here is my entire philosophy—that is, with man, there is something more important than my life, and that is the life of the other. That is unreasonable. Man is the unreasonable animal. [laughter]Most of the time my life is closer [than that of the other], most of the time one is preoccupied with oneself. But we cannot admire saintliness, understood? Not the sacred! Not the sacred! Saintliness!⁶⁷

I would like to emphasize that the quotations of the scholars considered Levinas ‘anthropocentric’ and ‘arguably speciesist’ without a scholarly definition of what they mean by these terms. From the earlier part of this introductory chapter, it had been shown that the terms are problematic and have to be threshed out from their muddled ordinary usages. For example, during the pandemic, I have deployed a part of my savings to the animal rescue teams and ignored completely the feeding centers for the impoverished families of daily-wage earners whose jobs had been closed off. My reason is precisely that in a crisis, everybody will remember to feed humans but not animals. I suppose that this is not anthropocentric because it is reflected upon, but it is not ‘anthropocentrically speciesist’ according to the critical definition of Horta.

The significant tone and attitude that I gathered from Levinas’s responses in the above interview is his humble admittance of lack of knowledge and his attitude of scholarly

⁶⁷ Levinas, Emmanuel. The animal interview. Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds. and trans. *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, pp. 3-5.

tentativeness in his ideas. He repeats the avowal “I don’t know” five times (four times in 3; once in 4).

Drawing from the framework of Horta the definition of moral anthropocentrism, I would like to state that inasmuch as Levinas makes the concluding statement in (3) “I also think that quite clearly, even if it is not as simple as that, even if animals are not considered human beings, the ethical extends to living beings. I really think so . . .” this rules out the possibility that he could be a moral anthropocentrist. A moral anthropocentrist, in Horta’s sense, makes a conclusion that nh animals cannot be given full moral consideration for certain reasons. Even if Levinas makes a lot of comparisons between humans and nh animals that seem to favor the former, as long as this commitment to moral consideration for all beings is stated, it cannot be said that he is a moral anthropocentrist. But I cannot also say that he is epistemically anthropocentric in the naïve sense.

Levinas’s statement is one of belief and not an argument. In order to make an argument, there has to be a premise that sustains the conclusion or claim. Levinas makes a moral claim but he cannot sustain it with premises. In short, he makes a belief statement and not an argument. Throughout the interview, Levinas argues that there are a lot of reasons for the difficulty of including animals within the description of his ethics of the face. He makes a commitment to the ethical consideration of all living beings but he says that he is not certain if his ethics of the face can be used as a reason for this.

In my perspective, the reasons of animal ethicists who study Levinas and criticize him as anthropocentric are doing so upon Levinas’s avowed ambiguity if his ethics of the face could be applied to animals and for me, this is unfair. The philosopher’s seemingly anthropocentric comments on the animal appear to me as expressions of his own self-contradiction, In fact, he challenges his own ideas, if indeed, the animal could fit within his ethics of face.

The question is precisely: why does he jump into such conclusion of admitting moral consideration for all animals if he is contradicting this conclusion more than affirming it? The answer is: it is his moral intuition that jumped into it because Levinasian ethics, after all, is intuitive. Even if he is full of contradictions about it, he grasps that belief as truth conviction. Levinasian ethics is disruptive: it shows how the intuitive call of ethics overrules rationalistic

contradictions. Intuitive truth, however, does not also mean that the truth is mystical and is above all explanations and historical causes. There are many ways of explaining (and defining) what is intuitive that need not toggle down to the Platonic realm of ideas nor to religious mysticism. For example, in Levinas, empathy to another's suffering is intuitive but explainable by psychological transfer. What is meant there by intuitive is that it is sensed quickly, motions one to respond quickly, even if the reasons that justify the response or imagining the ways to respond may be contradictory or may not be sufficient.

My assignment in this part is to articulate on the significant points in the arguments of the scholars who considered Levinas anthropocentric in view of the question: what do they want to modify in Levinas's thought and his ethics that will be inclusive for the animal? This task is necessary as a comparative background that will give form to my strategic approach in this thesis.

1.2.2.1 Atterton, the Animal's Face, and Darwinism

I would like to pick up three points that are pertinent to the above quoted interview. The *first* contention of Atterton concerns Levinas's statements regarding what may be called face – if the animal's face could be considered a face and an other just like that of the human face that presses on the ethical. Levinas says:

- I do not know if [the face] it is in the snake. . . a more specific analysis is needed. Certainly not with the flea. . .(3)

- One cannot entirely refuse the face of the dog. . .(1)

From the above, Atterton problematizes what Levinas considers 'other' and 'face.' Levinas's ethical notion of face will be treated more comprehensively in the third chapter. For the moment, it would suffice to say that Levinas's notion of other is an individual being with manifestations of subjective reality that cannot be categorized: "The alterity of the other does not depend on any quality that would distinguish him from me, for a distinction of this nature would precisely imply between us that community of genus which nullifies alterity." This

other has a face which “is present in its refusal to be contained . . . cannot be comprehended . . . neither seen nor touched.”⁶⁸ The ‘otherness of the other’ is that sense of mystery that the other exudes when I discover that she is different and incomprehensible within my normal rational universe. This mystery carries a personal presence that relates to us; it has a ‘face.’ What comes closest to the notion of Levinas’s face and other is ‘personhood.’

In Levinas, the other is a being who has a face that invokes responsibility from one. What Atterton expects is that Levinas would say that the nh animal also has this ‘face’ that invokes moral responsibility but then he fails to do so. Levinas jokes around and says he does not know if the snake has a face, and much less, the flea. Yet, he concedes to the face of the dog. Atterton tries to decipher what ‘specific analyses’ Levinas would need to account for the differences in face. He makes use of the items below from the interview:

- One cannot entirely refuse a dog the face. It is in terms of the face [that one understands] the dog . . . It is not in the dog that the phenomenon of the face is in its purity (1).
- It is not because you recognize the human face that you see the face of the dog . . . The wisdom of the face does not begin in the dog (2).
- On the contrary, in the dog, in the animal, there are some phenomena. For example, that force of nature—it is pure vitality. That which characterizes above all the dog [is] its vitality—yet there is also a face (2).

Atterton notes that the above, it could easily be misconstrued in the traditional formulation in science that what accounts for the difference between humans and nh animals lies in the distinction between reason (phenomenon in the pure sense) and instinct (pure vitality). But he is not convinced that Levinas leans toward this way of thinking because ‘reason is not a guide for moral action for Levinas.’ Even if the realm of the pre-rational or non-rational that invoke the ethical response may not be present in animals in the same degree as humans, it does not show animals to be of lesser moral status, “as the argument from “marginal cases” establishes.”⁶⁹ Humans with defective cognitive faculties that may be, in some respects,

⁶⁸ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 194.

⁶⁹ ATTERTON, Peter. Levinas’s humanism and anthropocentrism. In: Michael MORGAN, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Levinas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 13.

comparable to nh animals cannot be said to be of lower moral status. If such lower moral status cannot be said of these defective humans, then it cannot also be applied on animals.

Atterton thinks that what accounts in Levinas for the difference in the faces of animals and nh animals is sentiency as shown in the quote from the interview below:

- The ethical extends to all living things . . . but we do not need to make an animal suffer needlessly. (3).

This brings about Atterton's *second* contention against Levinas: his implication in the inverse that there could be ways to consider "necessary" animal suffering. He accosts Levinas that:

[. . .] there is no question about whether (sentient) animals matter for Levinas, but only why they matter. What is clear is that whatever the reasons for why the lives of animals that have the capacity to suffer matter, those reasons do not extend as far as prohibiting the use of animals for legitimate human interests.⁷⁰

Atterton emphasizes that Levinas does not say what those legitimate human interests that could justify nh animal suffering are. Atterton injects the edict in the Talmud against needless animal suffering which is called *tza'ar ba'alei chayim*. It is interpreted in various ways: that compassion for animals elevate moral quality in humans, promotes compassion for other humans, that animals have inherent value in themselves, etc. Yet, eating meat is allowed in the Jewish religion. In any case, Atterton refuses the idea that animal suffering could be justified in any way and says that Levinas affirms this: "the justification of the neighbor's pain is certainly the source of all immorality."⁷¹

Levinas fails to account for the reasons why some animals, i.e., snake and flea do not seem to have a face. It does not lie in having reason nor in justifiable human reasons in making a nh animal suffer. The final contention that may account for Levinas's inhibition to fully accept that the animal has face seems to lie in the following aspects in the interview:

- The human face is another thing altogether and only afterwards do we come across the face of the animal. . .(3)
- But the prototype of this is human ethics (3).

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 14.

⁷¹ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Entre nous: On thinking of the other*. Translated by Michael SMITH and Barbara HARSHAV. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 173.

- I do not know at what moment the human appears, but what I am going to underline is that the human breaks with pure being, which is always persistence in being (4).
- That is my principal thesis. A being is something attached to being, to its being. That is the idea of Darwin. The animal being is a struggle for life, a struggle for life without ethics. Is that not true? It is a question of might, no? Darwinian morality (4).

The *third* contention of Atterton has to do with Levinas's distorted understanding of Darwinism. According to Atterton, Levinas "is denying the famous Darwinian claim that great as the differences are between humans and animals, the difference in intellectual and moral attributes "certainly is one of degree and not of kind."⁷² On the contrary, Darwin insists that basic forms of ethical behavior can be found throughout human and animal societies.

Darwin writes that the human race evolved from simple organisms just as animals did and were subjected to the same environmental conditions that shaped thinking. For this reason, humans and animals have different gradations of shared mental abilities:

If no organic being excepting man had possessed any mental power, or if his powers had been of a wholly different nature from those of the lower animals, then we should never have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been gradually developed. But it can be clearly shewn that there is no fundamental difference of this kind. We must also admit that there is a much wider interval in mental power between one of the lowest fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and one of the higher apes, than between an ape and man; yet this immense interval is filled up by numberless gradations . . . My object in this chapter is solely to shew that there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties. . . As no classification of the mental powers has been universally accepted. . . As man possesses the same senses with the lower animals, his fundamental intuitions must be the same. Man has also some few instincts in common, as that of self- preservation, sexual love, the love of the mother for her new-born offspring, the power possessed by the latter of sucking, and so forth.⁷³

In his comparisons of mental abilities between species, Darwin cites, for example, that kittens, puppies and lambs, exhibit happiness when playing, that humans cannot make a hatchet or canoe except by a long range-imitative learning whereas a beaver could build a dam even in his young age, that terror is exhibited by both humans and some wild animals through the same biological reflexes such as having palpitations, relaxations of sphincter, and hairs

⁷² ATTERTON, Peter. Levinas's humanism and anthropocentrism. In: Michael MORGAN, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Levinas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 16; also in DARWIN, Charles. *The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 105.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, DARWIN, C.,pp. 34-35.

standing on ends,⁷⁴ and that female monkeys suffer grief for the loss of their young just like humans.⁷⁵ Darwin says that pack animals such as wolves exhibit behaviors of helping and defending each other against other predators when hunting. He observed two stallions defending another stallion from the attack of a group of mares. Some animals also share food. Hamadryas baboons invert stones to search for insects and when they find a large one, they take turns eating.⁷⁶

Furthermore, according to Atterton, Levinas has a distorted understanding of Darwin's struggle for existence in animals.⁷⁷ Atterton says that Darwin is concerned with the struggle for existence but does not preclude the aspect of altruism in animals. It is not a dog-eat-dog world out there. Darwin says:

The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its cognitive faculties had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in the human. For, firstly, the social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform various services for them.⁷⁸

Atterton claims that Darwin also emphasized that animals have well-developed social instincts that predispose them toward sympathy and doing services to others. Atterton supposes that Levinas may have generated this impression of Darwin from Thomas Huxley, who in 1893, gave a famous Oxford address entitled *Evolution and Ethics* which has been responsible for the sensational interpretation of Darwin's struggle for existence because he "conjured in the minds of his genteel Victorian audience the image of a "gladiatorial" fight in

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 40.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 77.

⁷⁷ ATTERTON, Peter. Levinas's humanism and anthropocentrism. In: Michael MORGAN. ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Levinas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 16.

⁷⁸ DARWIN, Charles. *The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 71-72.

which the strong survive at the expense of the weak.”⁷⁹ When Levinas claims that the prototype of animal ethics is human ethics, this is untenable if he is claiming this in the evolutionary or biological sense. Atterton emphasizes that “evolution is not linear, and the animal doesn’t evolve.”⁸⁰ In short, Levinas has a faulty understanding of Darwin when he uses the latter’s concepts to contend that only humans are capable of the moral sense.

In my interpretation, what Atterton wants from Levinas is for him:

- to clarify what specific characteristics would qualify an animal to have a face and what reasons could be morally justified to make an animal suffer
- that for a brilliant scholar as Levinas, if only he understood Darwin well, Levinas would have used Darwin to clarify the characteristics for the animal’s face and why an animal cannot be made to suffer.

My comment on this is I do not understand why Atterton expects Levinas (and even Levinas himself seems confused in necessitating himself) to differentiate between human and animal faces in order to qualify as face because it had been clear from the Levinasian definition of face that face is not qualifiable. The mere argument of species overlap in terms of human and animal biological, cognitive, and agential characteristics is already a manifestation of the animal otherness, but still, otherness of the face is not determined on the plane of scientific nor rational distinctions. So where is it determined, then? I shall return to clarify this topic in the third chapter which will take up the subject of the face of the animal.

⁷⁹ ATTERTON, Peter. *Nourishing the hunger of the other: A rapprochement between Levinas and Darwin*. *Symplokē*, 2011, 19 (1-2), p. 22; also in ATTERTON, Peter. Levinas’s humanism and anthropocentrism. In: Michael MORGAN ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Levinas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 16; also in HUXLEY, Thomas Henry. *Evolution and ethics: With essays on its Victorian and sociobiological context*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 140.

⁸⁰ ATTERTON, Peter. *Nourishing the hunger of the other: A rapprochement between Levinas and Darwin*. *Symplokē*, 2011, 19 (1-2), p. 17.

1.2.2.2 Plant on Wittgenstein and Levinas: A More Hospitable Anthropocentrism

In the essay of Plant entitled *Vulnerable Lives: Levinas, Wittgenstein, and Animals*, he states that “a degree of anthropocentrism in our ethical lives is unavoidable.”⁸¹ His suggestion is to rethink ways of making this inevitable degree of anthropocentrism as hospitable as possible to more animals. The way he imagines it is drawn from his criticism of Levinas as springboard for his preference for Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The task here is to delineate what for him delivers Levinas over to anthropocentrism and on that aspect, how Wittgenstein makes that anthropocentrism more benign.

Plant reacts to the following passages from the interview:

- One cannot entirely refuse a dog the face. It is in terms of the face [that one understands] the dog [. . .] It is not in the dog that the phenomenon of the face is in its purity (1).
- The human face is an altogether different thing, and we rediscover [only] afterward the face in the animal. I do not know whether one finds it in the snake! [laughter][. . .] Not in the flea, for example. The flea! It’s an insect, which jumps, eh? [laughter] (3).
- Clearly, one [approach to] ethics is the transference of the idea of suffering to an animal, certainly. The animal suffers. It is because we as men know what suffering is that we can also have this obligation (3).

According to Plant, the anthropocentrism of Levinas lies in his obscurity to account clearly how the transference of the idea of human suffering is imputed on the non-human animal which invokes the ethical responsibility: “But what, we may ask, does it mean to transfer the idea of suffering to other animals from our prior knowledge of human misery? Is the “human” paradigmatic in the way Levinas here suggests?”⁸²

To begin with, Plant primarily expresses that this difficulty has already been apparent in the human-to-human face relations. There is difficulty in understanding how Levinas’s deduces moral responsibility from the otherness of the other:

⁸¹ PLANT, Bob. *Vulnerable lives: Levinas, Wittgenstein and “Animals.”* In Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT., eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 32.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

The Other is not other with a relative alterity as are, in comparison, even ultimate species, which mutually exclude one another but still have their place within the community of a genus- excluding one another by their definition, but calling for one another by this exclusion, across the community of their genus. The alterity of the Other does not depend on any quality that would distinguish him from me, for a distinction of his nature would precisely imply between us that community of genus which already nullifies alterity [. . .]

The Other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which his epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be common to us [. . .]⁸³

The difficulty from the above consists in that if the other is infinitely foreign, then how could this be a source of the moral obligation? How could one be compassionate toward another who is infinitely enigmatic?

The idea is that there should, at least, be some connection between one and the other that lies on the plane of similarity. I think this could be threshed out by saying that the source of discrimination and oppression of the other in Levinas mainly comes from the plane of representation and rationalistic systems. This is why it is important for him to emphasize that the other is beyond representation. This is what he means by ‘infinitely foreign,’ it is defensive against discrimination but ‘friendly’ toward cognizance of sameness in view of harmonious relations. It should not mean that there is no means of connection or relation to the other when the other is infinitely foreign.

This relation on the premise of sameness emanates from shared embodiment. The source of the moral is the shared experience of suffering among humans. To say that the moral obligation emanates from otherness simply means to protect the otherness of the other’s body from the violence (‘do not kill’) sponsored by the world of representation. Between humans, the portal of embodiment by which the otherness of the other is experienced is through the face. Plant quotes Levinas:

You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you describe them. The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the

⁸³ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. The trace of the other. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. In: Mark TAYLOR, ed., *Deconstruction in context: Literature and philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 194.

Other. The relation with the face surely cannot be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face cannot be reduced to that.⁸⁴

In the above, Plant says that it is not clear in Levinas “why noticing the color of the other’s eyes thwarts and derails the ethical relation.”⁸⁵ But Plant explains it well in his appreciation of the most insightful idea in Levinas. In everyday social encounter, one does not regard the person in terms of age, nationality, looks, species, etc. but regards the person in her entirety.⁸⁶ We may well say that this ‘pure’ regard on the person that does not categorize from prejudices in history and language, is the look of moral regard, one of respect. When one focuses on an area of the body, i.e., a scar on the face, or a woman’s breasts by a man, it is most likely a look prompted by representation and social labelling from whence violence begins.

Now the problem about the nh animal steps in when it is said that while the ‘flesh and blood’ connection between humans seems intuitive or immediate, this is not so with nh animals because as Levinas says, not all nh animals could be said to have a face. He is not sure if the snake has a face and much less insects like the flea. The way he laughs about the flea emphasizes well his point. Yet, as suggested by Plant, this is incongruent with what Levinas said that “the whole body—a hand or a curve of a shoulder can express a face”⁸⁷ because any part of the body, when hurt or ailing, threatens the mortality of the entire living being. In fact, the advantage of this principle, when applied to animals, would mean that even those animals who do not have faces like the human face, i.e., with eyes, mouth, nose, etc., any part of an animal’s body could very well speak of their otherness. But Levinas, in the interview, does not take recourse in this principle of his and insists on the difference of the face in the nh animal.

The question is, of course, why does Levinas still insist on the difference? Plant locates the answer by linking what Levinas said that (even for a dog who has a face) the phenomenon of

⁸⁴ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1982, pp. 85-86; also in PLANT, Bob. *Vulnerable lives: Levinas, Wittgenstein and “Animals.”* In: Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 34.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

⁸⁷ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 262

the face in the dog is not pure and his statement that the nh animal is riveted to the struggle or his own being. This, discussed earlier in Atterton, is a misinterpretation of Darwin.

It seems to me that for Levinas, between humans, the moral compassion for another's suffering is intuited, but with that for some nh animals, the 'pick-up' may be slower (perhaps depending upon cognitive faculties or social capacities), and the effectivity of the 'pick-up' differs between species of nh animals who relate more to humans on their own initiative and those who do not. It is on this complication that Plant favors more the philosophy of Wittgenstein than that of Levinas.

According to Plant, the advantage of Wittgenstein's philosophy is that the perception of another's suffering is 'primitive' and does not pass through thinking. Plant explains this in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* wherein he makes a distinction between "an attitude towards a soul" and believing that the other has a soul. Plant quotes Wittgenstein:

I believe that he is suffering."-Do I believe that he isn't an automaton? It would go against the grain to use the word in both connexions [. . .]

Suppose I say of a friend: "He isn't an automaton" – What information is conveyed by this, and to whom would it be information? To a human being who meets him in ordinary circumstances [. . .]

I believe that he is not an automaton," just like that, so far makes no sense. My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul [. . .]

The human body is the best picture of the human soul.⁸⁸

Plant explains that when the other complains of having a toothache, the primitive reaction is to care and to tend and not to wonder about the fact of what it is.⁸⁹ He says that in Wittgenstein, the response to another's suffering is not something that is ruminated over but "something animal."⁹⁰

The ensuing query is that since the quote above mentions 'human body,' does this mean that Wittgenstein considers this primitive emotion toward suffering only applicable for humans

⁸⁸ WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. *Philosophical investigations*. Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1958, p. 178; also in PLANT, Bob. *Vulnerable lives: Levinas, Wittgenstein and "Animals."* In Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 40.

⁸⁹ Ibid., PLANT, Bob. p. 45.

⁹⁰ WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. *On certainty*. Oxford:Blackwell Publishing, 1999, p. 359; also in *ibid.*, p. 43.

and not for animals? Plant says that Wittgenstein does say that sometimes, we are unsure about whether nh animals, most especially those whose physiologies do not resemble ours, if they are indeed suffering or not. In Wittgenstein, what is crucial is “resemblance” to the “general facts of embodiment.”⁹¹ “General facts of embodiment,” Plant translates this as an intuitive knowledge of what is a biologically living being and what is not. In this, Plant quotes Wittgenstein:

What has a soul, or pain, to do with a stone? [. . .] Look at the stone and imagine it having sensations. One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of subscribing a sensation to a thing? One might as well subscribe it to a number! And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems to get a foothold here [. . .] And so, too, a corpse seems to us quite inaccessible to pain. Our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead, is not the same.⁹²

The above means that for Plant, Wittgenstein affirms that there is the primitive connection to the suffering of many nh animals that need not be dependent on capacities but on the plain common sense of what the body means when it is alive or dead. This is most important for Plant since he finds in Wittgenstein a way to connect to nh animals even when there is no knowledge of their neurological bases. Plant makes use of Wittgenstein’s ‘attitude toward a soul’ that knows what is living and what is dead in playing up the notion of the nh animal’s vulnerability. The example that he gives is that of people who tear off butterflies’s wings or crush down snails. Even if there is no knowledge whether they have pain or not, the mere sense of their fragility when alive is enough to sound the ethical alarm.⁹³ But all things said, Plant, still, admits that the sense of vulnerability and mortality has limits. He does exonerate Levinas for joking about the flea, because even the appeal to vulnerability and the ‘attitude toward the soul’ would be a rough ride to consider mites, ticks, and worms. In this, he admits and concludes that some amount of anthropocentrism cannot be helped.

To summarize, what Plant expects from Levinas that the latter did not fulfill but which could be found in Wittgenstein are:

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 44.

⁹² Ibid., §§283-84, pp. 97-98; also in PLANT, B. *Vulnerable lives: Levinas, Wittgenstein and “Animals.”* In Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 44.

⁹³Ibid., PLANT, B., p. 48.

- A way to connect intuitively to nh animals that need not be blocked by the gaze of cultural prejudice. Levinas's failure to account for this subtends his confusion about having to differentiate (impure) faces of different animals vis-à-vis the (pure) human face.

- Wittgenstein's 'attitude toward the soul' admits more species of nh animal as capable of sounding the moral alarm in as far as we have a sense of 'living' and 'dead' whereas Levinas's 'transference of the idea of suffering' has a stronger bias against those species who do not have similarities with humans in terms of physiological characteristics.

My caveats on the above consists of two points. The *first* has to do with the stubborn issue about Levinas saying that the impurity about the nh animal's face has to do with his disability to transcend the Darwinistic battle for the fittest, which Atterton already explained, has been a misunderstanding of Darwin. Granted that it is scientifically correct that nh animals are riveted to the dog-eat-dog world and are not capable of altruism, it is still a wonder why this is an issue for Levinas and Levinasian animal ethicists. A nh animal does not merit less moral consideration than a human just because the nh animal is centered on survival. It may mean that, yes, that makes them less valuable in terms of 'capacities' and this, for animal ethicists, may be considered 'anthropocentric' and 'speciesist.' But it does not affect the validity for moral consideration. As Levinas himself insists, even without considering nh animals as having a face, the fact remains that they are still worthy of moral regard.

Moreover, in Levinas's thought, it must be remembered that the structure of responsibility is unilateral: "I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair."⁹⁴ One is responsible for the other even when the other does not return that obligation. In fact, parents do this for children; they remain responsible for their children even if they do not reciprocate care, understandably, since they are too young. But it is also the same attitude that many people have when they do charity work for people who would not be able to return their kindness. So, I do not see why in Levinas, an animal's being riveted to self would make the face 'impure.' I do not understand how the impurity of the nh animal's face is linked to his being less deserving for moral consideration, most especially,

⁹⁴ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1985, pp. 98.

when the argument of marginal cases is invoked. In Levinas, it is not the nh animal that is in question for the ethical act but the human.

But there may be a way to understand why both Levinas (and Plant) relate the impurity of the face of the nh animal to the incapacity of nh animal for altruism. It may be said that the nh animals differ in capacity to relate both to conspecifics and interspecifics. In a way, there are animals who 'keep to themselves' and animals who are, we might say, 'more equipped for the social life' and in this, we do not even have to use the species as basis. Those nh animals who are very good at reaching out and relating to humans, by their own initiative, are the ones who, by perception, 'have more face to us' than those who do not.

I think that when Levinas makes comparisons between human faces and nh animal faces, what he says is that bodily connection (which enables moral empathy) is more immediate among humans than with nh animals (in this, epistemic anthropomorphism works). In addition, there is also more bodily connection between humans and nh animals who go out of their way to relate more to humans, and frequently, these are the animals who have faces with, more or less, the same facial features as humans. This explains why there is more moral compassion for dogs than snakes or fleas in the realm of everyday life. It explains the presence of graduated degrees of moral intuition in humans for the suffering of nh animals. But still, I do not think it should not subtend the argument of moral anthropocentrism.

My *second* caveat involves Plant's preference for Wittgenstein's 'attitude toward the soul' as a way of explaining the immediate intuition of the suffering of the nh animal. It seems that for him, Levinas lacks this vision but I defend that he does not. In Levinas's essay entitled *Useless Suffering*, he demonstrates immediate perception of the suffering of a living being by saying that care is primordial than cure. Levinas says:

Original opening toward merciful care [. . .] more pressing, more urgent, in the groan, than a demand for consolation or the postponement of death—the anthropological category of the medical, a category that is primordial, irreducible, ethical, imposes itself. For pure suffering, which is intrinsically senseless and condemned to itself with no way out, a beyond appears in the form of the interhuman.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Entre nous: On thinking of the other*. Translated by Michael SMITH and Barbara HARSHAV. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 93-94.

Levinas says here that medical science is underlined by the ethics of care – this is what he refers to as the anthropological category of the medical that is ethical. He says that even medicine, which is supposedly politically oriented to be preoccupied with cure, is overrun by the immediate concern for care. The care is (or should be) a more primordial concern than cure. This is why emergency units in hospitals exist despite specialized clinics of resident physicians.

Moreover, the creation of the 911 rescue operations and its equivalent form in many countries is actually intuitive care systematized on the interhuman level. The ethic behind the 911 is that in a perilous suffering that threatens mortality, there should be no social categories and that this service is made available to everyone. The 911 rescue is intuitive, immediate, and its effectivity is measured by the swiftness of succor, as if done without thinking, with militaristic focus on care. I would like to mention here that the same ethic runs also for animal rescue operations.

The whole drama of how self-centered suffering summons the altruistic interhuman in the face of suffering in Levinas also demonstrates Wittgenstein's attitude toward a living being who is not a stone. In short, Levinas does not lack a philosophical account for an immediate intuition of the other's suffering that is as non-categorical such as the one held by Wittgenstein. Moreover, it is not only the human who is capable of the immediate intuition for care over cure. From the reports of cognitive ethology, even animals are capable of altruistic acts both toward inter and conspecifics.

1.2.2.3 Calarco on Derrida and Levinas: Thinking the Limits

Calarco presents Derrida's argument in his essay, *Ecce Animot: Levinas, Derrida and the Other Animal*. He says that there is a need to move beyond the limits of Levinas's work in view of transcending humanism and anthropocentrism immanent in the Western philosophical tradition.⁹⁶ The *first* issue of Calarco revolves around Levinas's allowance of an elbow room

⁹⁶ CALARCO, Marc. *Ecce Animot: Levinas, Derrida and the other animal*. In: Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 121.

for the non-murderous sacrifice of the non-human animal within a sacrificial framework of Levinasian ethics that supports an anthropocentric, anthropophagical, and phallogocentric structure. Calarco's discussion of Derrida's assessment of Levinas touches on the following points from the interview:

- We do not want to make an animal suffer needlessly, etcetera. But the prototype of this is human ethics . . . There are certainly, I don't know, vegetarians—those who [are in] the animal protection league; that exists (3).
- I don't know. I cannot tell you at what moment you have the right to be called "face" (3).

Calarco, in the same view as Atterton, would understand the first item to imply a fatal inverse: that there could be ways to make an animal suffer 'needfully' and it is related to the matter of making ethics an affair between humans only. Calarco tackles this on the foundation of Levinas's unique concept of the subject which does not start from the autonomous self and its freedom. Subjectivity in Levinas is never autonomous but is always already held in hostage by the other. The self asks: what am I doing for the other? The ethical relation begins here. According to Calarco, Derrida appreciates that Levinas makes an effort to denounce the autonomous humanist subject by opening "a path of thought that helps to create the space for the idea of responsibility that is not always generated within themes of freedom."⁹⁷ But Levinas ends up being posthumanist himself even as he thwarts the very self-centeredness of humanism, and this is evident when the question is posed: in the fourth commandment "Thou shalt not kill," who is this "thou"? This is seen in the interview of Derrida by Jean-Luc Nancy:

But the "Thou shalt not kill" is addressed to the other and presupposes him. It is destined to the very thing that it institutes, the other as man. It is by him that the subject is first of all held hostage. The "Thou shalt not kill" - with all its consequences, which are limitless-has never been understood within the Judeo-Christian tradition, nor apparently by Levinas, as a "Thou shalt not put to death the living in general. " It has become meaningful in religious cultures for which carnivorous sacrifice is essential, as being flesh. The other, such as this can be thought according to the imperative of ethical transcendence, is indeed the other man: man as other, the other as man.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 122.

Humanism of the other man is a title in which Levinas suspends the hierarchy of the attribute and the subject. But the other man is the subject.⁹⁸

‘Thou shalt not kill’ only applies to the human species and not to all living beings. The other human, who is supposed to fracture the self of the autonomous ‘I’, is still also another human, reinforcing and maintaining the notion of ‘humanity.’ It transcends the ego of the subject and predisposes her toward service for another human being, but not the ego of ‘humanity.’ What maintains the structure of the same is the very sacrificial structure that is initially intended to undermine it. Derrida exposes this most especially in the anthropocentric politics of eating. Levinas’s extolling of the act of hospitality is the sharing of food to eat, indeed, when the food one is about to eat in one’s hunger is sacrificed and given for the hunger and nourishment of the other. There are many forms of sacrifice, of course, but the sacrifice of food that is meant for the self is of special significance in Levinas because food is the greatest temptation for self-maintenance or survival. To maintain the self, one has to eat, not only food, but to eat ‘good food.’ What happens here is that the ethics of ‘humanity’ is positivized upon the sacrifice of the non-human animal. What should be the sacrifice is the human self but the human subject is unwilling to “sacrifice sacrifice,”⁹⁹ and proffers that the animal flesh become the ultimate sacrifice to serve as the foundation of this human sacrificial benevolence. In short, it is the sacrificial expense of the non-human animal flesh that founds the idea of the good in the human and goodness that is sharing of goods among humans.

In addition, Derrida considers this sacrificial tradition in ethics phallogocentric because it follows the patriarchal structure of ‘who’ gets to decide ‘whom’ to sacrifice. Humans sacrifice animals to maintain ‘humanity’ in the same way that men get to decide what to do with women’s bodies and those of children. Derrida claims that in as far as the power over life and death goes, phallogocentrism is also carnal; the political machinery that is a tautology of the self is fed by the appropriation and assimilation of the other’s flesh and blood. Derrida says:

⁹⁸ DERRIDA, Jacques. “Eating well,” or the calculation of the subject: An interview with Jacques Derrida. In: Eduardo CADAVA, Peter CONNOR and Jean-Luc NANCY, eds., *Who comes after the subject*. New York: Routledge, 1991, p. 113.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 113; also in CALARCO, Marc. Ecce Animot: Levinas, Derrida and the other animal. In: Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 125.

The conjunction of "who" and "sacrifice" not only recalls the concept of the subject as phallogocentric structure, at least according to its dominant schema: one day I hope to demonstrate that this schema implies carnivorous virility . . . Authority and autonomy (for even if autonomy is subject to the law, this subjugation is freedom) are, through this schema, attributed to the man (homo and vir) rather than to the woman, and to the woman rather than to the animal. And of course to the adult rather than to the child. The virile strength of the adult male, the father, husband, or brother (the canon of friendship, I will show elsewhere, privileges the fraternal schema) belongs to the schema that dominates the concept of subject. The subject does not want just to master and possess nature actively. In our cultures, he accepts sacrifice and eats flesh.¹⁰⁰

In Christological religion, the standard of all sacrifice is the god-man's drama of the expenditure of his life in order to demonstrate the maximum good, the good of forgiveness for the most horrific evil. In reality, Christ is flayed alive, but his flesh had not been eaten. But this is what the sacrament of the Eucharist symbolizes among Christians: the expenditure of flesh so that all enfleshed may live; such is the law of sacrifice. All living things cannot escape from this tautology because all must eat in order to live. One must cannibalize upon another enfleshed living neighbor, whether sentient or non-sentient (in this sense, even vegetarians are cannibals because plants are still enfleshed, though non-sentient), feign cognizance of that neighbor, and suspend the difference between what is good to eat and whether it is good to eat it.¹⁰¹ But still, the sacrifice of the spirit in the idealized manner among humans in whatever good that they do for others, ultimately, and still predominantly, cannibalizes upon animal flesh.

The *second* issue that Calarco raises from Derrida's review of Levinas has to do with Levinas's ambiguity whether to grant the animal a face. But in this second point, Calarco moderates Derrida by saying that "it is not entirely clear that Levinas categorically denies animals in the way that Derrida states."¹⁰²

In Derrida's essay, *The Animal that Therefore I am*, Calarco recalls that Derrida challenges Levinas's privileging of the human face with the idea that a cat could actually gaze also at the

¹⁰⁰ DERRIDA, Jacques. "Eating well," or the calculation of the subject: An interview with Jacques Derrida. In: Eduardo CADAVA, Peter CONNOR and Jean-Luc NANCY, eds., *Who comes after the subject*. New York: Routledge, 1991, p. 113.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² CALARCO, Marc. Ecce Animot: Levinas, Derrida and the other animal. In: Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 127.

human. Derrida ruminates on his experience of a cat who gazed upon him when he was naked, which made him feel ashamed of himself. He recalls that scene:

Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, and Levinas—belong to this quasi-epochal category. Their discourses are sound and profound, but everything in them goes on as if they themselves had never been looked at, and especially not naked, by an animal that addressed them. At least everything goes on as though this troubling experience had not been theoretically registered, supposing that it had been experienced at all, at the precise moment when they made of the animal a theorem, something seen and not seeing. The experience of the seeing animal, of the animal that looks at them, has not been taken into account in the philosophical or theoretical architecture of their discourse.¹⁰³

Pertinent to this gaze, Derrida claims that philosophers from Aristotle to Lacan, Descartes, Heidegger, including Levinas, denied the animal the agency for language, which enables a response that is not mere reaction.¹⁰⁴ Calarco points out that in Derrida, this inability to respond in nh animals that for Levinas matters is what places them on the sacrificeable zone.¹⁰⁵ Of course, no ethologist would ever accept today that the nh animal does not respond (beyond reaction) even without employment of human language because many nh animals do have a language of their own.

One example that Derrida presents is Levinas's Kantian dog, Bobby, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Supposedly, Levinas exalts Bobby because of his purity in categorical thinking; that Bobby does not know the difference between humans and dogs, which makes possible the non-judgmental attitude of the dog toward the inmates, in opposition to the Nazis. Derrida puts this statement down because Bobby cannot be Kantian; he is innocently 'stupid.' Only those who have judgment and could suspend judgment to grasp a universal maxim could be, strictly speaking, Kantians. Levinas's regard for Bobby is really no more than that of a romantic anthropomorphist. Derrida writes:

But how can one ignore that a Kantian who doesn't have "the brain needed" to universalize maxims would not be Kantian, especially if the maxims in question are the maxims of "drives" that would have made Kant bark. Bobby is thus anything but Kantian. This allegorical or fabulous Kantian is at the very best an infirm neo-Kantian, a Kantian deprived of reason, a Kantian without

¹⁰³ DERRIDA, Jacques. *The animal that therefore I am*. New York: Fordham University, 2008, p. 14.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁰⁵ CALARCO, Marc. *Ecce Animot: Levinas, Derrida and the other animal*. In: Peter ATTERTON and Tamra Wright, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 128.

universalizable maxims. Reckoning only by the measure of what we glimpsed in a certain unconscious of pure practical reason, namely, the cruel and merciless war that a virtual “fascist” (in Adorno’s terms) Kantian idealism declares on animal life, calling Bobby a Kantian is no compliment.¹⁰⁶

But Calarco does not agree with Derrida about this. In another article, *Faced by Animals*, Calarco criticizes that what is at issue is not the fact that Bobby can universalize (or not universalize according to Derrida) maxims. There is something here amiss. Calarco says that Levinas does not recognize that Bobby’s life is also at stake in the camp. Levinas says that Bobby emerged from a “wild patch in the region of the camp” which implies that he is homeless, typical of dogs abandoned in war. Levinas’s biblical quote at the beginning of his essay about Bobby already reveals society’s human-animal distinction, that humans “do not eat cursed meat that is cast to the dogs.” Levinas mentions other forms of maltreatment toward the animal: how rabid dogs are persecuted, how community strays are put out in the cold and rain. It is impossible that in this context that Bobby didn’t have a previous encounter of the brutality of humans, not only toward fellow humans but also toward many kinds of animals. For a starving and vulnerable dog, Calarco stresses that the transcendence of Bobby is not the dog’s sense that the Jewish inmates are not Nazis, but that in his abject poverty, he could still afford to express joy toward others.¹⁰⁷

What I would like to add here as the aspect of transcendence in Bobby is not that he has some grasp of human concepts such as what ‘human dignity’ and ‘prisoner’ means but that pertinent to his being dog, he has a full grasp of what brutality means in relation to his body as a dog. His ability to trust again (since not all dogs trust again and this is not relative to species but individuality) is his act of transcendence. Bobby trusts that his body will not be brutalized again by humans and this is the point of his transcendence. In this sense, Bobby reverts from being face as moral patient to being moral agent because he invites the human other in a relationship and risks his hide doing so. It may be that what Bobby needs from the prisoners is simply food, but his assumption that these people could somehow be kind speaks of the desire that goes beyond food. Bobby is a moral patient in the sense that he needs affection and food from the prisoners but he is also a moral agent in the sense of gesturing a brave invitation to a

¹⁰⁶ DERRIDA, Jacques. *The animal that therefore I am*. New York: Fordham University, 2008, p. 114.

¹⁰⁷ CALARCO, Marc. Faced by animals. In: Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds., *Radicalizing Levinas*. Albany: University of New York Press, p. 116.

relationship that precedes any material transaction and that he assumes will be given at his own risk.

Calarco does not agree that Levinas “denies animals a face in the way that Derrida states”¹⁰⁸ because he did say that the dog has a face (so some animals do), only that the animal’s face is secondary to the human face. Calarco appreciates Levinas’s humble admittance of his limitations in understanding how the animal’s face could fit into his ethics. But in Derrida, Levinas’s disavowal that he does not know whether the animal has a face, whether the snake has a face, and where the face begins and ends is tantamount to saying that, ultimately, Levinas does not know how to account for what a face really is. Calarco says:

By admitting that he can’t respond to the question of knowing what a face is . . . he can thus no longer answer for his whole discourse on the face. For declaring that he doesn’t know where the right to be called face begins means confessing that one doesn’t know at bottom what a face is, what the word means, what governs its usage . . . Doesn’t that amount, as a result, to calling into question the whole legitimacy of the discourse and ethics of the ‘face’ of the other.¹⁰⁹

But this jaded space which does not define the beginning and end of face in Levinas and in which Derrida thinks failed to dismantle the long-withstanding humanism and anthropocentrism, is, where Calarco finds hope for the nh animal. Calarco thinks “that the task of ethics for Derrida is to learn to endure and negotiate that space in all its complexity.”¹¹⁰ It is within this jaded space wherein acts of transcendences by the nh animal such as that of Bobby’s trust, would receive validation. In this gaping hole, all kinds of animals would be allowed to manifest, challenge, and expand infrastructures of intelligence, emotion, agency, and moral participation that envision to transcend the horizons of anthropocentric ethics.

To encapsulize, Calarco makes two significant points of limits in Levinas according to Derrida:

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 129; also in DERRIDA, Jacques. *The animal that therefore I am*. New York: Fordham University, 2008, p. 109.

¹¹⁰ CALARCO, Marc. Faced by animals. In: Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT., eds., *Radicalizing Levinas*. Albany: University of New York Press, p. 132.

- Levinas failed to see that the scaffolding of his sacrificial ethics is waged upon the expense of non-human animal life and suffering, making his ethics an exclusive affair between humans. He failed to see this because for Levinas, like the philosophers who preceded him, he regards the animal as simply expressive but not responsive.

- Levinas cannot fully account for the phenomenology of face in terms where its manifestation begins and ends which casts obscurity upon the fact if the animal, indeed, could have a face. But this, Calarco does not consider a weakness of Levinas but a strength. The lacuna could be seized as an opportunity to accommodate not only a phenomenology but phenomenologies of faces of many kinds of non-human animals.

I do not have caveats to make on Calarco. I concur with his remark about Levinas's idea of face which is abstruse, a very much lauded concept in the realm of contemporary ethics because of its originality, is also one that needs to be pondered over and endured in its profundity and complexity for the sake of the non-human animal. This is the horizon where I would like to begin my academic mine.

1.3 FOLLOWING THE TRACE OF THE ANIMAL

This part will lay down the strategy or approach that this thesis will utilize in view of proving the argument that Levinasian ethics could serve the interests of animal ethics. The task that I will perform in this thesis is quite unconventional. My point of departure will be the background involving the arguments of the scholars who considered Levinas anthropocentric in terms of what they demanded from Levinas that would have been more hospitable for the animal. In my analysis, the most significant points made by the aforementioned scholars who are interested in applying Levinas's ethics on animals all point to a demand that Levinas should expound and clarify his idea of face:

- the specific analyses needed to distinguish between animal and non-human animal face, and,
- to distinguish between faces of many kinds of animals in their invocation of the ethical command;

- the recognition of the capacity for altruism in many animals as a form of transcendence that would credit their identity as moral agent (instead of being mere moral patient);
- the overstepping of the animal in the sacrificial practice of ethics

Their expectation is that if Levinas had clarified the above, it will seal his conclusion that many (if not all) animals should receive moral consideration. But not only this. This is also how they define a Levinasian way out of anthropocentrism. A Levinasian animal ethics is valuable to them because Levinas's ethics thwarts egocentric systems and militates against them; if this is so, then it could also overcome the ego of the human species and its totalizing structures: this is what Levinas has to offer for them. This background will inform my strategy or approach for this thesis. My approach in this thesis is not to criticize the limits in the ethical thought of Levinas but to use his central ethical concepts on some problems in animal ethics and see if it changes the discourse.

To use an image, if I am making dandelion honey, there are two approaches: *one* is via formal cause, to make the dandelion honey internally tasteful in view of its applications beforehand (that it will be used for my coffee, my bread, my pancakes) and so I will put all my favorite ingredients, i. e., adding lemon, lemon verbena, vanilla, cocoa, etc. The problem is, it cannot be totally predictable if the dandelion honey I make will really apply for all kinds of coffee, bread, and pancakes, etc. For example, it may blend well with plain white bread, but not with raisin bread. This is one way Levinas has written his ethics: it is really addressed to humans because it had been intended to prevent the holocaust from happening again. To be pressuring Levinas to modify his thought so as to extend it to animals, and that if he finds this task confusing, to criticize him as being anthropocentric because of that confusion, I think, is unfair to Levinas. Nevertheless, it would be an exciting venture on his ethical thought to apply it on the problems involving animals. The philosopher has accomplished an enormous body of thought that challenged both the destiny of Western metaphysics and the frameworks of many ethical systems. I think the expectation on Levinas is that any philosophical thought should function 'prophetically' and 'biblically,' that is, universally in time, as a standard of assessing its truth value.

The *other* way is the adventure of an anonymous final cause, to simply to grab any jar of dandelion honey and apply it on pancakes, breads, coffees, and see if it makes any difference on them. If it helps, it helps. If it doesn't, it doesn't. *I am using this second approach for this thesis*. My motive is not to make any comparisons whichever of the two approaches is scholastically or theoretically superior. I think this is pointless. I once had a luminous poet as a teacher in creative writing whom I asked: could we tweak language into creative forms even if they transgress grammar? He replied with nonchalant confidence: "What works, works!" My movement is centrifugal, and not centripetal. So this is my strategy: if Levinasian ethical concepts blaze insights and perspectives to help animals in the animal ethics discourse, let it do its work and forget Levinas. I am certain, that even Levinas, who is so keen on 'giving space' would stand aside despite himself, in the way of making the "ethical extend to all beings" – this is, after all, his moral conviction which I intend to serve.

Taking from what has been said in the previous part, I could now clarify that what the thesis title *Otherwise than Anthropocentrism* means: it is simply an exodus from the controversy that tries to pin down Levinas if he is anthropocentric or speciesist. I believe I have already sorted this out, for the sake of what the academic controversy is up to. My statement is that Levinas cannot be said to be anthropocentrist in (Horta's) sense in that he makes an ethical commitment for the nh animal even without being clear if his face ethics could accommodate him. He could be considered (epistemically) anthropocentric in (Paez's and Faria's) sense in that when he wrote his ethical works, he didn't seriously think of including the nh animal because as I said, he was addressing the tragedy of the holocaust. The problem of Levinasian scholars is precisely that Levinas has some scholastic misconceptions about nh animal nature and that his anti-humanist aims did not succeed in transcending the species bias. This is acceptable.

What I do reject is the thesis that if Levinas is found to be (epistemically) anthropocentric, then he might as well be debunked by animal ethicists. What I would rather interrogate is this entire business of finding an organic unity in Levinasian texts by which it could be said that he is (or not) anthropocentrist. Levinas, having launched a polemic against being and essence, is a champion of discontinuities, reversals, as well as movements of exodus. The 'otherwise than anthropocentrism' is not a project of formulating a new framework of animal ethics that

will forge a worldview that is free from the anthropocentric ideology because I share the viewpoint of Plant: "I suggest that a degree of anthropocentrism in our ethical lives is unavoidable [. . .]"¹¹¹ Perhaps the challenge that faces us is not one of eradicating anthropocentrism from ethical life, but of fostering more hospitable forms of anthropocentrism."¹¹² Hence, the 'otherwise than anthropocentrism' is, taking Calarco's challenge, is to work at the lacunas in Levinas that could somehow welcome the face of the animal that would not dabble anymore with the question of anthropocentrism or speciesism in his philosophy, one that is preoccupied with meeting the face of the nh animal. I would rather indulge in a project that picks up from where Levinas has ceased to speak for the animal.

But there is a final hitch. There rests a scholastic ethic on the part of a Levinasian researcher such as me not to 'abuse' Levinas, that is, to use his thought in ways that are contradictory to the major aims of his ethical project; otherwise, this would not be a Levinasian research. This calls for a standard. What guidelines for interpretation could be drawn in order to say that the application of Levinas's ethical concepts still lies within the Levinasian tradition of thinking?

I would like to generate this standard from Shroeder who takes up Levinas's notion of the 'trace.' He said that the 'trace' is central to applying Levinas's ethics to animals.¹¹³ Levinas's idea of trace occurs in his discussion of the characteristics of the face. If the face is Levinas's alternative to a philosophy of Being, then the trace, being the event of the face's visitation, is central to the exposure of the nh animal's face. Levinas does not define directly what trace is because he is more fond of tropes. The trace is a sign that face is present; it is the demeanor of the face. It is responsible for effectuating the event of transcendence from self-centeredness toward service of the other.

¹¹¹ PLANT, Bob. Vulnerable lives: Levinas, Wittgenstein and "Animals." In: Peter ATTERTON and Tamra WRIGHT, eds., *Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question*. New York: Suny Press, 2019, p. 32.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 51.

¹¹³ SHROEDER, Brian. What is the trace of the original face? Levinas, buddhism, and the mystery of animality. *ibid.*, p. 190.

Levinas does not shirk in saying that in this face is found the trace of God. In the same way that God is not a Being who could be understood as he is, the face cannot also be grasped in thought concepts. The face which is infinite, is the venue of God's passing.¹¹⁴

Consciousness could never catch the face in its fullness and perfection because 'perfection' would be tantamount to immanence. Immanence is the region of the selfsame that thrives in unities. In following the trace of the face, one transcends the regions of unity and the selfsame but finds the self in a rather uncomfortable domain. The effect of trace is to break up, to wound, to fragment otherwise enclosed regions and petrified constructs of self-consciousness so that the order of things could be overhauled and reversed. The novelty introduced is the vision that ethics is first philosophy and the first motivation of both language and thought. If there is no other or regions of otherness, thought and language would not exist.

The trace as the event of the face's passing will serve as the fundamental standard by which to judge if the application of Levinas's concepts to the problems of animal ethics would still be within the interest of Levinas or not. In the following, I present two characteristics of the trace in order to draw from it a proper method of interpretation for the employment of Levinas's ethical concepts on the problems of animal ethics. The trace, will thus, shepherd the way of proceeding.

1.3.1 Embodiment & Visitation

The *first* characteristic of trace is that it is based upon embodiment. Sense precedes the world of cultural signification.¹¹⁵ Levinas reacts against a kind of intellectualism wherein "signification is reduced to the contents given to consciousness."¹¹⁶ He appreciates Husserl's campaign for a return to the things themselves wherein the fissure between the object/subject had been healed by the relation between *noesis* and *noema*. But still, the fatality of Husserl, for Levinas is that objectivity is ultimately judged by the transcendental ego which makes the

¹¹⁴ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *The humanism of the other*. Translated by Nidra POLLER. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p. 44.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

event of truth a property of consciousness. Levinas is antipathetic of phenomenologies that conceive of a consciousness hovering above the world and has a hold on the body. While it is acceptable to look at things from a cultural perspective, embodiment, when not at ease with culture, could act to modify that culture. Levinas claims that:

Cultural action does not express prior thought; it expresses the being to which, embodied it already belonged. Signification cannot be inventoried in the interiority of thought. The thought itself intervenes in the culture through the gesture of the body that precedes and surpasses it.¹¹⁷

Levinas, instead, favors the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty which sees embodiment as the basis of knowledge: we do not use a mouth to sip coffee; we sip coffee. We do not use our hand to take up a pen; we write. The body is not a tool because the body is very much also the embodied subject. Vision is not a reflection of being but a position of seeing as attached to a body which, when physiological impaired, also distorts seeing itself.¹¹⁸ Levinas says that what is marvelous in Merleau-Ponty is this idea that "the body is a sensing sensed [. . .] sensed, it remains on the side of the subject [. . .] but sensing, it remains on [. . .] the side of objects."¹¹⁹ Merleau-Ponty demonstrates this well in the image of a hand touching the other hand, alternating between touching and being touched; the term he uses is chiasm or intertwining. He says:

Between the exploration and what it will teach me, between my movements and what I touch, there must exist some relationship by principle, some kinship according to which they are not only, like the pseudopods of the amoeba, vague and ephemeral deformations of the corporeal space, but the initiation to and opening upon a tactile world. This can happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, is also accessible from without, itself tangible, for my other hand, for example, if it takes place among the things it touches, is in a sense one of them, opens finally upon a tangible being of which it is also a part. Through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, its own movements incorporate themselves into the universe they interrogate, are recorded on the same map as it; the two systems are applied upon one another, as the two halves of an orange.¹²⁰

I interpret the above in that like the amoeba, in its locomotion, 'feels' environmental space as part of its own body. By touch, we are informed of the outside world by mediation of the

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

¹²⁰ MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice. *Visible and invisible*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968, p. 133.

body. But touch is always a double-touch. I oscillate between touching and being touched, crisscrossing between being subject and object of my experience. In effect, *chiasm* realizes meaning as a dynamic interrelation of inside and outside that inform and interrogate each other, ferreting out an objective meaning of the world.

Embodiment is important for Levinas because the wellspring of ethics is the epiphany of the face which is always naked. The face breaches cultural totalization and imposes a moral command “Thou shalt not kill!” Levinas said that “Morality does not belong to Culture; it allows us to judge culture, to evaluate the dimension of its elevation.”¹²¹

Thus, the face, in Levinas, cannot be ultimately grounded on culture: the moral command of the face precedes culture. The question here is: how does Levinas account for an embodiment with a moral command that escapes culture? Isn't the body, as its morality, always imprisoned in and saturated with culture? The difference lies in the structures that scaffold the embodiment imprisoned by a colonizing culture and the epiphany of the face that takes place within culture. Levinas writes:

Elevation introduces a sense into being. This I already experienced in the human body. It leads human societies to erect altars. It is not because men experience verticality in their bodies that the human I placed under the sign of elevation, it is because being is ordained by elevation that the human body is placed in a space where top and bottom are distinguished. ...universality could be only, as Merleau-Ponty expresses it, lateral. This universality means that we can go from on culture and penetrate another, as one goes from one's mother tongue to learn another language. The idea of a universal grammar and an algorithmic language built on the skeleton of grammar must be abandoned. No direct or privileged contact with the World of Ideas is possible. Such a conception of universality translates the radical opposition, characteristic of our times, against cultural expansion by colonization. Culture and colonization do not go together.¹²²

An example of how embodiment is colonized by culture, from Marxist critique, is the experience of the body alienated from oneself to meet the demands of capitalism. The result is the wearied body of the laborer that struggles to produce the required quotas in factory work. But there is something in the body that rebels against elevated moralities. And the pragmatic proof of this in Marxist critique is the rebellion of labor unions against capitalists. The mere

¹²¹ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *The humanism of the other*. Translated by Nidra POLLER. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p. 36.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 37.

fact that the embodiment is volatile, that it could perish as a final frontier of rebellion when moral systems in culture 'kill it' with its deals and standards, means that there is in embodiment, a frontier that is other than culture, but which is still within culture. The mere fact that embodiment is so volatile that it could be shaped and reshaped by the moral impingements of one historical epoch to another implies that universality is laterally nomadic and is not an absolute imposed from above.

Levinas also evades a kind of a fundamentalist empiricism wherein all meaning is limited only to the facticity of physical matter and sees the body only as material. He says the face is also abstract but not in the sense of the abstraction of substance and accidents in the tradition of metaphysics nor in the numinous concealment and unconcealment of the Greek a-letheia in ontology:

The face is also abstract. This abstraction certainly does not correspond to the raw sensible given of the empiricists. . . the abstraction of the face is visitation and advent that disturbs immanence without being set in the horizons of the World. Its abstraction is not obtained from a logical process going from the substance of beings, from the particular to the general. On the contrary, it goes toward beings but is not engaged with them, retires from them, is ab- solved. Its wonder lies in this elsewhere whence it comes and where it already retires.¹²³

Levinas describes trace as the signification of the face that is like no other sign. The face, Levinas says, is not exactly a phenomenology in that it does not appear. He regards Husserlian phenomenology as a rational enterprise as it is still fascinated with the activity of consciousness; face does not belong to this region. Trace cannot be also contemplated as the origin of truth such as the a-letheia of the Greeks. What it does precisely is to interrupt the discourse of being toward something more important than truth, which is service for the other. Levinas has to find a certain description of the demeanor of the face that would lead the philosophical discourse away from the search for truth. Thus, he conceives of the framework of passage. Passing is a lateral movement that is never circular; it never goes back to the point of origin. The face passes and leaves its trace behind. We could only keep track of the trace. The image that Levinas uses is that of a criminal leaving traces of her crime in a scene or a animal that leaves the tracks of his activity behind in a forest for a hunter to follow. The investigator or the hunter follows these tracks logically as presented by a cultural world order

¹²³ Ibid., p. 39.

of signs to carry out the task of the catch. But the unique difference of the trace from these tracks is that the trace superimposes its imprint on a current world order and changes that order, as it were, a criminal who non-intentionally erases some of his marks, thus, misleading the investigator who comes up with a different schema of things from the initial one made by the criminal.¹²⁴

It is because the trace passes that one can never catch the face as it is. The face could never be found ‘as itself’ because it is a visitation, a passage that is fleeting; it is always beyond us.¹²⁵ In this sense, it retains embodiment but resists fixed meanings because it is always in transit. The face visits by passing over to the beyond and the future which mounts an apex for an open-ended, process-oriented ethics. Thus, the resistance of the face to cultural imperialism is not attributed to the giving of a numinous Being, not to the elevated sacred, but incremental visits of an en fleshed and abstract naked face that is always passing over to the beyond.

I will use Janatková and Frederiksson’s short fictional film on Merleau-Ponty to demonstrate this characteristic of trace: how it is grounded in the body and yet abstract and how it operates in real-life scenes with animals.¹²⁶

In the film, there is this scene wherein a man walks with his dog. The film builds up the character of the man as a stoic thinker, someone intellectually and interiorly absorbed in his world of ideas. His dog suddenly sprints forward chasing a squirrel which brings the reality of the squirrel to the man’s attention. Using the thought of Merleau-Ponty, the narrator in the film points out that if the dog had not chased the squirrel, that little animal will not be included in the reach of the man’s perceptual field, even if actually present in the scene. The film intends to demonstrate Merleau-Ponty’s idea that thinking is not an interior nor a solitary act of consciousness but is engaged with the world outside. Trace is present there in the visitation of the face of the squirrel which enlarges the world of perception of a man. Due to this distraction, his orientation in thinking and perception of reality would be changed. I presume the squirrel contributed something to his world of ideas. If he were, say, a poet,

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 41.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 39.

¹²⁶ *They roam together* [film]. Directed by Veronika JANATKOVÁ and Antony FREDERIKSSON. [online]. Vimeo (viewed date: 27 May 2021). Available at: <https://vimeo.com/482719550>.

perhaps he had gained a topic for a poem. Or perhaps, the distraction would teach him to look out for his dog when taking a walk because his pet's chasing after little animals could lead to accidents. Perhaps, still, we do not know, if he would take an interest in where the squirrel lives and embark on a study of this species. Whatever it is, the squirrel has contributed something to his current train of thought. But it is a trace. The squirrel only visits and passes, as it were, a paw that introduces a novel stirring against a current stream of thought. The movement of the man's thought, to where it leads to and how the squirrel will affect his life as a whole, cannot be said. Chances are, he may not even remember that it is the squirrel that changed his thought. The squirrel disappears into the abstract. But definitely, this is how the life of thought and action is enriched by the trace of the other. Of course, I am not limiting this trace of the other only to the world of humans and nh animals. Abiotic nature also has its own movements that affect us as well as non-living objects that are part of the artificial world. But this is not included in the domain of my thesis and so I shall leave it at that.

I would like to push further the proposal that not only are the activities of nh animals helping us to see, but that the movement of perception itself, as well as the constructs of thought, rely on dynamically lived human-nh animal relations. It's not that we think of the nh animal but that the nh animal helps us think and perceive; in this they are co-thinkers in the evolution of the human mind. That nh animals contributed to the evolution of human intelligence has anthropological backing.

Liane Gabora & Anne Russon claim that "The more we learn about non-human intelligence. . . the more we find that abilities previously thought to be uniquely human are not."¹²⁷ They reveal that the first hominid lineage, *Homo habilis*, that existed about 2.4 million years ago in the Lower Paleolithic had no language and exhibited very simplistic modes of thought, similar to animals. Drawing from Merlin Donald, they said that these ancestors were:

[. . .] governed by procedural memory. They could store perceptions of events and recall them in the presence of a reminder or cue, but they had little voluntary access to episodic memories without environmental cues. They were therefore unable to voluntarily shape, modify, or practice

¹²⁷ GABORA, Liane and RUSSON, Anne. The evolution of human intelligence. In: Robert STERNBERG and Scott Barry KAUFMAN, eds. *The Cambridge book of intelligence*, 2015, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 329.

skills and actions, and they were unable to invent or refine complex gestures or means of communicating.¹²⁸

Donald similarly holds that human intelligence evolved from primate culture, which advanced in episodes, from the mimetic, mythical, and culminating in the symbolic culture of representation. He says:

The essence of my hypothesis is that the modern human mind evolved from the primate mind through a series of major adaptations, each of which led to the emergence of a new representational system. Each successive new representational system has remained intact within our mental architecture, so that the modern mind is a mosaic structure of cognitive vestiges from earlier stages of human emergence...vestigial behaviors for instance, baring the teeth in anger, or wailing in grief.¹²⁹

What the study suggests is that there is such a thing as the history of the development of knowledge and cognition; that once upon a time, humans have simplistic modes of thinking as they also lived more closely with the natural world. What I am presuming is that their close and habitual interaction with animals contributed to their early modes of knowledge and cognition. But as human thinking advanced and developed on its own, it departed from the simplistic thinking primarily learned from animals. The attitude of human thinking became more interiorized and relied predominantly on the abstract as human-nh animal relations became more estranged. It could then be said that the advanced modes of thinking that we have known now, and that which we say is 'not animal' or 'more than animal,' actually has its beginnings with nh animal-like cognition. The modern representational thinking that is known, is not anymore taught by the animal. I am speculating that if it had been informed all the way by intimate and harmonious cohabitation with the animal, it may have developed its attitudes in another way that would be kinder to the nh animal. The modern colonization of the animal is an offshoot of a thinking that is a product of a consciousness that developed from animal-nh animal estrangement.

What had been lost in human cognition from the alienation of animals is seen in Temple Grandin's article entitled *How does visual thinking work in the mind of a person with autism?*

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 332; also in DONALD, Merlin. *Origins of the human mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture and cognition*. London: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 332.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

She claims that it is her autistic visual cognition that helps her connect to animals. She describes:

My mind works similar to an Internet search engine, set to locate photos. All my thoughts are in photo-realistic pictures, which flash up on the 'computer monitor' in my imagination. Words just narrate the picture. When I design livestock facilities, I can test run the equipment in my imagination similar to a virtual reality computer program¹³⁰

She goes on to explain that in order to form a concept of orange, she has to play up and see many orange-colored objects in her mind. The acute visual cognition seems to have downplayed abstract reasoning skills. Because of this, Grandin suffered her mathematics subjects when she was a undergraduate; she was able to handle geometry and trigonometry but not economics and algebra.¹³¹ This kind of thinking seems to have jibed with animals because Grandin says "animals are controlled by what they see" and they maneuver visually through the environment; they are not primarily abstract thinkers¹³² Animals are detail-oriented.¹³³ She states further:

The problem with normal people is that they are too cerebral. I call it too abstractified... Unfortunately, when it comes to dealing with animals, all normal human beings are too abstractified, even the people who are hands-on. That's because people aren't just abstract in their thinking, they're abstract in their seeing and hearing. Normal human beings are abstractified in their sensory perceptions as well as their thoughts.¹³⁴

It is interesting to note that in the practice of Buddhist meditation is actually to unlearn the habit of thinking ideas instead of perceiving and beholding directly the thing before oneself. Visual thinking capacity, supposedly, should be innate in people, but that it is not honed because education teaches and appreciates the superiority of abstract thinking skills.

David Morris confirms this, saying that the human species has a certain way of navigating by use of maps, which is abstracted from the environment because it looks at things from above.

¹³⁰ GRANDIN, Temple. How does visual thinking work in the mind of a person with autism? *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, 2009, (364), 1437.

¹³¹ GRANDIN, Temple and JOHNSON, Catherine. *Animals in translation: Using the mysteries of autism to decode animal behavior*. New York: Harcourt Books, 2005, p. 17.

¹³² Ibid., p. 7.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 31.

¹³⁴ Ibid., pp. 29-30.

The human still stands to be taught by animals the ingenious way of lateral navigation via physical senses. This enables salmon to find their way across continental oceans in search of the place where they were born in order to die there. Turtles also do this in order to mate and lay eggs where they were born. Animals find direction by feeling their space horizontally and by an intimacy with their physical environment.

[. . .] we humans we get easily lost whereas it is quite the opposite with animals [. . .]

What is the basis of this difference between human animals and other animals? [. . .] First, on a sensory motor level, humans have (or typically cultivate) very different capacities, abilities, and skills from those of most other animals: our sensing and moving ability is usually much coarser. Second, we navigate by way of maps, as if looking down on ourselves from above, as if the task is transporting ourselves according to a space that maps onto our surroundings, rather than being tuned to the sweep of regions we inhabit as already determinately positioning us.¹³⁵

The visitation of the embodied presence of the animal into the ring of human-centered perception would challenge from whose perspective is the establishment of the knowledge of the human sciences, if they purport to have been informed exclusive of the perspective of the nonhuman animal. For example, that the human mind depended on the accomplishments of the nonhuman animal mind is significant in backing up the charge of animal-human studies against disciplines like history and sociology because of their dominant reliance on human-created culture in the truth-making business. The contribution of nonhuman animals had been eliminated in their fields of study to make it seem as if the only history-making agent is the human species. This is the claim of Kay Peggs in her study on exploring a sociology for nonhuman animals:

Sociology centres its attention on human societies, but societies are broader than the human. Humans live in relation to nonhuman animals (Bryant, 1979) and these relations are often based in the human oppression of nonhuman animals (Nibert, 2002). Although human relations with nonhuman animals are taking an increasing role in social inquiry, sociologists often see the study of these relationships as marginal to the 'proper' human focus of sociology (for discussion see, for example, Kruse, 2002, p. 1). Even when nonhuman animals are included, the human oppression of nonhuman animals is often overlooked.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ MORRIS, David. The place of animal being: Following animal embryogenesis and navigation to the hollow of being in Merleau-Ponty. *Research in Phenomenology*, vol. 40 (2010), nr. 2 p. 202.

¹³⁶ PEGGS, Kay. The 'animal-advocacy agenda': Exploring sociology for nonhuman animals. *Sociological Review*, vol. 61 (2013) nr. 3, p. 592.

Similarly, Dominique Guillo claims that anthropology, while it has not excluded the animal, has refused to grant the animal a subjective perspective because of the great divide, not only between nature and culture, but satellite epistemological dualisms that support it: object-subject, matter-spirit, indigenous-academic knowledge, etc. She says:

Of course, it is stressed, animals have not been totally neglected by anthropology. But it has always refused, in principle, to grant them a form of agency by studying them only insofar as they can be seen as the basis of symbols, objects of representation, ritual instruments, or tools for action or consumer goods; in other words, provided that they are objects available to the human being, and in no case whatsoever subjects.

Why this treatment? Because, according to these researchers, anthropology, like other sciences, has been based since its inception on an ontology that separates humans from other beings by introducing a sealed boundary between nature and culture—or society.¹³⁷

Levinas's idea of trace has deconstructive aims. For example, from the above, it follows that there is a necessity to deconstruct the perspective of the human sciences that had been founded on a philosophy of being. What would compel this is the turn away from ontology toward the embodied presence of the animal in the belief that a dynamic interrelation with the animal as co-savant could be a source of truth. I translate the passing visitation of the face toward the beyond as the open-ended interrogations caused by the direct encounter of the animal's embodiment in the formation of knowledge in the sciences. From this, we establish that the guiding question that would check on the fidelity of the interpretation and application of Levinas's ethical concepts on the animal would be: *how do actions and behaviors of animals that have been observed directly from living human relations with them uproot pre-existing knowledge and notions of the animal in society?*

1.3.2 Movement Without Return

The *second* feature of the event of trace in the face is this movement away from the self toward the other which creates upheavals and ruptures in unities. In Levinas, "the condition of

¹³⁷ GUILLO, Dominique. What is the place of animals in the social sciences? The limits to the recent rehabilitation of animal agency. *Revue française de sociologie*, vol. 56 (2015) nr. 1, p. 118.

thought is moral consciousness,”¹³⁸ making ethics first philosophy and not ontology. The primary task of the philosopher is to make an exodus from Western ontology’s favorite subject of being which, for Levinas, is a totalizing discourse. This longstanding discourse on being, he argues, is none other than the obsession of philosophy to achieve a perfection of truth, an aspiration to comprehend the totality of everything but turns out to be a hegemonic enterprise that is meant to stamp out the incomprehensible, the alien, the stranger, which launched Levinas’s business of contributing to the analyses of the roots of Nazism and the holocaust. A philosophy of being, he claims, is a self-serving ego-logy that dwells in the abstract. It is a philosophy without ethics; it has forgotten the face of the other.

The project of Levinas in *Otherwise than Being* is to rehabilitate the meaning of transcendence which had been distorted in Western ontology’s obsession with being. To transcend is to find alterity. Levinas defines alterity as escaping to the other side of the discourse of being, not to become its opposite and opponent, but simply to have an alternative to a philosophy of being as a framework for doing philosophy. The grand exodus toward the new order of things will debunk the notion of transcendence as intellection from a lower knowledge to a higher kind of truth. The new order of things prefer the meaning of transcendence in terms of valuing something better than being, which is the other, the one to whom the ‘I’ aspires for in transcending its ego and self-maintenance. The ‘I’ finds a value higher than itself which is the other. For Levinas, this kind of philosophizing which is a concern for the other has a better value for a world rife with war and violence than pure intellection on being. ‘Otherwise’ does not refer to a search for an antithesis to offset a prevailing thesis, as he says “not to be otherwise but otherwise than being,”¹³⁹ that is, to exit from the exhaustive and narcissistic discourse of being and focus on something which had been overlooked, a being better than being: the other.

The classic question about being is: why is there being rather than nothing? ‘Nothing’ was conceived as death or meaninglessness and it had been counterposed as the opposite of being. Being is desirable rather than nothing and so every effort had been made to fill in gaps that

¹³⁸ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Entre nous: On thinking of the other*. Translated by Michael SMITH and Barbara HARSHAV. New York: Columbia University, 1998, p. 17.

¹³⁹ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1991, p. 3.

threaten existence. Thus, being became synonymous with interest. “Essence thus works as an invincible persistence in essence, filling up every interval of nothingness . . . Esse is interesse, essence is interest”¹⁴⁰ Thinking became a grasping. Knowing became an act and a will: a process of intentional consciousness. Representation became valuable as a way of controlling the fluctuation in things, as it were, making things present even in their absence, as a way of defying the absence of knowledge. Representation, thus, defies time; it freezes past and future in the presence of the concept.¹⁴¹

Levinas dramatizes the struggle to recover the face of the other that had been forgotten in the themes of Western philosophy through a clash between two concepts: totality and infinity, after which he entitles his magnum opus. But Levinas explains these themes more closely in his book *Alterity and Transcendence*. Totalization, he explains, is an intellectual operation in which a multiplicity of objects is gathered together in a whole: “Totalization may be understood to mean either the grouping of objects or of the points in a whole or the intellectual operation by which that multiplicity of objects of points is encompassed.”¹⁴² The goal is to understand the whole because it is what will dictate the function of the parts. The organic interpretation of texts, for example, is a shuttle movement from part to whole.¹⁴³

Levinas finds a similar movement in philosophies of rationality such as those of Husserl and Kant which supposedly aim at an objective knowledge of the external world but ultimately end up positing truth within categories of consciousness. He also finds a similar problem in a philosophy of being in Heidegger which purports to transcend the realm of consciousness but ends up in the mystical abstract, the truth about beings in Being. On the level of social and political systems, totality is at work in systems of exchange such as those of policy and government that aim at contractual peace and the economic systems behind the production of labor and exchange of goods. The good or goodness in Levinas does not operate within arrangements of equality exchange because it always returns to self.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁴² LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Alterity and transcendence*. Translated by Michael SMITH. London: The Athlone Press, 1999, p. 39.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 41.

Opposite totality is the theme of infinity, a movement which always escapes limits. Philosophy conceived of the notion of infinity from the theological reflection of a finite world. Levinas says:

Philosophy has borrowed the notion of the infinite correlative to that of the finite - from reflection on the exercise of knowledge, on the one hand; from religious experience or tradition, on the other. . . It designates the property of certain contents offered to thought to stretch out beyond all limits. . . But the term infinite is also appropriate to magnitudes of continuity - to extensive or intensive quanta continua, in which no part of the whole is the smallest possible.¹⁴⁴

Infinity is ruminated in terms of space, continuity, or power. What is infinite is a vast space that has no end. It is also something that never expires, or something that cannot be destroyed. The Platonists imagined infinity as something that exists beyond multiplicities. The Jewish mystics thought of it as a power supreme to all powers.¹⁴⁵ Levinas aligns the original concept of transcendence with infinity.

Levinas presents the Cartesian cogito as an example of a trace of infinity within a totality. For example, Levinas cites Descartes's meditation on God, supposedly an unthinkable infinite, but nevertheless could be held in thought. Descartes said that if this idea cannot be derived from the world, then it must be God who put it in the human mind:

I decided to search for the source from which I had learned to think of something more perfect than I was, and I plainly knew that this had to be from some nature that was in fact more perfect. As to those thoughts I had of many other things outside me, such as the heavens, the earth, light, heat, and a thousand others, I had no trouble at all knowing where they came from, because, noticing nothing in them that seemed to me to make them superior to me, I could believe that, if they were true, they were dependencies of my nature, insofar as it had some perfection, and that, if they were not true, I obtained them from nothing, that is to say, they were in me because I had some defect. But the same could not hold for the idea of a being more perfect than my own, for it is a manifest contradiction to receive this idea from nothing, and because it is no less a contradiction that something more perfect should follow from and depend upon something less perfect than that something should come from nothing, I could not obtain it from myself. It thus remained that this idea had been placed in me by a nature truly more perfect than I was and that it even had within itself all the perfections of which I could have any idea, that is to say, to explain myself in a single word, that it was God.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 53-54.

¹⁴⁶ DESCARTES, Rene. *Discourse on method and Meditations on first philosophy*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998, p. 19.

But then, Levinas is disappointed that Descartes does not pursue the end of this unthinkable in beings in the external world; his transcendence is made via the fulcrum of the cogito which ascertains the existence of other things. Descartes's preoccupation is still, ultimately, thinking truth.

And noticing that this truth—/ think, therefore I am—was so firm and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I judged that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking. Then, examining with attention what I was, and seeing that I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world nor any place where I was, I could not pretend, on that account, that I did not exist at all, and that, on the contrary, from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed very evidently and very certainly³³ that I existed; whereas, on the other hand, had I simply stopped thinking, even if all the rest of what I had ever imagined had been true, I would have had no reason to believe that I had existed.¹⁴⁷

Descartes sponsors the tradition of a philosophy of subjectivity. Self-consciousness is an interiority which affirms itself to be itself and thus becomes the Archimedes point by which it posits objects outside of it. This gave birth to the modern subject/object epistemological framework. Levinas says "It is because I am from the first the same—me ipse, an ipseity—that I can identify every object, every character trait, and every being. . . The outside of me solicits it in need: the outside of me is for me. The tautology of ipseity is an egoism"¹⁴⁸ Levinas claims that the face of the other in the philosophy of subjectivity had been lost.

The movement of knowledge becomes one by which things that are foreign are assimilated inside. This explains why the French word *savoir* is close to savor: knowing is some kind of alimentation, a process by which the mind gobbles up foreign things in the world that are external to the 'I' and digests their essences interiorly. This is what 'comprehension' means. The fatality of this is that philosophy, as knowing par excellence, in an attitude of allergy to anything external that insists on being foreign, subordinated the external life to understanding, and along with it, the relationship with the other in favor of truth about the other.

Thus, the escape from being and subjectivity, Levinas understands as a movement away from the ego and the selfsame. Levinas understands egoism as a movement by which the 'I,' in a

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 18.

¹⁴⁸ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. The trace of the other. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. In: Mark TAYLOR, ed., *Deconstruction in context: Literature and philosophy*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 345.

process of self-realization, moves out into the world and assimilates everything foreign into the comforts of the selfsame. The world of work follows this process of seeking a harmonious unity. One goes out into the world to share talent and labor but in the end returns to the *domus* and brings home the bacon and bread. The transcendence that Levinas seeks is one which moves out of the self and does not return to the place of origin. The champion of Levinas is Abraham who moves out of his country to seek the land of promise and never returns, in opposition to Ulysses who lives out his saga, returns a hero to his fatherland of Ithaca.¹⁴⁹ The trace of Levinas is even a more radical movement than mere ethics. For example, the act of reciprocal gratitude, he does not consider goodness in the superior sense. The more elevated form of gratitude is to give back not to the benefactor but to pass on the goodness to others, most especially to those who would not have the power to reciprocate.¹⁵⁰

The struggle to move away from self is again a drama enacted in Levinas's opposition between need and desire. Lovers spout sonnets characterizing love as a need: 'I love you, I need you.' But in fact, he says, that need is a form of ego that seeks to love on the basis of a lack, and thus, reaches out to the other for the sake of healing the crack in the self. Desire, on the other hand, is borne out of hunger not for love for oneself but for the beloved. The exemplar of this, Levinas finds in Dostoyevski's *Crime and Punishment* that speaks of an 'insatiable compassion' and not inexhaustible compassion.¹⁵¹ The idea is that the relation of need is centered on the virtue of the lover to make compassion 'inexhaustible' whereas the infinity of desire originates from the attraction toward the other whose infinity keeps open the wound in the I-self. For this reason, desire is never satiated or filled.

We shall see how the ruptures caused by the movement away from the ego that never strives for a unity is translated in the scene of the discourse of animal-nh human relations. A manifestation of this trace in the nh animal as other is the capacity of the nh animal to rupture social and personal life that tends to focus mainly on the egoistic maintenance of the human species.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 348.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 349.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 351.

A fitting example that would demonstrate these ruptures would be one of the pioneer classics of animal biography which is Elizabeth Marshall Thomas's book *The Hidden Life of Dogs*, which in 1993, became a New York Times bestseller for nine months. At that time, the popular question of anthropology would be the question if animals (or dogs for this matter) have thoughts and feelings. Thomas sidesteps this question because she thinks that the existence of such a thing as a 'dog' itself already begs an obvious answer: "Do dogs have thoughts and feelings? Of course they do. If they didn't there wouldn't be any dogs."¹⁵²

She ruptures the conspicuous subject of contemporary discourse with a rather different inquiry that already includes the dog's agenda: "what do dogs want?"¹⁵³ The inquiry pertains to what dogs want within their human condition as already domesticated, living within human homes. She observes and records the lives of eleven dogs of her own (but not of contemporaneous generations), five males and six females. Five of them were born not only in the house but on her bed. She said, "I wanted to see what they would do when free to plan their own time and make their own decisions."¹⁵⁴ Her idea is that if she would observe dogs from afar, following their trails, without them being aware of her presence, she would generate ideas of 'what they are up to,' much similar to children who sing and dance when they are left alone by parents but which reveal their hidden desires.

Among her interesting findings is that most dogs want to belong to a pack of other dogs more than the alpha position of being superior. The 'dog-eat-dog' world is really a cliché applicable more to humans rather than dogs. Thomas discovered this when she found a wolf-like den dug secretly by her own dogs which they worked on day by day when she was not around. The excavation had the size of three feet wide, two feet high, and three feet deep.¹⁵⁵ What surprised her was that her family had provided all her dogs much more environmentally-secure and comfortable quarters than what the dogs have created. But the dogs preferred their den rather than their human domicile. She also discovered that when Fatima had an overnight stay in a veterinary hospital and was released, the dog immediately went straight to the

¹⁵² MARSHALL-THOMAS, Elizabeth. *The hidden life of dogs*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993, p. xvii.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 114-115.

company of her canine pack, Suessi and Inookshook, snubbing her human family companions who came to fetch her.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, Inookshook, in his old age, had forgotten his human family and yet continued to recognize his canine kin. Suessi, at the end of her life, stricken with Alzheimer, did not recognize anymore the faces of her human companions but continued to recognize the coyotes, voles, and dingoes in the forest.¹⁵⁷ Thomas came to the conclusion: "What do dogs want? They want each other. Human beings are merely a cynomorphic substitute, as we all know."¹⁵⁸

Thomas's findings introduces an upheaval, not only on what current theory holds about dogs's subjective interiority, but on the ubiquitous practice of animal domestication, not only of dogs, but of all kinds of animals. Her finding supports the claim of Gary Francione:

Domestic animals are neither a real nor full part of our world or of the nonhuman world. They exist forever in a netherworld of vulnerability, dependent on us for everything and at the risk of harm from an environment that they do not really understand. We have bred them to be compliant and servile, to have characteristics that are actually harmful to them but are pleasing to us. We may make them happy in one sense, but the relationship can never be "natural" or "normal" They do not belong, stuck in our world irrespective of how we treat them.¹⁵⁹

What complicates the matter is that upon awakening to the injustice of human colonization of animals, it's not as if the world changes overnight. There is a temptation to propose a solution to revert to a unity of an imagined ancient world wherein animal domestication has not been there. But the trace resists a return to the former world because it beckons toward the future that is other. The implementation of justice has to follow the path of effective history. It cannot be antiquarian and go back to an idealized glorified past. And since an effective history of morality works out from within its chaos a new moral constellation that oftentimes run contrary to the old, there are uneven ends that are not threshed out, in the same self-conflictual way that people, who are intellectually convinced that the climate crisis threatens to annihilate the human race, refuse to sort out their trash. What is left is a moral clutter; to

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 134.

¹⁵⁹ FRANCIONE, Gary. "Pets": The inherent problem of domestication. *Animal rights: The abolitionist approach*. [online] 31 July 2012. [viewed date: 16 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.abolitionistapproach.com/pets-the-inherent-problems-of-domestication/>

use a term of Bernard Williams, an ‘ill-assorted bricolage.’ The moral self never becomes a perfect unity at any time. It is an ill-assorted bricolage because while it prophesies a moral ideal universe in the future, it finds the self stuck in the ideologies of society at present. And so the moral self will never be integrated but will always have frayed unreconciled issues. This is the chaos and the wound left by the trace that will never close up. It is indeed a challenge for the individual and societal systems to adjust and make both ends meet each as exhorted by the demands of an ideal moral universe that the face beckons toward as it passes by. The moral evolution never achieves a unity; it is a litter. The moral subject struggles, on the one hand, to move away from the self in order to address the demands of her own companion animals; on the other hand, and on top of that, to cope with obstinate ideologies in social systems that do not move away from the tradition and hardly allows an enlightened individual to change.

In the context of Thomas’s living situation, what would she expect to do in the face of her dogs who are pining after the wild life of their wolf ancestors? That she would just free them in the forest? This is out of the question. The only adjustment that she could do is to sustain and allow them as much freedom in their wild life activities. Perhaps she may opt not anymore to have dogs in the future as a form of personal protest against the system of domestication. But we could imagine a larger scene. What if she were an individual who runs a factory farm on which her income depends on? The faces of her family of dogs are staring at her. Would that not be a crack in her moral universe - that she would allow her dogs to dig up their dens but promote the slaughter of animals for meat, not to mention the guilt of eating meat herself?

Taking the principles of the movement without return to the ego and the selfsame as guidelines for an interpretive check if the application of Levinas’s ethical concepts still serve Levinasian aims, the discussions in the next chapters will be spearheaded by this question: *how do direct experiences with animals disrupt personal and societal moral universes and compel humans to pivot from anthropocentric interests to address the needs of the non-human animal other?*

Without further ado, let the bow-wow and miyaw-miyaw begin.

Chapter 2

Il y a and Nausea: To Care and to Eat

2.1 A GAGGLE OF GEESE AND THE GOBLER

William Lishman, born in 1939, was a man of many talents. He “was a Canadian sculptor, filmmaker, inventor, naturalist and public speaker, president of William Lishman & Associates Limited, Vice President of Paula Lishman Limited and Chair Emeritus of Operation Migration Inc.”¹⁶⁰ Lishman wrote his childhood memoirs and adventures in the rescue of Canadian geese in a book entitled *Father Goose: One Man, A Gaggle of Geese, and their Real Life Incredible Journey South*. He dedicated the book to his mother, Myra White Cronk, who grew up in a Quaker farm to become one of the few women in her times to obtain a Master’s degree in Biology from the University of Toronto. He remembers that:

Her love of the natural world was passed on to me at an early age. She spent many hours talking to me about everything from the teaching of Darwin to the inner workings of a chicken as we cleaned/dissected it for Sunday dinner.¹⁶¹

Lishman grew up in his father’s cattle farm in south-central Ontario. His father dug up a two-acre pond there which became the habitat of many animals. There were “stickleback, chub, catfish, leeches, crayfish, clams, and many more species.”¹⁶² The pond was riddled with waterfowl. There were mallard ducks whose sounds Lishman imitated, the blue heron who scavenged for minnows and frogs, grebe and wood ducks who made their nests there. Then came the domesticated geese. The alpha goose was named George who was an aggressive grey and he had two wives named Whitey and Nothing. It was then that Lishman learned the difference between domestic and wild gander. During the migration season, there would be an excitement among the geese, a lot of flying around and gabbling. Then an entire flock would

¹⁶⁰ ‘BILL LISHMAN.’ *Wikipedia*. [online]. 21 October 2021 (viewed date: 17 October 2022). Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Lishman

¹⁶¹ LISHMAN, William. *Father goose*. Toronto: Little Brown & Company, 1995, pp. 8-9.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

finally take flight, while the domestic ones join the initial flight only to return ultimately to the ground and Lishman sensed their frustration. It was then that Lishman thought:

Where did they come from? And where are they going? What map within them charts the way?
How do they know when to fly? I longed to be up there with them to see the world from their
vantage and to discover the places where they went [. . .]¹⁶³

After that, Lishman felt he had to fly. At 14, he enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Cadets 151 Squadron and passed the ground exam but was dismissed when examined that he was partially color-blind. He moved on to woodcarving and metal crafts. He completed his first metal sculpture of a horse in 1963 which won in a design contest and gave him a commission of nine pieces of wall sculpture in wood and metal for Canada's largest grocery chain in Yorkdale Shopping Centre.¹⁶⁴

Lishman met Paula Vockeroth in 1966, when he was 27 years old, and married her two years after. He got a boost in his career, being commissioned for many sculpture projects but he never forgot his dream to fly. He poured all of his artistic and engineering skills into creating several kinds of singular aircrafts. His first project was an imitation piece of the 1968 lunar lander, in frenzy over the first human trip to the moon. He worked on the lunar lander for 12 years, all the time being laughed off by his neighbors, but he got to sell it in the Great Space Shuttle Exhibition in Tokyo, for the 25th anniversary celebration of NASA.¹⁶⁵

Swooning over the moon by his success, he proceeded to create his first crude hang-gliders in the 1970s. His first experiment was an imitation of John Moodie's Easy Riser with a go-cart engine and a back propeller. It was tricky getting it to a stable glide and he had some mishap landing with it.¹⁶⁶ He redesigned the Easy Riser with a three-cylinder, electric-start radial engine, an elevator, one-stick control, and a steerable tricycle gear. He built a hangar for it and put it on a 600 feet long airstrip. It cruised smoothly and once, he was able to follow behind a flock of geese which thrilled him. But when the snow came, it collapsed the hangar and the

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 27, 40-41.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 46-47.

aircraft.¹⁶⁷ Obstinate with his dream to fly, Lishman bought on sale “a Mark II Lazair with rudder pedals, an overhead stick, twin-nine-horse engines, and a narrow landing gear.”¹⁶⁸ He flew the more sophisticated aircraft with guidance from a flying instructor but he crashed it. Still, not giving up, he bought another Lazair on bargain price, fitted its wings on the fuselage of the one he destroyed, installed on it the old engines, and soon he was on air again.¹⁶⁹

The man who helped Lishman learn the science about the geese was Bill Carrick, an Austrian naturalist who spent his life studying animal behavior by doing photo and video shoots for nature films. Carrick experimented with geese imprinting, following after Nobel awarded scientist, Konrad Lorenz. According to the theory of imprinting, goslings, upon hatching, imprint on the first animal they see, and identify this animal as parent. Sigmund Freud also identified this behavior in humans in a process he called ‘fixation.’ In 1986, Carrick hatched some goslings and moved them to Lishman’s home in Purple Hill in Ontario. Soon, the geese were attached to Lishman, his wife, and three children. They followed them wherever they went. Every morning, the family members trained them to follow a motorcycle in the fields, then later, a twin-engined Lazair which Lishman crashed again and from which he broke his foot. He tried again with a Riser, of which he shot some videos. Finally, he was able to lead some geese into the air. They were featured on the Toronto Sunday Star and in a show called *Incredible Sunday*. He encountered some troubles he had to deal with. Some geese detached from the flock, making their own autonomous flights. Some landed on desolate marshes and just vanished halfway the trip.¹⁷⁰

In birds, the ability to migrate is a knowledge passed on from one generation to the next when the young recognize their parents by the natural instinct of imprinting and are taught to fly following aerial paths learned from their predecessors. Unfortunately, because of the rape of their ecosystems, the parents of these birds have either died or abandoned their young. The

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 48, 52.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 55-77.

young birds that hatch and live near human settlements have no parents to teach them how to migrate to warmer lands when winter comes and so they do not survive the season.¹⁷¹

Lishman enlisted the support of Joe Duff, an aeroplane pilot and commercial photographer, and together, in 1993, they imprinted on 18 Canadian geese and led them to a migratory path from Purple Hill in Ontario, cutting across Ontario Lake toward the Environmental Studies Division of Airlie Center in Warrenton, Virginia. Sixteen of those birds made it through the winter and 13 returned to their original home all on their own. In 1995, Operation Migration contracted Columbia Pictures to produce the film *Fly Away Home*, which starred Jeff Daniels and Anna Paquin, to spread their inspiring story of saving migratory birds.¹⁷²

Lishman named his training geese the ‘Ultralight Geese.’ Each of his training geese have numbers on their neckbands. There were “Egghead, Ringneck, Spanky, Spot, Peckerhead, Peppy, Coffee, Sam, O.J., Ogar, Eyes, Roman Nose, Homer, Bugler, Clunkhead and a host more.”¹⁷³ He knew their unique personalities.

Fleck Neck was so called for a strange growth of feathers growing from the back of his neck as if some of his breast feathers had been transplanted . . . Like his mutant feathers, he was a bit of a rebellious personality and would always be difficult to put back in the pen while the rest of the geese would walk in with ease . . . Number 25, Ringneck, was different matter, a plucky female goose that survived an attack by a great horned owl. The owl had killed six of her siblings and had left a half-inch strip around her neck completely devoid of skin and feathers.”¹⁷⁴

The most notorious among them is Number 38, otherwise, known as Igor, the most dominant of one batch of geese that he hatched. Lishman remembers him as thus:

He had a slightly misshapen head and walked with a faint limp and thus was named Igor after Frankenstein’s assistant [. . .]

Christmas goose, number 47, got his name because of his persistent waywardness in the air. I don’t know how many times during our summer practice flights he would just break out of formation and head home, on occasion taking the rest of the flock with him. Several times he would turn

¹⁷¹ OPERATION MIGRATION ‘OUR WORK’ In *Internet Archive Wayback Machine*. [online]. 28 January 2020 [viewed 17 October 2022]. Available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20200128204118/http://operationmigration.org/the-work-of-operation-migration.asp>

¹⁷² *Fly Away Home* [film]. Directed by Carroll BALLARD. USA: Columbia Pictures, 1996.

¹⁷³ LISHMAN, William. *Father goose*. Toronto: Little Brown & Company, 1995, p 187.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

around immediately after take-off and land back at the pen, confusing the whole issue. If any goose was going to be up for being Christmas dinner, he had the number-one ticket.¹⁷⁵

Among the geese, Igor is the most notorious one who grabbed some limelight in the film *Fly Away Home*. In reality, in a migration route to the Tom Yawkey Wildlife Center South Carolina, Igor disappeared twice, and was found by the Hunter family in their property, then another time by a wildlife officer in the Niagara Falls, some 800 miles away from the Yawkey.¹⁷⁶

Lishman and his team also experimented with Whooping cranes. Carrick and Lishman co-founded Operation Migration, a charity program that helps Canadian birds such as geese and Whooping cranes to migrate. The Whooping crane is, at that time, already identified as an endangered species due to habitat loss from human settlement. Before European migration to the New World, there was an estimate of 10,000 Whooping cranes which dropped to 1,500 in the 1800s. Then, in 1941, the count was an alarming 23 in captivity and only about 2 dozen in the wild.¹⁷⁷

The first migration of Whooping cranes took place in 2001. For 15 years, Duff led a team of pilots dressed up in crane costumes, to teach a new generation of Whooping cranes to migrate through a 1,200 plus mile journey from Wisconsin to Florida. The costumes were significant not only for imprinting, but also to transfer the imprint to other pilots who would don them. In effect, the birds would distinguish their foster parents from other humans who may otherwise domesticate them. In effect, the birds would retain wild behavior. More than 10 million dollars had been spent, covering 17,457 miles with a count of 186 cranes, all of them surviving the winter in Florida and returning to their original domestic habitat. Duff claimed in an interview with *Vetstreet.com* that there is a count of 500 Whooping cranes in the wild, an increase of twenty times from the last generation count of 15 in the 1941. To date, there are around 700 within North America.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 147, 149.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 146.

¹⁷⁷ LEWIS, Dan. *Operation Migration: Saving the Whooping crane*. [online]. 13 March 2013 [viewed 17 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/49035/operation-migration-saving-whooping-crane>

¹⁷⁸ ZELEVANSKY, Nora. Operation migration saves endangered Whooping cranes by teaching them to fly. [online]. *Vetstreet*. 17 January 2012 [viewed 17 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.vetstreet.com/our-pet-experts/operation-migration-saves-endangered-whooping-cranes-by-teaching-them-to-fly>

But some good things never last. On August 17, 2018, Operation Migration issued a statement of its closure due to certain observations from government-sustained environmentalist groups such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service which assessed that the method was ‘too artificial.’ For example, the Whooping cranes who followed their human crane-costumed parents inculcated a behavior of being inattentive to their young, and thus, fail to protect their offspring.

Current captive rearing techniques may not instill Whooping cranes with the characteristics that allow them to successfully reproduce in the wild. Behavioral deficiencies may include, but may not be limited to: inappropriate response to predators, inability to cope with biting insects, poor nest or offspring attentiveness or defense, poor nest site selection, poor foraging ability, etc. In addition, artificial selection through captive breeding has been shown to cause traits that are deleterious in the wild.¹⁷⁹

Operation Migration also declared being unable to cope with the new directives set by the Whooping Crane Eastern Partnership (WCEP) which is a breeding program that encouraged natural breeding processes and prohibited artificial methods. The closure of the Operation Migration was a heartbreaking event for donors and supporters who followed the saga of Carrick, Lishman, and Duff but no one could ever deny their crucial role in saving migratory birds from near extinction and their success in putting the avian cause of North America at the front of global attention.

I have to narrate the entire saga of Lishman, from his early childhood upbringing of proximity to nature and the wetland fowls, the untiring making and remodeling his airplanes, the conscription of his entire family in the regimen of feeding and training the geese, networking with experts to form the team of Operation Migration, until his skirmishes with state and environmental authorities to manage his cause legitimately and independently, just to emphasize how all of this story ends up twisted.

¹⁷⁹ FASSBENDER, Pete; Doug STALLER, Wade HARRELL, et. al. *The Eastern Migratory Population of Whooping cranes: FWS Vision for the next 5-year strategic plan*. [online]. 23 June 2015 (viewed date: 17 October 2022). Available at: https://knrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FWS_5-Yr_Vision_Doc-09_22_2015.pdf

Lishman is a carnivore, and yes, he does eat some of the geese, especially those who are ‘troublemakers.’¹⁸⁰ Not only this, the family became wealthy from their fur-making business from farm-raised minks and foxes. He writes:

I found myself caught up in this debate over the past two decades when Paula’s creativity turned to knitting and selling beautiful garments made with fur. The central activities of our family have seemingly incorporated what many people consider to be two poles of a supposedly irreconcilable debate. I am often surprised by people who assume that I would never eat a goose; I prefer it to chicken. So there will be goose on our table this Christmas, and No, it will not be number 47. It will be a farmed variety this year, but still very much a goose. As I’ve said I was raised on a farm. As children we made friends with the cows, but in autumn they were slaughtered and went into the freezer. Sometimes we are the predators [. . .]

My goal is not for the geese to become cult icons, like Brigitte Bardot’s seal pups. My hope is that our work may help restore some wonderful species of birds to their traditional habitat.¹⁸¹

From what Lishman said above, it may be deduced that there is no conflict on his part, to be going at great lengths imprinting on some geese as their parent and teaching them to migrate, but at the same time, to be eating some of them. It is not confirmed if he did eat, specifically, any of the Ultralight Geese he cared for, like Christmas Goose, but he did say he considered eating him as “he does eat the troublemakers.” Lishman’s behavior may be reasoned out in that his family occasionally eating geese would not lead to the species’s extinction as their inability to migrate could. But wouldn’t caring for some geese somehow give a face to all the geese – for him, as individuals? Perhaps not, because Lishman does co-own Paula’s mink farm, and for sure, all of his family members wear these furs. From Paula’s Blog *Truth About Fur*, she defends the reasonability of the North American fur trade in this way:

TaF (Truth About Fur): What do you think of anti-fur protesters?

PL (Paula Lishman): Everyone is entitled to their own opinions, and no one is obliged to eat meat or to wear fur or leather. But when you try to impose your ideas on others, when you vandalize other people’s property, then you’re just a criminal and should be prosecuted as such. Intimidating and “bullying” women wearing fur is a form of terrorism, and is out of place in a modern, educated society.

In the same blog, within the section Ethics of Fur, it is written:

¹⁸⁰ ‘Bill Lishman.’ *Wikipedia*. [online]. 21 October 2021 [viewed date: 17 October 2022]. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Lishman

¹⁸¹ LISHMAN, William. *Father goose*. Toronto: Little Brown & Company, 1995, p 191.

Is it ethical to wear fur?

To answer this question, we must take a step back and ask what makes it ethical to use any animal product.

Research has shown that most people believe that the use of animals is morally acceptable if the following conditions are met:

1. The existence of the species should not be threatened.
2. No unnecessary pain or cruelty should be inflicted.
3. The killing should serve an important use.
4. The killing should involve a minimum of waste¹⁸²

According to Paula Lishman, their business conforms to all of the above in that they do not trap wild minks and foxes but grow their own stock in conditions favorable to their country's animal welfare standards. However, from the point of view of animal ethics, items 2 and 3 would be in question, and they are related to each other: the wearing of furs, considering that there are a multitude of alternatives, cannot be that important such that the lives of animals that are bred and killed for this purpose would be necessary. In this sense, its ethics is in question. Even if slaughter would be painless (it is still in question if there is such a thing as 'painless' killing), breeding and killing nh animals simply for fashion is downright cruelty.

The topic for this chapter would really focus on the meat question and not the other resourceful uses of nh animal bodies. But the question about fur is submitted to the same ethical interrogation because it still involves the manufacturing of the nh animal body into a consumer good.

Here, there are two questions that sprout: is it ethical to eat meat? And, what explains Bill Lishman's (lack of) and other people's (lack or presence of) cognitive dissonance on meat? Cognitive dissonance here is defined as the paradoxical attitude of people in that while most of them would find abominable the way industrial farm animals are bred, raised, and slaughtered, they would still eat meat without batting an eyelash. I would like to address these questions in three parts: the *first* will present how the ethics of meat is argued in

¹⁸² *Truth about fur* [online]. (Viewed date: 17 October 2022). Available at: <https://www.truthaboutfur.com/en/ethics-of-fur>

contemporary animal ethics discourse; the *second* will put to the scene Levinas's concepts of *il y a* and nausea to point out the gaps missed out in the contemporary animal ethics discourse; and, the *third* will discuss how Levinas would enlighten the issue about the cognitive dissonance on meat.

2.2 THE DEBATES ON ANIMAL MEAT CONSUMPTION

The debate on the ethicality of animal meat consumption is a gamut of many issues. I would like to divide the major issues into three areas: *one*, the cruelty issue of animal agriculture; *two*, the nourishment and environmental sustainability of the vegan diet; and, *three*, the carbon emissions of meat production. The task at hand is to capture show how these issues are problematized in the contemporary animal ethics discourse in order to appreciate where Levinas's ethics, if applied on the nh animal, would launch a different ethical interrogation.

2.2.1 The Cruelty of Animal Agriculture

The ethics of meat originates from the rise of the industrial methods of animal farming. In the prehistoric times until the period wherein small scale family farms are a business, meat-eating had been viewed as belonging to the natural order of predation among all human and nh animals. John Baird Callicott said that Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic, considered by many as the canon of modern environmentalism, advanced the idea that caring for people cannot be divorced from the care of land. The integrity of land consists in humans having a direct responsibility toward nh beings (biotic and abiotic).¹⁸³ This respect is naturally instilled in the human who lives in communion with the natural environment. The human is not a 'conqueror of land' but simply a member among the living beings in an ecological community whose relations with other humans will not be harmonious unless the nh environment is respected.¹⁸⁴ The Land Ethic is stated as thus: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,

¹⁸³ CALLICOTT, John Baird. Animal liberation: A triangular affair. *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 2 (1980), nr. 4, p. 312.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”¹⁸⁵ Callicott cites, for example, that Leopold’s unabashed hunting game activities,¹⁸⁶ implies that the latter regarded predation as a natural ecological cycle and that he saw the environment in a holistic manner of species’s interdependence. This is unlike the perspective of animal liberationists who morally prescribed veganism or vegetarianism from an attitude of partitioning species: plants vs. animals and humans vs. animals.¹⁸⁷

In the same way, Michael Pollan, does not see domestication of animals as a political imputation but views it as a natural process of evolution, a creative interaction between nature and human artifice, in which natural species tacitly ‘agree’ to ride along human projects for their species to survive and thrive. But Pollan agreed to the cruelty embedded in the structures of animal agriculture.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, he defended eating meat for the reason that to refuse meat is to deny human animality,¹⁸⁹ that predation is the way of the natural world, that even animals prey upon each other and perhaps in much cruel ways than the abattoir. But animal ethicists assert that the ways in which the aboriginal peoples hunt meat sparingly and mainly for nourishment survival are different from the way modernity deals with the gluttony for meat and the way the industry works to support that indulgence within the capitalistic system. The modern animal agriculture and the slaughterhouse are simply downright systems of violence.

Peter Singer said that ”if we had to kill our own meat we would all be vegetarians”¹⁹⁰ The only reason why people could comfortably eat meat is that they hardly know (or would refuse to know) the reality of what goes on in the animal agricultural plants and slaughterhouses. People obtain their neatly-packed meat chops all bloodless, frozen, and fresh from grocery stores. The small-scale family farming which had treated animals more humanely in the past

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 320; also in LEOPOLD, Aldo. *Sand county almanac*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, pp. 224-225.

¹⁸⁶ CALLICOTT, John Baird, *ibid.*, p. 314.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 313-315.

¹⁸⁸ POLLAN, Michael. *The omnivore’s dilemma: The natural history of four meals*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006, pp. 318, 328.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 315.

¹⁹⁰ SINGER, Peter. *Animal liberation: The definitive classic of the animal movement*. New York: Open Integrated Media, 2009, p. 226.

had been extinguished by large scale factory farming, the horrors of which are unspeakable. Daniel Imhoff marks three aspects of comparison that differentiate between traditional husbandry and what we call CAFOs (concentrated animal feeding operations) that characterize confinement-based industrial agriculture which Leopold never witnessed in his time.

The *first* is the aspect of production diseases. Traditional husbandry only tended to livestock diseases that are typically diseases of the species. Production diseases is a term used by veterinarians to refer to a set of diseases that arose out of the conditions that farm animals experience in confinement agriculture. An example that he gives is liver abscesses prevalent in feedlot cattle. Cattle that are raised in traditional husbandry are given a free graze and grass to eat. But cattle that are raised in confinement agriculture are treated to pastures only at the beginning but later on are consigned to eating grain in confinement the last years of their lives. Grain is an unnatural diet for them because it is too high on calories and no roughage. Another is the madcow disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE) that springs from the feed given to cows manufactured from the proteins of infected cows or sheep.¹⁹¹

The *second* is the aspect of individual husbandry. In traditional dairies, farm animals had names and since there are, say, only 50 cows in the stock, they are cared for individually when they are sick. In industrial confinement farming, there are thousands of animals to care for, i.e., U.S. dairies hold as much as 15,000. In order to minimize costs and maximize profit, the entrepreneur hires a handful of unskilled workers who tend to these thousands of animals. Imhoff, for example, cites a confessional story of a CAFO vet which he wrote in a column for the *Canadian Veterinary Journal*. In a farm, this veterinarian was called to examine the vaginal discharge in sows. He found out that the staff is composed of three employees and one manager who tend to about 5,000 animals. As the veterinarian examined the sows, one sow had a broken leg. He was ordered to ignore the fracture and just attend to her farrowing because afterwards, the ailing animal will be shot. Despite the veterinarian's offer to save the animal and to cure her for free, the manager said it would still be too expensive and laborious to attend to her healing.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ IMHOFF, Dan. Introduction, In: IMHOFF, Dan., ed. *The CAFO Reader: The tragedy of industrial animal factories*. California: University of California Press, 2010, pp. 1-2.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

The *third* aspect is physical and psychological deprivation. In the children's imagination of Old MacDonald's farm rhyme, "Cows . . . should be grazing in pastures, lambs gamboling in fields, pigs happily cooling themselves in a mud wallow." In the CAFO setting, living animal bodies are stashed in truncated spaces, deprived of spatial mobility, sunshine and grass, companionship of humans and fellow animals, and are fed antibiotics (even when not needed) and unnatural diets for 'efficient production.' In Old MacDonald's farm, the indicator of a farmer's success is the well-being of the animal. In the CAFO setting, the indicator of the entrepreneur's success is the productivity of the animal (kilograms of fleshy meat, milk, lots of offspring) that is ensured by "antibiotics (which keep down disease that would otherwise spread like wildfire in close surroundings), vaccines, bacterins, hormones, air-handling systems, and the rest of the armamentarium used to keep the animals from dying."¹⁹³ The productivity is ensured at the expense of the animal's pain, i.e., debeaking fowls, tail-docking in pigs, to prevent their attacking other animals as a result from boredom and madness being confined.

The canon reading considered to be the equivalent of Rachel Carson's *The Silent Springs* for modern animal agriculture, and which caused a public uproar over the atrocities to animals that it revealed, is Ruth Harrison's book entitled *Animal Machines*. The following items present some descriptions of the suffering of these animals.

Harrison had witnessed the inside realities of these factories herself. In a poultry packing station, she reports that ten-week old birds who were formerly kept in dimmed and hushed environments are wrenched out of it, bundled by twelves into crates, seeing sunlight for the first and last time, and thrown into slaughter houses filled with the noise of chains and banging of machine. They are starved 12 to 16 hours before they reach the packing stations. They are taken out of their crates and suspended by their legs on a conveyor belt. When they rear up and flap their wings in a seeming appearance of panic, their heads are pulled down to quiet them. Harrison recalled a conversation once with Konrad Lorenz, the renowned behaviorist, in which she asked if these birds knew what lay ahead of them since they had been exposed to the other part of the conveyor belt bearing the chickens that are already defeathered. She noticed that it was at this time that these birds exhibited most behaviors of

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 5.

anxiety. The answer of Lorenz was that chickens are not aware but that cattle would be, when they smell the blood of their own species. But this was contradicted by the claims of a distinguished poultryman, Murray Hale. He said that the alertness, anticipation, and consciousness of danger is a basic instinct in all animals because it spells survival for them. Also, from the report of Mr. Fry of Reading who wrote in the UK Magazine, *Poultry World*, Harrison learned that chickens do know of what will happen to them when they are exposed to dead bodies of slaughtered chickens. Their tension when they die makes it difficult to pluck their feathers. Normally, chickens are stunned first before their throats are slit. The factory that Harrison had seen had stunners but the workers do not use them for the reason that the birds 'do not bleed properly.' When their throats are cut, they flap their wings wildly and disappear into the bleeding tank. From there, they pass through the scalding tank and the defeathering machine, but this is witnessed by live birds suspended upside down on a passing line of a conveyor belt. After these, the dead ones go to the evisceration room where the choice cuts are made, packed and stacked into the freezer, while the bad parts are thrown out.¹⁹⁴

In Harrison's account of veal production, the suffering of a young calf begins when taken away at birth or a few days after and taken away in a truck without feed.¹⁹⁵ They are kept in very small pens in order to restrict movement because activity makes them lose body fat, the basis on which they are sold. The worst that Harrison had seen of these pens are those of side boards, with spaces of 22 feet by five feet deep which is hardly enough to make them lie down comfortably. These pens are deprived of light in order to keep away the flies and to quiet them because they are tethered to the pens which drive them crazy.¹⁹⁶ They are so used to darkness that when lights are suddenly put on in the barn houses, they panic.¹⁹⁷ Anemia is another matter. The veal calves receive milk substitutes meant to fatten them up quickly but are actually not the nourishment they need since their diet is mainly grass. For one thing, anemia is a welcomed matter because of the mass penchant for white flesh, and to produce this, farmers utilize bloodletting. A veterinary surgeon attests having seen veal calves who are

¹⁹⁴ HARRISON, Ruth. *Animal machines*. Oxfordshire: CABI, 2013, pp. 56-58.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 87, 89, 90-91, 104.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

so anemic that they drop dead when taken out of their pens for slaughter. If not this, they are so meek upon slaughter because the anemia makes them almost unconscious zombies.¹⁹⁸

Surprisingly, despite Harrison's account of animal suffering in intensive production, she comes out as very pragmatic and accepts the reality that animals could be manufactured for meat. She problematizes the ethics of meat in three ways:

The *first* concerns the welfare of animals in containment, using scientific backing from John Baker of the University of Oxford in the claim for animal sentience. She says:

That animals are sensitive to pain and discomfort is obvious from the fact that in the higher animals the sensory and nervous systems are similar to those of man. An animal of higher intelligence would have a greater span of memory and sense of anticipation and therefore suffer more acutely than less highly developed species, but the initial pain felt would be experienced equally by both.¹⁹⁹

In the breeding and growing of these animals, the industrial animal factories have designed their infrastructure against these natural instincts of animals: their affinity to be attached to the mother when young as a source of food, comfort, and protection,²⁰⁰ the selection of their diet in a natural environment, i.e., grass instead of treated grains, freedom for mobility and the provision of space,²⁰¹ the respect for natural sleep cycles, i.e., keeping hens under light round-the-clock for more eggs, and, having flat and dirt grounds as their claws and hooves are accustomed to stand on,²⁰² i.e., instead of slats.

She argues that while many countries boast of having laws and bills for animal protection that spell out very specific actions of violence toward animals such as kicking, maiming, baiting, infuriating, what is understood by the public is that these laws only cover scenarios of domestic companion animals and animals in natural surroundings. They do not cover the state of animals in intensified agricultural production in the name of commerce and the public demand for meat.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 87, 102, 104.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 173.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 176.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 177.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 178.

It is worth noticing that cruelty is never defined as an absolute quality, there is plenty of space for interpretation in the animal protection acts. What strikes one forcibly is also the reluctance to define cruelty in relation to animals reared and killed for meat. In fact, if one person is unkind to an animal, it is considered to be cruelty, but where a lot of people are unkind to a lot of animals, especially in the name of commerce, the cruelty is condoned. Once large sums of money are at stake, the cruelty will be defended to the last by otherwise intelligent people.²⁰³

The *second* concerns the myth that factory farming is cheaper and economically more efficient. In a chapter that she devotes on the maintenance of battery cages, she makes meticulous calculations of the expenses on the establishment of these animal houses, their processing machines, the special diets, the specialized labor along the production line, the veterinary costs on recurring production diseases, combined with cheaper-priced meat chops, actually turn out to be more expensive than traditional farming which would have kept the small-scale agricultural producers and workers.

To show some examples, the automatic feeding and watering systems which have been devised for indoor stock and which are the greatest savers of labour could just as easily be adapted for use for outdoor stock. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly evident that the price of labour in traditional farming, which is assumed to have been saved in factory farming, would actually still be the same because the labor in the former would simply be transmuted into new modern forms; for example, in the case of poultry, de-beaking, and repetitive vaccination operations. In the case of all intensively kept animals, a higher incidence of disease must mean more time being consumed by veterinary officers and others in dealing with it, and if the cost of all the ancillary services were to be analyzed, the labour content in the production of buildings, mechanical appliances, feed, drugs and so on might well prove to have outweighed the saving in traditional agricultural labour. One begins to wonder whether it might not be cheaper to eliminate the labour shortage in this field by raising the status of the agricultural worker.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 175.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 196.

The *third* involves the myth that this CAFO scenario answers the need to produce more food for world hunger. Five to 10 times as much vegetable protein can be produced per acre as animal protein, and the experts realize that this is the first answer to the problem. Ultimately the best help we can give the undernourished is to help them to help themselves, to increase the scope and productivity of their natural resources, and further, to teach them to use wisely those resources they have.²⁰⁵

Harrison argues that the unnaturalness of the CAFO breeding of animals is not answering the question of world health. It does not always mean that if a rich country produces meat, all that meat will be distributed to the hungry. Besides, the cruelty by which the animals are bred in genetically-modified conditions produce meat with less protein, if not, toxic, which bring on more public health problems. If the expenses that had been used on building these machineries had been spent on scientific research for quality instead of quantity food, and this expertise shared with poorer nations, it would have addressed more both the problem of world hunger and health.

To encapsulize, the CAFO method of animal farming is framed as thus: for all the suffering of these animals, it is not even profitable economically for the entrepreneur, nor has it addressed the problem of world hunger and public health. Harrison did not frame her ethics of meat on the ground of the animal's right to life, which is really the argument of contemporary animal ethics. I will discuss this more in the next part.

2.2.2 The Vegan Alternative and Its Nourishment Sufficiency

What I want to thresh out in this part is to put into question the human need to eat animal meat because there is no other way for sufficient nourishment which underscores and fortifies the fundamental doctrine of the naturalness of the food chain: that human and nh animals eat other animals, and that this is not wrong. There are three contentions to this.

The *first* is the argument that nh animals eat other animals and that this is the wild way of nature and so what is wrong when humans eat nh animals? It is like responding to the

²⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 199-200.

question: if a child can hit anyone, why can't an adult hit the child? I find this argument recurrent and petty. The straight answer here is that nh animals do not indulge in massive CAFO and GMO motivated animal agriculture that spins the systemic wheel of animal cruelty. Nh animals do not scientifically produce nor store their food the ways humans do. They simply hunt and there is no other way for them to eat no matter if their hunting is perceived to be more savage than the ways we slaughter animals. It may appear more savage but not cruel. I am using here the term 'cruel' to refer to the motivation behind CAFO and GMO machineries which is simply for the fetish of meat, with no regard for the life nor welfare of the animal. I would also like to stress that the ethics of meat is imputed only on the human and not on nh animals; there is simply no way to negotiate with the tiger not to hunt for wildebeest or antelope. The question also of 'what is nature or natural,' in the sense of the pristine condition that is 'untouched by humans' as the standard for threshing out the ethics of meat, is a highly contended and ambiguous zone. There is no more 'natural' or 'nature' that has not cohabited and blended with artifice as what we call 'natural evolution' is but a response to historical forces applied on nature.

The *second* contention deals with the question: if animals could be slaughtered in a humane way, then, is it ethical to eat meat? An example of this is Pollan's perspective that:

A deep current of Puritanism runs through the writings of the animal philosophers, an abiding discomfort not just with our animality, but with the animals' animality, too. They would like nothing better than to airlift us out from nature's "intrinsic evil"—and then take the animals with us. You begin to wonder if their quarrel isn't really with nature itself.

But however it may appear to those of us living at such a remove from the natural world, predation is not a matter of morality or of politics; it, too, is a matter of symbiosis. Brutal as the wolf may be to the individual deer, the herd depends on him for its well-being. Without predators to cull the herd deer overrun their habitat and starve—all suffer, and not only the deer but the plants they browse and every other species that depends on those plants.²⁰⁶

Pollan calls veganism a 'utopic ideology'²⁰⁷ for the following reasons:

²⁰⁶ POLLAN, M. *The omnivore's dilemma: The natural history of four meals*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006, pp. 321-322.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

1. that to prefer one's species over another which animal ethicists call "speciesism" is natural;²⁰⁸

2. that animal ethics's devotion to the view of nh animals as individuals is a gray area in cases when the culling of invasive animals is necessary for the survival of a particular species, i. e., the slaughter of pigs to protect the island fox in the National Service and Conservancy in Santa Cruz island of Southern California;²⁰⁹

3. that the harvest of crops also brings to death many nh animals, i.e., harvest of grain shreds lots of field mice; ²¹⁰

4. that scrapping the pig production plants would be tantamount to the extinction of the species; and, ²¹¹

5. that humans and animals have a symbiotic existence, i.e., Indian hunters depended on bison for food and clothing and their hunting bison caused herds to move making grass healthier. Thus, the principle 'all flesh is grass' is true but also inversely, that 'all grass is flesh.' ²¹²

I will briefly take up each of the above items, although for me, this is not the most substantial argument for the defense of meat. Item 1 had already been dealt with in the introductory chapter that treated the issue on speciesism. The anthropocentric speciesism that animal ethics thwarts has been defined as a critical decision to prefer humans over nh animals on the basis of agential qualities in view of moral consideration for life and welfare. The species bias that Cora Diamond mentions that is historically borne is what we may call 'natural' and it is understandable in terms of the lifeboat situation of whom to rescue: nh animals or humans, because this calls for quick instinct. But the species bias is not an excuse for the installation of the CAFO plants, most importantly, when humans have already had the benefit of historical time to contemplate their effects.

I will take items 2 and 3 in tandem but I will begin with item 3. This is a question of moral scrupulosity that is not livable. The discourse of animal ethics, in my view, never made a utopic ideal of not killing any animal in the puritanical degree. It simply abhors useless and

²⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 311-312.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 324.

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 326.

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 322.

²¹² Ibid., p. 323.

unjustified killing of animals. If all people would contemplate stepping on any bug or worm on the grass as a moral problem, then no one can even go outside the house. As regards the culling of ‘invasive species,’ I note here three caveats. *First*, the decision for culling should not be blamed on animal ethicists because culling is usually a collaborated decision of local government, wildlife management agencies, and NGOs that do not take into consideration solely the lives of animals but the extinction of endemic species, the maintenance of crops, and human health. *Second*, in the research of Sugoto Roy, Graham Smith & James Russell, they report that environmentalism is still in its elementary stages of studying how the proper management of invasive species should be. They report that:

Generally, there is a paucity of information on successful eradications, both in terms of population ecology of invasive species and the techniques applied. There is also very little information on failed eradication attempts and techniques (Thorsen et al. 2000, Seymour et al. 2005), and this, too, needs to be recorded to help future eradication schemes avoid repeating mistakes, often at great expense (Nogales et al. 2004, Howald et al. 2007).²¹³

Among the enlisted items that lack study are:

[. . .] removal rates, whether or not techniques were targeting all individuals, and immigration rates. In the risk assessment and planning category, the main shortfalls were on whether the scale of removal operations is appropriate for the species targeted, the effects of techniques on nontarget species, detection of individuals at low density, techniques used to remove animals, and adequacy of monitoring the potential pathways through which invasive species can arrive to a new location.²¹⁴

The scarcity of information is indicative of a faulty system in the study of how invasive species came to be. For example, in the article of Meera Iona Inglis, she claims that the term invasive species is a misnomer because it demonizes non-endemic animals, as if they harbor contemplated plans of destruction.²¹⁵ This term was introduced by Charles Elton in his book

²¹³ ROY, Sugoto; Graham SMITH and James RUSSELL. The eradication of invasive mammal species:: can adaptive resource management fill the gaps in our knowledge? [online]. *Human–Wildlife Conflicts* , vol. 3 (2009) nr. 1, p. 34. (viewed 17 October 2022). Available at: <https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1214&context=hwi>

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ INGLIS, Meera Iona. Wildlife ethics and practice: Why we need to change the way we talk about ‘Invasive Species.’ [online]. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, vol. 33 (2020), p. 300. [Viewed 17 October 2022]. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-020-09825-0> 1 3

*The Ecology of Invasion by Plants and Animals.*²¹⁶ According to Inglis, Elton used the militaristic language characteristic of authors who just underwent WW II, the Vietnam War and the Cold War. Furthermore, many non-endemic species are harmless, i.e., wheat, cattle, poultry, honeybees are non-native to the U.S.A. The term is a carry-over of the xenophobic attitude of citizens toward illegal immigrants who are perceived as ‘others’²¹⁷ She, instead, offers the more appropriate term ‘potential problem species.’ In keeping with the idea that it is unfair to charge animal ethics with a utopic non-kill ideal, she says: “This is not to say that killing animals is always wrong, but rather that killing on the grounds of ‘invasiveness’ is ethically contentious, and thus, kill policies should be instigated using a different ethical framework, if they are to be used at all.”²¹⁸ Lastly, the management of the so-called invasive species overlooks the fact that this perceived imbalance is mostly due to anthropogenic causes. For example, in the UK, the native red squirrel has been overrun by a burst of population of the grey squirrels. Thus, the grey squirrel had been considered ‘invasive.’ But the decline of the red squirrel had been caused by a destruction of their habitat by humans. Moreover, when the red squirrel had been abundant, they were also considered then as the ‘invasive species.’

In response to item 4, this is called the ‘opportunity of life argument’ in the animal ethics discourse: that the animal is given the benefit of a life in exchange of slaughter for meat. Various forms of this argument had been advanced by Michael Pollan, Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall, Temple Grandin, and others who favor meat production that follow welfare conditions. Stephen Budiansky also advances this argument in favor of domestication of animals such as dogs and cats, giving up wild freedom in exchange of protection, free food, and lodging from humans.²¹⁹ Tony Milligan notes down two benefits of this opportunity for life argument: *one*, the advantage of being cared for and fed before slaughter; and, *two*, the existential benefit of being there rather than not being there.

²¹⁶ ELTON, Charles. *The ecology of invasion by plants and animals*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1958.

²¹⁷ INGLIS, Meera Iona. Wildlife ethics and practice: Why we need to change the way we talk about ‘Invasive Species.’ [online]. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, vol. 33 (2020), p. 214. 7 March 2020 (Viewed date: 17 October 2022). Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-020-09825-0> 1 3

²¹⁸ Ibid., 301.

²¹⁹ BUDIANSKY, Stephen. *The covenant of the wild: Why animals chose domestication*. London: Yale University Press, 1992, p. 15.

The *first* could be called off on many counts: that it cannot be discussed on a Rawlsian contractual basis because pigs don't share the same language, that the predominant way CAFO is done cannot guarantee pigs a pleasurable life that could be a pay off the discomfort of slaughter and that there is no such thing as 'comfortable slaughter,' that animals do have rights not to be eaten, etc. The *second* may be more plausible, given that all get to live and die at a certain point in time, anyway. But Milligan cites that Henry Salt argues contrarily on the reason that "animals cannot benefit from events prior to their lives because benefits always require that the beneficiary enjoys the *terra firma* of existence."²²⁰ In short, the notion of 'benefit' does not make sense on a metaphysical level. My argument against this has to do with the preset machinery of the end-of-life slaughter. The very notion of life as 'gift' (I prefer to call it 'gift' rather than benefit) entails the randomness of the death circumstances. It must be remembered that in utopic societies, birthing individuals for specific purposes already designed before their existence are associated with totalitarianism. In addition, nh animals do not contemplate the idea of the continuation of their species; they are only aware of their welfare and that of their kin. Pigs are highly intelligent and sentient animals and their bodies alone would rebel against CAFO conditions. In any case, wild pigs would still exist even if CAFO pigs would be extinct.

In response to Item 5, animals and humans do have a symbiotic existence but that symbiosis need not be in terms of their slaughter for meat nor clothing because there are already established alternatives. The aboriginal peoples did not have this science and technology during their time but modern people do.

Pollan concludes by saying that as long as animals are slaughtered in the most humane way possible, exemplifying Grandin's designs of slaughter plants, meat eating need not be a moral issue.²²¹ But what could be recovered in terms of attitude is a sense of gratitude to the animal who dies to feed human life, a spiritual attitude that the aboriginal peoples had. From the point of view of animal ethicists, there is no such thing as 'humane slaughter' inasmuch as the current practice of slaughtering is done. Grandin designed more compassionate slaughter

²²⁰ MILLIGAN, T. *Animal ethics: The basics*. London: Routledge, 2010, p. 71.

²²¹ POLLAN, M. *The omnivore's dilemma: The natural history of four meals*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006, p. 330.

plants but it still, it does not address the CAFO conditions of breeding animals. The invaluable life of the animal still rests as an ultimate argument. But even this is not the most substantial issue of meat.

The most substantial moral issue about meat rests on the question: is it necessary for human nutrition and health? Because if it is, then there is no alternative but to keep the meat and to simply make the production process as humane as possible. The necessity of meat in the human diet to keep full nutrition is the most convincing way of establishing the human consumption of meat as ‘natural.’ Yet, even if it is indeed established, there still rests the moral distinction of what is an adequate meat diet (that would limit the amount of meat production and animal slaughter) and what is a fetish indulgence such as what culture is doing to exotic animals that are slaughtered unnecessarily for mere gustatory pleasures and affirmation of dining social class.

Supporting the above, Lierre Keith claims that the structure of the body and its nutritional needs demands the omnivorous diet. The human intestines, for example, measure 22 feet, which show long-term processing of a protein diet (implying that a vegetarian-feeding body would have a shorter digestive track.²²² Most vegetarian/vegan sources of protein are grains which transform into starches and sugars that stress the gut and could cause inflammations. For example, lectin, a grain-protein, causes cell damage and train of immune and auto-immune diseases like Crohn’s disease and Celiac disease, the latter being induced by a diet of too much grain.²²³ Paleo-pathologists say that auto-immune disorders co-existed with agriculture.²²⁴ Keith says that the quality amino-acids are all meat-based and cannot be merely obtained from grain:

Meat contains protein, minerals, and fats, fats that we need to metabolize those proteins and minerals. In contrast, grains are basically carbohydrates: what protein they do contain is low quality— lacking essential amino acids—and comes wrapped in indigestible fiber. ²²⁵

²²² KEITH, Lierre. *The vegetarian myth: Food, justice, sustainability*. California: Flashpoint Press, 209, p. 148.

²²³ Ibid., p. 150.

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 151.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 152.

Aside from this, heart disease which is blamed on fats and cholesterol, is a myth because the body does need them.²²⁶ He explains that cholesterol is the body's basic substance for repair, has antioxidant powers, and keeps away cancer-inducing radicals.²²⁷ While there are many studies that show a correlation between saturated fats, cholesterol, and heart disease, Keith claims that there are also epidemiological studies that show the opposite; in any case, only correlation is demonstrated but not causation. There are cultures that have a high consumption of saturated fat but paradoxically show low levels of chronic heart disease (CHD). He says:

First are all the paradoxes: the French Paradox, the Greek Paradox, the East African paradox, the Swiss Paradox, the Pacific Island Paradox. These countries have high levels of saturated fat consumption, but low levels of heart disease. France has one of the highest—the French consume four and a half times as much butter as US Americans, for instance—but the French have substantially lower CHD. The Masai of Kenya eat a diet almost entirely of meat, milk, and blood. On average, young Masai warriors ingest 300 grams of animal fat every day. Yet their cholesterol levels are some of the lowest found anywhere—averaging under 160—and heart disease is unknown.²²⁸

To challenge the above claims of Keith, granted that omitting meat may not give a one hundred percent balanced nutrition. Yet still, from the utilitarian perspective, the suffering of so many animals just to provide that small percentage of nutrition from animal meat that Keith claims cannot be extracted from plants, it is not justifiable to expend their lives for such purpose, even more so now that humans are capable of reflection, advanced scientific, and technological expertise, to enable them to manufacture meat substitutes from plants. What trumps definitively Keith's claims is the statements of medical associations such as those of the American Dietetic Association and Dietitians of Canada that vegetarian diets, when properly prepared, provide sufficient nutrition to human body at any age and bodily condition:

[. . .]appropriately planned vegetarian diets are healthful, nutritionally adequate, and provide health benefits in the prevention and treatment of certain diseases. This position paper reviews the current scientific data related to key nutrients for vegetarians, including protein, iron, zinc, calcium, vitamin D, riboflavin, vitamin B-12, vitamin A, n-3 fatty acids, and iodine. A vegetarian, including vegan, diet can meet current recommendations for all of these nutrients. In some cases, use of fortified foods or supplements can be helpful in meeting recommendations for individual nutrients.

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 161.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 162.

²²⁸ Ibid. p. 170.

Well-planned vegan and other types of vegetarian diets are appropriate for all stages of the life cycle, including during pregnancy, lactation, infancy, childhood, and adolescence. Vegetarian diets offer a number of nutritional benefits, including lower levels of saturated fat, cholesterol, and animal protein as well as higher levels of carbohydrates, fiber, magnesium, potassium, folate, and antioxidants such as vitamins C and E and phytochemicals.²²⁹

The same claim is issued also by the Dietitians Association of Australia, the British Dietetics Association, and the UK National Health Service. Not only has this data sparked the growing number of vegan practitioners and the spawning of vegan restaurants. Martial experts and body builders also attest to the sufficiency of plant power in supplying the necessary nutrition that the body needs.²³⁰

To sum up this part, the human consumption of non-human animal meat as a natural part of the food cycle of biotic life cannot be sufficiently justified from the prehistoric consumption of meat should be used as the fundamentalist standard of what is ‘natural,’ not from the puritanical and scrupulous ethic of not murdering any animal, not from the establishment of humane slaughter plants, but that if non-human animal suffering from becoming meat is necessary for humans to live healthily. And since the vegan and vegetarian alternatives have scientific back-up from medical societies and health practitioners all over the world, then it is clear that the consumption of meat cannot be established as ‘natural’ and if the ‘natural’ is what underlines the ethical, then meat consumption is not ethical. What could be morally considered is that: it is not also ethical to simply dictate as a totalitarian rule for all countries to instantly scrap the meat and demand that all people adjust *pronto*. I believe this is what Pollan could call ‘utopic ideology.’ There is always the option of long-term education and cultural infrastructural change.

The above is really the strongest argument against meat. But there is still a task to do. It is not enough to establish that animal meat is not necessary for a healthy human diet but that if massive plant agriculture would be implemented as the sole source of world nutrition, would

²²⁹ ADA Reports. Position of the American Dietetic Association and Dietitians of Canada. *Journal of the American Dietetic Association*, Vol. 103 (6). June 2003, pp. 748-765. [online]. (viewed date: 18 October 2022). Available from: DOI: [10.1053/jada.2003.50142](https://doi.org/10.1053/jada.2003.50142)

²³⁰ *GVA: Great vegan athletes* [online]. 2023 [viewed date: 19 October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.greatveganathletes.com/category/vegan-bodybuilders/>

this be earthly sustainable? If not, then, what are the repercussions of keeping the CAFO plants? Would this be also earthly sustainable? This concern will follow.

2.2.3 Effects of Animal and Plant Agricultures

Granted that it has been established by medical societies that human nutrition could be properly managed by an exclusive plant diet, the next question that sprouts is if ubiquitous plant agriculture could sustain world hunger. This question is asked only in the purely agricultural and environmental context, when hunger is not caused by wars and social inequity, since these are its most pervasive causes. In this context, the fact that must be considered as the greatest environmental threat that animal meat plants pose is global warming.

The webpage of *Skeptical Science* corrects the common report that the greatest sources of greenhouse emissions come from fossil fuel combustion in energy and transportation. It supports the public statement of *Planet Earth Herald* that "Animal agriculture and eating meat are the biggest causes of global warming. Becoming vegan or cutting down on your own personal meat consumption could be the single most effective action that you can do to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions."²³¹ From the statistics of the World Resources Institute and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 64% of greenhouse emissions come from fossil fuel burning for energy and animal agriculture; 18% of it comes from deforestation, and 13 to 18% coming from animal agriculture alone.

Citing from the research of Pitesky et. al.:

[. . .] it says that: animal agriculture and meat consumption are significant contributors to global warming, but far less so than fossil fuel combustion. Moreover, fossil fuels are an even bigger contributor to the problem in developed countries, which use more energy and have increased livestock production efficiency.²³²

²³¹ SKEPTICAL SCIENCE. *How much does animal agriculture and eating meat contribute to global warming? [online]*. 20 November 2015 (viewed 18 October 2022). Available at:<https://skepticalscience.com/how-much-meat-contribute-to-gw.html>

²³² Ibid.; also in PITESKY, Maurice; Kimberly STACKHOUSE, and Frank MITLOCHNER. Clearing the air: livestock's contribution to climate change. In Donald Sparks. ed., *Advances in Agronomy*, vol. 103 (2009): pp. 1-40. Burlington: Academic Press, 2009.

Perhaps the most feasible solution at this point in time is to keep animal agriculture at the lowest minimum but the only alternative which is to implement ubiquitous plant agriculture still needs to be interrogated.

According to Keith, while it is true that carbon gases are predominantly emitted by animal agricultural plants, the remaining option which is to squeeze out all food from plant agriculture would also spell death to the environment. Ubiquitous plant agriculture is equally not earth-sustainable because of mono-cropping, which also strips the earth of topsoil. Growing crops also demand a lot of water which will sap up rivers and compete for water reserves in the dams meant for human utilization: “It is my conviction that growing annual grains is an activity that cannot be redeemed. It requires wholesale extermination of ecosystems— the land has to be cleared of all life. It destroys the soil because the soil is bared—and it has to be bared to grow annuals.”²³³

He parrots the words from Mark Purdy, “the vegan agriculture is an ‘ecological wasteland.’”²³⁴ On top of it all is the production of fertilizer which will ultimately come, still, from animal bodies including killing many by pest-repellents. Even small-scale organic farming will need picking out and killing pests, like slugs, so where is the animal compassion ultimately? This position is backed by Richard Gray in an article posted in the website of BBC Futures, he says:

But anyone looking to adopt a vegan or vegetarian diet for environmental reasons may also want to consider whether there are some plant-based foods that also come with a heavy price. . . . Research by Angelina Frankowska, who studies sustainability at the University of Manchester, recently found that asparagus eaten in the UK has the highest carbon footprint compared to any other vegetable eaten in the country, with 5.3 kg of carbon dioxide being produced for every kilogram of asparagus, mainly because much of it is imported by air from Peru. She and her colleagues found, in fact, that the succulent green stalks have the largest environmental footprint of any of the 56 vegetables they looked at, including its land use and water use (which was three times greater than the next highest).²³⁵

²³³ KEITH, Lierre. *The vegetarian myth: Food, justice, sustainability*. California: Flashpoint Press, 2009, p. 49.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 40; also in *Price Pottenger*: PURDY, Mark. The (vegan ecological) wasteland. [online]. 21 December 1998 (viewed 18 October 2022). Available at: https://price-pottenger.org/journal_article/the-vegan-ecological-wasteland/

²³⁵ GRAY, Richard. Why the vegan diet is not always green. *BBC Futures*. [online]. 13 February 2020 (viewed 18 October 2022). Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200211-why-the-vegan-diet-is-not-always-green>

Gray, for example, said that the artificial fertilizers alone emit three percent of greenhouse gas emissions like methane and nitrous oxide. The U.S. Department of Agriculture reports that the common button mushrooms, chestnut, and portobello mushrooms, per kilogram, emit 2.13 – 2.95 of greenhouse gasses in the energy rooms which cultivate them. Cocoa has a dark history of clearing 2.1 hectares of forest in West Africa from 1998-2007. One kilogram of 13 shelled almonds saps up 4,132 liters of fresh water. One avocado tree needs 2019 liters every day in summer. Gray concludes that meat plants still produce more greenhouse gasses than plants but it is better to pay attention to where food, whether meat or plant, comes from and how it is produced. It is better to buy fruits that are in season and not conveyed by air freight and even better to cultivate a commitment to eating just what is necessary for a sufficient diet. In short, he does not rule out the environmental sustainability of the vegan diet if properly managed in terms of production and consumption.

To counterpose the claims against vegetarianism from ubiquitous plant agriculture, specifically, for the items that Keith mentions like mono-cropping, erosion of topsoil, massive depletion of water resources, production of fertilizers which come from animal bodies, etc., my position is that these are only problems that spring from conventional agriculture. Conventional agriculture has the same capitalistic motivation as the CAFO agriculture which is maximized production for greater profit. There are agricultural systems, though more difficult and requiring more human labor, are environment-friendly: i. e., organic farming and permaculture.

Organic farming is an agricultural system that uses fertilizers and pesticides that are organic and not chemical-based. Known examples of organic fertilizers are animal manure and green compost. Organic ways of evading pests are companion planting in which certain crops, if planted near each other, are able to work together to keep away diseases and pests, i.e., the Three Sisters method of planting corn, pole beans, and squash, practiced by native Americans.

The perceived disadvantage of organic farming is that it is less profitable compared to conventional farming. From studies by Terry Cacek and Linda Langner, cited the comparative research of William Lockeretz et. al. on the profitability of 14 conventional farms and organic/livestock farms in the Midwest that are, more or less, the same types. It was found that the market value of organic farm yield was 11 percent less than conventional farms but

when the expenses on chemical fertilizers and the use of energy are taken into consideration, the overall profits for both farms were comparable. Cacek and Langer also cited a similar study conducted by Kenneth Roberts et. al. on 15 organic farms on the western Corn Belt and the data of the United States Department of Agriculture on 15 conventional farms on the same area. It was found that in most cases, the net returns of organic farms were higher.²³⁶ Cited was also the research of Mike Brusko et. al. that made use of a 1984 survey by the Regenerative Agriculture Association, 88 percent of the respondents reported the same or an increase in the net income of organic methods than conventional farming and 12 percent reported a decrease of net income for organic methods, when input expenses are taken into account. It would still be debatable if, indeed, organic farming would be more profitable than conventional farming as a universal experience because countries have different geographical conditions as well as policies concerning taxation, borrowing capital for farmers, as well as market-pricing of produce. But what Cacek and Langner suggest is that it would have more long-term benefits in terms of environmental sustainability.

Organic farming is a sophisticated alternative agricultural system. Ample data exist to conclude that it can compete economically with conventional farming in the Corn Belt and the semi-arid Northwest. Further research is needed on the economics of organic farming with horticultural crops and in other geographical regions [. . .]

Organic farming benefits society substantially by reducing pollution and flooding; conserving energy, soil, nutrients, fish, and wildlife; reducing federal costs for grain price supports; and insuring the supply of food for future generations. ²³⁷

A more comprehensive vision for sustainable agricultural system is 'permaculture' or permanent agriculture. The term 'permaculture' is coined and conceived by Bill Mollison and David Holmgren in 1978 to refer to an approach to land management and settlement that inculcates wholistic patterns of thinking that follow the ways of previously observed, already

²³⁶ CACEK, Terry; Linda LANGNER. The economic implications of organic farming. *American Journal of Alternative Agriculture*, vol. 1 (1986) nr. 1, p 25. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44506903>; also in LOCKERETZ, William; Georgia SHEARER, George KUEPPER and Susan SWEENEY. Field crop production on organic farms in the midwest. *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, 1978, 33, pp. 130-334.; also in ROBERTS, K., WARNKEN, P., SCHNEEBERGER, K. (note: first names are not given in the article), The economics of organic crop production in the western Corn Belt. *Agricultural Economics Paper* No. 1979-6, 1979, University of Missouri, Columbia; also in BRUSKO, Mike; George DeVAULT and Fred ZAHRADNIK, Fred. *Profitable farming now. The Regenerative Agricultural Association*, Emmaus, Pennsylvania, 1985.

²³⁷ Ibid., CACEK Terry; Linda LANGNER. p. 28.

existing ecosystems.²³⁸ The Asian rice terraces, conceived and designed by indigenous peoples, is actually permaculture even before the term had been coined. In conventional farming, a mountain will probably be bulldozed to flatten and serve as a rice field. But indigenous peoples, having no bulldozers in their time, thought of a way to carve out terraces following the slopes of the mountain in order to plant rice.

Sepp Holzer is an Austrian farmer who started farming in childhood. In 1969, he took over his parents's farm Krameterhof in Lungau, Salzburg at the age of 19. He claims that since then, he has "doubled the original size of the Krameterhof" to 45 hectares, "reaching from 1,000 to 1,500 meters above sea level across the southern slope of the Schwarzberg mountain."²³⁹ In the summer of 1995, from a seminar held by the Natural Resources and Life Sciences in Vienna, he learned of the word 'permaculture,' attributed to the Australian ecologist Bill Moleson and his student David Holmgren. But Holzer claims that he has long employed the main principles and systems of 'permaculture' and integrated farming,' even in his youth, when he created ponds and gardens that follow natural ecological systems, long before these terms had been coined in 1979.²⁴⁰ He enlists the following as the basic principles of permaculture:

- All of the elements within a system interact with each other
- Multifunctionality: every element fulfills multiple functions and every function is performed by multiple elements
- Use energy practically and efficiently, work with renewable energy
- Use natural resources
- Intensive systems in a small area
- Utilise and shape natural processes and cycles
- Support and use edge effects (creating highly productive small-scale structures).

²³⁸ PERMACULTURE. [online]. *Wikipedia*. [18 October 2022]. Available at: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permaculture>

²³⁹ HOLZER, Sepp. *Sepp Holzer's Permaculture: A practical guide to small-scale integrative farming and gardening*. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004, p. xv.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xv-xvi.

The idea of permaculture is to study the nature and shape of the land that is given and to work with its ecological systems, maximizing its potential for productivity. In contrast to this, conventional farming radically changes terrains to give way to monocultures. Holzer explains:

Rocks and cliffs are blasted to make the fields and meadows suitable for mechanised farming. Wetlands in which the most beautiful orchids grow are drained and dense spruce monocultures are planted there instead. The Austrian Chamber of Agriculture is responsible for these measures having increased from 60 % to 80 % today. Large-scale drainage is still actively encouraged in a number of places. Hedges and orchards are still being grubbed out and cut down, rivers and streams are straightened and it is the monoculture system that is driving these changes.²⁴¹

When planning a permaculture system for a piece of land, there are several elements that should be taken into consideration such as soil condition, elevation, exposure, drainage basins, etc. For example, since the Krameterhof is located at a high altitude, Holzer has to design a system that would compensate for the shorter growing systems and the lower temperature climate. One has to assess the ph levels of different kinds of soils in different areas. There are plants that could be cultivated in acidic soils and others in alkaline soils. Indicators of soil nutrient and ph levels are the plants that are growing in the area. The presence of bracken and heather indicate acidic soil. Elderberry and goose grass indicate nitrogen-rich soil. Meadow clary and pheasant's eye are indicators of alkaline soil.²⁴² One can create wind breaks through fruit bushes, fruit trees, shrubs, and raised beds. Seeds could be sown in clefts, cracks, holes, crevices, and they could be filled with a cover of leaves to germinate them. He discovered that the sweet chestnut trees combined with broom could grow in these microclimate areas.²⁴³ Microclimates mean that a farm area does not have a homogeneous climate and temperature. It has nooks and crannies that have biotopes that differ from the general climate of the area and fosters ecosystems of their own, breeding combinations of plants and small animals that thrive in them. They may be found near tree stumps, rock crevices, among trees and shrubs.

²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁴² Ibid., p. 15.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 11.

A principle of permaculture is multifunctionality. According to Holzer space should be considered multifunctional: every slope, nook and cranny should serve a purpose. No piece of space should be unproductive. In contrast to conventional farming which has specialized and organized terrains, i.e., patches of cornfields and wheat, permacultured space is burly and disorganized, resembling a tropical forest. With certain techniques, one could also create microclimates in small spaces to produce particular crops. Terraces could be created even in the steepest of slopes to serve as pieces of extra land for extra crops. They serve as valuable spaces for conserving humus and soil erosion. He explains:

When making a terrace it is very important to minimise the number of dead ends. If possible every terrace should form a continuous belt of land, so that the terraces can be worked using the least amount of energy Whilst making terraces I try to follow the principles of nature. As a rule, there should be no straight lines, corners or steep slopes (with the exception of raised beds). It is also important to break up the landscape by creating plenty forms and features. These help to create numerous microclimates, which give the land an even greater potential for cultivation. Creating dry areas, wetlands, hedges, windbreaks or raised beds in different locations results in special climatic conditions. In these places I can grow a large variety of plants that would otherwise not be able to survive.²⁴⁴

One could also make use of techniques to create microclimates for heat-loving plants. In order to trap heat for castor oil plants, sunflowers, pumpkins, and courgettes, one could place a lot of stones on a hillside, creating a kind of a masonry stove. To grow shiitake mushrooms, Holzer made use of a 50 cm-thick log and sank it halfway underneath the ground to sap up water. There were so many sprouts continuously for many years and all he ever had to do was to harvest them. ²⁴⁵

By tapping and fostering microclimates, it is possible to grow a variety of crops that would otherwise not grow in general climate conditions. Holzer says that he had grown crops that are reputedly not grown in the cold Austrian Siberian climate of the Krameterhof, i.e., kiwi, lemons, and grapes and various types of cereals such as wheat, oats, rye, and flax using his sun-trapping techniques. ²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

To encapsulate, contemporary animal ethics ferreted out the ethics of meat within the following points of conflict:

1. that meat-eating has been there from the aboriginal times as indicator that the predator-prey relationship is the natural government of the life and the death principle of nature but animal ethicists argue that the modern production of meat is simply a system of violence against animals that support an indulgent culture for meat and that the proposal for 'humane' slaughterhouses still violate the principle that animals have a right to their own life;

2. that the vegan-imperative is a 'utopic ideology' of puritans who claim not to kill animals for meat and yet are silent about thousands of small animals killed in plant agriculture but I argue that there is a difference between a guilt-stricken puritanism that is not livable and the conscious, planned and systemic CAFO;

3. that there are animal proteins necessary for a balanced and nourished diet but animal ethicists argue that the medical associations of leading developed countries claim that a properly-managed vegan diet supplies all the necessary nutrients the human body needs at any age and condition;

3. that the massive plant agriculture to sustain the vegan diet may not be earthly-sustainable because of the water-expense, the depletion of soil nutrients from mono-cropping, and the slashing of forests to give way to plantation areas but animal ethicists insist that carbon emissions from meat-production still pose as the greatest contributor to the climate change threat and that ubiquitous plant agriculture such as permaculture could be managed in sustainable ways.

The above has already answered the first question that stands: on why meat-eating cannot be ethically sustained (from the point of view of contemporary animal ethics). What remains to be answered is how Levinas would view the ethics of meat and its difference from the contemporary perspectives and how this could enlighten the absence or presence of the cognitive dissonance of meat even for people who consider themselves animal lovers. This will be taken up in the next part.

2.3 IL Y A, NAUSEA, AND THE FEAR OF DEATH

To usher the discussion on a clear platform, Levinas does not have a stand on the ethics of meat *per se*. This has to be worked out from his ethical concepts and such is my task for this part: to develop a perspective on the ethics of meat that is metaphysical, using Levinas's concepts of *il y a* and nausea. As far as I know, these concepts have not yet received attention from Levinasian animal ethics scholars.

2.3.1 From an Ontology of Eating Meat to a Metaphysics of Abstinence for the Other

A Levinasian ethics of meat would have its eye on how the ingestion of the body of the animal is appropriated for the maintenance of the human body which is an egoistic movement that counters ethics, which in Levinas, is a concern for the other, a value higher than the self. Ethics is a pivoting from the self toward concern for the other. Its philosophical equivalent is the movement of ontology toward ethics; or in Levinas's terms, the preoccupation on philosophising about Being which he considers an egology and a preference for something more valuable which is the other.

There is a Levinasian ontology of eating which is a preoccupation with the self. Alimentation is a subject that figures prominently in Levinas's discussion of *jouissance* and the world of nourishments.

Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into the same, which is in the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is other, recognized as other, recognized, we will see, as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it, becomes, in enjoyment, my own energy, my strength, me. All enjoyment is, in this sense, alimentation. Hunger is need, is privation in the primal sense of the word, and thus precisely living from... is not a simple becoming conscious of what fills life. These contents are lived: they feed life . . . Enjoyment is precisely this way the act nourishes itself with its own activity.²⁴⁷

In Levinas, hunger takes an existential meaning; it means to be in need of something. The process of being-in-the-world is an experience of abundance and spontaneity; joy is none

²⁴⁷ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. London: Martinus Nijhoff. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1969, p. 111.

other than to say that ‘the world is mine for the taking.’ It is not cliché to say that the most beautiful things in life are for free. Even in the modern world, fresh air and sunshine are still free, the carpet of grass is always laid down for one’s feet, flowers are awaiting to be sniffed and the butterflies flutter around invoking awe. The world is first experienced in its generosity before it becomes the basic foundation on which one could later move on to become hospitable to the other. The world of nourishments is significant for Levinas in order to show that there are basic activities in the world that receive its meaning from spontaneous sensation, enjoyed for its sake alone which need not be understood as selfishness. He said:

This sinking one’s teeth into the things which the act of eating involves above all measures the surplus of the reality of the aliment over every represented reality, a surplus that is not quantitative, but is the way the I, the absolute commencement, is suspended on the non-I. . . To be sure, in the satisfaction of need the alienness of the world that founds me loses its alterity: in satiety the real I sank my teeth into is assimilated, the forces that were in the other become my forces, become me (and every satisfaction of need is in some respect nourishment). Through labor and possession the alterity of nutriments enters into the same. ²⁴⁸

At a certain point, the joy of eating is disrupted when the other enters into the scene, in the face of another in need. Then one begins to be ashamed, as it were, having eaten the fruit of paradise which awakens to the nudity of the other. Nudity in Levinas is destitution. One asks in the face of the needy: ‘do I have the right to be?’ One has to respond to one’s right to be, not by referring to some abstract and anonymous law, or judicial entity, but because of one’s concern for the other. This is the ethical realm:

My being in the world or my ‘place in the sun’, my being at home, have these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? Pascal’s ‘my place in the sun’ marks the beginning of the image of the usurpation of the whole earth. ²⁴⁹

The challenge is precisely to share food with the other, to feed the other, to invite the other to partake of the resources in one’s nourishing world because this allows the dimension of enlargement, of expansion, of infinity into an otherwise constricted self-oriented world, but the demand is the sacrifice of the ego. One becomes ‘wounded’ for the other. All of a sudden,

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 129.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 82.

another kind of hunger emanates from the subject. It is not anymore the hunger for nourishment which could be satiated by alimentation. This is a hunger that cannot be satiated, while it longs for its object, the longing stokes the eternal fires. Levinas calls this "a desire for the Other."²⁵⁰

In the thought of Leon Kass, part of human perfection in alimentation is the capacity for hospitality,²⁵¹ which, in Levinas's words means "to take the bread out of one's mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one's own fasting."²⁵² On the same token, it may be inversely posited that the greatest 'sin' in the ethics of alimentation is not simply to deny the other her share of food, but to deprive the other of food to the point of one's indulgence while the other starves. Perhaps, if pushed to the extreme, it could be said that the alimantal perversion is eating up the other (as done in cannibalism or on animals). In short, what draws the line between responsible and irresponsible eating in Levinas would be the question: what kind of eating is nourishing the self that would promote the ethical response to provide the needs of the other and what does not?

David Goldstein cites Socrates's image of eating in Plato's *Gorgias* which is like filling jars with water. There is a kind of filling in which the water poured is too much and overflows, going to waste. Here, Socrates makes a distinction between one who eats to satisfy and nourish herself and another who eats for the sake of the pleasure of eating. The latter is one who is "forced to work day and night at keeping [the jars] full, or else suffer terribly."²⁵³ This is not the attitude of nourishing alimentation that Levinas idealizes. Here, Levinas's ontology of nausea may be applied in that overindulgence and its effect of undernourished eating leads to vomiting because one has depersonalized one's own subjective body. The indulgent eater has an attitude that is more locked up with obsession for self-pleasures to the detriment of

²⁵⁰ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1985, p. 92.

²⁵¹ KASS, Leon. *The hungry soul: Eating and the perfecting of our nature*. New York: The Free Press, 1994, p. 100.

²⁵² LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1985, p. 56.

²⁵³ PLATO. *Gorgias*. Translated by robin WATERFIELD. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 81-82, 493e-494c; also in GOLDSTEIN, David. Emmanuel Levinas and the ontology of eating. *Gastronomica*, vol. 10 (2010) nr. 3, p. 35.

one's health and is not likely to be interrupted by the hunger of the other. It is not by chance that there is an attributed emotion of revulsion (or the 'yuck' factor) attributed to the repulsive personality of a narcissist who is so inflated with self.

According to Kass, there is a worse 'sin' than simply being inhospitable, this is cannibalism. Cannibalism is the inverse of hospitality.²⁵⁴ In the 1991 Gulf War codenamed 'Operation Desert Storm' led by the US military with allied forces from coalition countries, aimed at delivering Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, Saddam Hussein was reputed to have made the following statement on the subject of POWS, "We will not keep prisoners of war; we will eat them up!" The statement is intended, of course, to strike fear. The prospect of being eaten as a warning hoists the worst level of barbarism; for worse than mere killing or even torture is to be consumed orally by the enemy. Being consumed by another human is universally so horrible which explains why there are no laws explicitly written prohibiting cannibalism. It is simply taken for granted that no one could even stomach the idea. In law, when a human eats another human being, the fault is murder and not cannibalism. Cannibalism in civilized societies would be considered a psychological disorder.

Levinas's ontology of eating is as thus: there is something banally egoistic about eating in that it is an activity in which one takes the other, ingests, and assimilates otherness into the selfsame in order to fulfill one's own hunger. This means that the other's substance is consumed to become part of oneself so that the being of the self is maintained. This is the ontological basis of the taboo of cannibalism: that we eliminate otherness to propagate sameness or egoism. To be sure, we do not consider the eating of animals as cannibalism, but there exists, still, the 'yuck' factor in the consumption of those species nearest to us, which explains why we do not eat raw meat but cook and garnish it. If in environmental science, there is such a thing as the human species's hospitality (altruism) to the other species, then the inverse of that is inter-specific cannibalism: the eating of the meat of the other animal.

At this point, I would now like to return and fulfill the objective questions that were posed in the beginning, in the story of Lishman and the geese: it is ethical to eat animal meat? And, what explains Lishman's (lack of) and other people's (presence of) cognitive dissonance on

²⁵⁴KASS, Leon. *The hungry soul: Eating and the perfecting of our nature*. New York: The Free Press, 1994, p. 114.

animal meat? I would be able to explain this by establishing the empathic connection between the fear of one's death and the consumption of the other animal. I would like to establish that the primeval fear of human death is not directed at a simple vanishing of existence but a state of anonymity and objectification in which one does not matter to the other. This establishes that existence is about a desire for the other, to be in relation to the other. In a way of reversing the golden rule, there is a fear to do violence to another because we do not want it done to us. This is why Levinas says that it is very difficult to kill another face-to-face, why in rituals of executions, it is proper to cover either the executioner's face or the face of the condemned. There is a direct empathic connection between one's body and the other's body. That empathic connection demonstrates that one recognizes the other as other.

This fear of the state of death as objectification and anonymity is what Levinas calls *il y a*. It is his notion of evil – the opposite of goodness which is ethics, and ethics for Levinas is hospitality, a welcoming of the other as other. When nh animals are killed for meat, it is sending them to the state of *il y a*. What I wish to demonstrate is that there is fear when doing this violence, both for the nh animal as other but also as a mirror of a possible violence that could happen to the self. There is fear of the *il y a* as a loss of relation to the other, which in turn, renders also the self as meaningless since in order for the self to have meaning, it needs the other as a source of enrichment. One way by which to manage this fear is to actually kill an other and to try desensitizing oneself in the process. It is more effectively done in two steps. The *first* is to find a safe 'prey' in which one could justify the killing; in this case, a nh animal, with the justification that one needs to eat. The *second* step is to create an aestheticization of the killing, to mask the fear and pretend that it does not exist: the death of the other, which in turn mirrors also one's death. This is done in the entire creation of putting the killing and cooking of the nh animal other in an aesthetic culture of the culinary arts.

2.3.2 The Fear of Death and the Shivers of *Il y a*

In the research of Lori Marino & Michael Mountain, the cruelty toward animals is part of the human management of the fear of death.²⁵⁵ otherwise known as TMT or Terror Management Theory, initially proposed by cultural anthropologist, Ernest Becker, who wrote the Pulitzer prize winning book *In Denial of Death*. Becker characterizes the human condition as a bearer of her own paradox: that she is both immanent in a body subject to sickness and mortality and yet, has an idea and actually strives, to become immortal by virtue of her ability for symbolic reason and language:

Yet, at the same time, as the Eastern sages also knew, man is a worm and food for worms. This is the paradox: he is out of nature and hopelessly in it; he is dual, up in the stars and yet housed in a heart-pumping, breath-gasping body that once belonged to a fish and still carries the gill-marks to prove it. His body is a material fleshy casing that is alien to him in many ways—the strangest and most repugnant way being that it aches and bleeds and will decay and die. Man is literally split in two: he has an awareness of his own splendid uniqueness in that he sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he goes back into the ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to rot and disappear forever. It is a terrifying dilemma to be in and to have to live with. The lower animals are, of course, spared this painful contradiction, as they lack a symbolic identity and the self-consciousness that goes with it.²⁵⁶ (Ernest Becker, 1973, p. 26).

Becker explains that the terror of death and the desire to transcend it somehow is the root of many religions, and in the realm of ethics, it is employed as motivator of human courage as virtue and as social cult.²⁵⁷ In Darwin, this fear is also the response of many animals at every perilous situation and becomes a way of living as survival. The human species, being the one who most understands and anticipates death, is the most freakish at defying it and therefore, among the species, has developed a hyper-anxious attitude to life.²⁵⁸ It is already present in childhood, but in a more complex symbolism because the child does not yet have the ability to comprehend life and death by putting together the pieces of the puzzle. For example, Becker explains the Talion principle in psychoanalysis. When the child observes the

²⁵⁵ MARINO, Lori and MOUNTAIN, Michael. Denial of death and the relationship between humans and other animals. *Anthrozoös*, vol. 28 (2015) nr. 1, p. 1.

²⁵⁶ BECKER, Ernest. *The denial of death*. New York: The Free Press, 1973, p. 26.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

cat eat the mouse and that the mouse disappears, or a parent who clubs down a rat which dies, the child senses a kind of a power play present in life wherein one can make the other disappear. She, then, fears being the victim of that power play that can make her vanish. At the same time, she is fully conscious of her vulnerability not to be able to control what is at hand. However, she is not able to consolidate yet the entire picture of death; it is simply too much.²⁵⁹ No wonder that childhood is spent in frequent crying about the most trivial of conflicts, from nightmares to horrors of insects and mean dogs.

Becker recasts also the sexual theories of Freud with the wrappings of this instinctive fear of death. For example, anality is the second stage of the psychosexual development in children wherein they discover how to control their bladder and bowel movements. For Becker, anality is not simply this but also a discovery of the anus as a symbol of a pitch-black hole wherein feces and foul odors come from; it is part of the body that should be hidden because it is a symbol of decay and death.²⁶⁰ Similarly, Freud's idea of the Oedipus complex is not simply a child's desire for the mother and a sexual competition with the father. It is also mixed with terror at being killed (and castrated) by the father for having sexual attraction for the mother.²⁶¹ The human being grows up bearing within her an amalgam of complex feelings of fear, guilt, and shame about her own sexual parts because they are organs which generate and activate the cycles of life and death.

Levinas contributes to the philosophical thinking of the experience of what death is – not death at the end of life but that twilight zone before being born into existence. What I am presupposing here is that death is understood as a return to nothingness because it is within that limbo from which one is also born. There has been much contemplation about what will happen at the end of life but what Levinas contributes is the thinking of that metaphysical limbo before one is born – if that could also be considered a death zone. The *il y a* is not an articulation of becoming nothing but a description of the terror of not becoming an existent. There is such a fear of not 'actually' existing in Levinas and my job here is to characterize that the fear has to do with the vacuum of being unrelated to anything which posits that the

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 19.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 31.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 34.

business of *existerre* – of ‘standing out from existence’ is to relate; and to keep relating, the relations must be ethical. The ethical relation precedes all kind of relations. This existential description of the *il y a* is significant in pointing out what people fear about the idea of not-existing yet, is something deeper than simply being without a body.

Levinas first writes about the *il y a* in his first book *Existence and Existents* (which became a part of his later book *Time and the Other*) while imprisoned in a stalag during World War II. It would be proper to begin with Levinas’s phenomenological description of the *il y a* as the state of being or existence. Because the *il y a* is an existential state, it is not possible to talk about it systematically, and so Levinas resorts to poetics. The *il y a* translates in English as ‘there is’ and in German, *es gibt*. It is existence in the gut of Being. Levinas borrows the term *il y a* from Blanchot’s *Thomas the Obscure* which is “The presence of absence, the night, the dissolution of the subject in the night, the horror of being, the return of being to the heart of every negative movement [. . .]”²⁶² The Heideggerian equivalent of the *il y a* is the *es gibt* which refers to thrownness in a state of facticity. In Levinas, there is a horror of being stuck with Being. I would describe it in two features.

The *first* feature is the impersonality of the *il y a*. Levinas imagines: what would be the state in which “. . . all things, beings and persons, returning to nothingness” be like?²⁶³ It is not really a void but an objective field of forces like a weather condition: there are forces around but they do not relate to anyone or anything. They are just there without being the matter of anything. He says, “It is impersonal like ”it is raining” or ”it is hot.” Another way of putting it is like existing without being an existent (and being surrounded by other existents). Being an existent requires two things: *one*, having an embodied ‘I’ that becomes the focal point of individuation from other existents; and the *other*, the presence of other embodied beings which relate to the ‘I’ in terms of conveying otherness to the selfsame. Now, if one were to imagine these embodied beings losing the intactness of their individual selves, like being chopped into pieces and thrown into the field (i.e, pieces of animal meat in the market; or the pile of bodies in Auschwitz, to relate to Levinas’s experience), it becomes a horror picture, the

²⁶² LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Existence and existents*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, p. 63.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

violence of impersonality, like the identity-intactness of things all gouged out, disemboweled, and scattered into outer space.²⁶⁴

The *second* feature is the drag of waiting. The image that Levinas uses is a memory of childhood wherein a child is sent to bed by his parents. She sleeps alone at night looking out into the vast darkness and emptiness while overhearing the adults outside, continuing their lives.²⁶⁵ The silence itself rumbles. As we know, sending a child to her room or bed is also a common way of punishment in the old times, when the child is taught the basic social etiquette that ‘children are seen but not heard.’ Within the dark room, the child, discriminated from the adult world, experiences the horror of anonymity, like being in a womb (which is also a tomb) clamoring to be born (or to be reborn), to become something in the world (or something else) and the deliverance awaited is an exit from Being.

To encapsulate, the two features of *il y a* are: *one*, impersonality or the dissolution of the subject within the objective; and, *two*, the anonymity or the absence of the ethical relation (the lack of value, no one matters. This analytic of death is unique in the sense that common descriptions of what is feared in death would simply include aging, sickness, and a return to nothingness, making physiological function and embodied being the indicators of life or the joy of life. For Levinas, hellish death is the disappearance of an outside realm wherein one is trapped within impersonality and anonymity. This implies that to exist, or the joy of the existent, is not simply to-be or being but to-be-with-the-other, because to exist is tantamount to being in relation with the other. To exist means to be an independent subject (a triumph against impersonality) and to be a valued subject who is enriched by others (a triumph against anonymity).

The connection of the *il y a* to the killing of animals for food and product resource is that culinary arts is part of the terror management of mortality salience. The reaction to the *il y a* becomes the pursuit of an elusive immortality that reverse the aspects feared in it: in reaction to anonymity of the world, the subject becomes the only reference point of all of the objective world; in reaction to the child’s segregation from others, the subject becomes the most

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 61.

²⁶⁵ LEVINAS, E. *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1985, p. 48.

valuable among all other beings. There is an escape from the *il y a* via the dream state which denies the possibility of death. Their equivalent apocalyptic effects on nh animals are that: the *ego cogito* becomes the point of reference of the truth about the animal world; the human species are valued out of proportion even at the expense of all other nh animals which translates to a creation of a magical artificial world wherein the human subject cannot be limited in transforming artificially all of *Animalia*.

There are some experiments that show the human need to stand out from the animal world as part of the management of the fear of death. Marino & Mountain cite the experimental researches of Jamie Goldenberg and her colleagues that demonstrate that cultural norms and systems support and propagate the idea that humans could rise above nature and the baseness of the nh animal body, in defiance of their alignment with them.²⁶⁶ For example, in one experiment, a group of respondents were asked to read an article demonstrating that dolphins are more intelligent than humans and another group, an article that simply featured dolphin intelligence. The group that read the article that elevated dolphin intelligence from humans showed higher frequency of death-related thoughts than the other group.²⁶⁷ In another experiment aiming to show the relation between sexuality and mortality salience, Goldenberg's team made one group read an article that showed similar sexual characteristics between animals and humans and another group read an article that showed the exceptionality of human sexuality in terms of love and commitment. The results showed that the latter reading is universally more appealing.²⁶⁸

Becker theorizes on the psychoanalysis of cultural fetishism as a creation of a magical dream world that dispels the threat of mortality. Cultural studies define fetish as valuing something out of proportion from its own real value, i.e., a diamond is really only a stone, virginity is really only the opposite of not-being virgin. In Becker, fetishism means transferring one's

²⁶⁶ MARINO, Lori and MOUNTAIN, Michael. Denial of death and the relationship between humans and other animals. *Anthrozoös*, vol. 28 (2015) nr. 1 p. 8.

²⁶⁷ GOLDENBERG, Jamie; Tom PYSZSZYNSKI, Jeff GREENBERG, et.al., I am not an animal: Mortality salience, disgust, and the denial of human creatureliness. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, vol. 130 (2001) 3 pp. 427–435.

²⁶⁸ GOLDENBERG, Jamie; Tom PYSZSZYNSKI, Jeff GREENBERG, et.al.. Understanding human ambivalence about sex: The effects of stripping sex of meaning. *Journal of Sex Research*, vol. 39 (2002) nr. 3, pp. 310–320.

fears and anxieties toward an object (or practice) and investing it with heroic quality, as it were, the venue of one's heroic struggle and triumph over death.

Fetishism is practiced on a broad spectrum of objects, running from pills all the way to furs, leather, silks, and shoes. They exercise of a kind of symbolic magic: the person hypnotizes herself with these fetishist valuables and creates her own aura of fascination that completely overturns the threatening reality of death. In other words, humans use the fabrications of culture, in whatever form, as charms with which to transcend natural reality.²⁶⁹

Nh Animals are conscripted to participate in this fetishism by becoming experimental objects and resources for beautification products, by selective breeding of designer pet animals, by serving as targets for trophy-hunting, by their effigy commodification in terms of animal stuffed toys or taxidermied animals displayed in zoological museums, and yes, the fetish for meat.

2.3.3 Nausea and Vomiting over Animal Carnage

In this part, I stand to demonstrate that the emotion of nausea over carnage (whether belonging to the animal or human) is a moral one. It is indicative of the inwardly empathic animal-human bond based upon shared embodiment that cannot be denied. I would like to begin by Levinas's metaphysics of nausea.

The stage is now set to present Levinas's ontology of nausea. The word 'nausea' in existentialism is traced to John Paul Sartre's Nobel-prized novel of the same title. In the story, the protagonist, Roquentin, feels dizzy whenever he feels that his life is absurd. In Levinas, the word 'nausea' occurs in his book *Existents and Existence* wherein he cites Levy Bruhl's idea that among primitive peoples, death is a natural event in life. It is not something feared as long as the dead body is still revered and seen as 'a person' which explains the spiritual rituals in the funeral tradition.²⁷⁰ The anxiety about death is a modern production. In Levinas's *il y a*, this anxiety is directed at the galactic mess of anonymity (as it is in war), and, solitude, being locked out from others who bring joy and enrichment to the selfsame. Levinas writes:

²⁶⁹ BECKER, Ernest. *The denial of death*. New York: The Free Press, 1973, p. 236.

²⁷⁰ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Existence and existents*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, p. 61.

In horror, a subject is stripped of his subjectivity, of his power to have private existence. The subject is depersonalized. “Nausea,” as a feeling for existence, is not yet a depersonalization; but horror turns the subjectivity of the subject, his particularity qua entity, inside out. It is a participation in the there is, in the there is which returns in the heart of every negation, in the there is that has “no exits.” It is, if we may say so, the impossibility of death, the universality of existence even in its annihilation.²⁷¹

The other word that Levinas uses in the same book is ‘vertigo’ but he refers to it as the event of losing subjectivity, of losing hold of oneself as base, when the contents of *il y a* gurgle out. He says that all emotions, in this way, is vomiting, losing control of identity. This is the content of the expression ‘I can’t take it anymore’ or ‘I am so sick and full of it.’ These expressions are commonly said, in situations wherein one is abused for a long time, treated like nothing. It is poetic of a desire to regurgitate the mess of that emotion so that one could again stand on firm ground and assert the value of one’s identity.

Emotion puts into question not the existence, but the subjectivity of the subject; it prevents the subject from gathering itself up, reacting, being someone. What is positive in the subject sinks away into a nowhere. Emotion is a way of holding on while losing one’s base. All emotion is fundamentally vertigo, that vertigo that one feels being in a void. The world of forms opens like a bottomless abyss. The cosmos breaks up and chaos gapes open — the abyss, the absence of place, the ‘there is.’²⁷²

Nausea is actually the emotional expression of the *il y a*, the ‘original sin’ of being in the limbo of not existing-yet, which is a state of anonymity and solitude. When an existent surges into the world, having escaped the state of pure Being, she still bears this original sin of *il y a*.

What I intend to examine next is, in relation to the ethics of meat and the human-nh animal connection, I would like to establish that the particular disgust over raw meat (whether animal or human), the nauseous feeling that nearly everyone would have (if I cannot claim universality) over the sight of a body whacked open, with viscera and blood splashed out, is a manifestation of that nausea, which originates from the *il y a*. Proceeding from the idea of the previous part that has been shown that to exist is to be ordained ethically and that the ethical relation precedes all forms of relation, then the disgust for raw meat inversely means a fear for the nh animal’s life, of a wish that the nh animal not to be doomed to the *il y a*, which

²⁷¹ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Time and the other*. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press. Fata Morgana, St. Clement, 1987, p. 61.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

establishes our main principle on the ethics of meat: it violates the concern for the animal and non-human animal-human relations which are always there but denied.

Is the nauseous reaction over raw viscera subjective? Simple mind experiments could sort this out. In conditioned contexts, such as the meat market and the surgical rooms, it is assumed that not everyone would faint because it's a matter of already knowing what to expect. But despite social conditioning, there is still the strife to bear the stench of the meat market, at least, which invokes disgust. I would say the same for the situation of surgeons, that the mask is an indication of the disgust over the smell of flesh and blood and that it is not a simple hygienic paraphernalia. But if the social context would be removed, say, to suddenly find plain viscera and bloodied meat thrown over an unidentified space, I would bet that the reaction would still be disgust rather than surprise. Now, between two rooms wherein in one room, there are identifying body parts that belong to a non-human animal, i. e., a pig's head, and that in another room, i. e., a man's head, I would bet that the horror from the human head would be greater over that of an animal. But if the viscera is not identified, I bet there would be equal disgust. What I am implying is that there is universal disgust over unidentified viscera. While there is greater disgust over the human head than an animal head, which implies a greater empathic connection between embodiment among same species, there is still a manifestation of an empathic connection with the other animal species.

In order to solidify the platform for nausea as a moral emotion, I need to establish next that emotions are moral indicators. Annette Baier criticizes the old view that emotions are passions that cloud judgment. On the contrary, they direct the mind to areas that need reflection. She says:

Emotions are history-laden states of mind. I have been taking for granted that our emotional reactions are evaluative reactions, and that to endorse an evaluation is to endorse some emotion as appropriate. To find something really disgusting is to find disgust appropriate, to find an action of one's own really wrong is to find guilt appropriate . . . Emotions are spontaneous evaluations, but not therefore uninformed ones-past experience as well as innate predisposition informs them. Reflective evaluations will be either attempted corrections of or endorsements of these spontaneous evaluations.²⁷³

²⁷³ BAIER, Annette. What emotions are about. *Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind*, 4, p. 18.

As mentioned above, Baier's view is that emotions attach to objects and that the emotion develops its identity through the frequency of the exposure to them, while socially (or personally) establishing valuations of that emotion as either appropriate or inappropriate. She will not share Levinas's view that some emotions can have transcendental origins but her idea of disgust as emotion has something similar with Levinas's nausea; they are both associated with taste and digestion: "Thus disgust will have as its formal object the unpalatable, presumably having as its deep object whatever first was falsely accepted as mother's milk, then on tasting rejected in disgust."²⁷⁴

The psychologist who specialized on the experimental study of disgust is Rozin and his team of researchers. Paul Rozin and April Fallon saw disgust as primarily food-related and their research is not aimed at defining it in terms of expression but in terms of organism-object interactions. They define it as follows: "Revulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an offensive object. The offensive objects are contaminants; that is, if they even briefly contact an acceptable food, they tend to render that food unacceptable."²⁷⁵

Disgust as nausea and *il y a* push the buttons of the animal-human connection in two ways. The *first* way has to do with the internal being expelled externally. Rozin et. al. found that in disgust, there is a tension between what is internal and external to the body and between what is alien and familiar to the body. For example, Rozin et. al. report that many people do not find their feces and saliva disgusting but when they are externalized from the body, (and thus objectified, with them as subjective onlookers), they are found to be disgusting. They said:

Allport (1955) noted that although one is not disgusted by saliva in his or her own mouth, it becomes offensive outside of the body so that one is disgusted at drinking from a glass into which he or she has spit. We have confirmed this in a questionnaire in which we asked subjects to rate their liking for a bowl of their favorite soup and for the same bowl of soup after they had spit into it. There was a drop in rating for 49 of 50 subjects (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986). The same is true for chewed food, which we accept in our mouths but refuse to consume once we have spit it out.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁷⁵ ROZIN, Paul & FALLON, April. A perspective on disgust. *Psychological Review*, vol. 94 (1987), p. 23.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 26.

Riding on the above, I would also presuppose that if it were possible to vomit one's heart (or stomach) as a natural body reaction like saliva, it would also be equally revolting to us and it would fill us with shame if others have seen it. The funny thing is that it is a public knowledge that everyone possesses a heart and a stomach in one's body, but we do not like it objectified, as we do not even like our naked bodies objectified. My metaphysical interpretation of this in the light of Levinas would be: that entrails expectorated overboard conjure the harrowing of the *il y a* existence; it is taboo, it must not be named (nor seen). The skin of the body holds the frame and insides intact (and hidden, even if others know you have innards). The skin that wraps up and shapes the individual body is the proof of one's escape from *il y a*, that is to become an embodied existent. To lose that intactness in the form of disembowelment is an apocalyptic reminder: disintegration was my origin (and future). Perhaps this is the reason why in the ancient and medieval times, disembowelment and being condemned to the *inhuman* animals (which has the same effect of disembowelment) is a worse punishment than hanging. The reason is not only the degree of pain but because of what it symbolizes.

Rozin and Fallon reveals the *second* way in which disgust over innards establishes the animal-human connection. He states:

Angyal (1941) suggested that all disgust objects are animals or animal products, and we confirmed this claim through questionnaires and interviews (Fallon & Rozin, 1983; Rozin & Fallon, 1980). Almost all objects that qualify as disgusting by our criteria are animals or parts of animals, animal body products, or objects that have had contact with any of the above or that resemble them. A major animal source is interpersonal: The prospect of consuming things contacted by people who are disliked or viewed as unsavory often elicits disgust.²⁷⁷

Rozin explains that the disgust over animals come from the disavowal that 'I am not an animal!' to parrot the title of Marino and Mountain's article on this. The disavowal, is of course, the panic of seeing the animal-human connection. It is known in psychology that what we find irritating in the other is what one identifies with and yet rejects. For example, a father's nagging is what irritates a child; that is because, such tendency is also in the child, having come from him, but which the child learns to surmount, because she rejects that kind of trait in her.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 27.

Disgust concerns the borders of the body: it focuses on the prospect that a problematic substance may be incorporated into the self. For many items and many people, the mouth is a peculiarly charged border. The ruling principle about disgust is the moral guide that ‘one becomes what one eats’:

Angyal claims that incorporation of offensive objects is debasing or demeaning. We suggest that an explanation for this may come from the simple and primitive notion, explicitly present in many traditional cultures, that one assumes the properties of what one ingests ("You are what you eat" or "Man ist was man isst").²⁷⁸

The question that springs from the above is that, in the avowal that ‘I am not an animal,’ what, then explains why humans eat meat? The fact of the matter is, to eat meat is a universal gustatory delight in all cultures. What then, explains this? There are two reasons. *One*, it has to do with disguising the meat when cooked and relished according to standards of culinary art. In turning the live animal into meat, Carol Adams claims that meat replaces the animals as absent referents. In cooking them, it becomes possible to remove the disgusting apocalyptic taste of the *il y a*. Adams states:

Through butchering, animals become absent referents. Animals in name and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist. Animals’ lives precede and enable the existence of meat. If animals are alive they cannot be meat. Thus a dead body replaces the live animal. Without animals there would be no meat eating, yet they are absent from the act of eating meat because they have been transformed into food [. . .]

After being butchered, fragmented body parts are often renamed to obscure the fact that these were once animals. After death, cows become roast beef, steak, hamburger; pigs become pork, bacon, sausage. Since objects are possessions they cannot have possessions; thus, we say “leg of lamb” not a “lamb’s leg,” “chicken wings” not a “chicken’s wings.” We opt for less disquieting referent points not only by changing names from animals to meat, but also by cooking, seasoning, and covering the animals with sauces, disguising their original nature. Only then can consumption occur: actual consumption of the animal, now dead, and metaphorical consumption of the term “meat,” so that it refers to food products alone rather than to the dead animal.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ ADAMS, Carol. *The sexual politics of meat: A feminist vegetarian critical theory*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010, pp. 66, 74.

But not only this. The strongest act of defiance that 'I am not an animal' is, precisely and paradoxically, eating the animal. In the kingdom of *Animalia*, the hierarchy of animals is classified according to the spectrum of diet. In the jungle, the lion is said to be the apex predator because the lion could eat other smaller and weaker animals but no other animal preys on him. The whale, in the ocean, is also an apex predator. He could eat the smaller fish but no fish preys on him. Similarly, the human species is the apex predator of all *Animalia*. Eating is an act of power of one animal over another animal. In his book *The Hungry Soul*, Kass contemplates that much of the discourse that has to do with eating is the demonstration of the human superiority over animals. So to speak, animals feed, but only the human eats; eating is governed by an entire realm of rituals aimed at refinement of the human alimentation. He speculates:

Yet whatever may be said of gods and such remarkable human beings, one must also face the fact that most human beings are or would be meat eaters; that is, when they can be. Indeed one must face the possibility that animal meat—not fruits or seeds or grasses, any more than human flesh—is the human food, the food human beings eat when they first rise to their humanity, the food that marks their self-conscious recognition of their difference from the other animals.²⁸⁰

Kass devotes the entire book in describing how the entire exercise of eating has been governed by ethical rules in the form of a rigorous education unto the minutiae of how to eat like a human, geared at human perfection. For example, the human, unlike the other animals, is the only one who eats on the table. All animals eat on the ground. Even in Japanese and Korean dining tables, the table is still elevated from the ground, to distinguish from animals who normally eat from the ground.²⁸¹ The intricacies of the dos and don'ts of table manners is taught since childhood: one should not chew food nor slurp the soup noisily; to use implements in order to control the sizes of the bites so that they don't smear over the mouth nor fall on the table; not to put one's elbows on the table; not to pout nor make faces on the table, or speak when chewing, etc. Only animals devour; humans eat with refinement. Even polite conversation at the table is trained. In a public dinner, for example, the ability for polite conversation is an art, and is a mark of one's education. One should not talk about disgusting things, nor sensitive matters, i. e., religion and politics. The art of entertainment in

²⁸⁰ KASS, L. *The hungry soul: Eating and the perfecting of our nature*. New York: The Free Press, 1994, p. 118.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

dining is a talent and intelligence that not everyone is capable of. It necessitates a brand of wit and humor since there is such a thing as crass humor and intelligent humor: one must be able to make others laugh with absolutely no offense to anyone present.

The denial of the human who refuses to be a non-human animal culminates in the digestion of meat in which the animal form is transformed into human form. Kass writes:

Eating something means transforming it, chemically as well as physically. Eating comprises the appropriation, incorporation, and de-formation of a complex other, and its homogenization into simples, in preparation for their transformation into complex same. More precisely, in eating, another becomes one's own through specific stages. First it loses independence when it is seized or plucked or uprooted and grasped by hand or mouth. Next its own distinctive form is destroyed, beginning with ingestion and proceeding through the homogenizing process of digestion. Otherness is ultimately overcome by the incorporation of the homogenized simples that is absorption, followed by their re-formation and assimilation to sameness through biosynthesis. Whereas in seeing, the sight of the viewer is informed by the visible object, in eating, the edible object is thoroughly transformed by and re-formed into the eater.²⁸²

The degree to which one denies the connection is also the degree to which one sees the connection. The above completes Levinas's ontology of eating.

To wrap up, Levinas's contribution to the discourse of meat in animal ethics is an articulation of the metaphysical origins of how eating meat is really a preoccupation with oneself and a denial of the presence of the animal other, which goes against ethics. The concept of the *il y a* is able to show that the hell of existence is to exist in a world of anonymity and pure objectivity and in dreadful solitude. This implies that the movement of existence is not individuation nor mere affirmation of subjectivity, but a search for a relation with the other. The desire for the other is synonymous with a desire to be a self. Mere affirmation that the other exists and has a claim on my resources is the beginning of ethics. In other words, the very motive and movement of existence is ethics: the joy of existence is the flourishing and expansion of the self and this cannot occur without the other. If this is put in the context of an ethics beyond the *anthropos*, the meaning of being human cannot be enriched and expanded without an ethics for the other animal.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 26.

Finally, I intend to answer the questions at the beginning: it is ethical to eat meat? And, what explains Lishman's (lack of) and other people's (presence of) cognitive dissonance on meat? To respond to this issue, it has been made clear that the entire ritual of fine dining and the art of cuisine sublimates the fear of one's mortality which, in meat-eating, would be an assertion that 'only animals die but not me!' The surrealistic aestheticism of gourmet is what sustains the cognitive dissonance.

My position about Lishman is that his lack of cognitive dissonance which he rationalizes by the natural law of life and death of species is still a denial of the human-animal connection and is coming from Becker's terror management.

I surmise that Lishman's preoccupation with the geese is that he simply wanted to fly with them, to be counted among them, to be equal with them on the aspect of something that humans can't do but birds can. Lishman wanted the thrill of flying among the geniuses of flight. When he succeeded in fulfilling this wish, he returns to assert what the real score, which is: that he is still the master of birds, and to prove it, he could still eat one, if he wishes to. There are many geese out there, anyway, like all the wild minks. It wouldn't hurt to expend one troublemaker goose, like Christmas Goose. Even if he helps the geese migrate which averts their extinction, he still has not seen a goose's face, because for him, Christmas Goose is still expendable. This invites to the next chapter which takes up the difficult subject of what it means when an animal is seen as other and as face.

Chapter 3

A Face Between Two Flippers

3.1 THE SAGA OF KEIKO

Keiko is a male orca whose lifelong adventure began when, barely two years old, he was captured in 1976 from the waters of Iceland by whale traders who sell these animals for entertainment. His first name was Siggí which was later changed to Kago. He was sold for 100 thousand dollars and transported to Marineland in Niagara Falls, Ontario. There, he lived with six other whales in training for amusement parks for five years. Being the youngest, he was constantly bullied by the other whales. He showed signs of poor health and skin lesions due to the chlorinated water in the pool. In 1985, he was resold to the amusement park, Reino Aventura, in Mexico, and renamed Keiko, meaning ‘a blessed child.’ He grew to an enormous size of 21 feet long, which dwarfed his tank, with a measurement of 22 x 65 feet.

In 1992, Keiko got the fat chance to play the plum role in the Warner Brothers’s film entitled *Free Willy*. The story tells the life of a maladjusted 12-year old boy named Jesse, who befriends an orca whale named Willy in an ocean park. The boy learns of the ill intentions of some businessmen against the whale. With the strong love he had developed for the orca, he hatched a plan to free him into the seas so he could rejoin his pod. And so the happy tale begins.

The film, which had a budget of 20 million, hit the box office with 153.6 million. Keiko won the hearts not only of the Mexican people but children from all over the world. This is a case of an extraordinarily intelligent and talented killer whale who played the main role in a film that championed the aspiration of setting captive animals free, even though in his real life, he was not free. Keiko earned capital million bucks for his owner and the production company, Warner Brothers, and yet, lived within the squalor and stink of a dirty water tank too small for his size that he developed from it a papilloma skin disease. Jenny Lew Tegend, the producer, became concerned about helping Keiko. With help from David Phillips, they set up the Free

Willy Foundation. His miserable situation stirred a tidal wave of sympathy from the international audience, most specifically from the children who watched *Free Willy*. American children started saving their lunch money to start up a fund fueled by the romantic dream that they could somehow free Willy back into the ocean, as it were, to make his fiction story come true. The children and their parents spread awareness and generated support for the ailing orca through social media using the heart-wrenching slogan: ‘Why is Free Willy not free?’ And who had the heart to ignore a children’s crusade such as this one? The whirlwind of youth social activism was picked up by media and the Keiko Foundation was put up. Donations swelled from trickles of money from children all over the globe and Warner Brothers Studio beefed up the funds.

The initial medical tests conducted on Keiko revealed that the orca had been suffering from a weakening immune system, a curved dorsal fin developed from swimming in a too shallow pool, and skin rash with papilloma virus infection due to the warm and chlorinated waters. Because of this, Keiko had to be moved, first to a rehabilitation sanctuary where he could regain his health since the stress of moving him straight to Iceland may cause him his life. The McCaw Foundation and the Warner Brothers donated millions for the construction of a new aquarium tank in the Oregon coast near the town of Newport which would serve as a marine life rescue sanctuary with Keiko as the first rescue. The construction, supposed to take place for 24 months, was accelerated to 11 months because of Keiko’s failing health. The owner of Reino Aventura agreed to release the animal. The Free Willy-Keiko Foundation swelled from an initial fund of seven million until 20 million dollars.

The much-awaited event came. The last day Keiko performed at the Reino Aventura had all tickets sold out. On the eve of Keiko’s departure, people came in droves to watch his final show, kept vigil during his last night and lighted candles to bid him goodbye because the plan was to transport Keiko during the wee hours in the morning for reasons of temperature. Around 10,000 Mexican people witnessed the event. Keiko’s journey home was covered by international media. A C-130 Hercules jet, donated by the United Parcel Service, came to transport the animal to the Oregon Coast Aquarium.

The 7,000-pound whale was lifted 45 feet above cameras by a customized canvas sling of a construction crane into a crate which was filled with ice. Before the crate was closed, Keiko’s

first trainers and lifelong friends, Renata Hernandez and Karla Corral, had to spread cream all over the whale's body to keep moist his skin. When the crate was transported to the airport, the streets were filled with a vigil of lighted candles. Around 10,000 Mexican people came to bid the whale goodbye. The crowd actually delayed the whale's arrival at the airport. It was a tear-jerking event with worldwide live coverage. The crate was inserted by roller bars (which even jammed for some hours) into the Hercules jet plane. Then, the plane flew for 14 hours, trailed by another plane, which contained a grand entourage of the best veterinarians, animal behaviorists, and Keiko's best friend trainers. They had a stopover in Arizona to load fuel and more ice and fresh water for Keiko.

Upon arrival in Oregon in 1996, he was met by crowds of people from Newport town who welcomed the star. His new home was 5,000 times bigger than his tank in Mexico, filled with seawater and built with rocks at the bottom to simulate as closely as possible his natural environment. Under the water is a built-in television where Keiko watched films that showed other orcas and he was extremely attracted to them. In Oregon, Keiko flourished and within six months of a better diet of restaurant quality herring and capelin fish, his appetite doubled, his flippers grew more six inches in width, and his weight grew to 9,620 pounds. His skin lesions also disappeared. With a bigger pool, he had more exercise because he could then dive and had been spy-hopping more often. Dr. Cornell, the veterinarian who led the team also reported that for the first time, Keiko vocalised. These vocalizations were recorded in the hope of finding in Iceland his original pod. Whales learn very original sounds that are typically made only by their family.

After some months of gaining back his health, the celebrity whale was transported onto the Icelandic waters. The last leg of the journey took place on Sept. 9, 1998 but not without friction from the Icelandic government which, at that time, allowed whaling. But it seems that 'the blessed child' passed under the teeth of politics because Keiko was allowed to fly over to Klettsvik Bay, Iceland. He was initially placed in a sea pen wherein he was trained to feed in the wild with supervised swims to the open ocean waters. The expenses for his daily care and management was taken care by the Free Willy-Keiko Foundation and the Ocean Futures Society. Then, in the summer of 2002, he was fully released and the fairy tale wish of the children finally came true.

There were ethologists who questioned the success of the operation since Keiko had not been able to reintegrate fully into ocean life. He found it difficult to join the pod of other whales and at times refused to forage and waited to be fed by his caretakers. He swam frequently near ports, wanting human companionship and had been seen playing with children riding on his back. But the marine animal specialists who handled the case claimed that Keiko lived longer compared to the normal lifespans of whales kept in water tanks and that alone should be a measure of success. There had also been a wave of human rights issues such as the statement of pro-whaling politician, Steiner Bastesen, who questioned why Keiko was not instead killed and his meat given over to the starving people in Africa together with the 20 million spent for his release?²⁸³

I chose Keiko's story because the tension between what is showbiz image and the real face of the animal will be significant in the discussion of what Levinas means by 'face.' My aim in this chapter is to show how Levinas's ethical concept of face could also contribute to the current animal ethics discourse. I will accomplish this in three parts: *first*, a review of the closest concepts to Levinas's face in the classical animal rights discourse, namely, that of the subjects of equality, rights, and personhood; *second*, a presentation of Levinas's idea of face and its difference from the aforementioned concepts from the classic animal ethics discourse, and, *third*, how Keiko's breaching of societal systems of totality demonstrate that animals have a face in the Levinasian sense.

3.2 ANIMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND PERSONHOOD

I would like to depart from the criticism of Steiner Bastesen on why millions were splurged on a single whale instead of contributing his meat and the funds generated for his cause to the starving people of Africa. To reveal the context where this statement is coming from, I would like to use Brydon's investigations regarding the Icelandic responses to Keiko's case within the politics of whaling and the whaling industry during the time of Keiko's reintegration to

²⁸³ THE FREE WILLY STORY: KEIKO'S JOURNEY HOME. [film]. Directed by Raymond CHAVEZ. [online]. USA: Discovery Channel, 1999. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p6Ipm4zKo2E> ; also in *Keiko: The untold story of the Star of Free Willy*. [documentary film]. Directed by Theresa DEMAREST, USA: Joshua Records LLC, 2010; *Keiko (Orca)*. Wikipedia. 27 September 2022 [viewed 18 October 2022]. Available at: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keiko_\(orca\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keiko_(orca))

the wild. Iceland is a country surrounded by sea and as early as 1883, it has set up its first whaling station. It rejected, along with Norway and Japan, the 1982 global moratorium (implemented in 1986) of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) which banned all commercial whaling. In 1986, Iceland was the first to have launched the scientific hunt for 117 Sei and Fin whales and they were sent to Japan which angered the anti-whalers because it was wanton meat commercialism. Iceland has suffered attacks on its whaleboats and rumor has it that it was the doing of the American-Canadian Sea Shepherd Society, headed by activist Paul Watson.²⁸⁴ Keiko's case have stoked old fires of the debates between pro and anti-whaling advocates and at that time, there were boycotts on the purchase of fish and fish products coming from Iceland which provoked nationalistic feelings in Icelanders whose fishing industry composed a part of their identity as a people. They understood the whale as a commodity, a source of livelihood and subsistence. Brydon writes:

While knowing full well that whaling itself has not been of historical, cultural, or economic significance, many Icelanders can still be provoked to anger should a foreigner question their country's pro-whaling position. They have accepted as true their government's argument that to hunt whales is a sovereign right, justifiable by science as an appropriate and rational use of nature defined as a capitalist economic resource.²⁸⁵

Iceland has withdrawn from the IWC and has joined the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) in order to insist on its rights to whaling. There are three central issues with regard to the ethical consumption and utilization of whales. The *first* is the conservative stance which believes that whaling is acceptable but that it must be regulated for sustainable use and to keep the species from extinction. The *second* is the preservationist stance which believes that to kill whales is unacceptable because they are highly intelligent and are keystone species who play a central role in the ocean ecosystem. The *third* is spearheaded by the American perspective, that commercial whaling is unacceptable but subsistence whaling, such as aboriginal whaling and small-scale whaling practiced by local coastline communities, may be acceptable.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ STOETT, Peter. *The international politics of whaling*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997, pp. 80-81.

²⁸⁵ BRYDON, Anne. The predicament of nature; Keiko and the cultural politics of whaling in Iceland, *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 79 (2006) nr. 2, 2006, pp. 232-233.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

These three stances have echoes of the old debate between environmentalist ethics and animal ethics: the former judges the management of species upon the objective and holistic principle of ecological balance which finds culling of a certain species acceptable and falling within the natural way of life and death whereas the latter looks upon each animal as an individual of personal value. In the *first* and *third* stances, it does not even appear that the animal is a stakeholder and so there is no moral consideration for the individual animal. Since the interest of this research is the perspective of animal ethics, it is more favorable to the *second*.

The next task is to discuss how the whale is treated from the perspective of the classical discourse of normative animal ethics. Considering Bastesen's statement that the funds for Keiko should have been used on humans instead of animals and the three central issues of the ethical consumption and utilization of whales, I suppose this provokes the core question: what is the status of whales? Are they meat or (beings that are like) persons?

The classic method used in normative animal ethics is to search for substance qualities in the animal that would serve as basis to invest the animal with protection and preservation value. An example of this is the classic debate between Peter Singer and Tom Regan regarding what quality in the animal would be a bullet-proof argument that would ensure the unquestionable granting of protection for the animal. Singer used the argument of Jeremy Bentham who questioned African slavery by the British. "The question is not, can they reason? nor can they talk? but can they suffer?"²⁸⁷ This gave Singer the idea that when a being suffers, there is no moral justification why the welfare of that being should not be taken into account, that is, regardless of the nature of that being. The capacity for suffering in nh animals indicates an interest for their own welfare. The nh animal's interest not to suffer should be given equal consideration; not to do so would be to discriminate against their species. Singer uses Richard Ryder's term 'speciesist.' He writes:

Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Racists of European descent typically have not accepted that pain matters as much when it is felt by Africans, for example, as when it is felt by Europeans. Similarly those I would call 'speciesists' give greater weight to the interests of members of their own species when there is a

²⁸⁷ BENTHAM, Jeremy. Limits between private ethics and the art of legislation. *The principles of morals and legislation*. London: T. Payne & Son, 1780, Sec. 1:4, footnote.

clash between their interests and the interests of those other species. Human speciesists do not accept that pain is as bad when it is felt by pigs or mice as when it is felt by humans.²⁸⁸

On the contention that humans suffer greater pain than animals, Singer agrees that, indeed, slapping a baby would not have the same pain as slapping a horse, given that the skin of the baby is more sensitive. But Singer contends that if the pain of slapping the horse (with a stick) is equalized with that of the gentle slap on the baby, still the principle of equal consideration of interests apply.²⁸⁹ The differences in the capacity to feel pain does not mean that one should give more consideration to the welfare of one species over another. That some animals suffer less does not grant one the right to use them in medical experimentation any more than a person with multiple sclerosis. Moreover, it is possible to argue in the reverse: it makes sense to claim that lower sensibilities in animals actually increases their capacity to suffer because of the lack of reflection, given that reflection could serve as therapy that makes suffering endurable. Singer cites, for example, that war prisoners who are captured could be given an orientation that if they do not struggle, they would not be harmed and would be set free at the end of hostilities. Animals cannot be given such orientation.²⁹⁰ Given the fact that comparisons of suffering between beings are impossible to make, Singer argues that "precision is not essential," and that "pain and suffering are bad and should be prevented and minimized, irrespective of the race, sex, or species of the being that suffers."²⁹¹

On the challenge of the hypothetical experiment that questions if a single animal could be sacrificed in the laboratory for the sake of developing medicine for a dreaded disease that could save millions (not specified if humans or animals), Singer answers that this is acceptable but on the basis of the utilitarian principle that maximizes the highest possible good and it is not made on the basis of species's difference. Moreover, Singer strikes back by asking, on the above same token, would it be acceptable to experiment on an orphaned human with irreversible brain damage if this would save millions of others. If not, then why do it on an animal? To do it is speciesist.²⁹²

²⁸⁸ SINGER, Peter. *Practical ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 58.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 59.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 60.

²⁹¹ Ibid., p. 60.

²⁹² Ibid., p. 67.

According to Milligan, Singer is not a rights theorist but a proponent of the argument for equality between humans and animals.²⁹³ It is Regan who is the representative of the argument for animal rights. In the discourse of rights we know that rights are inalienable but that this only becomes a reality, if predominantly, there is mutual cooperation between citizens for respecting each other's rights. This is why in contractual ethics, a human being gains the right to be respected on the basis that she does the same good to others, and so, the concept of rights is correlative to the possession of moral reasoning. It is also the basis why criminals, who commit actions that go beyond reason, are supposedly deprived of rights to their freedom by imprisonment.

On the subject of rights, it is necessary to make a distinction between moral agents and moral patients, the defining element being the capacity to have moral reasoning. Moral agents are humans and moral patients are nh animals but also those humans with underdeveloped intellectual agencies such as children and persons with mental impairments. Moral patients are at the receiving end of goodness from moral agents regardless of whether their actions could be judged as good and bad (at least not yet, for children while they are young). On the talk of rights, there is no problem in conceiving that children and the mentally-impaired would have rights but it becomes a problem for nh animals. There is then, a necessity in finding a continuous quality between all kinds of moral patients that would serve as basis for rights.

For Regan, there is sense in speaking of nh animal rights even if they cannot rationally participate in the ethical exchange in a moral community. What makes this possible is the argument that nh animals are beings who are subjects-of-a-life: He explains:

To be the subject-of-a-life, in the sense in which this expression will be used, involves more than merely being alive and more than merely being conscious. To be the subject-of-a-life is to be an individual whose life is characterized by those features explored in the opening chapters of the present work: that is, individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their

²⁹³ MILLIGAN, Tony. *Animal ethics: The basics*. London: Routledge, 2015, p. 50.

utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests.²⁹⁴ (Regan, 2013, p. 243).

Supposedly, the advantage of this concept over Singer's principle of equality is that it is proofed against the contentions of levels of sentience and suffering between humans and animals for the reason that a living being alone has inherent value. Mere being subject-of-a-life invests a living being an inherent value, and thus, rights, regardless of levels of experiences. To make this clearer, Regan uses the image of cup to explain that in discussions of moral value, people value what goes on in the cup but not the cup itself. He says:

The difference between the utilitarian-receptacle view of value regarding moral agents and the postulate of inherent value might be made clearer by recalling the cup analogy . . . On the receptacle view of value, it is what goes into the cup (the pleasures or preference-satisfactions, for example) that has value; what does not have value is the cup itself (i.e., the individual himself or herself). The postulate of inherent value offers an alternative. The cup (that is, the individual) has value and a kind that is not reducible to, and is incommensurate with, what goes into the cup (e.g., pleasure). The cup (the individual) does "contain" (experience) things that are valuable (e.g., pleasures), but the value of the cup (individual) is not the same as any one or any sum of the valuable things the cup contains. Individual moral agents themselves have a distinctive kind of value, according to the postulate of inherent value, but not according to the receptacle view to which utilitarians are committed. It's the cup, not just what goes into it, that is valuable.²⁹⁵

For Regan, what grants equal rights to all life forms is not sentience but being subjects-of-a-life, which makes the claim more fundamental and integral to their being. When we treat animals with kindness, that is not compassion but an act of justice; they deserve it because their inherent value presses a deontological obligation on our part to respect them. Regan's claim is tantamount to saying that the subjective living being has inherent value that cannot be questioned even by levels of sentience or suffering. The value of subjective life alone is absolute and this bestows on the animal a right toward his own life and welfare.

We have discussed the minimal qualities that entitle a being rights and equality in the discourse of animal ethics. It is time to shift to a more strenuous category to pass for moral consideration – the category of being 'person.' To put it simply, the contention here is that the non-human animal is not a person, so the animal could not have a moral status. The challenge, then, is

²⁹⁴ REGAN, Tom. *The case of animal rights*. California: University of California Press, 1983, p. 243.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

to review the philosophical notion of what being ‘person’ means and for this purpose, I would subscribe from the ideas of Mark Rowlands who treated this theme heavily in his book *Can Animals be Persons?*

Rowlands first toys with the rhetorical uses of the word ‘person.’ He says that when one is watching science fiction films, they are loaded with characters that are really imaginary creatures, humanoids, but we refer to them as ‘persons’ in the sense of having ‘character.’ He says:

Spock is not human, but he is certainly a person. But he’s half human, you say. Okay then: Worf is not a human—he is entirely Klingon—but he is still a person. Switching Stars from Trek to Wars: Yoda is not human but is still a person. Jabba the Hutt is a person. Even the supremely annoying (and-in- some-circles-rumored-Sith-lord) Jar Jar Binks is a person²⁹⁶ (Rowlands, 2019, p. 3).

Similarly, in the film *The Secret Life of Pets*, animals are shown to have mental lives.²⁹⁷ There is no reluctance in calling them persons in the film but the fact, he argues, is that the similarities that animals have with humans is precisely the presence of a mental life, and so, it is a wonder why they cannot be persons in real life.

He, then, recalls John Locke in making the distinction between human beings and persons. He explains that “the category of a human being is a biological one, but the category of a person is a psychological one that involves consciousness, thought, intelligence, reason, reflection, and the ability to “consider” oneself the same thinking thing in different times and places.”²⁹⁸ The strategy of Rowlands is to identify the most inclusive conception of what ‘person’ means in order to argue that animals still, are persons. Rowlands then proceeds to examine the meanings of ‘person’ in three senses: *legal*, *moral*, and *metaphysical*, in order to expose the loose meanings of the word ‘person.’

In the *legal* sense, an individual is considered a person when her status is codified in law.

Rowlands contends that one need not be a human person to be a ‘person’ within law.

Following the idea of the American jurist Wendell Holmes Jr. that the law descends not from

²⁹⁶ ROWLANDS, Mark. *Can animals be persons?* New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 3.

²⁹⁷ THE SECRET LIFE OF PETS. [film]. Directed by Chris RENAUD. U.S.A.: Universal Pictures, 2016.

²⁹⁸ ROWLANDS, Mark. *Can animals be persons?* New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 4; also in LOCKE, John. *An essay concerning human understanding*. Oxford: Oxford University, Press, 1975, p. 188.

logic but from experience, Rowlands says that even in law, one need not be a human person to be 'person' because it "is not uncommon for US courts to extend personhood rights to non-sentient, non-living entities such as corporations, municipalities, and even ships."²⁹⁹ Inversely and paradoxically, American history is also full of legal cases that debate on the issue of whether living human persons could actually be considered legal persons under the law such as slaves, women, and native Americans.

Now, the contemporary debate is whether to consider animals as legal persons also. Rowlands cites the case of Tommy the chimpanzee who starred in the 1987 film *Project X*,³⁰⁰ and who had been living in an isolated car lot in Groversville, Texas. The Nonhuman Rights Project filed a petition of the writ of *habeas corpus* for Tommy to grant him the status of legal person for protection of rights under the law but it was denied in 2015 by Justice Karen Peters on the ground that chimpanzees cannot be legal persons because they "cannot bear any legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities, or be held legally accountable for their actions."³⁰¹

Rowlands argues that if someone like Tommy cannot be granted the title of legal person because he is not a legal agent capable of assuming legal duties and societal responsibilities and being held accountable for his own actions, then, it follows also that children cannot be legal persons. Following Peters's decision, Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Barbara Jaffe did not also grant the writ of *habeas corpus* for the apes Hercules, Leo, and Kiko.³⁰²

In the *moral* sense of being person, Rowlands takes up Tom Beauchamp's definition of a moral person as "an individual who (1) is capable of making moral judgments about the rightness and wrongness of actions and (2) possesses motives that can be judged morally."³⁰³

Individuals who are capable of moral judgment and moral motivations are moral agents. Rowlands says that Beauchamp makes a distinction between moral persons and moral considerability; not all beings who are given moral considerability need to be moral persons and an example of this is children. Children are not moral agents but are moral patients. As

²⁹⁹ Ibid., ROWLANDS, Mark. p. 6.

³⁰⁰ PROJECT X. [film]. Directed by Jonathan KAPLAN. U.S.A.: 20th Century Fox, 1989.

³⁰¹ ROWLANDS, Mark. *Can animals be persons?* New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 6.

³⁰² Ibid., p. 7.

³⁰³ Ibid., p. 8; also in BEAUCHAMP, Tom. The failure of theories of personhood. *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, 1999, 9 (4), pp. 309-324.

Regan has seen, Rowlands says that if children who are clearly not moral persons but moral patients, in the sense of being on the receiving end of goodness from others, even if they cannot (yet) be fully capable of moral action, if they could still be treated with moral considerability, then why not nonhuman animals? But the loophole in this is that normal children, unlike nonhuman animals, stand in the future to be fully moral agents, and this is what makes them still different from nonhuman animals.

In the end, Rowlands finds it necessary to focus on the meaning of personhood on the level of the *metaphysical*. He understands metaphysical as that which something is. He uses Daniel Dennett's definition.

[. . .] a person is (1) a rational being, (2) a being to which states of consciousness are attributed or to which psychological or intentional predicates are ascribed, (3) a being to which a certain sort of attitude or stance is adopted, (4) a being capable of reciprocating—treating other persons as persons, (5) a being capable of verbal communication, (6) a being that is conscious in some special way—typically, self-conscious.³⁰⁴

Rowlands places this definition alongside Thomas White's definition, which is also derived from that of Dennett, when White was developing an argument for the case of dolphins, in view of examining if nonhuman animals can have the status of person.

[. . .] (1) being alive, (2) being aware, (3) feeling positive and negative sensations, (4) having emotions, (5) having a sense of self, (6) being able to control its own behavior, (7) being able to recognize other persons and treat them as such, and (8) having a variety of sophisticated cognitive abilities, such as analytical thinking, learning, or complex problem-solving.³⁰⁵

Another parallel definition that Rowlands uses is that of Beauchamp:

Cognitive conditions of metaphysical personhood similar to the following have been promoted by several classical and contemporary writers: (1) self-consciousness (of oneself as existing over time); (2) capacity to act on reasons; (3) capacity to communicate with others by command of a language; (4) capacity to act freely; and (5) rationality.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Ibid., ROWLANDS, Mark, p. 10; also in DENNETT, Daniel. Conditions of personhood. *Brainstorms: Essays on mind and philosophy*. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 176-196.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., ROWLANDS, Mark, pp. 10-11; also in WHITE, Thomas. *In defense of dolphins: The new moral frontier*. Massachusetts: Wiley- Blackwell, 2007, p. 156.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., ROWLANDS, Mark., p. 11.

Rowlands proceeds to extract the common denominators between the definitions of Dennett, White, and Beauchamp and comes up with this list of features:

An individual, C, qualifies as a (metaphysical) person if C satisfies:

- (1) The consciousness condition: C is conscious.
- (2) The cognition condition: C can engage in cognitive processes such as learning, reasoning, and problem-solving.
- (3) The self-awareness condition: C is self-conscious or self-aware.
- (4) The other-awareness condition: C is capable of recognizing other persons as such.³⁰⁷

I will not anymore take up the intricacies of how Rowlands defines each of the above aspects but it suffices to say that for the animal to qualify as person, he needs these four aspects of mental capacities. The idea being pursued is that if a being is a person, then that being is entitled to legal rights and thus, a respect for her rights. The next part will discuss the difference of Levinas's metaphysical concept of face from those of animal equality, rights, and person.

3.3 THE ETHICS OF FACE AND ALTERITY

Reviewing the earlier part, it may be said that the classical method of acquiring moral consideration for the animal consists in finding essential continuities between humans and animals which is difficult to do, since, as we have mentioned in the introductory chapter wherein the definition of anthropocentrism is taken up, there are no clear-cut differences between species. If humans are sentient and could suffer, and on that token, have interest and rights, if they are subjects-of-a-life, and if they are conscious, rational, self-aware, and other-aware like any other human person, then their life and welfare should be of moral worth. But the problem is still, that animals vary in degrees when these qualities are considered as measuring sticks. The motive is to find a ground principle for moral protection for as many animals as possible. And this calls for the task of investigating if the Levinasian concept of

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

face could offer that advantage as well as make a difference in the discourse of the bases of moral status of animals.

On the question of where ethics originates, Levinas proffers not the concept of right, subjects-of-a-life, and person but that of 'face.' The temptation which Levinasian animal ethicists fell into is to find out if the animal has characteristics that fit into Levinas's concept of face and on that basis, impinge a deontological obligation on the human to place a moral value for the animal's life and welfare. And this is where the problem begins. Consider, for example, Christian Diehm's view of Levinas in the face of animal ethics.

Diehm reviews Levinas's qualifications of what a face is and asserts that the animal fits all of those features. For example, Levinas does not require rational and linguistic agencies in order to be a face.³⁰⁸ Levinas's understanding of language is not a set of linguistic codes to be used as a tool for communication but a way in which the other makes an ethical appeal and the animal could very well accomplish this through bodily gestures and sounds that communicate distress. This ethical appeal escapes all cultural stipulations such as title, class, or nationality. It does not also depend on the capacity of the other to give back because Levinas has explicitly said that the structure of ethics is non-reciprocal. In his interview by Philippe Nemo in the book *Ethics and Infinity*, Levinas insists on the non-asymmetrical relation between the 'I' and the other:

PH.N.: But is not the Other also responsible in my regard?

E. L.: Perhaps, but that is his affair. One of the fundamental themes of Totality and Infinity about which we have not yet spoken is that the intersubjective relation is a non-asymmetrical relation. In this sense, I am responsible for the other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair. It is precisely insofar as the relationship between the Other and me is not reciprocal that I am subjected to the Other; and I am "subject" essentially in this sense.³⁰⁹

Goodness is not bestowed on the condition that it could be given back, otherwise, it defeats the infinite nature of goodness. Furthermore, the face does not also have to mean literally

³⁰⁸ DIEHM, Christian. Facing nature: Levinas beyond the human. In Katz, C. E. ed., *Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers* Vol. 4, New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 180-181.

³⁰⁹ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1985., p. 98.

face, i. e., having eyes, ears, nose, and mouth. Any part of the body can be a face; “[. . .]the whole body, the hand or the shoulder, can express itself as face.”³¹⁰ It simply means any part of embodiment that is subject to suffering and mortality. Levinas stresses this in his comment on a scene in Vasily Grossman’s novel *Life and Fate*. He says:

Face that thus is not exclusively the face of man. In Vasily Grossman’s *Life and Fate* (Part Three, Chapter 23), there is mention of a visit to the Lubianka in Moscow by the families or wives or relatives of political prisoners, to get news of them. A line is formed in front of the windows, in which they can only see each other’s backs. A woman waits for her turn: ‘Never had she thought the human back could be so expressive and transmit states of mind so penetratingly. The people who approached the window had a special way of stretching the neck and back; the raised shoulders had shoulder-blades tensed as if by springs, and they seemed to shout, to cry, to sob.’ Face as the extreme precariousness of the other. Peace as awakening to the precariousness of the other.³¹¹

From the above scene from the novel, Levinas says that the only thing that anyone can see is the nape of the other in front, which is not exactly ‘face,’ but contains the fullness of suffering and mortality. Upon this note, Diehm claims that there is no reason why the animal cannot qualify in Levinas’s own description of what a face is.³¹²

In the introductory chapter, I have mentioned that my argument is to show that Levinasian ethics could be of service to animal ethics and that my first task was to transcend the usual discourse of anthropocentrism, of having to prove if Levinasian ethics is anthropocentric or not, and on that premise, determine if it could have something in favor of the animal. That process could likewise be implemented here in the classical method in animal ethics. If ever the face of Levinas would be discussed, I would like it to move beyond the discourse of having to prove similarities between animal and human faces because to do so would be following the essentialist tradition that Levinas goes against: that of silting out the substance from accidents, or, finding the ‘eternal’ element that does not change between humans and animals. The ethical project of Levinas is to bring back otherness into the realm of sameness

³¹⁰ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 262.

³¹¹ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Alterity and transcendence*. Translated by Michael SMITH. London: The Athlone Press, 1999, p. 140.

³¹² DIEHM, Christian. Facing nature: Levinas beyond the human. In: Claire Elise KATZ, ed., *Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers* Vol. 4, New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 184.

which is its element of infinity and creativity. He defines ethics as a cognizance and beholding of otherness and the inverse of ethics being the enforcement of sameness onto beings who are, by nature infinite, which, when extreme and proliferate, become systems of violence, such as what happens in totalitarian governments.

Since we speak here of ‘moving beyond,’ I would like to inject Levinas’s notion of transcendence: “The movement of transcendence is to be distinguished from the negativity by which discontent man refuses the condition in which he is established. . . The negator and the negated are posited together, form a system, that is a totality. . . Metaphysics does not coincide with negativity.”³¹³ In other words, if the classical discourse of animal ethics seeks to combat the polar (and hierarchical) opposition between humans and animals by pressing on the continuities between them (the negative alternate), my move is precisely to escape from this framework, to move to the alter region.

Alterity in Levinas is not simply ‘difference’ such as that when comparing two things using an arch category, i. e. nh animals differ from the human in terms of reflective intelligence. It refers to a radical and absolute difference in which two things cannot be compared and even comparison does not make sense. To be sure, there is nothing in the world that cannot be compared under an arch category. For example, a chair and a butterfly differ in terms of being animate. God and the human can be compared in terms of immortality. Biology has a whole store of categories to distinguish between forms of life. There is nothing existent that is so radically different that they cannot be compared because the very nature of understanding is distinction. Distinction emanates from comparisons of qualities of things. It is from comparison between things that universal categories are drawn. So how could alterity be understood as a radical difference that does not emanate from comparison? Levinas explains:

The reversibility of the relation where the terms are indifferently read from left to right and from right to left would couple them the one to the other; then they would complete one another in a system visible from the outside. The intended transcendence would thus be reabsorbed into the unity of the system, destroying the radical alterity of the other... alterity, the radical heterogeneity of the other, is possible only if the other is other with respect to a term whose essence is to remain

³¹³ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969, pp. 40-41.

at the point of departure, to serve as entry into the relation, to be the same, not relatively, but absolutely.³¹⁴

What Levinas means by ‘alterity’ is a transcendent region that is the starting point of thought and language but does not belong to thought and language; it precedes it. This region is ethics. Levinas stands to demonstrate that the ethics of the other belongs to this region. The origin of ethics or the host of the ethical relation which makes possible language and thought is the other which brings infinity into the self-centered turf of the ‘I.’ The other is the basis and starting point of relating to and understanding a given world. As we have seen in the prior chapter’s discussion on the *il y a*, the movement of existence is more a desire to relate to the other rather than simply a short-circuited affirmation of self-identity. Alterity, therefore, is to be understood more of what remains outside any relation that tends to appropriate or subsume, this is the *a priori* of thought which is not a thought— the realm of otherness in which the other resides. When applied to human and non-human animal relations, the appropriate move is not to analyze differences between the human and the non-human animal as species, to determine what is the essence of the non-human animal face, but to focus on the ethical movement by which the other escapes any determination.

A significant reminder is the fact that Levinasian ethics unfolded within the context of the rebellion against the omnipresent ontological discourse of Being in Western thought: philosophy became a task of defining what Being is. Levinas thinks that there is something more important than Being which is the other. Philosophy is not for the sake of abstract contemplation for mystical knowledge of Being but for the worthy endeavor of servicing the quality of life that is intended to flourish. The move of distinguishing between human and non-human animal substances is furthering the business of ontology, and thus, a Levinasian animal ethics would not entertain this as a point of departure. It would, instead, anchor itself directly on the description of the ethical relation between the human and the non-human animal and this is what I endeavor to accomplish here. The point of departure should not be on what qualities reside in the human or in the animal as prompted by identity politics, but how the animal breaches the ego totality, on how the animal influences the human toward an ethics beyond herself and her species.

³¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 35-36.

Barbara Jane Davy explains that, ironically, when Levinas speaks of animals, he still makes comparisons based upon human states. For example, Levinas makes distinctions between plant and animal needs and human desire.³¹⁵ According to her, Levinas says that plants do not experience their needs while nh animals do, only that nh animals cannot surpass the need to struggle and fear for survival. In contrast to this, the human transcends needs of the self toward desire for the other. Needs are self-oriented and limited whereas desire is other-centered and infinite. What humans desire is the other but it seems that, according to Davy, following David Clark, that Levinas's concept of an other who has a face must be a being who is able to surpass needs of the self and embrace service for the other.³¹⁶

This demand of Levinas that for a being to be considered 'face' and 'other,' she must be capable of altruism, is kind of puzzling for me because in his ethics, the one under interrogation for moral action is the human-I and not the other animal (not the nh animal). This is how I understand Levinas's ethics. Levinasian ethics is unilateral and non-reciprocal. In the language of animal ethics, we are not interrogating the moral action of the moral patient but the one who is the agent. We are not interrogating the nh animal's action toward other animals to test if he can transcend ego. What is Levinasian is the inverse: that if the human who is capable of ethics can transcend his own ego for the nh animal, then it means that it is the nh animal who provoked him. It demonstrates the presence of the otherness of the nh animal. It also demonstrates that the animal has a face (but it does also demonstrates the capacity of the human to be ethical toward the nh animal). And so this nh animal must be a face and an other (not that the human is a face (even if actually, she is also a face to other ego-subjects)). This should be the direction of reasoning.

As demonstrated in the earlier chapter on the question of meat, humans have alternatives to animal meat whereas many nh animals need to prey on other animals because they are basically carnivorous and that need should *not* be put under ethical questioning. But then, just to pursue Levinas's concern that the nh animal show a regard for others in order to be considered 'face' and 'other,' we have already addressed this issue earlier by Atterton's

³¹⁵ DAVY, B. J. An other face of ethics in Levinas. *Ethics and the Environment*, 2007, 12 (1),p. 43.

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 44; also in CLARK, D. On being the 'last Kantian in Nazi Germany': Dwelling with animals after Levinas. In: Ham, J., & Senior, M., eds., *Animal Acts: Configuring the human in Western history*. New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 181.

explanation that Darwin has observations that many species of animals demonstrate a regard for others and it begins with care for their young. We have also demonstrated this in the introduction that Levinas's Bobby, a stray dog who suffered war atrocities, is still capable of trusting humans again.

Calarco meets the question head-on: what contributions might Levinas make to debates in animal ethics? He says that Levinas is dogmatically anthropocentric and yet, his framework of ethics militates against the human (species's) ego, and thus, anthropocentrism.³¹⁷ He clarifies the appearance of an agnostic form of ethical consideration for all living beings that has no *a priori* nor boundaries. To challenge Levinas's anthropocentrism in saying that only humans are capable of a life of the ethical. Calarco says that reports of animals sacrificing their lives for others are legion. As aforementioned in the earlier chapter, Calarco also insists that more than any early anthropological thinker, it is Darwin who has dissolved the distinction between human and animal because the scientist has been a witness of ethical behavior in many animal communities. The proposal of Calarco is that upon Levinas's note that he does not know where the face begins and ends, then this is a suggestion to tend an open-ended approach, to leave the door open to welcome any species that may take on a face.³¹⁸ In short, Calarco proposes that Levinas's 'universal consideration' should not be dogmatically taken to mean an *a priori* rule that all life forms and forms of relations between beings count once and for all but simply to keep the status open, with respect to effective history.

But there is another way by which nh animals could be shown as being-other which need not necessitate the animal's capacity to have a regard for others: again, our agenda is to include as many animals as possible within the sphere of otherness. Davy states that Levinas did not develop an argument that excludes nh animals and others from ethics but his assumption is that only humans have faces.³¹⁹ She supports what I understood as the unilateral direction of ethics: that what is crucial for ethical relations is to be redefined within the Levinasian framework of the face as maieutics: the other having the capacity to teach and provoke one to

³¹⁷ CALARCO, Marc. Faced by animals. In: Peter ATTERTON and Mark CALARCO, eds. *Radicalizing Levinas*. Albany: Suny Press, 2010, p. 113.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

³¹⁹ DAVY, Barbara Jane. An other face of ethics in Levinas. *Ethics and the Environment*, vol. 12 (2007), nr. 1, p. 40.

ethics. She says that this interpretation may not be in accord with the historical Levinas but nonetheless remains faithful to the spirit of his work.

To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain. In its violent transitivity the very epiphany of the face is produced³²⁰ (Levinas, 1969, p. 51).

Following the trails of Davy in turning away from animal qualities toward experiences wherein the animal provokes ethics and that of Calarco in exploring new ways by which the animal shows face in the *a priori* sense, I would now like to give sketches of what the animal's face could mean in Levinas.

3.4 THE FACE OF THE NH ANIMAL IN LEVINAS

I would like to begin this part by proceeding from what had been mentioned earlier that the point of departure for a Levinasian animal ethics is to move away from a diddling on what is in the animal and to focus on the relational effect that the animal has in the human, that is, to move beyond the substantialist normative ethics that focuses on qualities toward a description of relational behavior in ethics. To do this well, I need to clear away the cobwebs about what Levinas means that the ethical response takes place in the *a priori* mode. What does it mean that face ethics takes place in an *a priori* moment that is before thought, language, and history? Surely what postmodern philosophy has taught is that consciousness is forever immersed in language and history and for some philosophies such as that of Adorno and Foucault, there is no such thing as an escape from the politics of culture and history.

When Levinas talks of ethics as *a priori*, he means it in two senses. The *first* is already mentioned, that the priority of philosophy should be ethics and not ontology. To philosophize is not just to seek truth and become knowledgeable about the world, since this is how

³²⁰ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 51.

philosophy had been commonly defined. To philosophize is to become responsible for the other. If what matters in philosophy is thinking the unthought, the region of the unthought is not the overcoming of beings toward Being, for what else could be thought about Being? It means the overcoming of that kind of discourse altogether, for what matters more than the mystical Being which is the other.

The *second* meaning of ethics as *a priori* unfolds in the origin of language and thought as primarily oriented toward otherness. For example, there is no such thing as a private language; to speak is to speak to someone other. Levinas understands language in a broader sense that goes beyond the conventional system of signs and symbols. It should be remembered that, historically speaking, before the system of grammar had been instituted, subjective beings are already in communication with each other. In Levinas, “Discourse founds signification. . . It is language that conditions thought-not language in its physical materiality, but language as an attitude of the same with regard to the Other irreducible to the representation of the Other.”³²¹ Levinas explains that language always bears a ‘saying’ and a ‘said.’ The ‘said’ refers to statements structured after conventional signification but it is always preceded by the ‘saying,’ the language of the ethical relation, that of ‘welcoming the other.’ This means that anything said to the other, to talk of such a thing as weather or politics, or even simply to greet the other, would already bear consciously or unconsciously, the intent of accountability, answering not only to but for the other.³²² In the same way that discourse conditions language, it also conditions thought. He writes:

Language thus conditions the functioning of rational thought: it gives it a commencement in being, a primary identity of signification in the face of him who speaks, that is, who presents himself by ceaselessly undoing the equivocation of his own image, his verbal signs. Language conditions thought-not language in its physical materiality but language as an attitude of the same with regard to the Other irreducible to the representation of the Other, irreducible to an intention of thought, irreducible to a consciousness of [. . .] since relating to what no consciousness can contain, relating to the infinity of the Other. Language is not enacted within consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and reverberates in consciousness by putting it in question.³²³

³²¹ Ibid., p. 204.

³²² LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1985, p. 88.

³²³ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969, 204.

The ‘conditioning’ of language that Levinas speaks of is that it thwarts the representations of the ‘I’ and, as he says, these representations are put into question by a more primordial interrogation. The interrogation is: not: what you want to say to the other; this is preceded by: what are you doing for the other? In this sense, the meaning of language is always preceded and inspired by an attitude of service.

Levinas says that the most primeval thought is not concept but the fourth commandment “Thou shalt not kill!” He insists that “the essence of discourse is ethical.”³²⁴ The search for objectivity summons one from the solitude of being and places her in the world of intersubjectivity. The drive to truth in reflection does not aim at mere intellection but is motivated by a responsibility for the other.

So, when Levinas speaks of the face as prior to language, thought, and history, it does not necessarily mean that the ethical could enact a hermeneutical clearing of all idealistic categories; it simply means that it invokes a reminiscence, whether intuitive or critical, that the origin of language and thought is ethical. When it does not enact this reminiscence, then the face is not seen, though the face is always there and available. Encountering the face does not mean that the face is removed from history or that its perception moves toward the region of the transcendental ego as in Husserl but that the face commands a transcendence toward a region wherein another order of symbols and relations are inspired by the fourth commandment. It is the face that commands and coordinates that that ethical constellation be assembled as a gesture of hospitality. The point is important because it is commonly asked in animal ethics why some animals have faces whose ethical claims could be listened to and some do not? The truth is that this is the case for humans also: why is it that some humans appear to have faces and others do not? The answer is that the face had been lost in totalistic ideologies sponsored by language and culture. The overcoming of these totalities is dependent upon the power of the nh animal’s face to breach it, the volatility of the structures, and the strength of the fiber of relationship between the human and the nh animal (which is always there).

³²⁴ Ibid., p. 216.

I would like to present certain scenes of this in the everyday world of our lives with nh animals. Let us say that I am walking along a dirt road and an anaconda suddenly crosses my path. The instinctive behavior toward a neighboring wild animal is immediately to move away from it. This is also the human reaction whenever a fly or a wasp buzzes around. The movement of ethics in Levinas is that it prods the 'I' to give space for the other. In the language of the wild animals, this is what is known as a respect for territorial space. Nh animals learn that there is peace within one's domain and that of others when each one's territorial space/s and that of others is/are not breached. It may be argued that this moving aside to let the animal pass is not the equivalent of the benevolent "Après vous, Monsieur," of Levinas, that places first the concerns of the other before one's own.³²⁵ The evasion is not imbued at all by the charitable motive of not hurting the reptile; on the contrary, the behavior is provoked by all what that animal means within the stereotypes of what culture, history, and knowledge has told us: that the anaconda attacks and kills; that wasps prick and cause swelling; and that flies are vectors of bacteria. We may as well say that in this case of social definitions, the face is not recognized at all for what it really is. But then, in the complexity of life in that everything is shaded, I insist that the ethical motive is present in as far as the otherness has been acknowledged.

The ethical response need not always take the form of the positive; otherwise, it is romanticized. The fear or even disgust of the animal is a negative form of cognizance of otherness: that the nh animal has affairs and preoccupations of his own. Disgust or fear imply what is strange to one's orientation, and so it is 'other.' The moving aside and giving space for the other to pass is already an accommodation of the other even if the gesture is motivated by disgust. When one gives to a beggar just to drive her away, even if done in the spirit of 'disrespect,' the very response of irritation means "I want to drive her away because she is foreign to my interest." The mere cognizance of this otherness is already the beginning of the ethical. This is why no one who evades a wild animal could be in denial of being in face of an other, that the nh animal other teaches one to keep distance so that he could do his own foreign affair, even if one's attitude toward him is diluted with fear or disgust.

³²⁵ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. Interview with François Poirié. In: Jill ROBBINS, ed. *Is it righteous to be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas*. California: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 47.

The contention that arises is: how could this be different from an inanimate calamity such as a tsunami, an avalanche, or a falling tree? To be sure, the destructiveness of natural calamities (it is amusing that in legal terms, this is termed as ‘acts of God,’ which implies supernal otherness) signify the otherness that is inherent in nature, but this is still different from the otherness of a wild animal. The difference lies in the conversation: the wild animal evades or wishes to attack *me*, he intends *me*. He is trying to give me signals and checks if I also intend to evade or attack him: this is the behavioral conversation. The tsunami, avalanche, and falling tree, when they strike me, it is *not* me they are after. They are similar to the freely-falling bodies of Galileo. A falling tree or tsunami does not specifically chase me as a response to the threat of my presence.

In Levinas, the basis of the ethical is the move away from the ego to accommodate the other, to testify by benevolence that the other is a higher value than oneself. The human evasion of the anaconda in order to respect his territory is already ethical. The ethical relation need not always be ‘sentimental.’ I would like to demonstrate this in the tit-for-tat giving of way in the traffic system.

In the scenario wherein the traffic system is not yet instituted and two cars meet at the fork of the road wherein they turn the same way, there is a question of who first should give in to the other. When Driver A gives way to Driver B, it establishes a tradition of traffic, a way of giving in to the other in the trust that Driver C (behind Driver A) reciprocates, otherwise, Driver D (behind Driver B) would be waiting for his turn forever. It may be questioned that this is not Levinasian at all, on the basis that charity for Levinas is not reciprocal. But the primary move is indeed charitable because if I am Driver A, I would wonder why I should to be the one to give way first to establish the tradition of giving way instead of Driver B, the other. Charity starts at home, as we say. It should be noted also that this initial trust is a risk and a reckless abandonment of self because there is no assurance that when I give way to Driver B, the drivers of the cars behind us would continue our initiative. It should also be noted that the establishment of such tradition would only be effective in as much as I would always be the first willing to give way. What makes it also a movement without return is that it is a transcendent ascent from a world of competition by the initiative of a new civilization of being the first one to give way.

To get back to the anaconda, it may be argued that the stepping back may simply be motivated by an egoistic need to save one's hide and not a charity to preserve the life of the anaconda; yet it is, in the sense that the initiative to steer clear anticipates a peaceful response from the anaconda, as in the example of the tit-for-tat driving. In addition, there is always a choice to kill the anaconda rather than to initiate a relationship of respecting territory. In case the anaconda crosses the line and sets out to attack me, the natural human reaction is to kill him. Levinas talks about this in the essential poverty of the face, that in its fragility, it is so easy to kill it, as if exposing itself for murder:

The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill.

Ph. N.: War stories tell us in fact that it is difficult to kill someone who looks straight at you.

. . .

E. L.: . . . The face is what one cannot kill, or at least it is that whose meaning consists in saying "thou shalt not kill." Murder, it is true, is a banal fact: one can kill the Other; the ethical exigency is not an ontological necessity. The prohibition against killing does not render murder impossible [. . .]³²⁶

The above suggests that there is a paradox in killing the other: one kills what one hopes to eliminate but the face is always there, saying 'it cannot be killed.' The irony about murdering the other is that it intends to eliminate the other and her otherness but by its very act reverses that intention and testifies to the overwhelming power of the ethical power that is so strong on the 'I' that it necessitates murder of the other to eliminate that power.

It is important to note that in the Levinasian framework, ethics is not hosted by the goodness in the I-self, but it is provoked by the other. In *Time and the Other*, Levinas describes a kind of a mythical history wherein the 'I' takes a place in the sun and lives in a paradise of nourishments. This enjoyment of the world of givens is what he calls *jouissance*.³²⁷ It is a moment of innocence. This innocence is destroyed when the other enters into the turf and

³²⁶ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1985, pp. 86-87.

³²⁷ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Time and the other*. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1987, p. 63.

calls to question the freedom of the 'I' to be: this is the beginning of ethics: "We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics."³²⁸

Before the other came, there is no ethical life; there is no need for it. It is not also fostered by the world of ideas such as a reflection of the universal principle that operates a kingdom of ends as in Kant or the *a posteriori* result of a good act that benefited the majority as in consequentialism. To be sure, virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, and consequentialism cannot function without first, the presence of the other. The difference of Levinasian ethics from the said frameworks is that virtue ethics is focused on the goodness of the giver and that both Kantian and consequentialist ethics are negotiated on rational principles. Levinasian ethics is not geared at perfecting the cultivation of virtuous excellences in the self nor at a rumination of principles which underscore duties, justice, and egalitarianism. The idea is that the ethics that passes through rumination asks questions like: do I have an obligation or not? If so, what is my obligation? And what are the obligations of others vis-à-vis mine? Levinasian ethics does not take this attitude. Levinasian ethics is primarily focused on addressing the needs of the other in a non-negotiable kind of demand (he describes it like a hold-up by a robber) and is experienced in a radical solitude (I am the one called to help, not another). Levinasian ethics is very much attuned to the suffering body of the other on which urgent succor is non-negotiable on principles or reasons; the attitude it takes is very much like that of a mother on her crying child.

To be sure, Levinas also talks about the third-party justice of institutions but he is adamant in saying that the rational principles by which they operate to distribute justice should be based upon the conversations of the face-to-face ethics. The 'big' goodness should always be informed by the 'little' goodness. This caution is exercised in view of the egoism and ideology present within the power of the popular vote and state-centered politics that wield totalitarian rule. In this sense, popular reason always bears the temptation of supporting the selfsame which oftentimes overlook the suffering of individuals. Levinas exemplifies this little goodness that is invincible in the character: of Ikonnikov in Grossman's *Life and Fate*:

³²⁸ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 43.

But in the decay of human relations, in that sociological misery, goodness persists. In the relation of one person to another person, goodness is possible. There is a long monologue in which Ikonnikov, the character which expresses the author's ideas, puts all social preachments in doubt. That is, all rational organization and plans. The impossibility of goodness as a government, as a social institution. Every attempt to organize the human fails. The only thing that remains vigorous in the goodness of everyday life. Ikonnikov calls it the little goodness

...

In what does the good consist? the good is not in nature, and it is not in the preachings of the prophets either, or in the great social doctrines, or in the ethics of the philosophers. But simple people bear in their hearts the love of all living thing; they love life naturally; they protect life . . . there exists side by side with this so terrible greater good human kindness in everyday life. It is the kindness of an old lady who gives a piece of bread to a convict along the roadside. It is the kindness of a soldier who holds his canteen out to a wounded enemy. The kindness of youth taking pity on old age, the kindness of a peasant who hides a Jew in his barn ³²⁹

The little goodness that Levinas speaks of takes up the battle of promoting otherness within the seemingly omnipresent power of ideological governments that promise the distribution of the 'bigger' goodness but by subjecting the people under the rule of sameness. The vision of Levinasian ethics is the flourishing of the other and otherness in its broadest sense of community: we learn to co-exist with the otherness(es) of the other(s) which is/are responsible for the novelty that characterizes life itself. To have life is to have infinite novelty. With the other, life can never be the same and in that sense, there is always life.

3.5 KEIKO'S FACE AND THE BREACH OF TOTALITY

Levinas has said that "The face is present in its refusal to be contained."³³⁰ The mark of subjectivity is not so much the presence of rational faculties that invite an analytics of the other's substantial qualities. The indicator of subjectivity in the face is a particular type of a relation, a relation of that resists the colonization of the I.

³²⁹ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard Cohen. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1985, pp. 107-108.

³³⁰ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press.

When I was a child, my father and I had a game wherein he would corner me, hold or grip my hand and that I would win that game if I manage to wrestle away from him. Since he is bigger and stronger than I was, this was precisely my challenge, but that my advantage is that, as a child, my body was agile, squiggly, and liquid, like that of a cat, able to squeeze out from any form of enclosure. Here, I define my method of proceeding. The task at hand is to prove that the nh animal could be a face and the indicators of this provocation of ethics is by showing what ego-sponsored systemic totalities have been breached by the embodiment of the nh animal. I would like to show this in the situation of Keiko. I intend to present in three accomplishments of Keiko's face of otherness: *one*, the overcoming of the media image; *two*, the economic sacrifice, and; *three*, the ethical testimony of an insider witness.

Levinas's face is grounded on a body that undergoes mortality and suffering but paradoxically, the gaze upon the face sees the invisible. The face is both the visible and the invisible. The gaze upon the face carries the demeanor of respect as in medieval monastic communities and in military decorum wherein a subject honors the presence of a superior by not looking straight into her face when addressing her. Levinas reiterates that when the face is looked upon and a mole is noticed, one does not see the face: "The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes"³³¹ because this demotes the relationship to that of a subject-object. The gaze is a gaze toward the invisible and the invisible is infinity; it acknowledges that the face has "a meaning all by itself."³³² It is really this factor wherein the animal fits more as face. It is not just the body language of the nh animal that transcends the human conventional language. A bear's paw tracks on the dirt road or the mere buzz of a bee in one's ear could already be considered as face of the animal. Since not all animals really have the common facial features such as eyes, ears, and nose, the mid-section of an anaconda (or even just the sound of the hiss) may also well serve fully as face.

³³¹ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1985, p. 85.

³³² *Ibid.*, p. 86.

3.4.1 Overcoming of the Media Image

The *first* idealistic totality breached by Keiko is the overcoming of media image and here, I would like to use Levinas's concept of 'pose' which also belongs to the face. Levinasian scholars who seek to apply Levinas's concept of face to animals dwell on the politics of moral subjectivity and language but they have not used Levinas's concept of the facial pose. Levinas describes the face as exposed, poor, without defense, as if inviting violence. In an effort to mask this poverty, the face puts on poses.³³³ It puts on poses because it is a defiance of its own poverty, wanting to pretend otherwise. The opposite of pose is stare: the stare is a spontaneous expression of poverty. It is the stare that provokes the ethical challenge. This is why it is frightening to meet the stares of people who are refugees of war and victims of violence; the same reason runs even for covering the faces of the convicted in the scenes of execution such as that of hanging and the electric chair. These stares are frightening because they provoke the ethical responsibility.

In the nh animal world, the pose is enacted in terms of the camouflage which is the command of *noli me tangere*, ordaining the respect of territorial space. There are animals, for example, who can camouflage, such as the mimic octopus, chameleon, golden tortoise beetle, flounders and the Pacific tree frog. They do this in order to hide from predators or to capture prey. Those nh animals who cannot camouflage use the colors of nature that are akin to the color of their bodies to hide themselves, i.e., squirrels, walking sticks, kangaroos, owls, and rabbits. Other animals such as tigers and leopards have black spots and stripes that hide them well in the shadows. The black and white stripes of zebras that appear as light and shadow to their color-blind predators are also strategies for concealment.

I would like to apply the meanings of pose and face in the context of the play of cinema, that of image (pose of cuteness) and reality (face of misery). The question here is: how did Keiko as a face of otherness smash his own iconic image (pose) as defined by capitalistic showbiz toward the realization of his real miserable condition? Again, our way of proceeding is not affirming that this realization is due to the rationality and virtuous charity of the human benefactor; the focus is the power of the nh animal to elicit ethics: how did Keiko breach his

³³³ Ibid.

incarceration from the totality of the human system of commodification of the nonhuman animal? How did Keiko's face and other prompt the human toward a cognition of the infinite otherness of the nonhuman species?

I would like to begin from the fact that Keiko is not just like any whale, he is extraordinarily talented in relating to the human. Again, this note does not mean to focus on substantial comparisons that the animal could somehow measure up to human intelligence but to prove that the animal relates – and resists the I, as marks of his otherness, and on that token, presses the ethical alarm.

The price of Keiko's trust for the human is his own incarceration as a performing marine circus animal; he also contributed to his own iconization. He was turned into an icon of stellar status by his participation in two systems. The *first* has to do with the psychological 'power of cute.' Incidentally, Keiko's species belong to that of the roster of the facially-cute animals such as the panda bears, koala bears, dogs, cats, etc. There is no filmmaker who would make a film about the life of a praying mantis or a centipede as a main character unless they tweak their faces into animated cute images. What makes a particular animal 'cute?' It is being a mirror of the baby human which invokes instincts of parenting. Marta Borgi & Irene Cogliatti-Dezza, et. al. demonstrated in their experiments Konrad Lorenz's idea of baby schema:

The term baby schema (Kindchenschema, Lorenz, 1943) refers to a set of facial features (i.e., large head and a round face, a high and protruding forehead, large eyes, and a small nose and mouth) commonly found both in human and animal infants. In classical ethology this specific configuration of features has been described as triggering an innate releasing mechanism for caregiving and affective orientation toward infants (Lorenz, 1943) and more recently, its role in promoting human nurturing behavior was demonstrated at the neurophysiologic level using neuroimaging [. . .]³³⁴

Their experiments noted eye-tracking and gaze allocation toward pictures that resembled babies and those that did not. The results showed that, indeed, there is attentional bias and attraction toward pictures that are cute.

³³⁴ BORGHI, Marta; Irene COGLIATI-DEZZA. Victoria BRELSFORD, et. al., Baby schema in human and animal faces induces cuteness perception and gaze allocation in children. [online]. *Frontiers in Psychology*, vol. 5 (2014) nr. 411, p. 1. [viewed date: 19 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00411/full>; also in LORENZ, Konrad. Die angeborenen Formen möglicher Erfahrung. *Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie*, vol 5 (1943), pp. 130-134.

The *second* way that Keiko participates in his own iconization comes from human culture. On the cultural plane, Anne Brydon notes that an appeal of the *Free Willy* movies (since there are 2 sequels to *Free Willy I*) is the modernist trope of the “search for home and family in the world saturated with migration.”³³⁵ For example, the theme of *Free Willy I* is a child struggling to find a sense of trust and acceptance within the troubled bonds of a nuclear family. Children have a fear of abandonment and their vulnerability in a hostile world but they learn a way of trust if the family could provide that for them. *Free Willy II* and *III*³³⁶ speak of the triumph of family bonds and friendship against the capitalistic agenda of aquarium owners, oil industrialists, and whalers. In a way that films are myths, the orca returning to his pod in the ocean wild is representative of the human narrative of a longing for home because the modern world is rife with alienations and exiles of all kinds.

But unlike the typical showbiz stars who have to extend the simulacrum to the real world to continue as it were, the dream image, Keiko works to dismantle his own iconization by affecting humans. Simmons opens his exposé about the true story behind Keiko’s release by the foreword of Robert Wyland, an American mural artist who painted marine animals and was among the pioneer spirits in the movement of releasing Keiko. The following is Wyland’s confessional narrative of how Keiko affected him:

As fate would have it, I had a chance to meet Keiko long after the fame of movie stardom had passed [. . .] You couldn’t imagine a worse place for an apex predator like a killer whale to live. At this time the young male orca was sixteen years old and quite large. His massive dorsal fin was bent like many other orcas in captivity and he was grossly underweight. Worst of all he was suffering from a terrible outbreak of papilloma virus on his face, dorsal fin and other parts of his skin. Keiko also had three unique beauty marks on his lower chin, making him distinctive to all other orcas. But with all that, there was still an impressive spirit about Keiko. He seemed to like everyone and was curious about those who he encountered. . .

I couldn’t help thinking, How the hell can I help get this amazing creature out of that cesspool? . . .

At the official dedication ceremony, I somehow ended up standing next to Phyllis Bell and once again told her that my goal was to help free Keiko from the small park in Mexico City. I even stated directly that it would be great to bring Keiko to the Oregon Coast Aquarium . . . She told me

³³⁵ BRYDON, Anne. The predicament of nature: Keiko the whale and the cultural politics of whaling in Iceland. *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 79 (2006) nr. 2, , p 240.

³³⁶ *Free Willy 2: The adventure home* [film]. Directed by Dwight LITTLE. U.S.A.: Warner Bros.,1995; *Free Willy 3: The Rescue*. [film]. Directed by Sam PILLSBURY. U.S.A.: Warner Bros, 1997.

I would have to talk to David Phillips from the Earth Island Institute, whom I called the next day. I was told that unless I donated one hundred thousand dollars to the Earth Island Institute, I would never get close to Keiko. David asked me what I contributed to Keiko that would require any further involvement with me. I explained, quite matter-of-factly, that I painted a million dollar mural to negotiate Keiko's release. . .

The next time I saw Keiko was many years later when I was visiting my older brother Steve in Portland. I decided to go incognito to the aquarium to see my old friend. As I approached, Keiko saw me and swam straight at me, pressing his eye against the glass wall of his tank. He seemed to remember me from years ago. He followed me up and down the glass, making sounds. After two hours, I decided to leave him, content in knowing that he seemed to be recovering nicely . . .

I followed the Keiko story, like many, wondering what would ever become of this amazing animal that had touched so many. Tens of millions of dollars poured in to help Keiko over the years. Kids were giving pennies, nickels, and quarters, anything they had to help free "Willy."³³⁷

The above citation is a narration of how Keiko shatters the pose, exposes the stare of vulnerability, and hoists the fourth commandment which, in Levinas, is the mark that ethics has taken place. But this ethics is not forged in the discourse of principles of equality, rights, and personhood of animals; it focuses directly on the animal's affective relation toward the human that entreat actions against her ego. The idea is that there are other ways of doing animal ethics such as this one. The move here is not to pit animal qualities against human standards of moral considerability nor to make humans the champions of virtue. Here, the animal makes humans stand back and make way for otherness; the host of ethics is the other.

It may be argued that in as much as Keiko's release had been covered by media, the orca has not really breached the politics of the simulacrum because it has made his life a Reality TV show. Perhaps, but still, the ego-systems are reversed on two counts: *one* is that the release of Keiko (supposedly) was intended for his total disappearance in showbiz. Stellar personalities continue to make a 'show' out of their real lives because their continued commodification feeds their showbiz career. This is not the case of Keiko. The success for Keiko's release is actually measured by the banishment of all kinds of media coverage on him, to make him disappear from humanity and become integrated completely in the ocean world.

³³⁷ SIMMONS, Mark. *Killing Keiko: The true story of Free Willy's return to the wild*. Florida: Callinectes Press, pp. ix-xii.

The *other* count is the question: why make an effort to return Keiko at all to Iceland? It is so far away. It may well have been a shorter, safer, and easier route for Keiko to have been released in Canadian waters. Why Iceland? My hunch is that it is poetic of the sincerity and the intensity of the human repentance to reverse ego. In kindergarten school, we have been taught as children that we should return things to where we exactly got them. The return to Iceland is the perfect symbolic gesture of the human collective ego wanting to reverse its evildoing. It is something akin to the symbolical reversals in Nuremberg: the same city which gave birth to the Nazi party and promulgated the anti-Semitic and racist laws is the same city which held the 1945 trials against the Nazi and war criminals of World War II.

3.4.2 The Human Economic Sacrifice for the Nh Animal Face

The *second* system of totality that Keiko has breached is that of the economic sacrifice for his cause. There are two forms of this economic sacrifice.

The *first* form belongs to labor and money. It is necessary to give a background on how Levinas sees the meaning of labor. In Levinas, labor is seen as a movement of totality in two ways. *One*, to work is to have the means to acquire and accumulate possessions so that one could remain home comfortably for as long as possible. Labor is generally centripetal in movement, a going out in the world in order to come back to the domicile and stoke the hearth “Despite the infinite extension of needs it makes possible economic existence remains within the same (just as animal existence). Its movement is centripetal.”³³⁸ This is well demonstrated, for example, in the houses of the rich which include maids’ quarters, spas, gyms, salons, ballrooms, swimming pools, large storerooms so that for everything that is needed, one does not have to go outside. “Labor remains economic; it comes from the home and returns to it, an Odyssey where the adventure pursued in the world is but the accident of a return.”³³⁹ *Two*, labor is seen as a totality in the function of the modern corporation, as Marx has criticized, the

³³⁸ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press., 1969, p. 175.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 176-177.

modern corporation yields by capitalism which takes the services and products of the laborers and alienates them from their work as an expression of themselves. Levinas says:

Works have a destiny independent of the independent of the I, are integrated in an ensemble of works: they can be exchanged, that is, be maintained in the anonymity of money. Integration in an economic world does not commit the interiority from which the works proceed . . . The State which realizes its essence in works slips toward tyranny and thus attests my absence from those works, which across the economic necessities return to me as alien.³⁴⁰

In Marxist critique, since labor and its products have been detached from the creator, the laborer is depersonalized and devalued before the products that are her creation. She disappears in a world of the ‘what’ that has swiped out and forgotten the ‘who’ or the face. This is why in the world of money and capitalism, the humanity of the person disappears behind her titles. “We ask “Who is Mr. X? and we answer: He is the President of the State Council,” or “He is Mr. So-and-so.””³⁴¹ But Levinas insists that the face remains at the heart of labor because the “question that asks about the quiddity is put to someone. He who is to respond has long already presented himself” and this who is not a being to whom whatness corresponds to because the face precedes whatness.³⁴² To ask ‘what’ is to presuppose there is a ‘who’ who will respond to the question; it is in this sense that the ‘who’ is prior to the what.

Keiko as the ‘who’ of the face breaches the totality of economy with the cost of his release which exceeds the whatness of the reasonable from the objective point of view. The worldwide campaign to free Keiko amounted to 20\$ M. Some of the donors and their donations are enlisted in the following media reports:

- Anonymous donors (2\$ M)

- Children (1.2 individuals) from all over the world who wrote letters, made phone calls and donated pennies and dollars; 30,000\$ came solely from Tamper Florida Elementary School)

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 175.

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 177.

³⁴² Ibid.

- Craig McCaw, telecommunications billionaire (2\$ M)
- Familian Industrial Plastics donated and flew the materials to Iceland to construct Keiko's baypen
- Humane Society of the United States (1\$ M)
- Jimmy Buffet (500\$)
- Robert Wyland, American artist
- United Parcel Service (1.3\$ M)
- Warner Brothers (4\$ M)

Among the significant items in his expense list are the following:

- 7.3\$ M for the building of the Oregon Coast Aquarium for rehabilitation
- 1.3\$ M move to Iceland, C-17 Jet of United Parcel Service with fiberglass tank which transported Keiko to Newport and then to Iceland
- Salaries of 16 foreigners and 13 local workers who will implement the reintroduction to the wild
- Familian Industrial Plastics donated and flew the materials to Iceland to construct Keiko's baypen in Iceland (See webpages of Outside Magazine, Jean Michel Cousteau's Ocean Futures Society, and Keiko: The Untold Story at the end for the above data)
- Training boats to usher Keiko to the open seas ³⁴³

The above is the economic sacrifice all splurged on a single whale that would have gone to self-pleasures and human-oriented causes. The joke that Keiko's meat should have been sold and the proceeds given to feed the starving children of Africa speaks well of the

³⁴³ SINGER, Natasha. Jonah is the whale: Inside the 20\$ million campaign to free Keiko. [online]. *Outside Magazine*. 1 Aug 2001 [viewed 20 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.outsideonline.com/adventure-travel/destinations/europe/jonah-whale-inside-20-million-campaign-free-keiko/>; also in JEAN MICHEL OCEAN FUTURES SOCIETY.[online]. *Keiko's timeline*. [viewed 20 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.oceanfutures.org/action/marine-mammals/keiko/>; also in *Keiko: The untold story of the Star of Free Willy*. [documentary film]. Directed by Theresa DEMAREST, USA: Joshua Records LLC, 2010.

anthropocentric attitude of the human species; to splurge that amount on humans is rational, but for a single whale, it is irrational. And to think at that time, his species was not even endangered. It is crazy, most especially to the Icelanders who view the whale mainly as food. Some of the jokes include turning Keiko into 16,000 meatballs.³⁴⁴ Iceland's top chef Siggí Hall has been noted for the following quip:

This isn't a killer whale, it's a pet mammal. We could get better use of him on the dinner table! Do you know how many whale steaks I could get out of him? But Keiko's so old, he'd be hard to cook and tough to eat. . . We could boil his blubber down. Imagine how many soap bars and Keiko candles we could make out of him!"³⁴⁵

Simmons, who participated in the Keiko Release Project, had the chance to meet the local Islander folk reported:

Most fishermen on Heimaey had no concept of what the Keiko Release Project was about. There are an estimated 5,000 killer whales in the waters surrounding Iceland. To them, killer whales were a nuisance that interfered with fishing and competed for their resources. They often scoffed or laughed at us whenever we were fortunate enough to find ourselves in the same restaurant or bar the night a fishing vessel would return from weeks at sea. On many occasions the happenstance fisherman would take great joy in telling us that Keiko was no more than dog food and that we silly Americans were wasting money.³⁴⁶

The above demonstrates the *second* form of economic sacrifice that Keiko commands: that of redirecting the politics and economics of whaling toward the ecological concern for whales. The point here is that the rescue of a single whale raised the issue of whaling in general, if it is at all, ethical, even if it is a source of livelihood. It interrogates the economic business of whaling as an ethical source of livelihood on an international scale.

I would like to discuss the above by touching on embodiment. Keiko was captured in Iceland, performed in Mexico, but died in Norway. The question here is: whose whale is it? The very free-roam mobility of the whale to cross national territories speaks of its diplomatic immunity.

³⁴⁴ BRYDON, Anne. The predicament of nature: Keiko the whale and the cultural politics of whaling in Iceland. *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 79 (2006) nr. 2, p. 238.

³⁴⁵ SINGER, Natasha. Jonah is the whale: Inside the 20\$ million campaign to free Keiko. [online]. *Outside Magazine*. 1 Aug 2001 [viewed 20 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.outsideonline.com/adventure-travel/destinations/europe/jonah-whale-inside-20-million-campaign-free-keiko/>;

³⁴⁶ SIMMONS, M. *Killing Keiko: The true story of Free Willy's return to the wild*. Florida: Callinectes Press, p. 78.

Whales (like the issue of climate justice) interrogate the very notion of national territory. But their erratic migration stirs up competition for their catch. For example, one country may catch too many whales, leaving other seafaring countries without whales to catch. This sparks up the race of countries outdoing each other on who gets the bigger catch more quickly, effectuating an extinction of whales

The International Whaling Commission (IWC) was set up in December of 1945 under the auspices of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. The IWC addresses the politics of the whaling industry. Gillespie enlists that among the debates between countries are: transgressions of quotas in whaling, the question of humane killing methods, the marking of protected areas and those where whaling could be done, aboriginal subsistence whaling for indigenous peoples, ocean surveillance, etc.

This mad war on which country gets the more whales point out an aspect paramount to the uncontainable nature of the animal and the ideology of national territory. Whales are not like pandas and koalas which are endemic species that are territory-bound. Whales are free-roam animals that swim and migrate across oceanic borders. They abound in the Arctic oceans encircled by Russia, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, Canada, and the United States, countries that are big on whaling. Dr. Sidney Holt of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) could not have expressed this question more eloquently in the 1960s convention of the IWC:

Do they in effect belong to no-one or do they belong to everyone? Do they in effect belong to this generation or to future generations? Do they in effect belong to those who exploit them or to all the nations who in some way, however small and indirectly, depend on products from the sea for the nourishment of their own people?"³⁴⁷

It is a wonder why in all that apathy and mockery of Icelanders on the Keiko case against American sentimentalism and the way Iceland was put on a hot seat about its whaling policies and treatment of whales, their government still accepted the entry of Keiko.

The analyses of Brydon shows how satire helps in the therapeutic processing about uncomfortable issues. She profiles the Icelandic ambivalence about Keiko's plight that

³⁴⁷ GILLESPIE, A. *Whaling Diplomacy: Defining Issues in International Environmental Law*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2005, p. 179.

“required cultural creativity to block identification with the whale since in Icelandic hegemonic discourse such feelings have been associated with the supposed irrationality of foreign protests against whale hunting.”³⁴⁸ Brydon believes that what prevented “the face-to-face encounter with Keiko as Other” are these modernist discourses, which are forms of Levinas’s poses of the face. The human face could also make poses in its unease in confronting the miserable plight of the face of the non-human animal. Indeed, culture could either raise moral sensitivity toward animals but it may well also work to numb it.

The tropes below that Brydon discusses serve as straw arguments in the refusal to confront the face of Keiko. They are straw arguments in the sense that they serve as the bogus arguments that substitute for the real arguments that they cannot confront. These are some of those tropes Brydon mentions:

- **The trope of the return home.** Icelanders understand the concept of home in a quite different way than Americans who sentimentalize on family and home. They express it in a kind of tension between desire and fear. For Icelanders, while home is the warmth of the hearth, many young Icelanders since 1960s sought greener pastures abroad because they feel that their small country with a harsh climate is ‘confining’ to their careers and lives.³⁴⁹ Brydon reports that this is why they do not romanticize the homecoming of Keiko and that their satirical remarks about Keiko’s voyage home misses out on the point on the dark story of his capture in Iceland.

- **The trope of the relations between human and non-human.** Icelanders satirize in print media any display of intimate feelings for whales because they are Iceland’s most precious commodity. Brydon says that “Defining whales as economic resources is not the maintenance but rather the creation of a politicized cultural value that strives to purify economic logic of the morality of killing.”³⁵⁰ For example, she cites an article that came out in *Dagur* on April 29, 1998 meant to criticize Iceland’s prime minister David Oddson for

³⁴⁸ BRYDON, Anne. The predicament of nature; Keiko and the cultural politics of whaling in Iceland, *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 79 (2006) nr. 2, 2006, pp. 225.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

accepting Keiko and interpreted it as a signal that whaling will not be resumed. It is said there:

Halldor Runolfsson's comments about the killer whale Keiko have now become infamous, but in Morgunbladid the other day he was quoted as saying that Keiko was without a doubt a "thinking animal." The Chief Veterinary Officer reached this conclusion after having looked deeply into Keiko's eyes.... The Chief Veterinary Officer looks into Keiko's eyes as part of official business, but he was supposed to be examining the health of the animal at the behest of the government, especially Davia Oddsson who has been an enthusiastic proponent of Keiko's move home . . . Those who are the most excited about the resumption of minke whaling must then ask the Chief Veterinary Officer to go and look into the eyes of a few minke and hope that, unlike in the case of killer whales, the doctor won't state that they are 'thinking beings.'³⁵¹

In an article that came out in Morgunbladid on April 19, 1998, there was an article about a man who cared for a killer whale and eventually moved to a marineland in France. This man was satirized in some poetic lines written by Adalheidur Geirsdottir:

“Elias visited her at least twice a day and each time stayed a good while. He also visited her at night. Many of the fishermen in this place had really had enough of this friendship and at a porrablot that year Adalheidur Geirsdottir composed these lines: "Elli and Johanna went into the beautiful sea and he promised her undying love, she cried out with happiness: I give you my hand. Cried Elli then: I will never leave the water without you!”³⁵²

· **The trope of alienation and spectacle.** Icelanders welcomed Keiko on the satirical remark that his presence would boost the national tourism industry. Brydon mentions the Icelandic attitude of *verbud*, which literally refers to fishermen's huts that historically line the seashore. It means the attitude of making profit with no long-term commitment.³⁵³ But the irony of the situation, as Brydon points out, is that the presence of Keiko did not boost the tourism industry, as what had been anticipated, given the reception of the Free Willy film. On the basis that the vision of the Free Keiko Project had been to readapt Keiko to the wild, the orca had really been protected from human contact and thus, cannot be a tourist commodity, but he was allowed to meet visiting heads of state, celebrities and fashion models.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid., p. 244.

³⁵³ Ibid., p. 245.

In conclusion, Brydon states that these modernist discourses discouraged the real issue of the whale question from surfacing among the Icelanders, one which they would not rather confront. She says, “I argue that they express a hesitant broaching of a hitherto denied relationship—an actual, mutual social relation between human and non-human sentient nature—one that Icelanders, like the rest of us, will need to debate whether and how far to pursue.”³⁵⁴

3.4.3 The Ethical Testimony of an Insider Witness

The *third* totality that Keiko breaches has to do with the ethical testimony of an insider witness who risks his comfort, reputation, and career as an animal behaviorist to expose the anomalies behind the Keiko Release Project which destabilizes the iconic pose that the press releases of Ocean Futures have created to lie that the experiment of Keiko was a success. I am referring to Mark Simmons, who wrote the book *Killing Keiko: The True Story of Free Willy's Return to the Wild* published in 2014.

I would like to usher this part of the discussion with some remarks from Levinas's philosophy of testimony. Starting out from the principle that “the access to the face is the access to the idea of God,”³⁵⁵ it is tantamount to saying that bearing witness to the face is bearing witness to the glory of God: “It is through the testimony that the very glory of the Infinite glorifies itself.”³⁵⁶

Hanoch Ben Pazi employs as foil Sontag's idea of photography as witnessing in order to explain Levinas's idea of ethical testimony. The modern technology of pictures allows a person to become witness to things, places, and events, as a detached spectator. He says:

Consider, for example “nature photographs, in which man stands on the other side of the camera, protected by technology, and, in a certain sense, conquers nature by acquiring and retaining its image. It is an appropriation of nature, yet one that is not achieved by venturing forth into the wild but rather by placing it in a guarded box that is kept at home—a collection of pictures that others

³⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 247.

³⁵⁵ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and infinity*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1985, p. 92.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 107.

photographed that document the phenomena of nature. It is a form of bearing witness that is silent and does not take risks.³⁵⁷

Pazi focuses on the defining moment when the witness is “tempted to witness,” as this is the moment in which the witness is willing to expose the truth, and for that reason, must bear responsibility to what she says.³⁵⁸ In a sense, Pazi says, an outside observer becomes privy to the event herself; she shares the dark secret. She enters into the interior zone of the crime but does not remain within the safe zone of subjectivity; she speaks for the victim and externalizes the victim’s face. Levinas says:

Inwardness is not a secret place somewhere in me; it is that reverting in which the eminently exterior, precisely in virtue of this eminent exteriority, this possibility of being contained and consequently entering into a theme, forms, as infinity, an exception to essence, concerns me and circumscribes me and orders me by my own voice. The command is stated by the mouth of him who commands. The infinitely exterior becomes an “inward” voice, but a voice bearing witness to the fission of the inward secrecy that makes signs to another, signs for this very giving of sign. ³⁵⁹

Levinas says that this ethical witnessing to truth is the reversal of the Ring of Gyges: “It breaks the ring of Gyges, the subject that sees without being seen, without exposing himself, the secret of the inward subject.”³⁶⁰

I would also like to inject here, as example, the testimonial videos that show cruelty to animals posted ubiquitously in Facebook and the ones that are circulated by the PETA (People’s Ethical Treatment of Animals). The common criticism against this practice is: why is it that the spectator who is holding the camera would not run to the rescue of the victim, instead of taking the video? The common reason, of course, is that once the witness drops the camera and arrests the violence of the event (which will tend to be repeated), then there is no evidence of the crime. In a sense, the witness is both a culprit and martyr; she shares the crime by perpetrating it, but in her endurance of the bloody scene and the event of exposing it, she becomes a martyr because she risks her hide. She does not know the course of events that

³⁵⁷ PAZI, Hanoch Ben. Ethical dwelling and the glory of bearing witness. *Levinas Studies*, vol. 10 (2016), pp. 227.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

³⁵⁹ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*. Dordrecht. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, p. 147.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

follow in her decision to testify, if she goes to court, if people will believe her, and if the testimonial stories will not be inverted against her. In a way, the sincerity of the witness is demonstrated by the whole barrage of scandals and dangers that she brings on, not only to herself but to the alleged and to everyone involved, whether with malice or not. Levinas writes:

The subjectivity of the subject is persecution and martyrdom. It is a recurrence which is not self-consciousness, in which the subject would still be maintained distant from itself in non-indifference, would still remain somehow in itself and be able to veil its face. This recurrence is not self-coinciding, rest, sleep or materiality. It is a recurrence on this side of oneself, prior to indifference to itself. It is substitution for another.³⁶¹

Levinas has a philosophy of incarnation and he ascribes to it the term ‘substitution.’ The way the witness becomes a martyr is by sharing persecution of the victim by offering herself in answering for the truth of what happened to the victim. In this sense, the statement she bears is irreducible to representation, it is not a said, but a saying of “Here I am,” as it were, inviting violence by her own exposure as a witness, “Strike me if I am not saying the truth.”

“Here I am” as a witness of the Infinite, but a witness that does not thematize what it bears witness of and whose truth is not the truth of representation, is not evidence. There is witness, a unique structure, an exception to the rule of being, irreducible to representation, only of the Infinite. The infinite does not appear to him that bears witness to it. On the contrary, the witness belongs to the glory of the Infinite. It is by the voice of the witness that the glory of the Infinite is glorified.³⁶²

Levinas is Jewish but I am speculating that he has affinities with Catholicism and the persona of Christ because his family was saved by Catholic nuns during the holocaust. Mark Purcell, for example, juxtaposes in an inverse comparison Levinas’s ontology of eating which destroys the non-human animal other, assimilating him into sameness and the body of Christ in the sacramental Eucharist as an expense of his body for the spiritual nourishment of all. The persona of Christ in Catholic theology would be Levinas’s exemplar of the ethical witness as substitution.³⁶³ The testimony is not only the glory of the resurrection, but the divine demand that the only

³⁶¹ Ibid., p. 146.

³⁶² LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Dordrecht. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, p. 146.

³⁶³ PURCELL, Michael. An agape of eating: The Eucharist as substitution (Levinas). *Bijdragen*, vol. 57 (2013), pp. 318.

process to obtain this afterlife is by undergoing a terrible death. The Son witnesses to the reality of the Father not only by preaching and living the ethical life but by dying a horrible death. The best evidence of God's reality would not (only) be miracles of healing the sick nor turning water into wine but most paramount, is by resurrecting (not only the dead but) oneself from the dead. This is horrifically dramatized in a 'thousand deaths' through the crucifixion, as it were, a murder by 1,000 times, but the reversal is even more elevated and perfected by the prediction of the very victim that he would resurrect after three days.

Going back to Keiko's case and Simmons who is the witness on focus, the idea here is not to turn Simmons into a Christ or a martyr because for me, his character is questionable on some counts. When he joined the team implementing the Free Keiko Project, he may be "after capitalistic gains," that is, that Ocean Futures may employ a new company he is trying to establish that offers services of animal training and rescue. The following shows how he and his close colleague, Robin, got involved into the Keiko Release Project. He writes:

After leaving SeaWorld and finishing my business degree, Robin and I formed a professional partnership, creating a zoological consulting business. We both tend toward altruistic ideals and are passionate about our trade. As a by-product, our business objectives were equally benevolent and far-reaching. Our goal was to cross traditional boundary lines with our new organization and in so doing, to share a considerable arsenal of knowledge and experience to the betterment of animals and wildlife management. We were both blessed to have graduated from SeaWorld, the "Harvard" of the marine mammal zoological world, and we intended to spread this wealth of knowledge. Our focus was not solely public display facilities; we would seek out any case where the care of marine mammals was deficient and, of course, where the proprietor or government agency was accepting of outside help. That last criteria proved to be the toughest. Even so, there were enough projects to keep our small organization busy throughout the beginning of 1999. Much of our time was spent networking, which ultimately gave rise to our contact with the Keiko Release Project.³⁶⁴

But I could be wrong because Simmons declares that in joining the team, he says, that what they were venturing into were composed of experts whose ideals and practices run contrary to theirs:

Robin was requested to visit the Keiko release operations in Iceland and explore the possibility of working on the project. I remember immediately thinking, He's freaking crazy. Within the

³⁶⁴ SIMMONS, Mark. *Killing Keiko: The true story of Free Willy's return to the wild*. Florida: Callinectes Press, 2014, p. 30.

professional zoological world, the Keiko project was highly controversial, and there was no doubt in my mind, our involvement would be a risk to our professional futures.³⁶⁵

My other issue is that when Simmons (and Robin) were finally laid off from the project in 2002 because of clashes with the administration and the depletion of funds for Keiko, Simmons published his full exposé of the event in 2014. The project of monitoring Keiko ended in August of 2002. Keiko died in 2003. What happened in between? In the book, he mentions having monitored what happened to Keiko after he left Iceland but why is he coming out with his exposé only in recent years?³⁶⁶ He says in his book:

This story, the story of Keiko's reintroduction to the wild, has been in my head, plaguing me constantly, for the last decade. I began writing the manuscript late in 2000, immediately following my departure from the project. Since then, I have attacked this book many times over the years with elaborate choreographed assaults. My attempts have resulted in various author-like voices, none of which was true to me or Keiko and those who sacrificed much for the love of a whale. Finally, my wife, Alyssa, who lived this experience and adventure with me directed me to write the book as if I was documenting Keiko's story for my daughters. This voice, told to open hearts and minds, was much more natural for me. I hope it is for you, the reader, as well.³⁶⁷

The fact is that Simmons may have outwardly spoken before the media and the public after his involvement with the project to reveal his story but the only one I found is a lecture which had been posted in 2015 in Youtube.³⁶⁸ My point here is that I do not know if Simmons had attempts of an earlier exposé because it would have generated more attention when the Keiko controversy was still hot, a possible outpour of new funds for Keiko with a reemployment of another set of experts to rework on the project (possibly even him and Robin on the lead) so that Keiko may have been saved from an early death.

There are two significant revelations of Simmons (among the many) that I would like to mention here. The *first* is that the head of the team of the Free Keiko Project was Dr. Lanny Cornell who, for Simmons, was the worst kind of person that one would put in an extremely

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ MARK SIMMONS TALKING ABOUT KILLING KEIKO AT SHARK CON [online]. *Youtube*. 16 July 2016 [viewed 20 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdnwQaGerBU>

³⁶⁷ SIMMONS, Mark. *Killing Keiko: The true story of Free Willy's return to the wild*. Florida: Callinectes Press, 2014, p. xv.

³⁶⁸ MARK SIMMONS TALKING ABOUT KILLING KEIKO AT SHARK CON [online]. *Youtube*. 16 July 2016 [viewed 20 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdnwQaGerBU>

perilous mission of putting a whale back into the wild after 20 years of living in an urbanized environment wherein the only relationship he had known had been that with humans. The following was Simmons's revelation (from the grapevine) about Cornell's alleged medical malpractice in the past:

In the folklore of SeaWorld, his alma mater and the setting of his ascension to notoriety as a vet, one such story exemplified Lanny's predilection, some would say, of self-preservation over any ethical responsibility toward animal welfare. Following an animal death in the park, the veterinary team reporting to Lanny completed a necropsy investigation on the animal's carcass, required by law and intended to identify the cause of death. In the gross morphology, nothing overt was found. The next phase of the investigation focused on pathology, microbiology and other microscopic means to identify the unseen culprit. Lacking visible evidence, the final analysis would likely point to something bacteriological or viral that had been in the environment.

Lanny joined the investigation only after the veterinary staff completed a thorough dissection. Saying nothing, he reached into the midsection of the carcass and felt around the animal's adrenal gland. A few moments later he pulled a rifle bullet from the body. Then and there he declared the cause of death an abscess infection resulting from a fisherman's vengeance suffered long before the animal belonged to SeaWorld. The vet staff was stunned. Driven by the moral responsibility of their chosen profession first and secondly by fear of Lanny's hatred for incompetence, they had combed through the corpse in painstaking detail. Yet in the hours they spent searching, nothing of the sort was discovered. Sharing a common thread among the tales that have coursed through the inner circle regarding Lanny's fabled past, the convenient discovery effectively averted any personal responsibility for the animal's death.³⁶⁹ (Simmons, 2014, p. 113).

Simmons claims that Cornell is a veterinarian of hard-knock zoological science and knew nothing of the behavioral approach, which he represents, and which he claims as the best approach in handling Keiko. He says:

Much like the flatbed trailer scene in *Free Willy*, in which Willy was backed into the sea from a boat ramp, the leadership of the FWKF believed Keiko's release was primarily logistics, just getting him to Icelandic waters. Dr. Cornell had formerly been SeaWorld's head veterinarian in the 1970s and '80s; the only individual early in the project with any killer whale zoological experience worth noting. Lanny, however, was a veterinarian. While trained and studied in marine mammal medicine, he knew very little about shaping behavior. It was a classic case of Maslow's hammer: "If all you have is a hammer, then everything is a nail." Our experiences with Lanny in the past attested to his approach: behavior was treated with drugs, not conditioning, and behavioral science was fool's play.

³⁶⁹ SIMMONS, Mark. *Killing Keiko: The true story of Free Willy's return to the wild*. Florida: Callinectes Press, p. 117.

In fact, the project's staff at that time referred to much of Lanny's direction as "voodoo science." To say Lanny is well known for his loathing of animal trainers would be an understatement. In his previous career at the helm of SeaWorld veterinary care, he was also known as a bit of a bully. Sadly, there had been no shortage of stories recounting his notorious intimidation tactics.³⁷⁰

To give an example of what an ignoramus Cornell was, Simmons lays down Cornell's plan for Keiko's rehabilitation:

According to the staff, Dr. Cornell's masterminded release plan was a four-part venture (once Keiko was relocated to Iceland). The plan went something like this:

1. Physically acclimate Keiko to the seawater in Klettsvik Bay via the bay pen by exposure.
2. Stabilize Keiko's health (i.e., get him off any remaining special medications).
3. Fatten him up so that he has excess blubber to sustain him during the learning curve (whereby he spontaneously learns to hunt and forage on his own when hungry enough).
4. Literally fly Keiko out to sea in a sling suspended from a helicopter and drop him with wild whales.

The plan was heavily based on logistics with little beyond medical preparation relating to Keiko himself. Even the most inexperienced of the frontline staff knew this plan was a death sentence. They affectionately called this the "AMF Release Plan," short for "Adios, Mother F—ker"³⁷¹

Simmons compares the above with the basic requirements of researchers of the U.S. Navy in 1993 that served as the strict standard for the release of cetaceans back to the wild. These requirements had become the standard for evaluating release candidates. Represented here in their most simple form, the criteria were comprised of nine prerequisites that Keiko would have to meet prior to being considered viable for release (in this case, Keiko) to the wild:

1. Health: He had to be in good health. Keiko could not be reliant on any medication or veterinary assistance . . .
2. Physical Conditioning: He had to be in good shape (i.e., not injured or overly fat or thin) and able to travel great distances when necessary. Keiko had to be the equivalent of an ultramarathoner or long-distance trailblazer . . .

³⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 39.

³⁷¹ Ibid. p. 55.

3. Foraging Capability: Perhaps the most talked about in the general public forum, Keiko would have to eat live fish. It would not be enough to show us that he would or could eat live fish in a controlled setting. He would need to demonstrate the ability to find and catch his own food. . .

4. Normal Aversion to Man-made Equipment and Material: Keiko would need to be taught to stay away from man. That meant not approaching boats, docks, harbors or anything that constituted human activity in the ocean. . .

5. Avoidance of Humans and Human Contact: Keiko would need to forget his lifelong relationship with humans. He would have to replace his human relationships and prefer the kinship of his own kind. . .

6. Lack of Sensitivity to Monitoring Equipment: . . . Keiko would have to learn to accept a tracking device attached to his body. . .

7. No Behavioral Response to Acoustic or Visual Conditioned Stimuli: Keiko would have to forget everything he was ever taught by his trainers. . .

8. Normal Physical Capabilities: Keiko would need to demonstrate normal hearing, eyesight and sonar capabilities as well as normal immune response. He would have to show us the ability to dive deep and react to hunting or foraging opportunities. This criterion required that Keiko had no permanent disabilities and that all his natural abilities were intact. . .

9. Social Experience with Conspecifics: This element was the capstone of them all. Keiko needed to be with conspecifics, otherwise referred to as “his kind” [. . .]³⁷²

It was not only Lanny Cornell that was in question. For Simmons, there were many other members of the staff whose expertise were in question. For example:

[. . .] the primary individuals who attended to his needs, and whom I met on that first rotation, were Stephen, Karen McRea and Steve Sinelli. I was shocked to learn that none of the three had ever worked with a killer whale before Keiko. Worse yet, none had any professional experience in animal behavioral sciences.³⁷³

The *second* significant revelation of Simmons that I would place here is the lie that Keiko rehabilitated nicely in the wild by joining the pod of orcas and by being in good health. I would like to juxtapose his reports with what appeared in the press releases of Earth Island. This is one of them:

³⁷² Ibid., p. 54.

³⁷³ Ibid., p. 37.

September 10, 1999 marked the first anniversary of Keiko's arrival in the cold waters of Iceland's Westman Islands. With each passing day, Keiko is behaving more like a wild orca. He has adapted well to the local tides, winds, storms, and the environment. Keiko is eating nearly half of his daily feed as live fish. The other half is thrown into the water. (To discourage Keiko from associating humans with food, he is no longer fed by hand.) Keiko is chasing birds that land in his bay pen and spending much of his time underwater. Blood tests show that Keiko is free of pathogens. Most orcas develop higher levels of pathogens in captivity Iceland's clear, cold waters seem to have been the best medicine for all of Keiko's medical problems. Wild orcas have been seen within one- to-two miles of Keiko's bay pen.³⁷⁴

Simmons reports that Keiko had been fed fish by the HDS (Herring Delivery System), a kind of a big slingshot anchored on Keiko's accompanying boat that released a barrage of herring into the air and Keiko would feed on them. It imitates most closely, the demeanor of fish in the wild when they would jump into the air. The idea is to detach the feeding of fish from human hands so that Keiko would unlearn that fish come from humans.³⁷⁵ The following is Simmons's denial that Keiko had learned the wild way of foraging. He says:

Based on everything I had seen and knew of Keiko, his disposition, the trials we ran, and stories abundantly offered by the original staff, I knew the prospect that Keiko had hunted down and devoured live fish was highly exaggerated and done so to satisfy donors (or as likely to dispel detractors). It's one thing to eat a disoriented and lethargic fish and entirely another to chase down a dinner that has its own ideas on survival. The distinction of how live the live fish actually were was never expounded on in the public arena. ³⁷⁶

In his book, Simmons tirelessly repeated that Keiko was mishandled because the staff cannot get over with their sentimental affections for Keiko, overfeeding him, which made him lethargic and unprepared in his exercises of long swimming out to the open sea.

In large part, the driving force behind Keiko's lethargy was not only poor training, it was compounded by diet. Because Dr. Cornell had mandated that a top priority for Keiko's release was to fatten him up, Keiko was completely satiated with food. Keiko simply didn't care whether food was offered or not. The only motivation to interact with his trainers was the stimulation they provided, and the break it offered him from an otherwise monotonous day, void of social contact with other whales, stimulating mental challenges or any other form of variability aside from changes in weather or current. Occasionally, when Keiko would not even care to come over, the

³⁷⁴ BERMAN, Mark. Keiko Moves to Wider Waters. [online]. *Earth Island Journal*, vol. 15 (2000) nr. 1, p. 8. [viewed 20 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43857833>

³⁷⁵ SIMMONS, Mark. *Killing Keiko: The true story of Free Willy's return to the wild*. Florida: Callinectes Press, 2014, p. 164.

³⁷⁶Ibid., p. 153.

staff would literally throw herring at him to make sure he got all his food for the day. Often, without moving, Keiko would just watch the herring sink to the bottom.³⁷⁷

The paramount determinant in releasing Keiko is his integration with a pod. Joining a new family of whales would be crucial because they would protect Keiko and teach him the ways of the wild. The press releases reported the fairy tale:

Last June, a small pod of orcas visited Keiko near the sea-pen enclosure. The wild orcas seemed to be communicating with Keiko. This is an important development since Keiko eventually must be able to rejoin a wild pod to survive as a free whale.³⁷⁸

Keiko, the captive orca who starred in the hit movie 'Free Willy' is coming closer to turning a Hollywood fairytale into a real-life miracle. In August an Earth Island observer, flying in a super-silent research helicopter, watched as Keiko swam into the open ocean more than ten miles from his rehabilitation site in the icy waters of Iceland's Westmann Islands. At times, Keiko paused to mingle with wild orca pods.³⁷⁹

But according to Simmons, the reintegration was executed hastily and harshly at the command of the bigheaded Cornell. He recounts what happened on that fateful day of June 18, 2000, when the team was headed by Lanny Cornell and Robin Baird. Marine vessels were dispatched to monitor Keiko trailed by a helicopter. Simmons says that Robin Baird was “an orca researcher from the Pacific Northwest, who had zero knowledge of the complex processes at work in Keiko’s rehabilitation. Baird had no working understanding of the behavioral protocols, the progress we’d made, or the plan that got us there.”³⁸⁰

The pod chosen was one large male which dwarfed Keiko in size, two females with very small calves swimming to their sides. In the perspective of Charles Vinick, (Ocean Futures executive officer and CEO of the Keiko Release Project) it was not the right pod to choose because of too many moms and babies who may be threatened and may incite the bull male to protection. Michael Parks (one of the marine vessel helmsman) commanded that all boats stop their engines and to observe. Cornell insisted that the operation move on. Keiko made a

³⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 36-37.

³⁷⁸ BERMAN, Mark. Keiko Moves to Wider Waters. [online]. *Earth Island Journal*, vol. 15 (2000) nr. 1, p. 8. [viewed 20 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43857833>

³⁷⁹ KEIKO MAKES CONTACT. [online]. *Earth Island Journal*, vol. 15 (2000-2001) nr. 4, p. 7. [viewed 20 October 2022]. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43880897>

³⁸⁰ SIMMONS, Mark. *Killing Keiko: The true story of Free Willy's return to the wild*. Florida: Callinectes Press, p. 359.

frightening dive, released a disoriented geyser, and suddenly disappeared. The team had no knowledge of where he had gone or what happened to the chaos underneath them. The pod they have sighted left but Keiko was not swimming along with them. The helicopter spotted Keiko. Robin and Charles decided to lead Keiko back to the baypen to examine if he had any injuries from the wild whales. But Cornell, in a fury, insisted that the operation continue and that they find another pod with which Keiko would meet. In the heat of the argument when he and Robin were trying to prevent this, Simmons heard Robin's words, "The bastard just wants his success fee."³⁸¹ From the helicopter, "Keiko appeared confused, disoriented and swimming in circles."³⁸² He disappeared again from the tracking. When the orca finally surfaced, this was Simmons's description of his face:

Out of the black abyss and with no warning, Keiko surfaced almost within reach of the platform. I will never forget his eyes. His eyes were bugged out of his head; he looked out of his mind.

Robin saw it too and quickly reacted. "Mark, get off the platform. He's wiggled out. I wouldn't get too close!" Robin's deft assessment was made all the more dire by the fact that he used my name. He never uses my name [. . .]

Normally the eyes of a killer whale, even those of an alert animal, are a penetrating black orb. But here, the red extents of his eyes were apparent from any position on the boat. I had never witnessed such a stirring disposition in a killer whale. In those moments, I was moved first by relief at finding Keiko, and then by caution at what appeared to be an animal in shock. ³⁸³

Eventually, as the funds dwindled for Keiko, so did the Keiko Release Project's number of expert personnel. Keiko just disappeared one day and the story of the press was that he just happily took off with the company of the other whales. He was sighted again in the Norwegian waters playing with children. On December 13, 2003, Keiko beached himself at Taknes Bay, Norway and died of pneumonia, which according to Simmons, had been brought on with poor diet of not being able to forage on his own, stress from experiences in the wild ocean, and loneliness for human companions. Simmons reports:

Respiratory ailments had long plagued Keiko throughout his time in Iceland. To a person, every soul on the project knew this fact. Had he truly been on his own, he would have died a swift death. That he was pushed beyond all reason and rationale, slowly starved in half-measures, only

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 256.

³⁸² Ibid., p. 282.

³⁸³ Ibid., p. 259.

prolonged his suffering. He died of a very preventable condition. Indeed, the outcome was cultivated through actions imposed by the responsible party ordaining “release at all costs.”³⁸⁴

The Keiko Release Project was a failure. But then, perhaps, with the testimony of Simmons, it may not be a failure because it served a lesson to be learned by all for the destiny of whales and of the animal, yet at the cost of Keiko, who spearheaded the entire ethical event. In Levinas’s framework, it is not that Simmons becomes a hero for testifying. This is to miss the point. It is the other way around. That Keiko lost his life, the risks that Simmons took on himself and of disappointing those children and donors who contributed to the cause of Keiko and believed the fairy tale, was all for the altar of believing in the reality of the animal as face.

I would now confront the earlier question of Bastesen’s satirical remark on why Keiko’s meat and the enormous funds raised for him were not, instead, spent on the starving people of Africa. The answer to this is that Keiko is seen as face and an other in the Levinasian sense (which obviously, Bastesen has not perceived in the same way).

Levinasian animal ethics makes a contribution to the animal ethics discourse by demonstrating another way of underscoring accountability for the non-human animal without having to pass through the rigor of comparisons of interior qualities and capacities in beings by developing a concept of the face and otherness of the animal. Face and otherness of the other is demonstrable by its power to make the human and her species turn against self and anthropocentrism. This we have seen how Keiko did it: by raising tall funds that all went for his cause; by reversing the waves of culture and politics to allow his release and rehabilitation operations to be conducted in Icelandic waters which put into risk the Icelandic whaling industry and challenged the international whaling practices; and, by the testimony of Simmons about the atrocities behind the Keiko Release project which put to risk not only his personal reputation but also the faith of the millions of people who donated their money for the cause thinking that it would make the fairy tale of Keiko come true.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 309.

Chapter 4

Eros and the Ethics of Taming the Wild Animal

4.1 THE DOUBLE LIFE OF ANDRE THE SEAL

The story of how Andre the Seal entered the life of Harry Goodridge may be introduced from the time of his childhood when he was born with an insatiable desire to relate intimately to wild animals, “From the time I was aware of the world around me, I have felt a kinship with wild creatures.”³⁸⁵ Harry was born in 1916, the youngest in a brood of nine, and spent his early childhood in Salisbury, Massachusetts close to the salty marshes which teemed with wildlife. Rabbits, raccoons, rails, black ducks, herons, bitterns and marsh hawks made their homes there. His parents were pioneers from Europe who settled in Minnesota and had brought him up in the tradition of hunting.

Among Harry’s early adventures were abducting young animals from the wild and turning them into pets. His first pets were crows and his favorite, named Klinker, accompanied him in his crow-napping activities. He shares from experience that when he climbed a tree to capture baby crows, the ones that opened their mouth for food were the tame-able ones and the ones that bite cannot be tamed. Klinker also helped him capture some newborn grey squirrels for which he begged his father to keep them. His father agreed on the condition that he would take care of them and supported his bid by building the little bushtails a new squirrel house. Soon, they were named Tom, Dick, and Harry. Without the slightest idea of how to take care of squirrels, Harry was nudged by the notion that squirrels were rodents and so he experimented on feeding them by soaking a dishrag in milk. The bushtails sucked right on.

³⁸⁵GOODRIDGE, Harry and DIETZ, Lew. *A seal called Andre: The two worlds of a Maine Harbor Seal*. Maine: DownEast Books, 1975, p. 17.

But the idyllic life was interrupted when some environmental officers came up and accosted them about it, saying that to keep the squirrels, the family needs to secure a permit which cost 10 dollars. So Harry had to say goodbye to his pets. But when he released them, the little bushtails would go back to their house from the woods so Harry cut a hole in the screen door so that they could come in to snatch their peanuts and donuts. Harry's father discovered it and averted the affair so Tom, Dick, and Harry hanged around bus stops across the square where waiting passengers would throw out some crackers. But after that, they raided stores and the storekeepers harassed Harry's father about it. Harry's father, at that time, had his patience about the issue already stretched, became so furious that he threatened to shoot the squirrels. But it never happened because the little ones, one day, headed off to the woods and never returned.³⁸⁶

After graduating from high school in 1933, Harry went off to visit his Uncle Albert in Minnesota whom he describes as a 'total man of the wilderness,' living happily on a hand-to-mouth existence. His uncle owned only one dairy cow and one hand-run cream separator. He made cream, sold them, and used the money to purchase stuff he doesn't produce like salt, sugar, and tobacco. His uncle was a vegetarian, except for fish, but Harry lived on game which was plentiful in Minnesota. He claimed, though, that he never shot animals beyond what he could eat for the day. His uncle grew his own vegetables and flowers, chopped his own stockpile of firewood good for two years, and made excellent wild-rice puddings and buckwheat pancakes. Harry passed the time observing the natural world and remembered having watched a pair of blue-winged teal bring up their young. His uncle tolerated all wildlife around him except for woodchucks and crows because they attacked his garden. But he pardoned the crow when Harry tamed one whom he named Columbus. He trained Columbus to come flying out of the blue from a whistle and to alight on his shoulder. One day, walking on a trail for a few miles, Columbus followed Harry, hopping from tree to tree until he finally disappeared forever. Harry later on learned that Columbus was shot down by a farmer who didn't know he was his pet.³⁸⁷

³⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 18-20.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 23-28.

Harry took off for two years at the New York State Ranger School for forestry training, got married to a girl named Thalice, served in WW II, 18 months of which were spent in an Intelligence outpost in Iceland. He finally settled in Rockport, Maine where he established the Goodridge Tree Service and earned his living as an arborist (a tree surgeon) and, eventually, as harbormaster. He raised a brood of five children to whom he passed on his passion for wildlife. The eldest were twins: Steve and Susan. Steve became a woodsman and an expert scuba diver. Susan or Sue vowed to be an old maid veterinarian until she fell in love. Carol who came next, was the most softhearted when it came to animals. She took the routine of waking up at night to let a family dog or cat out and went out to check on Mrs. Cluck Cluck, the pet chicken. Paula, the youngest, preferred chickens to dolls and gave the rooster, Jake, and Mrs. Cluck Cluck a wedding ceremony since the pair had been living together already a long time. The youngest, Toni, was an expert at catching songbirds, cooing to them, and freeing them afterwards.

The other pets the family had were fowls named Inez, Blanche, and Madeline, who wandered in and out of the house whenever the door was left open. The chickens were friends with their dogs. Madeline slept near the beagle, Dick, and laid her eggs there. Story has it that Madeline's consort was a rooster named George. But George got devoured by a raccoon whom Harry shot down but only too late. The raccoon's liver was cooked for lunch and Carol declared it was delicious because it tasted like chicken. Madeline, having become a widow upon losing George, adopted Dick the beagle for her next relationship.

There was a pigeon named Walter whom Harry rescued as a fledgling because he fell out of his nest and landed near the Goose River. Walter became a homing pigeon and would beat Harry to a race with his car when he drove home. Walter spent time with the ducks and Harry thought that he thought of himself as a duck, indeed, as an alpha duck because he would beat the others when he didn't like the way they behaved.

The family also adopted a wounded seagull from the town dump whom they named Sam Segal. When Sam healed, he became a notorious terrorist in the barnyard and Dick the beagle became terrified of him. Sam Segal confirmed to Harry the public reputation of seagulls that they would eat anything. When he fed Sam Segal sardines on a clothespin, he ate both the sardines with the clothespin with no adverse effects on his health.

There was a flying squirrel named Charlie whom Harry encountered in one of his tree surgery activities. He brought him home. Charlie ate apples from the hands of Harry's family members. He flew out of the house during the day and they never discovered where he goes. But he would fly in by dusk and join the family for dinner. One evening, he simply glided out of the house and exited from their lives forever.

Reuben was a robin whom Steve found lying on the ground. The family fed him all sorts of creepy crawlers they plucked from the ground and he emerged as the greatest glutton. By then, Harry had already discovered the secret that many wild animals found the splash of water exciting. Reuben would join the Goodridge children in their Saturday-night baths and was a nuisance in the kitchen when Thalice washed the dishes. There was one time Harry accidentally kicked Reuben and he furiously attacked him. They became sour at each other for awhile but Harry apologized and was forgiven after a day. Reuben responds to a whistle by winging in and alighting on Harry's shoulder to be fed. Tamed as he was, yes, Reuben joined the flock of migratory birds every fall and headed south.

The family had a horse named Tiffany who followed Toni like a dog wherever she went. In one of Harry's drinking sprees with Eben, his neighbor whom he invited to come over his house, Eben was tipsy, went into the kitchen, and Tiffany eyed him face-to-face. Eben, still under spirits, came back to Harry and said, "I thought I saw a horse in your kitchen." In a quite similar occasion, Mrs. Locke, another neighbor, once arrived with her car and caught a glimpse of the horse being led out of the front door of the house. The family preferred the front door rather than the back door because it is wider. Mrs. Locke, bewildered, said, "You know, I thought I saw a horse exit from your house." Harry replied jokingly, "Did you, indeed, Mrs. Locke?"³⁸⁸

Then came in the seals. Harry's aim was to be able to prove to himself that seals are tame-able and trainable. It is worth mentioning that Harry confessed that for a brief period, he accepted commissions to capture seal pups for aquariums until he couldn't account to his conscience anymore what he was doing and thereon refused a number of lucrative arrangements.³⁸⁹ For a

³⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 32-42.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 46.

pet, he preferred the more common breed, the harbor seal (*Phoca vitulana*) because the other ones: the harp seal, the hooded seal, and the walrus are all migratory. Only the harbor seal is a main resident of the waters of Maine who stayed all year round.³⁹⁰

Harry's first seal was Marky, named as such because he caught him near Mark Island. He discloses:

When the sleek head dropped from sight, I searched the water for a sign of the pup's mother. Even before I enjoyed a close relationship with seals, I felt a reluctance to contend with a wild mother for her young. I confess I didn't look too hard that day. Wanting a seal pup badly, I salved my conscience by rationalizing that the mortality rate among seal pups was extremely high, and I was perhaps, performing a service taking this young seal into protective custody.³⁹¹

Harry had to wrestle with him for a moment and when the pup tired down, he plopped him on a lap-straked 19-footer boat powered by a 75-horsepower Johnson outboard which was fast and quick to maneuver. He was crying when he reached the Goodridge home and Sue quieted the 15-pound pup in her arms. At that time, Harry had no idea how to feed him. He was acquainted with a biologist named Carleton Ray who informed him that a mother seal's milk is roughly ten times richer than cow's milk. And so Harry set out to whack down a can of non-sweetened milk and added lots of egg yolks in it but the pup refused to eat the formula. He relied on the earlier strategy with the squirrel dishrag. The pup sucked on it but Marky eventually languished on it. One morning, Harry found him dead. Mac the vet performed an autopsy and found the dishrag in his stomach.³⁹²

Harry tried a second time. After examining a dead seal's body which he found near Ram Island, he improvised an artificial seal mother from a log which he wrapped in neoprene, the material of the scuba diver's suit. He put a bulb syringe inside the log body and cut a hole to make the tip of the syringe protrude like a nipple.

On May 14, 1960, he went out hunting with Sue for a newly-born pup around Mouse Island. He caught one, netted him in, and after a bit of snarling and nipping, he soon pacified in Sue's arms. Harry introduced the dummy seal and dabbed some warm water on the teat. The pup

³⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 46-47.

³⁹¹ Ibid., p. 45.

³⁹² Ibid., pp. 45-49.

sucked it and the whole Goodridge family was overjoyed. The pup was named Basil (for bay seal). Basil was content with his neoprene mother for some time but when he was mature enough for solid food, Harry confronted his second problem. Basil accepted the adjustment of emulsified herring but refused to eat live or whole ones. Eating raw fish was a practical course taught by a seal mother to her young. Harry had no recourse but to force-feed. He rammed a fish inside Basil's mouth. In the first two trials, he snorted in protest but on the third fish, he blinked with realization to the facts of life. Harry noted the date- July 4th. From that time on, Basil ate whole fish.

It seemed Harry had to learn his second hard lesson. On August 12 of that summer, he took Basil out to accompany him while he hunted down white sharks. At the gut between Mark Island and Robinson's Rock, he peered out for dorsal fins jutting out the water surface. He didn't notice that Basil disappeared from his usual place in the bow. When Harry looked back, his assumption was that the seal might have gone out for a swim but he saw telltale signs of blood and flesh. At the first sight of a dorsal fin, Harry shot his harpoon and the water gurgled. He towed the shark on his boat, cut him open, and saw Basil in three parts in the predator's stomach.³⁹³

Unrelenting, Harry tried a third time. On the question of why he wanted a seal for a pet? He wanted a diving companion. But this is the way he puts it:

Why did I want a seal for a friend and companion? I've been asked that question, and I've asked it of myself. The easy answer is: why not a seal? I've heard of people who have made pets of cobras and black widow spiders. Presumably, they found them interesting.

I wish I could say that having a seal was a childhood dream-that at the age of six, a harbor seal was at the top of my Christmas list for Santa [. . .]

So I have no satisfying answer. I can say that seals have always fascinated me. As a boy hunting in the salt marshes I would see an occasional harbor seal. I recall being stirred one day by the sight of an old bull. He rose up suddenly just beyond the grasses and, droplets glistening on his patriarchal whiskers, base me a pleasant good morning. I felt a tingling thread of communion running between us. It was my feeling then and later that seals are wise and friendly creatures. I had the curious sense that they wished to be friends.³⁹⁴

³⁹³ Ibid., pp. 52-53.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 15.

So one summer morning in 1961, Harry set out in his powerboat with a friend named Bob. He recounts that special moment of the first meeting with Andre:

I looked around for the pup's mother. No sign of her, and this was odd. Seal mothers are extremely protective of their newborn [. . .]

Then a curious and totally unexpected thing happened. Instead of submerging, the pup swam directly toward the boat. I swooped down with my net and swung the little orphan inboard.

Of course, I'll never know for certain that Andre was an orphan. The fact that the pup was unattended made this a reasonable assumption. Normally a seal has but one pup. On those rather rare occasions when two are whelped, one is usually abandoned. This suggests that the female seal doesn't possess the mammary equipment to care adequately for a pair.

The lot of an abandoned pup is slow starvation or sudden death by the teeth of a great white shark-in Maine, the harbor seal's sole enemy other than man [. . .]

The soft eyes that met mine were completely trusting. Without realizing it, I made a commitment that day fifteen years ago. There was no way of knowing at the time that Andre might be with me for life, his or mine.³⁹⁵

As Harry recounted in his book, Andre simply jumped on his boat, explored it, and went home to the Goodridge family. Unlike Marky and Basil, he did not cry. He was curious to explore every nook and cranny in the house. He was fed from the same neoprene mum and was given the cellar as his room. But he had the full roam of the house and yard during the day and twice a day, went back to the sea sunbathing and swimming. In two weeks, he was adjusted to emulsified fish and in three weeks, was fed whole fish. Eventually, he fed and hunted on his own. Harry described in the following his daily life and form of commitment with Andre:

Each day I'd release him at the harbor and leave him. If he departed for good, that was fine with me. Originally, my intention had been to enjoy his company for a few summer months. In my mind there had never been a question of whether he would return to the wild, but when, I wanted him prepared.

Each night I would go down the waterfront. He would be there waiting to be fed and picked up. His favorite rendezvous was under the town float. I'd pick up the deck board and there he would be.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

³⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 60.

Gradually, Andre revealed his bratty side. He kicked out Toot the beagle out of his doghouse, occupied it whenever he wanted to, and enjoyed the bathtub with Toni. His bath prank is lying on his back silently and when he senses a person near, he would suddenly splash up and wet that person. Harry taught Andre a few tricks like rolling over, clapping his flippers, shaking hands, which he did on command or simply on his own when he wanted attention.³⁹⁷ Andre also learned to toss up balls, to play retrieve, had a funny way of covering his eyes with his flippers when he's scolded or ashamed of something. According to Harry:

Not being a professional trainer-that is, my living didn't depend upon the exploitation of an animal's intelligence-I was not obliged to "teach" Andre anything. A bear must be taught to ride a bicycle; a poodle must be taught to walk around on its hind legs and drink tea. Andre has never been taught to do anything he did not do naturally.³⁹⁸

Soon, Andre caught the fancy of his neighbors, won the hearts of the Rockport community, and became its mascot. He liked to have his belly rubbed and fishermen often rubbed his belly with their oars.³⁹⁹

Andre's first winter presented a problem. The sea water at the harbor had frozen and Andre cannot forage. Harry and his neighbors tried to feed Andre with their stocks of herring but he refused it. He kept an ice hole open near the wharf but when the ice covered it and broke up in jagged floes, he was suddenly gone. Two winter months have passed up when Harry read from the Marblehead Massachusetts community paper that a certain friendly seal whom the townspeople named Josephine had been winning the crowd's attraction, playing tricks for them, and receiving treats. That was it! Josephine in Marblehead was Rockport's Andre, 180 miles away from home.⁴⁰⁰

Every winter after that, Andre thrived in that modus operandi. Harry would release him to the harbor and he would go home on his own. But Harry monitored him by alerting the newspapers that he would be frolicking around, to inform townspeople in the hope that they would not harm Andre if he would snooze in their boats or nip at their oars, and to insinuate to

³⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 61.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 80.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 61, 67-68.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 70-71.

possible abductors that no matter what a cute brat he is, the mascot officially belonged to Rockport. Always, he received calls from people everywhere, just informing him of Andre's whereabouts. Harry recognized that: "Andre was a product of two worlds: His blood responded to the call of the open bay; his heart belonged to the adoptive realm of humankind."⁴⁰¹

Beyond the Goodridge family, Andre also developed special friendships with other people. One of them was Elray, the son of one of Harry's friends, a lobsterman named Howard Kimball. Elray was twelve when he first met Andre. It was more of Andre who fell in love with the boy because Elray reported many times when the bratty seal would tug on his pants, nip his oars, or splash water on him with his flipper, begging him to play but then he would have chores to do. When Elray would grab a bucket, Andre would play tug-of-war with that bucket; much of a nuisance, Elray had to slat him many times. Their bonding time was when Elray took scuba diving lessons and Andre would just appear from nowhere, grab him on the rear and hug him with his flippers.⁴⁰²

In the spring of 1968, Harry found Andre in Kimball's floating pen with raw wounds on his throat which took three days to heal. It dawned on him that Andre had reached sexual maturity and had to fight for a mate against other male seals. To assist him on this problem, Harry bought a female seal named Trudy from the Sea and Shore Fisheries Laboratory. Supposedly, he chose the 'dumbest seal' among the litter, to ensure Andre's alpha position. Trudy proved not to be so dumb after all. Being younger and friskier, she beat Andre to the food at feeding time which upset her boyfriend. Trudy also interfered with Harry and Andre whenever the two would play ball. Andre and Trudy thrived in a somewhat big-brother-with-a-kid-sister kind of a relationship but after 18 months, when Harry released both of them in the waters, Trudy disappeared and never came back. They never achieved the romantic relationship that Harry had assumed. But then, after sometime, a local waterfront guardian reported to Harry having seen Andre at the seawall, finally mating with a female seal. Harry was pleased, if only at the

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., p. 98.

⁴⁰² Ibid., pp. 103-105.

idea that he didn't have to worry anymore about having to demonstrate to Andre the facts of life.⁴⁰³

In the winter of 1972, Andre had reached his senior years and Harry referred to him as 'the old mariner.' Although he showed no signs of physical deterioration, he performed less and less for crowds who came to visit him and it became a problem for Harry when people complained of it and when he had to shove off politicians who wished to use Andre for their election campaigns. There were also occasions when Andre proved to be a nuisance to other people who didn't know him, like: when he capsized a canoe with two passengers; when he 'kissed' a child who was frightened and cried and the parent complained that it was an 'attack;' when he nipped at the oars of some kayakers, endangering their boat; and, having been suckled on a neoprene mum, he had an obsessive love affair with scuba divers and some of them were scared out of their wits when faced with a bewhiskered sea creature underwater.

In the spring of 1973, Harry came to a decision to protect Andre from accidents with strangers, at least for a season every year. He made arrangements to keep Andre during the winter at the New England Aquarium in Boston. The aquarium personnel were instructed to release Andre during spring in the waters where he would make his journey home to Rockport. Andre accepted the arrangement and was quite pleased with the aquarium because he won the hearts of two female seals there, besting the other contender males. The first release from Boston was set in April 26, and again, Harry alerted the press for people to help him monitor his whereabouts. Andre returned to Rockport and showed up at Leonard's Skiff within four days, beating Harry's pegged waiting time of two weeks. In the next years, Andre made this journey successfully.

In July 1975, Harry received raps from federal officers of the National Marine Fisheries Service, apparently on the allegation that in keeping Andre, he was violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. He reasoned out that Andre had become his pet way before that law was promulgated.

The federal officers threatened him to be removed from office as harbormaster. The townspeople of Rockport rallied at the back of Harry and fought against authorities in order to

⁴⁰³ Ibid., pp. 114-116.

keep their harbormaster and Andre as the town mascot.⁴⁰⁴ Harry won his cause without having to apply for a permit to keep Andre.

In the summer of 1978, a local sculptor of reputation, Jane Wasey, offered to make a granite sculpture of Andre to immortalize him. The four-ton slab of granite was donated by a quarry. Wasey worked on her project for a year. Meanwhile, Andre trained for some showcase performance for the grand unveiling ceremony of his own statue. In October of the same year, the grand affair was attended by the local folk with a high school band playing. Andre pulled the rope that unveiled the covering of his own statue and received his barrel of mackerel. That statue still stands until today in the Rockport town park.⁴⁰⁵ Andre and Harry were awarded by the local Chamber of Commerce as ‘Townspersons of the Year’ in recognition of the public attention and tourist attraction that they have generated for Rockport. The awarding ceremony took place in a stately Whitehall Inn in Camden where Harry received a plaque, and Andre, a medallion around his neck.⁴⁰⁶

In 1981, Harry changed Andre’s winter sojourn from Boston to the Mystic Aquarium in Connecticut. He would be released from Marblehead and from there, he made the journey to Rockport safely.⁴⁰⁷ In the fall of 1980, Andre was present during Toni’s wedding and served as ring bearer. The rings were tossed to the waters and Andre retrieved them for the newlyweds. A generation after, when Toni’s daughter got married, the ceremony took place in the Rockport park so that the statue of Andre could serve as the ringbearer.⁴⁰⁸ In June 2018, Lauren Abbate reported in the Maine Public website the news that the statue of Andre has worn down with cracks on the head and so the Rockport community raised 14,000 dollars to have it restored.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 181-183.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 194.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 195.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 197.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 196-197.

⁴⁰⁹ ABBATE, Lauren. *Mainetown rallies to save statue of its most beloved resident, who happens to be a seal* [online]. 11 June 2018 [viewed date: 15 November 2021]. Available from: <https://www.mainepublic.org/maine/2018-06-11/maine-town-rallies-to-save-statue-of-beloved-andre-the-seal>

For the rest of his life, Andre made the faithful journey home to his human family in Rockport, even after 1985, when he turned blind with cataracts. In June of 1986, a bystander had witnessed Andre being attacked by a wild seal. In July, his body was found washed up in Lerond Cove near Rockland.

Andre lived for 25 years, choosing neither the wild nor the human community; he chose to live in both worlds. He was buried under a headstone in Rockport shore with the simple inscription: Andre 1961-1986. Harry Goodridge died four years after Andre, his ashes scattered out at Robinson's Rock, where Andre was born.⁴¹⁰

In 1994, Paramount and Turner Pictures released the film *Andre* to spread the story of an extraordinarily significant human and animal relationship to millions of people around the world.⁴¹¹

The question that spearheads the discussion for this chapter is: could Harry Goodridge's taming of Andre be considered an ethical act? I would like to address this question in three parts: the *first* will tackle the controversy regarding animal domestication in the current animal ethics discourse and here, I will present two conflicting perspectives on animal domestication; the *second* will establish what loophole had been missed out in the current discourse of animal domestication and how Levinas's concept of eros could fit into the gap; and, the *third* will describe Levinas's ideas of caress and diachrony and will utilize them to enlighten the ethical concerns of Harry taming Andre and to propose guiding principles that could enlighten reasonable boundaries within the significant wild animal-human relationships.

4. 2 THE DISCOURSE OF THE ETHICS OF ANIMAL DOMESTICATION

This part will work on the task of presenting the background of the arguments in animal ethics regarding animal domestication which covers all actions of animal-keeping - the abduction of

⁴¹⁰ GOODRIDGE, Harry and DIETZ, Lew. *A seal called Andre: The two worlds of a Maine Harbor Seal*. Maine: DownEast Books, 1975, p. 198-200.

⁴¹¹ *Andre* [film]. Directed by George MILLER. U.S.A.: Paramount & Turner Pictures, 1994.

wild animals and the keeping and breeding of evolved domesticated animals: for personal pet-keeping, entertainment in zoos and circuses, protection and nurturing in sanctuaries, meat and by-products, and for labor.

4.2.1 Francione and Abolitionism

I will start with the most prominent and absolutist perspective against the domestication of all animals, which criticizes the status of the already-evolved domesticated and the wild animals. This is the Abolitionist stand, at the helm of which is Gary Francione. Francione's animal rights perspective takes its rich context from analogies of the holocaust and slavery which he uses to argue for a strong species egalitarianism. He takes the first premise of Singer's stand that the interest not to suffer and die are present in all kinds of peoples as well as animals and so if human beings have a right to their life, welfare, and autonomy, so do animals. He says:

Animals, like humans, have interests. Depending on the species we are talking about, and depending on individuals within that species ('animal' is a very broad term), those interests will vary. We may be uncertain whether some animals are sentient. For example, although insects clearly react to stimuli, it is not clear as to whether they are subjectively aware and able to experience pain and suffering. There may be uncertainty as to whether some mollusks, such as clams or oysters, are sentient. With regard to any unclear cases, we believe it prudent to err on the side of caution and regard close cases as being sentient. There is, however, absolutely no doubt that the animals we routinely exploit—cows, pigs, sheep, goats, chickens, turkeys, fish, lobsters, etc.—are sentient. All sentient beings have at least two interests: the interest in not suffering and the interest in not dying.⁴¹²

For animal rights, Francione also uses the argument of marginal cases to establish the strong species egalitarianism. Inasmuch as we do not discriminate between the rights of a person with mental disabilities and those whose mental capacities are not-yet formed like children, then we cannot also discriminate against animals whom we say have lesser mental capacities. This has to be qualified, certainly, as to what question is being asked. For example, on the question of hiring an employee, who gets hired: the one with mental disability or one who is normal? The answer is obvious. However, some questions may have different answers:

⁴¹² FRANCIONE, Gary and CHARLTON, Anna. *Animal rights: The abolitionist approach*. Utah: Exemplar Press, 2015, p. 19.

But what if the question is different? What if we are asking whether John's disability is relevant to whether we should use him as a replaceable resource whose life should be "sacrificed" for others? What if the question is whom should we use as a replaceable resource— as, in effect, a slave—to serve the interests of others? When the question changes from who gets a driver's license to who gets enslaved, or otherwise treated exclusively as a resource, we see immediately that the answer changes. Cognitive capacities may be relevant to who gets a particular job or driver's license or who is permitted to write checks, have a credit card, or enter into contracts. We may give a greater share of social resources (in the form of employment opportunities and salary) to Mary, but that does not mean that we can treat John as a thing.⁴¹³

The comprehensive definition for animal rights that Francione uses is the 'right not to be property.' This right not to be property involves the utilization of all animals for all kinds of purposes: whether for meat, for resource, for labor, and yes, even for personal companionship. He argues that even if pets may be treated well, they are still considered property:

It is possible, of course, that some owners will treat their animals very well. Many of you reading this book may be sitting in a room with a companion animal who is happily sleeping away as you read. You love that dog or cat (or whatever the species) and regard them as a member of your family. But that animal is your property. Just as in the case of human slavery, you, as the owner, hold a property right in the animal that allows you to value that animal. As a general matter, as long as we provide minimal food, water, and shelter, we can otherwise treat our animals pretty much as we choose. We can treat them as members of our family and lavish great affection on them. Or we can use them as guard dogs and never let them into the house or show them any affection. They are our property. They are things that we own. We get to value their every interest. We get to decide every aspect of their lives. We get to decide if they live or die. We have the legal right to dump our animals at a "shelter" where they may be killed. We have the right to have a veterinarian kill the animal. In most places, we can kill our animals ourselves as long as we do it "humanely."⁴¹⁴

The radical proposition on a hot plate is Francione's call that all domestic animals should not be bred anymore even if this would entail the extinction of their species line. This means that the animals that are now kept in captivity, if they cannot be returned to the wild, they deserve the service of being cared for in their lifetime but that the entire practice of having animals under captivity should be ended. Francione reasons saying that with humans, if we consider it unethical to control their reproductive rights, then it also follows that we do not breed animals under captivity. To breed the animal forcibly is still to treat him as property. According to

⁴¹³ Ibid., p. 21.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

him, “We made a moral mistake by domesticating nonhumans in the first place; what sense does it make to perpetuate it?”⁴¹⁵ The arrest of breeding unto extinction would be the act that corresponds to the liberation of human slaves. Francione says:

To say that an animal has a right not to be used as property is simply to say that we have a moral obligation to not use animals as things even if it would benefit us to do so. With respect to domesticated animals, that means that we stop bringing them into existence altogether. So in this sense, the right not to be used as property arguably has a different result when it is applied to nonhumans than when it is applied to humans. In the latter case, the abolition of slavery means that those who were enslaved are no longer slaves and they became full members of the moral community. In the former case, it means that we care for those domesticated nonhumans currently in existence but we do not bring any more into existence.⁴¹⁶

The debate goes on in defense of pets who would be assured of all the love and care throughout their lives: could this case pass? Francione insists on a resounding ‘no’ for the reasons that their dependency on humans for their needs is considered contrary to their nature, and thus, against their autonomy, dignity, and integrity. He says:

Domesticated animals are dependent on us for when and whether they eat, whether they have water, where and when they urinate, when they sleep, whether they get any exercise, etc. Unlike human children, who, except in unusual cases, will become independent and functioning members of human society, domestic animals are neither part of the nonhuman world nor fully part of our world. They remain forever in a netherworld of vulnerability, dependent on us for everything that is of relevance to them. We have bred them to be compliant and servile, or to have characteristics that are actually harmful to them but are pleasing to us. We may make them happy in one sense, but the relationship can never be “natural” or “normal.” They do not belong stuck in our world irrespective of how well we treat them.⁴¹⁷

4.2.2 Donaldson & Kymlicka on Citizenship Theory for Animals

An antagonist of the extreme Abolitionist position of Gary Francione is the Citizenship theory proffered by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka. The Citizenship theory concerns only those animals who are assured by their human guardians of a lifelong companionship and

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., p. 25.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., p. 25.

commitment to their welfare; this assurance is reinforced by laws of the state that render these animals rights of citizenship. The primary principle of the Citizenship theory is to debunk the myth that most animal rights theorists hold: that animals under human supervision and care could never receive humane treatment. It is an established fact that we are living in an epoch wherein animals, especially those in industrialized farming are brutally treated but this does not eliminate the reality that there are still many animals who are justly treated during their life even if in the end, they would be killed for meat. This is the crux of the debate. Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that if the animal had been given a good life, their usage and killing in the end, if handled in a humane manner, could be morally permissible. Most animal theorists protest this with slogans saying that “there is no such thing as humane meat,” and that, even if exposed to humane methods of animal farming, they make use of an argument that settles the issue once and for all: that domestication, any form of it and for any purpose, is an unjust practice that must be done away with, like slavery. The idea is that it is better not to have bred the animals into being if their only future is to be used and killed. Abolition unto extinction is better than humane breeding and care with the end purpose of expenditure of the animal.⁴¹⁸ The following is the way Donaldson and Kymlicka understand the contention of Abolitionism’s abhorrence of animal domestication:

Whether we treat existing animals well ('make them happy in one sense') or badly (Le., exploit and kill them) does not change the intrinsic wrongness and 'unnaturalness' of their situation. This intrinsic wrongness contaminates any possibility of us having an ethical relationship with the class of domesticated animals. Francione's position here echoes that of environmentalists such as Callicott, who famously described domesticated animals as debased and unnatural, as 'living artifacts' whom humans have bred to 'docility, tractability, stupidity and dependency' (Callicott 1980).¹⁰ Similarly, Paul Shepard refers to pets as human creations, as 'civilized paraphernalia', 'vestiges and fragments', and 'monsters of the order invented by Frankenstein.'⁴¹⁹

Donaldson and Kymlicka react to the above on three points: The *first* reaction has to do with the idea that the position of abolitionism-unto-extinction cannot be sustained in practice. For one thing, it is an illusion that the phasing out unto extinction of all domestic breeds could just happen by a simple arrest of all breeding operations. The truth is that for the domestic breeds

⁴¹⁸ KYMLICKA, Will and DONALDSON, Sue *Zoopolis: A political theory of animal rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 76.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., p. 79; SHEPARD, Paul. *The others: How animals made us human*. Washington DC: Island Press, 1997, pp. 150-151; CALLICOTT, John Baird. Animal liberation: A triangular affair. *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 2, (1980) nr. 4, pp. 311-328.

to be phased out, this requires a massive control and sterilization of all domestic animals in order to keep them from mating, that is, for years, until all of them are phased out.⁴²⁰ The question is: is this gargantuan idea even workable? Francione is adamant to maintain it is a possibility if done as a long-range plan under a paradigm shift. He stated this in an interview by CBC News and this is the way he answers the questions:

Humans have been domesticating dogs and cats for thousands of years, what would it take to stop that?

Well, we would just spay and neuter them all.

So that's it then, the lines would just end?

That's right. And look, I have no illusions here. We would only stop domesticating dogs and cats after the paradigm shifted and we stopped seeing animals as things, we started seeing them as non-human persons, by which I mean simply beings that are morally considerable. And the only way we're going to get to the domestication of dogs and cats issue is if we come to the position that it's wrong to be treating animals as resources in the first place. And by the time we got to that point, by the time we transitioned to a vegan existence, we would see that pets are a problem, and other forms of exploitation are a problem.

So I'm not suggesting that we're going to start with pets, we're not going to do that. As a matter of fact, the use of animals as pets will probably be — I mean, I won't be around, you won't be around, but it'll happen eventually — will probably be the last thing to go once we really recognize animal rights in a meaningful way, it will be the last thing to go.⁴²¹

However, I think that Donaldson and Kymlicka will still disagree with Francione on the possibility of the 'paradigm shift' that he mentions. For one thing, if Abolitionism would be enforced democratically, majority of people should be convinced that even responsible pet-keeping could not be 'meaningful' in any way, if they are to support political referenda for this. For Donaldson and Kymlicka, there are still some underlying presuppositions of Abolitionism that need to be examined as the following parts will take up.

⁴²⁰ KYMLICKA, Will and DONALDSON, Sue. *Zoopolis: A political theory of animal rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 80.

⁴²¹ THE 180. Believe in animal rights? Be prepared to go pet free. *CBC News*. 16 September 2016 [viewed 16 September 2016]. Available in: <https://www.cbc.ca/radio/the180/facts-vs-values-in-canadian-health-care-forced-psychiatric-care-and-urban-indigenous-people-need-a-voice-1.3764173/believe-in-animal-rights-be-prepared-to-go-pet-free-1.3765424>

In Donaldson and Kymlicka, the *second* point of weakness in abolitionism is its entanglement with slavery. It begins with the premiss that domestication, like industrialization, has happened without the world being aware of the grand aftermath of its horrendous effects decades after. For example, they say that at a certain point in history, the world has come to a realization that slavery is an evil and so people campaign to end it. But the solution is not to return all black peoples in the Western world to Africa. These peoples and their descendants have already been born in foreign countries and have been habituated to live in progressive cultures and many of them would opt not to return. In the same way, we have already been awakened to animal exploitation brought about by the machinations of domestication, but the solution is not to stop breeding them unto extinction so that the end scenario would be that only wild animals would exist and that humans should have nothing to do with them. The solution for the freed slaves would be to integrate them into their present countries, to grant them full citizenship and rights, just like the native-born. In the same way, animals who have already existed in the care of humans should stay in their care and have their rights recognized and protected and this could be well executed if they would be declared citizens.⁴²²

When the above analogy is proffered, I take it that abolitionists would defend their position by saying that the integration of slaves in a foreign country cannot be said to operate on the same level as those of domesticated animals. Freed slaves and domestic animal citizens would differ on two counts: *one*, that slaves could choose a better life characterized by autonomy while citizen animals will be forever depend on their human guardians; and, *two*, that slaves could choose not to reproduce but domestic animal citizens cannot not reproduce, and this forced reproduction alone is an exploitation of them. Their lack of autonomy that is thoroughly enjoyed by wild animals, is also an offense against their dignity.

The *third* aspect of contention by the Citizenship theory against Abolition is that it misunderstands the human-animal relationship. Donaldson and Kymlicka pose their question in this way: “On what basis then can abolitionists claim that domesticated animals cannot have good lives?⁴²³ It is important to keep in mind initially that Donaldson and Kymlicka are

⁴²² KYMLICKA, WILL and DONALDSON, SUE. *Zoopolis: A political theory of animal rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp 79-.80.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

both privy to the fact that the system of domestication is unjust in its original purpose. They said:

We agree with abolitionists that the original intent of animal domestication—to alter animals to serve human ends—is wrong, just as it would be to engage in the selective breeding of a human subclass in order to serve other humans. Moreover, we agree that the process of domestication—confinement and forced breeding—involves a violation of basic rights of liberty and bodily integrity.

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Domestication is unjust because of the abolitionist criticism that it is unnatural. It is unnatural because the process of domestication engendered neotenization. This is the evolutionary change in animals that removed their aggressive behavior, retained their juvenile physical characteristics as well as disposition in order to adapt to their idealized dependent state in human companionship. So dogs resemble baby wolves and cats resemble the baby tigers and lions.⁴²⁵ Juvenile traits and physiology would make them docile and dependent on humans so that from the wild, they would be ‘tame’ and harmless.

Donaldson and Kymlicka cite Stephen Budiansky’s theory that neotenization is a natural process of evolution in which wild animals renegotiate their activities and partnerships in an endlessly fluctuating wildlife in order to adapt to climactic changes. Wild animals search for new food sources, new habitats, and new forms of partnership with other species in order to survive.⁴²⁶ Budiansky, in his book *Covenant with the Wild: Why Animals Chose Domestication* advances the hypothesis that the adaptation of many animals within urban space and life may actually not be a result of human domestication which we understand as ‘colonization’ but a result of evolution of animals in response to climate change (which need not be anthropogenically-caused) in which human handling (that we understand as ‘domestication’) only played a very minor role. He explains:

The story of domestication that follows is, like the best scientific stories, counterintuitive. Indeed, most of us are so accustomed to the notion that domestication was a human exploit that to suggest otherwise can make one sound more like a mystic than a scientist. There are some fundamental scientific concepts, however, that underscore the argument for domestication as the evolutionary product of a mutual strategy for survival, and setting these out at the start may

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

⁴²⁵ Ibid., p. 83.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., p. 85.

help the reader approach the subject with an appropriate measure of doubt about the conventional view of things.

First, the ancestors of today's domesticated plants and animals were, like mice and starlings invading our houses today, opportunists, not conservatives. They were species adapted by their evolutionary past to exploiting new terrain on the forest edge, rather than specializing in niches in the forest center. The first domesticated animals dogs, sheep, and cattle were social species that readily scavenged new food sources. [. . .]

Another consideration that makes the story of domestication less surprising and more understandable is the infinite genius of evolution in devising survival strategies that involve cooperation among species throughout nature. Man is far from the only species to practice domestication. Cooperative associations between some unlikely pairs finches and wasps, ants and trees, aardvarks and melons appear throughout nature. In almost all, there is one recurring pattern: The defense mechanisms that allow a species to survive on its own, but likewise make it fearful of associating with others, are dropped; in return, tangible benefits in the form of protection or food are gained. The state of dependence of one species upon another so formed is not degeneracy; it is a finely honed evolutionary strategy for survival. In a world made up so much of competition for survival, nature has with surprising frequency cast upon the solution of cooperation.

Finally, all domestic animals, in both behavior and appearance, retain juvenile traits in adulthood. One of the very first hints in the archaeological record of an animal's domestication is the jawbone of a wolf from southwest Asia, dated twelve thousand years ago, in which the face and muzzle have begun to shorten an adult with the face of a puppy crowding the teeth together. It is a process that has been repeated in every domestic animal. And that one fact of their evolution speaks volumes about what they are and how they came to be. Domestic animals are dependent, permanently juvenile, by nature, not just by circumstance or training.

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Budiasky pursues the critical question on the problem of explaining domestication as the act of human taming of an animal. He points out from Egyptian depiction in art showing Egyptians trying to domesticate gazelles, ibex, hyenas and antelope with collars around their necks but they have failed to do so, even when their civilization had been based on animal husbandry and had been well versed in it.⁴²⁸ Another problem is that the very traits that we know in animals in which they would be considered 'domesticated' like docility, lack of fear, high reproductive rate were not present in the wild animals that the Mesolithic hunters first

⁴²⁷ BUDIANSKY, Stephen. *The covenant with the wild: Why animals chose domestication*. New York: William, Morrow, & Company, 1992, pp. 15-17.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

encountered. Budiansky suggests that “If we are to believe that domestication was the result of human exploits alone, we run into biological paradox: The only way to produce an animal with desirable traits is through captive breeding, yet the only way they could have been captively bred is if they had desirable traits to start with. ⁴²⁹

A winning support for Budiansky’s argument is the theory of Wrangham that even the human species have self-domesticated in order to adapt to the demands of living in modern and urbanized spaces where there is growing population and cultural integration so how much more for nh animals?⁴³⁰ For example, the bodies of people in the times of ancient Greece and Rome have a different idealized shape (and I suppose different health conditions) from what it is now. Modern bodies are slimmer because of evolved nutritional needs, labor, and technological conditions.

Donaldson and Kymlicka insist that, if the behavior of dependency is what Abolitionists fear and reject in domesticated animals, they have failed to examine what undermines this stand. Is dependency always ethically wrong and its presence in a relationship always an indication of inequality and injustice? Donaldson and Kymlicka see this perspective as coming from an ethics that is male-sponsored: that dependency is against dignity. In support of this, we remember the criticism of Carol Gilligan in her book *In a Different Voice*. In this book, Gilligan criticized that in the realm of psychology, the theories of development, namely that of Piaget and Kohlberg, had followed the male standard of development, extolling the virtues of independence as a sign of maturity, and dependence, inversely, a sign of immaturity. She says:

Consequently, relationships, and particularly issues of dependency, are experienced differently by women and men. For boys and men, separation and individuation are critically tied to gender identity since separation from the mother is essential for the development of masculinity. For girls and women, issues of femininity or feminine identity do not depend on the achievement of separation from the mother or on the progress of individuation. Since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender identity is threatened by separation. Thus, males tend to have difficulty with relationships, while females tend to have problems with individuation. The

⁴²⁹ Ibid., pp. 23-24.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., p. 85; WRANGHAM, Richard. Hypotheses for the evolution of reduced reactive reaction in the context of human self-domestication. *Frontiers in Psychology*, vol. 10 (2019) nr. 1914. [viewed 16 November 2022]. Available in: <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01914/full>;

quality of embeddedness in social interaction and personal relationships that characterizes women's lives in contrast to men's, however, becomes not only a descriptive difference but also a developmental liability when the milestones of childhood and adolescent development in the psychological literature are markers of increasing separation. Women's failure to separate then becomes by definition a failure to develop.⁴³¹

In effect, according to Gilligan, women's development is judged according to male standards in which dependency is considered a failure to develop. In a similar tone, Donaldson and Kymlicka claim that:

Dependency doesn't intrinsically involve a loss of dignity, but the way in which we respond to dependency certainly does. If we despise dependency as a kind of weakness, then when a dog paws his dinner bowl, or nudges us winningly to remind us it is walk time, we will see ingratiating or servility. However, if we don't view dependency as intrinsically undignified, we will see the dog as a capable individual who knows what he wants and how to communicate in order to get it-as someone who has the potential for agency, preferences, and choice.⁴³²

Donaldson and Kymlicka emphasize that dependency is an essential ingredient in any type of relationship. Indeed, one of the principles of environmentalism is that in nature, 'everything is dependent on everything else.' It may be contended, however, that the dependency imputed on domesticated animals is still not the dependency that is dignified and inherent in healthy relationships. Dependency that is dignified may be said to be of choice; that in cases of abuse, there are existing capacities for asserting independence. Domesticated animals are not in this kind of situation. It is not also the same kind of natural dependency that children with disabilities have in which parents are ethically called to care for them for a lifetime.

In my perspective, Donaldson and Kymlicka would respond to the above by saying that even if domestic animals would be unbred unto extinction, if this were at all possible, there would still be the ethical responsibility of humans to intervene and care for wild animals that are hurt in the wild. This makes for an inevitable perpetuation of domestication for vulnerable constitutively wild animals. Constitutively wild animals are not inherently dependent as domestic animals are but upon situations of vulnerability such as environmental disasters or the diminishment of a species due to an overwhelming number of predators, humans are

⁴³¹ GILLIGAN, Carol. *In a different voice: Psychological theory & women's development*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 8-9.

⁴³² KYMLICKA, Will and DONALDSON, Sue. *Zoopolis: A political theory of animal rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 84.

called to care for them, if the context makes this possible. Abolitionists would contend that the wild should be left to itself to negotiate nature's own balance of species. But Donaldson and Kymlicka assert that that in the wild, it is not a fair play. There are some animals who are strong and independent in finding food sources, escaping predators, and in withstanding the changes in weather conditions. Other animals are not. Human intervention in the affairs of the wild does not only derive its ethics from the justice of reparation that is incumbent upon humans for their imprint in the Anthropocene. This ethics is called for in the sense that animals cannot be separated from humans and to insist on their relational separation is not only unnatural (if 'naturalness' could be defined in Budianky's sense of including evolutionary characteristics) but also impossible. There is no such thing as pristine nature and animals living as separated from humans. In terms of space, "Wild animals live 'in the wild', but they rarely live in pristine wilderness untouched or not invaded by humans, and we need a theory of animal rights that addresses these inevitable entanglements between humans and wild animals."⁴³³ Even if it makes sense to designate patches of wildernesses that policy would establish as 'don't go' places, the wild animals there would forever cross over to human territory no matter how many systems of surveillance would be installed, for example, the cases of koala bears and other animals fleeing from wildfires, and polar bears invading urban settlements in search for food. Even in urban areas, birds, ducks, raccoons, rabbits, and other neighboring animals would forever be present, even barging into human homes.

The above leads to the inevitable stand of Kymlicka and Donaldson: that the unbreed-onto-extinction ideal of Abolitionism is untenable. The position that turns out to be more reasonable is to maintain domestication but to install infrastructures that will be more benevolent to animals in ways that promote their interest. This could be advanced if public policy would accept the proposal of animal citizenship.

Donaldson & Kymlicka propose the following items for the exchange of duties and benefits between animals and humans under the category of domestic animal citizenship:

However, we can at least think about what is entailed or presupposed by ideas of membership/citizenship (and conversely what is inconsistent with them). We will try to identify the presuppositions of citizenship in nine areas:

⁴³³ Ibid., p. 64.

- 1) basic socialization
- 2) mobility and the sharing of public space
- 3) duties of protection
- 4) use of animal products
- 5) use of animal labour
- 6) medical care
- 7) sex and reproduction
- 8) predation/diet
- 9) political representation ⁴³⁴

It must be noted from the above that there is no item that allows slaughter for meat. Items 1 and 2 stipulate the rights of domestic animals to be well socialized and to move within public spaces which are shared with the human-animal community in which they live. Items 3, 6, 8 entitle animals to receive protection and medical care from the state and to receive food from their human guardians. The ones in question are items 4, 5, and 7 because these pertain to direct human use of nh animals to multiply their population in order to obtain by-products or for labor. Examples of animal products are wool from sheep, eggs from chickens, or milk from cows. Examples of animal labor are dogs and donkeys who serve to guard sheep, and dogs who service humans with disabilities. The most significant thing is item 9 which is political representation. Political representation will oversee the ethicality of all items above since there has to be lines drawn between service that animals could give comfortably and the service that is exploitative.

This is not intended to say that the idea of citizenship follows the nature of political representation as in the idea of democracy. In the idea of democracy, political representatives are chosen by the majority whom the populace accept as ‘like themselves.’ This is not the nature of political representation for domestic animals. But how could it be said that humans could actually represent nh animals (since they are not nh animals) politically with fairness? This could again, be addressed by the argument of marginal cases. If humans could represent

⁴³⁴ Ibid., p. 122.

the rights of children and mentally-challenged humans, then they could do so for nh animals, given that humans are also animals and that clear-cut differences between species cannot be established. On the contention that humans are not nh animals because the former are considered more intelligent, then all the more, the argument works; it is precisely that humans are a more intelligent species that they have the moral responsibility and capacity to study the needs of nh animals that are said to be ‘mentally beneath them.’

For the citizenship rights of wild animals, Donaldson and Kymlicka propose the following items of concern:

1. Direct, intentional violence-hunting, fishing, and trapping; the kidnapping of animals from the wild in order to stock zoos and circuses, or to meet demand for exotic pet-keeping and trophy-collecting, or other wild animal body or body part uses; the killing of animals as part of wildlife management programmes; and harmful experimentation on wild animals in the name of scientific research.

2. Habitat loss-the continuous encroachment of humans (whether for habitation, resource extraction, or leisure and other pursuits) into animal-inhabited territory in ways which destroy habitat and deny animals the space, resources, and ecosystem viability they need for survival.

3. Spillover harms-the countless ways in which human infrastructure and activity impose risks on animals (from shipping lanes, skyscrapers, and roadways, to spillover effects like pollution and climate change). While the vast bulk of human impacts on wild animals are negative in one of these three ways, we can also imagine a fourth category of potentially positive impacts

4. Positive intervention-human efforts to assist wild animals, whether individual (e.g., rescuing a deer who has fallen through ice) or systemic (e.g., vaccinating a wild population against disease); whether in response to natural disasters and processes (such as volcanoes, food cycles, predators) or in an effort to reverse or prevent human-induced harms (e.g. rewilding and habitat restoration).⁴³⁵

To summarize this part, the current animal ethics discourse by the Abolitionist perspective represented by Francione and the Citizenship theory represented by Donaldson and Kymlicka problematized the following points:

On the issue of the animal’s right to their own life, welfare, and autonomy, the Abolitionist perspective, embanking on the principle of equal regard for rights between humans and nh

⁴³⁵ Ibid., pp. 156-157.

animals, contends that animals have the right not to be property. As long as humans are in control of their lives as the system of domestication operates, they will always be treated as property, not having the rights to their own welfare, life, and autonomy. The proposed solution to the present domestication of animals is to continue to care for them but eventually to unbreed them unto extinction.

The Citizenship theory contends that the project of unbreed-unto-extinction is not practically tenable but Abolitionism insists that it is possible if there should be a paradigm shift, even if the reversal takes thousands of years to implement. Abolitionism proffers a different solution that would be more realizable but nevertheless humane. Since Abolitionism makes a similarity between human slavery and that of animals, in the history of human slavery, the release of slaves need not entail returning them to their own countries. Similarly, returning all animals to their wild state is not necessary. What is necessary is the arrest of further abduction of wild animals and the humane treatment of presently domesticated animals. This humane treatment would be realized if state policy would accept the idea of establishing a legal citizenship for nh animals.

On the issue of dependence of domesticated animals, it had been said that from the perspective of the Citizenship theory, domestic animals cannot be said to be treated unjustly simply on the premise of their dependence upon humans. Interdependence is inherent in human relationships as it is in the nh animal world. The idea that dependency is pathological is gendered in psychological theory, espoused by the masculine worldview wherein independence is the standard but we know that there is no such thing as a relationship that runs totally on independence. The Abolitionist position would contend that the healthy dependence present in human relationships cannot be held on the same level as that of animals. Animals, unlike humans, do not choose their dependency and cannot break off from the relationships in situations of abuse. The Citizenship theory maintains that even if domestication of all presently kept animals would be abolished gradually in time, there still exists, the ethical obligation to intervene for the welfare of the vulnerable species in the wild, under the principle of reparative justice for climate change. In short, this intervention in wildlife still propagates domestication and that domestication is inevitable. It is not

dependence of animals that is at issue but the humane treatment of animals in all kinds of human-nh animal relationships.

The next topic at hand is to identify what Levinasian ethics have to offer regarding this issue about animal domestication. In my perspective, what is overlooked is that the discourse jumped immediately to the debate on nh animal welfare which encased the entire phenomenon of nh animal domestication within the framework of colonization. The debate, then, is whether to decolonize or to assure humane colonization of the nh animal. It overlooks the phenomenon that before domestication of nh animal, before the event of colonization, there was the event of ‘taming’ first, which is an invitation to a relationship, more than downright colonization. Budiansky establishes that it is a dog’s decision to consent to a mutual-benefit relationship with humans because they are biological ‘opportunists’ readily in search for new food sources. There is a way in which it could be viewed that what humans benefit from dogs outrun what dogs actually benefit from humans. Budiansky says:

But the success of dogs and cats in association with human society far outstrips any of these benefits to humans, even when the benefits are very broadly defined to include companionship. As much as we in the United States lavish care and affection and money on our pets, the reproductive success of the country's one hundred million dogs and cats outruns our generosity, witness the millions of unwanted cats and dogs that are killed each year in animal shelters. In most parts of the world, cats and dogs are looked on much less favorably; but even where they are considered vermin and are the targets of occasional extermination campaigns, they continue to flourish. Their survival has nothing to do with being rewarded for their utility to man. It has to do rather with their superb adaptation to human society. In many tribal societies, for example, dogs live in loose association with humans. They are not captively bred; there is no concerted effort whatever to select for any desirable characteristics. Yet they are clearly domesticated that is, they are not wild dogs that have been brought up from pups and kept as pets in the mode of the Indians' raccoons. In the case of the Beng people of Africa, the dogs appear to serve no useful purpose whatever they are not working animals, they are not even eaten. They are not pets, either. They are tolerated but are shown no affection. Biologist Raymond Coppinger observed a similar phenomenon in villages in the Andes, although there the villagers actually tried to run off the dogs, which on balance were considered a nuisance, biting people and spreading disease. Coppinger describes the relationship of dog to villager as one of social parasitism.⁴³⁶

But if the human benefit from dogs outrun what dogs actually benefit from humans, and similarly for dogs, if despite what they benefit from humans, cases of their maltreatment are

⁴³⁶ BUDIANSKY, Stephen. *The covenant with the wild: Why animals chose domestication*. New York: William, Morrow, & Company, 1992, pp. 35-36.

ubiquitous, and if despite all they continue to trust humans as in the case of Levinas's Bobby, then it may be possible to hypothesize that what underscores this all is a personal attraction of humans to some nh animals (and vice-versa) which is beyond biological need. But the above discourses did not discuss this personal attraction that I speak of between humans and nh animals. It is this attraction that I would like to discuss in Levinas's concept of eros.

4.3 EROS AND THE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ANIMAL

In this part, I intend to defend that there is such a phenomenon as personal attraction that develops into a significant relationship and that it summons its own unique ethics that precedes any discussion which jumps outrightly into issues of the nh animal's right to independence and welfare.

I would like to begin with a posting by the New York Times online about a news item regarding Pope Francis criticizing couples who prefer having pets instead of children. This is within the context of the demographic rates showing a global decline in birth rates.⁴³⁷ I am also presupposing that the Pope's criticism emanates from the Catholic view that the essence of the marital relationship is for procreation and not simply for relationship which also underscores the Vatican's stand on contraception. Opposite this picture, what I stand to prove here is the reality of mutual feelings of love between humans and animals, the negotiation of which could ascend to the level of what we would call 'committed significant relationships' parallel to that of the human-to-human, but also not quite like it.

There is hardly any philosophical material that recognizes and affirms this reality. It should receive merit as one among the human loves which bring joy and flourishing. The nh animal who has won the heart of the human (and vice-versa) becomes what society calls 'a pet' and my challenge is to show how this relationship is not at all a 'petty' experience. What I stand to prove is the idea that such relationship is not a trivial but a serious matter because it demands

⁴³⁷ POVOLEDO, Elizabetta. New York Times. Pope scolds couples who choose pets over kids. 6 January 2022 [viewed 16 November 2022]. *New York Times*. Available in: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/06/world/europe/pope-pets-kids.html>

a lot of responsibility on the part of the human to care for an animal (and a wild animal at that) who has come to love her. I think what the Pope said that pets replace children in the family is coming from a misunderstanding of what human-animal relationships are. For one thing, the human-animal relationship is not intended to replace the interhuman relationship. Couples having the disability to have and keep children are becoming rampant, but is prompted by biological, economic, and labor reasons, aside from the fact that in many cultures at present, people view procreation as a choice and not as an ethical responsibility that is incumbent on them once they marry or engage in a partnership. The elderly who live with companion animals do so to ease their solitude because their children have moved on and they have their own families. Single people live with companion animals but I presume that many of them are still connected to their original families and have a network of friends, as the elderly are. In Hal Herzog's survey of pet-keepers from the North Carolina veterinary clinics, he said that contrary to the presumption that single people who are lonely are most apt to get a pet, the study reveals that most of those people who keep pets are families with children.⁴³⁸ In addition, the law or the Catholic Church do not formally include pet animals in the definition of 'family,' but many families (and couples without children) do consider their pet animals as a family member and treat them inclusively as one in many family activities.

Herzog even claims that it is a myth to think that people want companion animals because they provide unconditional love.⁴³⁹ While dogs have a reputation for being 'man's best friend,' cats are quite questionable on that matter. For example, Jenn Gidman reported the story of Alice Alexander's Siamese cat, Ming, who lived with her family in New Zealand. It so happened that Ming had been living and oscillating secretly between two families, the other one being the Smith family, who named him Cleo. The two families fought as to whose family Ming/Cleo really belonged to.⁴⁴⁰ So there is this desire for a relationship with an animal even when the animal cannot commit to a committed and permanent relationship.

⁴³⁸ HERZOG, Hal. *Some we love, some we hate, some we eat: Why it's so hard to think straight about animals*. Toronto: HarperCollins e-books, 2010, pp. 77-78.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁴⁴⁰ GIDMAN, Jenn. Cat lives secret lives with two families. *USA Today News*. 2022 [viewed on: 16 November 2022]. Available at: <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/30/newser-cat-lives-secret-life-with-two-families/14860527/>

I intend to use Levinas's concept of eros in this task of affirming the reality of the human-nh animal significant relationship that precedes animal ethics's interrogation of animal domestication. To make way for a clearer trajectory, there are three terms that need defining: what is meant by 'significant' relationship with a nh animal, the term 'wild' and finally, what Levinas means by 'eros'.

We recall in Harry's narrative that he tamed Andre because the former wanted a diving companion. The significant relationship I am referring to is that with a nh animal subject that is an object of desire for human companionship, or one that is considered 'family.' Pets like dogs and cats classify under this category. The relationship is significant in the sense that one would spend the sacrifice of time, care, and effort of working out the relationship with this animal than all others out there. This means that this discussion precludes the CAFO animals that are used for meat, by-products, or labor even if there would be some amount of emotional ties between the nh animal and human keeper because that would put into ambiguity the purpose of the relationship. The kind of animal that I am interested to discuss is the one that had been intended, from the start, to live as a human companion. I would also prefer, as example, a wild animal because it would dramatize the aspect of the animal's consent to live with the human, given that they still have the disposition and capacity to prefer living independently in the wild. In a relationship with a formerly wild animal, it cannot be said that affectively, that this solely serves human interest, most especially when the said animal lives in conditions when he is mainly free to go as he pleases and not to return to his human caregiver. Andre is an epitome of this relationship because he was initially intended as diving companion for Harry, he embarked freely onto Harry's boat, and that he lived freely a life wherein he could choose not to return to the Goodridge family if he doesn't want to.

Since Andre is originally a wild animal, perhaps, it would be necessary to clarify first what is meant by 'wild animal' by its opposite – the tamed or domestic animal. The terms 'wild' and 'domestic' are muddled in their usage in the animal ethics context. Anna Peterson says "wildness and domestication are not absolutes, but contextual, shifting, and relational qualities, relevant not only for species but also for individuals and multispecies communities."⁴⁴¹ The reason for this is that in the view of the era of the Anthropocene, there

⁴⁴¹ PETERSON, Anna. *Being animal: Beasts and boundaries in nature ethics*. New York: Columbia University, 2013, p. 65.

is hardly any patch of wilderness that has not been invaded influenced by humans and as such, the wild/domestic cannot be understood anymore “as mutually exclusive but rather as positions in a continuum.”⁴⁴²

For the definition of ‘wild,’ I find Palmer’s categories most useful. Palmer understands the meaning of wild in three senses:

First, there is constitutive wildness which is understood on a wild/domesticated spectrum. The most frequent draw line between domestic and wild has been pointed out by Juliet Clutton Brock which is the animal’s being “bred in captivity [. . .] in a human community that maintains complete mastery over its breeding, organization of territory and food supply.”⁴⁴³ The other distinctions have been proffered by Nerissa Russell who said that “the most crucial thing about animal domestication is that ‘wild’ animals are converted to property.”⁴⁴⁴ This suggests that the animal had been conscripted to be utilized for some human purpose in which there is some kind of economic exchange. The animal is assured of food, lodging, and safety from predators in exchange of labor, such as the horse.

Palmer defines constitutive domestication “to refer to animals intentionally controlled by humans with respect to breeding, in particular by deliberate selective breeding [. . .] I will not include as domesticated either behaviorally tamed animals whose breeding is not selectively controlled nor animals that have co-evolved alongside people, without any deliberate human intervention, but that live successfully in human communities (such as the grey squirrel).”⁴⁴⁵ In this sense, feral cats and dogs are considered domestic because even if they are moggies (colloquial term for mongrel) their species have been picked out as companions for humans since the ancient times and their bodily constitution have evolved ever since, in order to adapt to their modernized living conditions. For example, their body size have become smaller than

⁴⁴² Ibid., p. 66.

⁴⁴³ CLUTTON-BROCK, Juliet. *The walking larder: patterns of domestication, pastoralism, and predation*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 21; PALMER, Claire. *Animal ethics in context*. New York: Columbia University, 2010, p. 65.

⁴⁴⁴ RUSSELL Nerissa. The domestication of anthropology. In: Rebecca CASSIDY and Molly MULLIN, eds. *Where the wild things are now: Domestication reconsidered*, eds. Oxford: Berg, 2007, p. 36. Ibid., PALMER, Claire. *Animal ethics in context*. New York: Columbia University, 2010, p. 65.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., PALMER, Claire. p. 66.

their wild ancestors, with smaller brains and teeth, such as the dogs that have evolved from wolves, or house cats that have evolved from the Eastern wildcat (*Felis sylvestris*) wildcats.

Second, there is locational wildness in which wildness refers to a place that is largely uncultivated, more or less, in opposition to urban space and its environs. Some examples of these spaces are the jungles, rivers and seas, the uninhabitable mountainous regions, and the arctic regions.

Third, dispositional or behavioral wildness refers to the temperament of animals in reference to their friendliness or animosity to human beings. In this sense, wild animals are those that exhibit fear and aggression toward humans and tame animals are those who do not.⁴⁴⁶

From the above three definitions, we could see combinations in many animals. For example, a grey squirrel is constitutively wild, has dispositional wildness (unless tamed and habituated with humans), but does not have locational wildness because of its proximity to the urban settlements. The feral cats and dogs that are born feral are considered domestic breeds; yet, they have no locational wildness even if they exhibit dispositional wildness. Dolphins are neither domesticated nor urbanized, yet, when considered in singular cases, have varying temperaments with regard to dispositional wildness. There are dolphins who generally evade humans, yet, quite a number have a behavior of following divers around and playing with them. In the case of Andre, he may be qualified as wild in terms of constitution and location. His dispositional wildness may be defended as present in terms of his species, since both Marky and Basil, who were his age resisted Harry when they were caught. The tame disposition of Andre toward Harry could be argued as inherent in his individual personality, but cannot be said to be a trait of his species. The above definitions for the terms ‘domestic’ and ‘wild’ animals would classify Andre as a mixed case. He is constitutively wild, with an inherent attitude of a tamed disposition, but lives independently in both wild and domestic locations.

I am characterizing this significant relationship as eros. This is the third term that needs defining. The Greek term *eros* is used to refer to romantic or passionate love. It is to be differentiated from *philia* because *philia* refers to affectionate love, the kind we like to refer to

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 64.

when we mean friendships. But it cannot be said that Andre is simply a friend of Harry in the sense that of having childhood friends or in the sense of having longtime classmates whom we consider as friends. Andre is considered a family member by the Goodridge family. He lives in the house of the Goodridge family (when he wants it), unlike friends in the usual sense who do not live under our roofs, unless there are special arrangements.

What is important to take note also is that by *eros*, I do not wish to refer to the sexual love (and so, I will not discuss the ethics of sex with animals) even if Levinas's phenomenology of *eros* uses gendered language in describing the attraction of the masculine toward the feminine. Whenever the word *eros* is mentioned, what comes to mind is the sexual act or coitus, that the erotic relationship is qualified as 'erotic' if coitus is an essential ingredient of that relationship. But I would like to stress that it is not the presence of coitus that characterizes a significant relationship. There could be sex without commitment, or even without basic feelings of attraction, just the 'itch,' as it were. Even in Levinas's phenomenological discussion of *eros*, what is highlighted is the courtship, the desire, the attraction, and the sensuality that accompanies that taming; it is not centered on the sexual act nor does it end with it. The end of Levinas's *eros* is not even the beloved but the beyond, the future of the relationship. Harry did not have a coital relationship with Andre and so it is useless to dabble on this discussion. What is prominent in Andre's story is Harry's efforts to tame Andre, that is, to win Andre's affections so that he would identify the Goodridge family as an outstanding affective relationship among other seals and other humans, to make him return to this family regularly, even if he is released in the wild, since he is still, biologically a marine animal.

The sexual that is implied in the *eros* also has to be understood in the larger sense. In psychology, the sexual includes the sensual which is touch and caress. Levinas has a phenomenology of touch and caress which will be discussed later. From this, it could be said that even parents who caress their children are said to have a sexual relationship with them, but not coital. It is the touch that identifies the significance of the relationship. Only family and accepted friends (significant beloveds) could be touched: all others are simply acquaintances and strangers.

In many spiritual theories, any kind of physical attraction is considered sexual, even attractions toward things and objects. The world is charged with the erotic element. A

popularly-read secular spiritual guru and psychotherapist, Thomas Moore, writes in his book *The Soul of Sex*:

As a psychotherapist, I discovered that the soul often manifests itself in the sexual areas of life. Many of the men and women who consulted with me over the years came with sexual concerns, which eventually were revealed as containers of the central mysteries of the person's life. In some ways sex is the façade of the soul, and when we deal with it thoughtfully, the whole interior cosmos comes into the foreground [. . .]

We are obviously a sex-obsessed society. Why make it worse? [. . .]

In response, I call upon Freud. He enunciated a principle I find useful: we display outrageously and obsessively that which we do not fully possess or have deeply at our disposal. If we are displaying sex with unseemly exaggeration and preoccupation, then we have not found the heart of sex and made it fully integrated part of individual and social life.

Given our obsession with sex, we need to get more of it, not in quantity but in quality. It's like a person addicted to junk food. He eats as much as he can because there is nothing there. If he were to eat real food-unprocessed, close to its earth origins, wonderfully prepared—he might leave the addiction behind.

We need more sex, not less, but we need sex with soul. ⁴⁴⁷

According to Moore, when there is no soul in sex, that is when the sexual relationship with the other becomes distorted. Moore presents in his book how the world is present to us sexually. For example, certain flowers like orchids resemble the vulva, which makes them attractive. The moon hiding behind the clouds presents a peeping-tom experience. The sea cucumber resembles the penis, and when plucked and rubbed, emits a semen-like serum. The sexual imagination feeds passion and meaning to the sexual life and from this, the sexual achieves a soulful dimension.

We now proceed to Levinas's idea of eros. There are three features of Levinas's eros which I intend to use in order to assess the ethical dimension of Harry's relationship with Andre. The *first* has to do with the alterity of eros. This means that the invitation for a relationship is an invitation that comes from the other, and Levinas attributes this to the physical attractiveness (the sensual term that Levinas uses is exorbitant materiality) of the beloved.

⁴⁴⁷ MOORE, Thomas. *The soul of sex: Cultivating life as an act of love*. Harper Collins Publishers: New York, 1999, pp. xii - xiii.

Love aims at the Other; it aims at him in his frailty [faiblesse]. Frailty does not here figure the inferior degree of any attribute, the relative deficiency of a determination common to me and the other. . .

And yet this extreme fragility lies also at the limit of existence "without ceremonies," "without circumlocutions," A "non-signifying" and raw density, an exorbitant ultramateriality [. . .]

Ultramateriality does not designate a simple absence of the human in the piles of rocks and sands of a lunar landscape, nor the materiality that outdoes itself, gaping under its rent forms, in ruins and wounds; it designates the exhibitionist nudity of an exorbitant presence coming as though from farther than the frankness of the face, already profaning and wholly profaned, as if it had forced the interdiction of a secret. The essentially hidden throws itself toward the light without becoming signification.⁴⁴⁸

A prominent approach of Levinas is that his thought is always grounded on the physical but that there is an otherness that points to something more than the physical. I take it that the 'exorbitant materiality' is intended to mean an erotic temptation that starts as a physical attraction but offers a glimpse of something more than physical that cannot be put in language. Fashion gurus, when choosing their supermodels call this the 'X-factor.' The X-factor reaches out to the lover in a tempting fashion and reveals something attractive that cannot be named. This X-factor is featured in the 1998 romantic comedy film *There's Something about Mary* which stars then, the very sexy Cameron Diaz who attracts a lot of men helplessly to her, but they cannot say what it is about her that captures them.⁴⁴⁹ Levinas also characterizes this X-factor as something that is fragile, though not in the sense of weakness, but a delicateness, a tenderness that is too beautiful for a world that is coarse and savage.

Here, I would like to recall Levinas's description of the attractiveness of the animal. A great part of the animal's appeal is its innocent vulnerability and a childlike spontaneity. He said in the interview by his students:

But there is something in our attraction to an animal...In the dog, what we like is perhaps his child-like character. As if he were strong, cheerful, powerful, full of life. On the other hand, there is also, even with regards to an animal, a pity. A dog is like a wolf that doesn't bite. There is the trace of the wolf in the dog. In any case, there is here the possibility of a specific phenomenological

⁴⁴⁸ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 256.

⁴⁴⁹ THERE'S SOMETHING ABOUT MARY. [film]. Directed by FARRELLY, P. & B. U.S.A.: 20th Century Fox, 1998.

analysis....Children are often loved for their animality. The child is not suspicious of anything. He jumps, he walks, he runs, he bites. It's delightful.”⁴⁵⁰

Nearly all people would express an attraction for a particular animal (otherwise, zoos will not exist) and the fact that Harry had been taming several kinds of animals in the whole of his life implies this X-factor. People fall in love with animals and they cannot understand why or why is it that they sometimes prefer them over people, or why is it that even if they live with their families, they still would need companion animals. The unnameability of the X-factor explains the unpredictability of this erotic event happening to anybody. Clive Staples Lewis says in his book *The Four Loves* that the fatality about falling in love is that it is always the case that at the moment the lovestruck examines if she is in love or not, the affection is already there.⁴⁵¹ No one knows how it happened and what triggered the attraction. In many cases of falling in love and being in love for a long time, many people claim that they cannot understand the reasons why. Eros is prior to the unity of consciousness. In the same way that Levinas says that the face ambushes and holds us in hostage, the myth about the naughtiness of Cupid striking anyone is also true in the erotic relationship. Levinas says, “The supreme adventure is also a predestination, a choice of what had not been chosen.”⁴⁵² Levinas said this to subdue the Platonic myth of eros in the tale of one soul cut in half and so the two halves are predestined to find each other again as soulmates; thus, the popular belief of love as a search for one's soulmate in a past life. Levinas is antipathetic to the search for unities because it is implicative of the search for Being and the pursuit of ontology which is colonization of otherness toward the selfsame. Levinas understands eros as a personal attraction that originates from alterity, the dimension of infinity, which has come to wound and expand the selfsame of the 'I' toward difference.

To prove the attractiveness of the animal which captures the human beyond reason, I will inject here the fatal attraction of Timothy Treadwell, an American bear enthusiast who lived

⁴⁵⁰ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. The paradox of morality: An interview with Emmanuel Levinas. *The provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the other*. Robert BERNASCONI and David WOOD, eds. London: Routledge, 1988, p. 171.

⁴⁵¹ LEWIS, Clive Staples. *The four loves*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1960.

⁴⁵² LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 254.

among grizzly bears for 13 summers in Katmai National Park in Alaska. The story may be familiar because it had been adapted into the 2005 film entitled *Grizzly Man*.⁴⁵³

In his memoirs, Timothy confesses to being a difficult child. He recounts the first time he became a champion for animals when he clobbered a couple of kids toying with bucketful of frogs and smashing them one by one. His father, desperate to provide him an interest which may give his life a direction, was the one who encouraged him to go to Alaska to explore and meet the bears.

Timothy did meet the bears and it was frightening for him but he noticed that upon sight of him, they scampered away. He assumed a history of violent encounters between bears and humans which indeed, was confirmed later in his research of Alaskan bears. But he was filled with an obsession to “live with them.” In some initial close encounters with some juvenile bears, he tried to calm himself by singing and verbally talking “nicely” to them and he noted that bears tend to relax when the human is relaxed. Mastering his fears, Timothy succeeded getting up close and personal to some bears. The following is his description of the first bear whom he befriended:

The bear was a vision, a perfect creation that appeared to have materialized from an artist’s canvas. The shiny, golden, shaggy coat was flecked with blonder tips that glittered in the warm light. The eyes were well spaced on a face that was broader than of most grizzly brown bears. The triangular eyes stood up pertly, and were tufted with fur, like that of a lynx. Within twenty feet of me, the animal stopped and sat down, peering toward me. I was ecstatic! I wasn’t afraid, only that my presence might spook the bear. I was melting with love for the perfect animal.

“Good day, beautiful bear! Please don’t be afraid. I would never harm you. You look like an angel,” I said, overcome with emotion. “I love you!”

As I poured out my heart, the bear relaxed, and seemed to be enjoying the moment. Rambling on, I temporarily forgot about crossing the river. Suddenly, a name for the bear came to me. “You’re just a little ‘Booble,’ aren’t you? I said to the golden bear. “I love you, Booble.”⁴⁵⁴

In that moment, Booble went for a swim and Timothy followed him to the freezing river psyching himself up that he was a grizzly and so he endured the ice. When Booble got out of

⁴⁵³ GRIZZLY MAN. [film]. Directed by Werner HERZOG. U.S.A.: Lions Gate Films, 2005.

⁴⁵⁴ TREADWELL, Timothy and PALOVAK, Jewel. *Among grizzlies: Living with wild bears in Alaska*. New York: Niagara, 1997, p. 26.

the water and waggled off, Timothy imitated him. Following the behavior of bears, he did befriend a couple more bears whom he saw often: there was a white bear whom he named Beacon, brown giant fully-grown bears whom he named Warren, Hulk and Hefty. Timothy joined them in digging up clams on the beach. There were other sub-adult browns whom he named Windy and Mickey, and Holly. But Booble became his favorite and the subject that prompted his ethical conversion. He writes:

My stay in the Grizzly Sanctuary had led me to some serious introspection. As I watched Booble work, my heart ached. I felt sadness, hope, and the desire for redemption. Most of all, I truly wanted to help all bears. Yet deep down, I knew that alcoholism owned my soul. All my promises, pledges, or covenants were worthless. Yes, out in the wild I was clean and sober. But once back in civilization, I knew that alcoholism would overcome me. No person, program, or support group would ever help. As Booble mined the sea floor, I begged her for help.

“Booble,” I pleaded, tears rolling down my cheeks, “I’ll never really be your defender because I can’t stop drinking. I’m such a loser.”

The beautiful animal edged closer, radiating happiness and contentment. She leaned into the sand, shoveling with abandon next to me. Soon, her entire right limb was buried inside her latest clam hole. I could hear the air move in and out of her lungs. In that moment, we could not have been more vulnerable. Booble trusted me with her life and I trusted her with mine. I begged forgiveness from a higher power, then made me pledge: “I will stop drinking for you and all bears, I will stop and devote my life to you.”

Booble watched me calmly, then did something extraordinary. With a playful swat, she flipped a clam shell over to me. Elated by the action, I picked up the shells and stuffed these treasures into my pocket.

Many years ago, when I saved a bucket of frogs on the banks of a pond, an eco-warrior was born. Now, on a faraway beach, my battle for preservation truly began.⁴⁵⁵

Timothy developed a sense of trust and communication with bears and for this, he broke many of the park’s rules regarding proximity with these wild animals. As an environmental activist, he took many videos of the grizzlies, spoke for their cause over media, and gave educational lectures about them to children. History has it that in 2003, Timothy and his girlfriend were attacked and killed by prowling bears while camping out in the park.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 40-41.

The common reaction to the above may be the preachy dogma never to trust wild animals because they will always be savage. But what this research is sniffing on is that despite the reputation of ‘beastliness’ in wild animals, there are humans (the number is legion) who would risk their lives to get close to a wild animal because they cannot resist this personal attraction: the animal’s love is worth living and dying for - this is how deeply humans could fall in love with animals. For the common people, what they saw in Timothy’s obsession with the bears is plain stupidity but for those who understand the love for and of animals would see this in a different light: the bears gave Timothy’s wayward life a sense of direction and he devoted his youth creating videos of his encounters with the bears, lecturing in eco-camps for children, in an educational campaign for the public to conserve and protect them. There are many confessional testimonies such as these: how animals gave meaning and direction to people’s lives. James Bowen, for example, authored a book entitled *A Street Cat named Bob*, published in 2016, to relate his journey and testimony of how taking care of a stray cat veered him away from drug addiction.⁴⁵⁶ James’s life with Bob became a film in 2016 with Bob himself in the starring role.⁴⁵⁷

Going back to the story of Harry and Andre, we may measure the erotic attraction of Andre toward Harry to the extent of the burden he had to carry just to abduct the seal. Everyone would say that this act of abduction is ruthless, and considering the fact that it is the third time that Harry did it, with Marky and Basil dying from the process. I will not deny that it is. But that demonstrates how strong is the attraction, that Harry had to endure his guilt just to do it, which happens to many married people who indulge in illicit relationships. I am not saying it is just and ethical, but it is also hard to be judgmental about this. Some people do it trivially, but some people are not able to resist it and bear it seriously with conscience. They bear the guilt because they cannot find it in their will to stop the attraction. In the overall assessment of Harry’s character, while it could be claimed that what he did with Marky and Basil is not right, it still cannot be said that he is an ‘evil’ or ‘perverted’ person who simply abducts animals, nor is he an animal-hoarder. It is also difficult to judge his case with Andre in the context of his guilt with Marky and Basil. He has established that his taking Andre from the

⁴⁵⁶ BOWEN, James. *A street cat named Bob: How he saved my life*. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2012.

⁴⁵⁷A STREET CAT NAMED BOB. [film]. Directed by SPOTTISWOODE R. United Kingdom: Stage 6 Films, Shooting Script Films, Prescience, Iris Productions, & The Exchange, 2016.

wild is a different case from his abduction of Marky and Basil. Andre freely went along with him. Harry also succeeded in giving Andre the protection from human harm. The testimony to this is the way the townspeople approved his relationship with Andre, i. e., the way they fought for Harry as their harbormaster when his position was threatened, and the way he was awarded for promoting tourism for Rockport with Andre as town mascot. The most important testimony to Harry's significance to Andre is that he was free not to return to the Goodridge family but he did. He did again and again. Andre, having then an orientation that humans are kind, would have chosen another family to go home to. We also learned from the story that Andre exhibited an attraction for Elray. But it was not said in the story that he goes home and sleeps in Elray's house because for one thing, Elray found him a nuisance but it does establish that animals also are capable of being attracted to humans.

The *second* feature of Levinas's notion of eros is that of the process of wooing. It takes place in an interval of 'clandestinity' and 'revelation,' which in simpler terms, I take it to mean a gradual unfolding of a shy beloved toward a persistent lover. It had been mentioned in the previous chapter in the ontology of eating that in Levinas, need is different from desire. Eros is desire; it aims at the ungraspable, the not-yet. This is the way he describes it:

"Being not yet" is not this or a that; clandestinity exhausts the essence of this non-essence [. . .] It refers to the modesty it has profaned without overcoming. The secret appears without appearing, not because it would appear half-way, or with reservations, or in confusion. The simultaneity of the clandestine and the exposed precisely defines profanation. It appears in equivocation. But it is profanation that permits equivocation – essentially erotic – and not the reverse. Modesty insurmountable in love, constitutes its pathos. ⁴⁵⁸

Touch aims at being whereas caress ventures for the not-yet, the ungraspable within the graspable. Touch is an attitude of claim and entitlement whereas caress is tender and cautious because its joy lies in the glimpse of the fleeting.

The caress aims at neither a person nor a thing. . . The caress aims at the tender which has no longer the status of an existent, which having taken leave of "numbers and beings" is not even a quality of an existent. . . The tender designates a way, the way of remaining in the no man's land between being and not-yet-being. ⁴⁵⁹

[. . .]

⁴⁵⁸ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 257.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

The relations with the Other are enacted in play; one plays with the Other as with a young animal [. . .]"⁴⁶⁰ (p. 263).

[. . .]

The movement of the lover before this frailty of femininity, neither pure compassion nor impassiveness, indulges in compassion, is absorbed in the complacency of the caress.

The caress, like contact, is sensibility. But the caress transcends the sensible. It is not that it would feel beyond the felt, further than the senses, that it would seize upon a sublime food while maintaining, within its relation with this ultimate felt, an intention of hunger, that goes unto the food promised, and given to, and deepening this hunger, as though the caress would be fed by its own hunger. The caress consists in seizing upon nothing, in soliciting what ceaselessly escapes its form toward a future never future enough, in soliciting what slips away as though it were not yet. It searches, it forages. . . The desire that animates it is reborn in its satisfaction, fed somehow by what is not yet [. . .]⁴⁶¹

In human affairs of the erotic, what Levinas refers as intervals of ‘modesty’ and exposure or ‘profanation’ appears as the process of wooing wherein the lover pursues the beloved and discovers the secrets of the beloved, making her all the more desirable, as the pursuit of the mystery that surrounds her continues. This unending mystery in the beloved stokes the spark of desire of the lover. When applied on human-nh animal affairs, the wooing is translated as the process of taming the nh animal. As known by many ethologists, the process to tame many wild animals is at first to respect territorial distance. One should first simply sit from a distance, be available to the animal on the scene at regular times, and to let the familiarity invite the animal to approach on his own terms. As the distance becomes proximate, the wild animal then, allows the human to touch him. And this is what makes Levinas’s notion of eros most especially applicable to animals. The way to tame many animals is by caress and many animals love to be caressed. It is the language of love and trust. The mark of trust that the animal’s heart had been won over is when they allow ‘petting’ or being caressed. Levinas had been most critical about the description of caress; it is not just any touch. The caress is a touch that does not grasp; it lets the other be in her otherness. In cats, this is most especially important. When the touch toward the cat feels like ‘grasping,’ most cats move away or bite at the hand. The caress is the image of Levinas’s ethics of eros: it is the boundary of the ethical.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 263.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., p. 269.

The erotic relationship is only sustained in its eroticism when the caress remains tender and does not grasp or appropriate the otherness of the other into the selfsame.

Applying the poetics of caress on the affair of Harry and Andre, the question here is precisely, in what ways did Harry not possess Andre and let him ‘consent’ to the relationship? I could note two responses to this. The *first* had already been mentioned, that Andre lived as a free seal, to oscillate between the civilized and wild habitats. When Andre was imprisoned by Harry during his first winter, when Harry worried that he did not know how to migrate to warmer areas and at that time, he has not figured out how to do this, Andre broke the glass window to show his rebellion and escaped from the house. He was free never to come back, but he did. Furthermore, when Harry placed him in winter aquariums, he was freed to the vast open seas but he always came back to the Rockport bay and visited the Goodridge family.

The *second* is the relationship of play in which the Goodridge family members taught Andre some games and antics. In ethological studies, animals do play with conspecifics and interspecifics. The consent to play is a sign of consent to a relationship because it is not forced and consists of repetitive actions. The repetition of the activity is a sign of the pleasure experienced by both parties. It is not only with the Goodridge family that Andre showed his antics: he also demonstrated it with the townspeople and that is how he became a town mascot. Andre was never forced to do it and Harry also mentioned that eventually, as Andre grew old, he performed these tricks less and less, and that he actually had to protect Andre from these people who would force him to perform, like the politicians who used him for their political campaigns.

The strongest contention about animals becoming significant partners to humans, is again, that they cannot enter into the deepest transaction of ‘sharing secrets’ that I have spoken earlier because then, what do animals have to reveal about their past? They do not share the same language and cannot measure up to humans in terms of reason. But here’s the catch. What proves that there could be such transaction of intimacy is that some (and a lot of) animals could play with humans. In fact, the surest way to tame any wild animal is through play. That the nh animal could play in leisure is an indication that not everything in the animal’s life is riveted to survival, in opposition to Levinas’s impression of animals. The play between human and animal is the way in which both players discover each other’s likes,

dislikes, tolerances, limitations, strengths, vulnerabilities, thus, an orientation about how to treat the other in the way the other welcomes it. Levinas writes:

Here lies the very lasciviousness of erotic nudity – the laughter . . . which brings us to an order where seriousness is totally lacking. The beloved is opposed to me not as a will struggling with my own or subject to my own, but on the contrary as an irresponsible animality which does not speak true words. The beloved, returned to the stage of infancy without responsibility-this coquettish head, this youth, this pure life “a bit silly” –has quit her status as person. The face fades, and in its impersonal and inexpressive neutrality is prolonged, in ambiguity, into animality. The relations with the Other are enacted in play; one plays with then other as with a young animal. ⁴⁶²

Gordon Burghart defines animal play across species: “Play is repeated, incompletely functional behavior differing from more serious versions structurally, contextually, or ontogenetically, and initiated voluntarily when the animal is in a relaxed or low-stress setting.”⁴⁶³ The repetitious behavior is to be distinguished from such acts as self-biting or tongue-lolling primates that manifest as pastimes but are expressed by anxious animals such as those who live in prolonged containment. In as far as they are signals of distress, they cannot be considered play. On the same line, it could also be asked here: why play and not food offerings? Food offerings correspond to need. Wooing the animal with food offerings shade the line between agape and eros. The animal’s consent to play is a consent to be wooed because it takes place not in the context of need but relaxation and leisure.

Here, I would like to inject Hans Georg Gadamer’s philosophy of play because of its special features of the interpretive process of understanding, the wild abandonment of the self into the playful fray, the unselfing process that goes along with it, and the transformation of the self that is the effect of it.

Play is Gadamer’s metaphor of the interpretive process of understanding. According to Gadamer, the essence of play is the to and fro movement.⁴⁶⁴ The mark of having played a good game is when both players lose themselves and begin to be carried by the buoyancy of this rocking movement, in which both subjects emerge refreshed and recreated. In a similar

⁴⁶² Ibid., p. 263.

⁴⁶³ BURGHARDT, Gordon. *The genesis of animal play: Testing the limits*. Cambridge: Bradford Books, 2005, p. 82.

⁴⁶⁴ GADAMER, Hans Georg. *Philosophical hermeneutics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, p. xxiii.

way, the dialogical process of understanding is enabled by an openness to the other, when one does not insist on one's rules on how to play the game nor winning the game but the unselfing process in which one gives of oneself in the creative process of play. The new horizon of meaning belongs to neither to the subjects involved but is a creation of the both of them that contributes to the universal world of language and knowledge but also effectuates a metanoia of the very subjects themselves.

There is no doubt that interspecific play manifests and attests to the play of language. Ethological data shows that the world of animal play is governed by an established routine of behavioral signals that each animal has learned to read non-symbolically. For example, for animals to play, they have to understand gestures that solicit play and to recognize the play mood in the other. Since a lot of social play between animals imitate predatory, anti-predatory, and mating behaviors, they have to distinguish between play fight and the real fight, play mate and the real mating. Within the process of playing, they also have to capture and make sense of behavior in nuances and overt gestures when the play is being 'too rough' on the other or how to give off signals of 'wanting to end the play.'

Marc Bekoff, for example, writes:

The canid 'play bow', a highly ritualized and stereotyped movement that seems to function to stimulate recipients to engage (or to continue to engage) in social play...When performing a bow, an individual crouches on its forelimbs, remains standing on its hindlegs, and may wag its tail and bark. The bow is a stable posture from which the animal can move easily in many directions, allowing the individual to stretch its muscles before and while engaging in play, and places the head of the bower below another animal in a non-threatening position. ⁴⁶⁵

Bekoff further explains that play bows are more frequent at the beginning and middle of play. Other gestures that arouse play could also be rapid approach-withdrawal movements, exaggerated pawing on the face of the other, head waving, and low-grunting. Canids learn the difference between the play bites where teeth do not sink and the aggressive bite with head shakes. There is also a difference between playful mounting and sexual mounting. Playing with an animal teaches the human to shift gears from verbal speech to body language. The trade of secrets need not be personal narratives but an exposition of vulnerability by revealing

⁴⁶⁵ BEKOFF, Marc. *Animal play: Evolutionary, comparative, & ecological perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 105-106.

secrets about what gestures, activities, and body parts could be stimulated in order to incite play, but inversely, what behaviors and touches on the other hurt, which incite fear and anger. These secrets could be used against the animal but the animal trusts that they would not be. When the animal enters into play with the human, the lack of formal human language between them expose both parties to the risk of misinterpretation and thus, unsolicited negative emotions and reactions; thus, it becomes a ritual of ‘getting to know each other’ which cannot take place unless there is a surrender of trust. An animal cannot play with a human with whom he feels unsure, and may proffer trust in gradual doses of play, until he is certain that the human has good character and intentions.

The *third* feature of Levinasian eros is its essential orientedness toward an open-ended future. This is the way he describes it:

The caress aims at neither a person nor a thing. It loses itself in a being that dissipates as though into an impersonal dream without will and even without resistance, a passivity, an already animal or infantile anonymity, already entirety at death [. . .]

But precisely in the evanescence and swoon of the tender the subject does not project itself toward the future of the possible. The not-yet – being is not to be ranked in the same future in which everything I can realize already crowds, scintillating in the light, offering itself to my anticipations and soliciting my powers. The not-yet-being is precisely not a possible that would only be more remote than other possible. The caress does not act, does not grasp possible. ⁴⁶⁶

[. . .]

Hence Eros is a ravishing beyond every project, beyond every dynamism, radical indiscretion, profanation, and not disclosure of what already exists as radiance and signification. Eros hence goes beyond the face.

The relationship between lovers in voluptuosity fundamentally refractory to universalization, is the very contrary of the social relation. It excludes the third party, it remains intimacy, dual solitude, closed society, the supremely non-public [. . .] ⁴⁶⁷

Nothing is further from Eros than possession. In the possession of the Other I possess the Other inasmuch as he possesses me; I am both slave and master. Voluptuosity would be extinguished in possession. But on the other hand, the impersonality of voluptuosity prevents us from taking the relation between lovers to be a complementarity. Voluptuosity hence aims not at the Other but at

⁴⁶⁶ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 259.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

his voluptuosity; it is voluptuosity of voluptuosity, love of the love of the other . . . I love fully only if the Other loves me, not because I need the recognition of the Other, but because my voluptuosity delights in his voluptuosity, and because in this unparalleled conjuncture of identification in this trans-substantiation, the same and the other are not united but precisely – beyond every possible project, beyond every meaningful and intelligent power – engender the child. ⁴⁶⁸

There are two implications from all the quotes above. *One* is that Levinas acknowledges that even if the ethical is the highest level of life and existence, Levinas goes against the temptation to interpret this as universal altruism that regards personal loves as ‘selfish.’ This makes a statement on the nature of being human. The human cannot live solely on the level of the ethical as the highest good. She needs affection and intimacy which cannot be objectified by systems. We only need to imagine, for example, the extreme opposite of having to live in a perfected communist society wherein no one is allowed any personal relationship in order to idealize universal and egalitarian love. Margaret Atwood’s dystopic novel, *The Handmaid’s Tale*, presents a picture of this. Gilead turns out to be a totalitarian society in which the choice of personal relationships and even of family is not allowed. What is offered in significant relationships is a continuous partnership with someone who becomes a regular purveyor of infinity in an otherwise, self-oriented and limited life.

Two is the element of voluptuosity. In its fatal attraction toward possessiveness, the erotic relationship has a tendency to become promiscuous. The ethical check that this does not become promiscuous is the aspect of voluptuosity, a richness in en fleshed life (or that it leads to a growth or a flourishing of the quality life) that is afforded by the open-endedness of the relationship. This could be interpreted in simple examples. In the legal marital relationship, it is said that a document binds the couple to each other but even this document, in reality, is never binding. The marital life is still open-ended to dissolve itself and find other loves. This is why the system of divorce exists. In fact, the freedom that one experiences in significant relationships is what makes these relationships thrive. The open-endedness of the relationship is the purveyor of infinity within the exclusivity of circle of loving. The erotic or significant relationship is oriented toward an open-ended future which cannot be determined. Eros seeks the shared otherness that is recreated in both lovers. Again, this is not supposed to mean a joining of two or half souls, as normally understood in an erotic union and in the Platonic

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 266.

notion of eros. The beloved is not absorbed into the selfsame essence of the lover nor vice versa. There is a third region of otherness that is created by loving in which both the personal egos of both parties dissolve and turn beyond themselves. That loving relationship has a life of its own, a flourishing, which has an outpour toward the larger community, but which, still remains exclusively sustained by the lovers.

I would like to apply Levinas's aspects of open-endedness and voluptuousness in the significant relationship between Harry and Andre by pointing out two areas.

One is the essential unpredictability and impermanency in keeping a wild animal. We had seen that even in Harry's relationship with his other pets in the past, they had been free to come and leave, and that he accepted the grief of losing many of them permanently. It could be said that Harry had been open-ended in the relationship in the sense, as had already been mentioned earlier, that he would welcome Andre's decision never to come back to him and not to force him to become a domicile pet. But in the consent to free Andre to the wild also demanded of Harry to be prepared for problems he never imagined nor planned for, but which 'he took as they came.' Harry's care for Andre was unrelenting love from a distance. For example, we knew that in befriending Andre, he simply wanted a diving companion. He never imagined the sticky situations that Andre would put him into. For example, the fact that Andre became tame toward humans posed problems. Andre loved to flop and sunbathe in boats and for those who did not know him to be the town mascot, they would freak out. He mentioned in his book that he always had to appease these people whom Andre 'attacks,' that he had to inform and teach them simply to slat Andre so that he would go away. He never anticipated the extent to which Andre had become so sociable, that he would go around to entertain people, and that he would eventually become an official town mascot. For this, he had to ward off opportunists like politicians who intended to use Andre for their popularity campaigns. Harry did not anticipate how he would handle Andre's needs to migrate to warmer regions during winter in Rockport. For this he transferred Andre to aquariums every winter. But in his desire to let Andre live the wild life, he allowed him to swim on his own back to Rockport, which posed great perils to the life of Andre and to his own emotions. For this, Harry had to solicit the support from the press to survey Andre's migratory whereabouts every year. Harry did not anticipate that later on, he would receive federal raps for owning a 'wildlife pet' in

which his position as harbormaster had also been threatened. But he also never anticipated the overwhelming public support that affirmed the significant relationship he had with Andre.

Two, I wish to point out in Harry's conduct of the relationship which makes for open-endedness and voluptuousness is his confession of culpability about what happened with Marky and Basil, which is an avowal of guilt, an exposure of the fracture in his character. He also confessed to the fact that for a while, he tamed seals for aquariums for a fee, until he could no longer stand himself. The confession resists the ego to control the conclusive meaning of his own autobiographical narrative. The truth is that Harry could have kept this morbid detail from the public in order to make his fairy tale with Andre flawless. But in confessing this in the autobiography, he showed honesty. He risked public judgment on his reputation, and at the time the book had been published, the discourse of animal ethics had been more prominent.

To encapsulate, the unique import of Levinas's concept of eros is that when applied to the animal, it helps us to realize that there is also such a thing as a human-nh animal significant relationship and that the significant other need not always be human. The significant relationship between humans and nh animals is not a petty thing and reveals deeper meanings:

1. that the erotic is not underlined by the coital but by affective intimacy and desire for exclusivity, that humans experience a fatal attraction to nh animals and are willing to work and even die for the altar of this kind of love;

2. that taming animals involve caress and play which are indicators of the animal's ethical consent and enjoyment to enter into a relationship (and stay for companionship) with the human;

3. and, that the proof that this significant relationship is not a selfish promiscuous possession is that it remains open-ended which the human consents to addressing whatever future challenges the relationship may bring and this includes a possible exit of the nh animal from the relationship.

However, it is also important to note that the ethics of this relationship is incumbent only on the human and not on the nh animal. This means that even if the attraction starts from the animal, the host of the relationship is still the human. As such, the human lover is charged

with a responsibility to care for the nh animal while he is within the keeping of the human but is not the same for the other nh animal.

4.4 NOT LOVE OF FUR BUT FUREVER LOVE

We arrive at the ultimate part in which we confront the question about Harry: is it ethical to tame a wild animal? The main merit of the entire discussion on Levinas's eros is that it changes the structure of the original interrogation. Since it has been acknowledged in eros that nh animals are included in the typology of human loves as a significant relationship, the question is not anymore if it is ethical to tame a wild animal or not but what is ethical and not ethical in the taming. This is not to say that there is nothing wrong in the domestication of animals. Domestication is not supposed to be understood as taming. As afforded by the enlightenment from Levinas's eros, the first dog who came home to share human hearth had been tamed, an inevitable attraction that is elicited primarily by the alterity of the animal. Domestication is a system of totality or that it eventually became a modern system which branched out to include the CAFO and the breeding of animals for entertainment and labor. This was not the case of Andre. It cannot be said that Levinas, then, would support domestication of animals but that what he acknowledges is that the fatal attraction to animals that comes from alterity is inevitable. However, taming is a choice of the human and that it is possible to form significant relationships with a nh animal following the ethical limits from the concept of eros.

It is important to outlay the conclusions within the context of climate change because this is the current scenario. It has been mentioned that part of eros is the attractiveness toward the vulnerability of the animal and its fragility in a hostile and barbaric world (as created by the Anthropocene). This plays a prominent role in the rescue of wild animals and in the formation of wild animal ethics. It is not possible to rescue and protect all species that the Anthropocene has affected and this is why taming the animal is a genuine consideration and should ethically become a part in ethological studies. Again, we are talking here of taming and not domestication, the wooing of the animal into a personal, significant partnership with the human. The reason is that taming is indispensable is because those animals that could be

tamed could be rescued and cared for in sanctuaries. The Anthropocene is inevitable and more and more animals will come into the care and protection of humans and so taming wild animals cannot be a total and downright evil. But this is never talked about in the issue of personal relationship with animals.

My perspective on this is that on the one hand, Francione is right in saying that the system of domestication of animals, if viewed from objective totality, turned out as a system of control and colonization of animals; but on the other hand, if viewed from the subjective sense of eros, even from within the system of domestication, there are still significant relationships that are underscored by the ethics of eros. It should be stressed that even within the present situation of domestic companion animals, Levinas's ethics of eros could still operate: the red lights of caress and face still hold if the needs of wild animal companions for good food, play, warm sunshine, are provided, and that they should never be neglected or abandoned. These are all rudimentary in the flourishing of the animal, the basics of which start from the language of their bodies.

What is a more important application of the movement against ego is that the demand of the open-endedness of eros is not to envision ends but to go with the flow of the discourse of the times, most especially that the utmost concern is climate change. For example, because of natural disasters and wars that may increase in time, it may be found later on that keeping pets is uneconomical and impractical so the unbreeding-unto-extinction may become a natural direction of things in the future: it does not have to be forced as a totalitarian system. The focus of economics and social participation may turn toward the survival of threatened species. But this again, will prompt the proliferation of another kind of human-animal significant relationships as well as new systems of colonization. It does not make sense to unbreed-unto-extinction as a result of the utopic vision that nature is pristine and that we should return to that paradise; that the only way to be kind to animals is not to be involved with them in any way. In the present crisis of climate change, leaving animals to themselves may be a more tyrannical way of treating them.

The prospect of open-endedness may actually be exciting but not without risks and dangers. For example, one scenario for panda bears is that there may be some success in releasing them into the wild but not in the way originally imagined by scientists. They may be hybrids of

domestic and wild, like Andre. Panda bears may be prowling around and become neighboring animals that squirrels were. It may be that their diet may evolve to include plants that are beyond the bamboo. It may be that they would need human assistance for installing winter coves or water sources for their survival if they live within urban environs. They may be free to come and go, just like Andre. We do not know what evolutionary changes may hold for the animal. It would be exciting to see that more intimate human and animal interaction may finally teach some species to speak: like Savage-Rumbaugh's apes may advance beyond lexigrams, or that Pepperberg's parrots may speak human language with precision. This is fantastical but what would really be more appreciated as a movement away from human ego is the evolving of the human to become more attuned toward animals, like a new era of Mowgli. The sense of being animal would finally inform the truth-seeing of the sciences and that Mowgli will also give rise to a *hundred secret senses* as Amy Tan has termed it in her novel with the same title—like the way gifted individuals such as Daniel Kish and Lucas Murray exhibited capacities for echolocation. The five senses are not all that we could ever have – animals could teach us more ways of seeing and living. Perhaps, Nietzsche had been right after all that the way to truth is to follow the animal instinct. Perhaps science will resurrect the theory of Anton Mesmer, that mesmerism or being attuned to the cosmic rhythm of the animal could be the new alternative medicine.

It is possible that the future may call for an end to all systems of domestication and the abuse of animals that go along with it but what is not possible is to end the taming of the animal and the significant relationships that emanate from human-animal encounters and they need not be the pet-keeping as we understand it now. The meaning of that is an open parabola. There is no way to install systems of surveillance that would keep animals and humans separated and isolated from each other. We are all animals that share one planet.

Chapter 5:

Filiation of a Shared World with Nonhuman Animals

5.1 POLAR BEARS EATING . . . GARBAGE?

In February of 2019, the polar archipelago of Novaya Zemlya (NZ), surrounded by the Arctic Ocean, received an unwelcome visit from dozens of polar bears who marauded the residential areas of Belushya Guba. The *AP News* noted that the villagers were ‘delighted but wary’ as the bears nosed around homes and buildings and literally chased people around. The local folk, nevertheless, had a grand time stealing candid photos and video footages of the bears with their cellphones. One woman who had sighted a female bear with two cubs cheered on, “Thank you! It’s so cool! We have seen polar bears. Bye, baby, bye!”⁴⁶⁹

Jane Dalton wrote in *The Independent* that Aleksander Minayev, deputy head of NS, declared a state of emergency on February 9.⁴⁷⁰ It used to be that the police patrols utilize signals to ward off bears but these animals have lost their fear of them. George Steer noted in *Time* that parents were afraid to leave their homes or send their children to kindergartens and so fences had to be installed around as safety measures.⁴⁷¹ On the same online page of *Time* were posted the video footages of Alec Luhn and Peter Murtagh showing the starved bears helping themselves on a heap of garbage.

⁴⁶⁹ Polar bears invade Russian town: Locals delighted but wary. *AP News*. [online] 12 February 2019. [viewed date 27 November 2022]. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/49eebede48684ba9b5d861e61897a757>

⁴⁷⁰ DALTON, Jane. Russia may shoot dead 52 polar bears “invading” village homes as sea ice melts. *The Independent*. [online]. 11 February 2019. [viewed date: 27 November 2022]. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/russia-polar-bear-invasion-shoot-dead-novaya-zemlya-hunt-climate-change-a8771906.html>

⁴⁷¹ STEER, George. State of emergency declared as polar bears invade Russian town. *Time*. [online]. 11 February 2019. [viewed date: 27 November 2022]. Retrieved from: <https://time.com/5526741/polar-bears-russia/>

The local administration head, Vigansha Musin said "I've been in Novaya Zemlya since 1983 [...] There's never been such a mass invasion of polar bears."⁴⁷² Since December of 2018, at least 52 bears had been spotted prowling around the islands with around 6-10 staying constantly on the territory.⁴⁷³ Russia considers the polar bears as vulnerable species and hunting or killing them is prohibited. The *AP News* reported that among the actions considered by the Russian officials were "relocating the dump that gives the bears a banquet and removing the bears. The scientists coming from the national natural resources agency will be equipped to sedate the bears and haul them away." The authorities have contemplated culling as a desperate measure should the bears become aggressive.⁴⁷⁴

The different news sources which reported the above phenomenon in Novaya Zemlya all pointed to climate change as the explanation for the polar bears's invasion of human settlements. In order to understand this, we need to review some background about the nature of this beautiful arctic animal.

5.1.1 The Polar Bear

It would be fitting to provide a background of the nature of the polar bear to understand the ecological predicament of this beautiful species. The polar bear (*Ursus maritimus*), otherwise known as the sea bear, is a pagophilic (ice-loving) terrestrial mammal that thrives in the arctic regions. According to Jon Aars, Øystein Wiig, and Erik Born, the polar bear is a recent species that evolved from the brown bears who inhabited the Bering Strait region, probably 250,000-400,000 years ago, and later on adapted to a life in the Arctic.⁴⁷⁵ This white bear species is an

⁴⁷² JOHNSTON, Ian. Manhattan project-sized effort is needed to create artificial arctic ice to prevent climate catastrophe. *The Independent*. [online] 20 December 2016. [viewed 27 November 2022]. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/manhattan-project-make-arctic-ice-artificial-stop-climate-change-global-warming-geoengineering-arizona-state-university-a7486796.html>

⁴⁷³ Russia islands emergency over polar bear 'invasion.' *BBC News*. [online] 9 February 2019 [viewed on: 27 November 2022]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47185112>

⁴⁷⁴ Polar bears invade Russian town: Locals delighted but wary. *AP News*. [online] 12 February 2019. [viewed date: 27 November 2022]. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/49eebede48684ba9b5d861e61897a757>

⁴⁷⁵ WIIG, Øystein; JON AARS and ERIK BORN. Effects of climate change on polar bears. *Science Progress*, vol. 91 (2008) nr. 2, p. 152.

apex predator that relies on sea ice for hunting, mating, traveling, and resting.⁴⁷⁶ The melting of the polar caps due to global warming has remarkably decreased the amount of sea ice and this affected the polar ecosystems on which these white bears depend on. The decline is described in the following data:

The change in temperature during the 20th century and into this century has had profound effect on the polar bear prime habitat, the Arctic sea ice. The amount of sea ice varies through the year: from about 14 million km² in March to about 7 million km² in September. Since 1978 passive microwave sensors on satellites has made it possible to detect overall trends in the extent of sea ice. During the period 1979 to 2006 the annual sea ice area in the Arctic decreased by about 3.2%/decade. The decrease was larger in summer (September = 8.9%/decade) than in winter (March = 2.5%/decade).⁴⁷⁷

The movement of the polar bears toward terrestrial land is prompted by the scarcity of food. Polar bears prey on ringed seals, bearded seals, belugas, narwhals, walrus and occasional fish and birds for food. The sea ice serves as their platform for hunting. The hunting season takes place in spring until early summer and the newly-born seal pups resting on the sea ice make prime food targets. These bears have an enormous appetite. A polar bear who has a 200 kg body mass needs to consume 2 kg of blubber a day.⁴⁷⁸ Polar bears need to fatten up on meat to make them survive throughout the winter hibernation. The diminishment of sea ice pushes them to retreat from the ice habitats and forage somewhere else in the terrestrial regions.

Food scarcity takes a heavy toll on bear reproduction. A typical female bear gives birth from one to three cubs between late November to early January. The cubs suckle from her milk which is composed of 50% fat, taken from her stored nourishment during the hunting season. When she emerges from the winter dens, she is desperate to replenish her health.⁴⁷⁹ The increasing scarcity for food places a high mortality rate for cubs. Cubs die from starvation, drowning, and hypothermia, or from being killed by adult male bears. In the western Hudson Bay where the highest numbers of fecundity have been recorded, mother bears successfully wean their young until 1.5 years (instead of the normal 2.5); the survival rate does not go

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 153.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 157.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 154.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 155.

beyond 44%.⁴⁸⁰ In the late 1980s through the 1990s, there had been a notable decrease of body mass of 4.7 kg per year among the pregnant mother bears which led to a drop in fecundity. Aside from this, polar bears have a behavior of fidelity to denning areas but since these ice-packed dens have declined, it prods them to migrate elsewhere, thus upsetting their reproductive processes. For example, there had been denning areas in the Hopen island of Svalbard. In the fall of 1999, when the ice did not come until near Christmas, the bears did not also arrive and thus, there were no dens.⁴⁸¹

In the last 10-15 years, there had been a delay of ice freezing in spring and so the bears from the Southern Beaufort sea and Chukchi are moving away from the Arctic toward the coastal habitats where the seals abound. According to Lindsay Card, the bears travel at a great distance which make them burn more energy only to pick up smaller and non-dietary prey.⁴⁸² In the Alaskan coast in the southern Beaufort sea, polar bears have also been observed feeding on bowhead whale carcasses that are wastes from human whaling activities.⁴⁸³ In the Arctic settlement in Kaktovic, scientists have seen thin and hungry bears foraging on whale bones.⁴⁸⁴ When the bears cross over to the land area, their prospects do not give them more favorable conditions. In the early 1990s, the Inuits of the Eastern coast of Baffin Island, Eastern Canada as well as those of the opposite side of Baffin Bay, Greenland, have noticed the increase of bears near the shores and on land that is synchronous to the diminishment of sea ice. The inhabitants of these areas thought that the population of bears have increased, which of course, encouraged hunting for poachers and the killing of bears who threaten and attack humans.⁴⁸⁵

The most pressing question that arises is surely: what could be done for the polar bears? This chapter will aim to understand the ethical considerations that should be in place in deciding the best approach for polar bear assistance. This part ventures to ruminate, through the

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 160.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., p. 161.

⁴⁸² CARD, Lindsay. Polar bears. *Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law*, vol. 34 (2018) nr. 1, pp. 171.

⁴⁸³ WIIG, Ó, AARS, J. & BORN, E. Effects of climate change on polar bears. *Science Progress*, vol. 91 (2008), nr. 2, p. 160.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 172.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 159.

perspective of Levinas, the moral considerations that prompt responsible action not only for polar bears but for all wild animals that are refugees of human-induced climate change. I will move in three segments: the *first* discusses the current discourse on the suffering of wild animals under climate change and the ethical perspectives that prompt their rescue; the *second* presents the conflicting ethical perspectives that motivate the strategies of rescue, and *third*, identifying the blind spots that are not covered by the conflicting ethical perspectives that motivate the rescue strategies and discussing how Levinas's concept of filiation would enlighten them.

5.2 THE DISCOURSE OF WILD ANIMAL SUFFERING UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE

This part intends to present a thread of the discourse of wild animal ethics in the context of climate change. Before dealing with the complex issue of wild animal ethics under climate change, there should be an initial confrontation with the human accountability for this problem as it is anthropogenically caused.

The issue of climate change is a complex one. For example, that people who lived during the onset of modern industrialization have foreseen some short-term effects of their activities but not long-term effects such as climate change. In this sense, they cannot be said to be responsible for an unforeseen harm. Clare Palmer cites John Nolt's argument that to be responsible for a harm demands four factors: "we must be able (a) to cause or prevent a harm, (b) to recognize it as morally significant, (c) to anticipate it with some reliability, and (d) to act in less harmful or more beneficial ways."⁴⁸⁶ Palmer says that while the deceased generations may not be held responsible for climate change, the present living generations, especially the industrialized countries, meet all of the four requirements and therefore do owe some compensation to wild animals who have become refugees from climate change. Palmer also assumes that this compensation is understood as an urgent responsibility in an earth

⁴⁸⁶ PALMER, Claire. Climate change, ethics, and the wildness of wild animals. In: Bernice BOVENKERK and Josef KEULARZ, eds. *Animal Ethics in the age of humans: Blurring boundaries in human- animal relationships* Cham: Switzerland, 2016, p. 132.; also in NOLT, John. Nonanthropocentric climate ethics. *WIRES Climate Change*, vol. 2 (2011) nr. 5, pp. 701-711.

locked in a greenhouse effect, given that the squabbles of nations over the distribution of (and even avowal to) moral responsibility would take a lot of time. On top of this, even if some decisions have been made by some nations, the implementation would still take some amount of time.⁴⁸⁷

In Palmer, the moral compass that guides wild animal ethics in climate change is the aspect of vulnerability which has variable meanings depending on context. She uses the three kinds of human vulnerability according to Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds and applies them to animals: general vulnerability, which are inherent to embodiment, i.e., hunger, disease, etc.; situational vulnerability, i. e., social and environmentally-mediated threats which includes those induced by climate change, i.e., forest fires; and, pathogenic or new vulnerabilities that arise from attempts to address already existing vulnerabilities, i. e., loss of hunting skill due to regular feeding.⁴⁸⁸ To add to this, she adds the term ‘reducing dispositional vulnerability’ to mean reducing individual animals’s susceptibility to climate harm.⁴⁸⁹

5.2.1 Duties to Wild Animals that are Casualties of Climate Change

Palmer treats tediously the issue about duties to wild animals affected by climate change. She identifies two perspectives regarding this: the rectificatory justice and the beneficence perspective. Palmer defines the principle of rectificatory justice from the animal rights perspectives as “it is better to avoid inflicting harms than to rectify them when they occur.” Following this, to arrest climate change-inducing activities would be the ideal scenario. In Palmer’s view, it is unlikely that nations would make drastic moves for this in the near future. So Palmer re-contextualizes rectificatory justice as “assisting occurrently animals actually harmed by climate change and reducing dispositional vulnerability of other wild animals by

⁴⁸⁷ PALMER, Claire. Assisting wild animals vulnerable to climate change: why ethical strategies diverge. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 38 (2021), nr. 2, p. 3. [online]. Available at: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14685930/2021/38/2>

⁴⁸⁸MACKENZIE, Catriona; Wendy ROGERS and Susan DODDS. Introduction: What is vulnerability and why does it matter in moral theory? In: Catriona MACKENZIE, Wendy ROGERS and Susan DODDS, eds. *Vulnerability: New essays in ethics and feminist philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 4.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

insulating them from the threat.”⁴⁹⁰ By the word ‘occurently,’ I take it that Palmer means “as they occur.”

There are two degrees of aid referred to. *One* is a drastic intervention for the directly affected animal, i.e., bringing a particularly sick animal to the vet. *Two* refers to an oblique intervention by addressing the source of threat for a group of animals, i. e., daily refilling an oasis with water for wild animals during drought. Threat does not only refer to the elemental threats of climate change but could also refer to accidental human-wild animal encounters that could spark violence. For example, an extended form of rectificatory justice would be to remove attractants (i. e., garbage) in villages and to create feeding areas within spaces in the wild to make them stay there rather than having to kill them when they invade towns and attack the human inhabitants. To note, feeding the polar bears by villagers is not encouraged by environmentalists because it encourages their dependency on humans and cultivates pathogenic vulnerabilities.

Palmer defines the beneficence perspective as: “reasons or duties to assist wild animals from non-anthropogenic causes.”⁴⁹¹ Palmer differentiates between duties of beneficence from duties of justice in the rectificatory perspective. Duties of beneficence arise from needs of animals that are not caused by moral agents. Duties of beneficence for wild animals that are harmed from non-anthropogenic causes is a highly debatable area. The idea is that since the harm is not caused by a human, there is no reason to intervene. Palmer admits some beneficent duties for some reasonable situations that do no harm to both human and wild animal.⁴⁹² For example, when male polar bears fight over a female and one male is left flayed, there is no positive duty to intervene in the fight and defend the disadvantaged because this is a naturally “wild affair.” But say, the victorious bear leaves and the coast is clear, the humans who saw the event, if they are capable and have the means, could opt to assist the injured bear. Palmer accepts only rectificatory justice as duties to wild animals but reserves beneficence duties only when the situation makes such aid reasonably possible, i. e. wildlife

⁴⁹⁰ PALMER, Claire. Assisting wild animals vulnerable to climate change: why ethical strategies diverge. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 38 (2021), nr. 2, p. 5. [online]. Available at: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14685930/2021/38/2>

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁹² Ibid.,

personnel who are equipped to give aid have beneficence duties, but not an untrained civilian.⁴⁹³ This agrees with the Kantian exhortation “I can, therefore, I ought.”

She defines three attitudes toward the problem of wild animal-assistance under the beneficence perspective that correspond to degrees of the Laissez-Faire Intuition (LFI). There is the strong LFI which means neither to harm nor to assist animals, i. e., blocking the predator from the prey; the weak LFI in which there is no presumptive duty to assist but permissible to extend some help if one has the expertise and means, i. e., bring an injured animal to the vet who had been left alone injured from an unknown precedent event; and the no contact LFI, in which there is no presumptive duty to assist, but that it is permissible to help in a way that does not allow direct contact with the animal (entanglement with the animal may generate special obligations to assist), i. e., putting wooden planks across the river to enable deer to easily cross.⁴⁹⁴ She mentions that Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka admit also beneficence duties as long as the actions respect the autonomy of the wild animal.⁴⁹⁵

In the ensuing part, we shall see the interplay between the rectificatory justice and the beneficence perspectives. While there exists the need for rectificatory justice to compensate wild animal suffering from general and situational vulnerabilities under anthropogenic climate change, the beneficence perspective moderates that responsibility in consideration of pathogenic vulnerabilities that naturally arise when the nh animal casualties are handled by humans or transferred to another habitat or ecosystem which would certainly effectuate new interrelations that are conflictual with other nh animal co-habitants.

5.2.2 Strategies for Wildlife Aid

Palmer discusses three possible strategies for helping wild animals affected by climate change: rescue and rehabilitation, restoration of habitat, and assisted migration. She analyzes

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ PALMER, Claire. *Animal ethics in context*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 68.

⁴⁹⁵ PALMER, Claire. Assisting wild animals vulnerable to climate change: why ethical strategies diverge. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 38 (2021) nr. 2, p. 6. [online]. Available at: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14685930/2021/38/2>; KYMLICKA, Will and DONALDSON, Sue. *Zoopolis: A political theory of animal rights*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

that in all of these strategies, while the rectificatory justice could come up with technologies of rescue, the duties of beneficence depend on an analyses of general, situational, and pathogenic vulnerabilities that may arise in the animals that are being helped.

I will proceed by discussing three climate change strategies on different animals to see the divergence between the rectificatory and beneficence approaches depending upon the variable play of vulnerabilities and imagine how these strategies may apply to polar bears. It is assumed that the following considers only the weak and no contact LFI from the beneficence perspective.

5.2.2.1 Rescue and Rehabilitation

Palmer gives the example of Hurricane Harvey which is induced by climate change.⁴⁹⁶ In such a situation, rectificatory justice demands that humans should rescue the bobcats from the floods because the source of the havoc had anthropogenic causes. But the conflict may come in when ethicists taking the beneficence perspective may bear the view that these bobcats have already been seen as an aggressive species in a particular habitat and that letting them die in the flood (or euthanizing a number) may actually be a way of protecting the vulnerability of the bobcats's future prey that have currently greatly diminished in number. In short, even if competent rescuers may have the training and means to rescue some bobcats, they may opt not to interfere and let nature take its course.

Similarly, a tension between the two perspectives may be seen in the case about the polar bears. We are working on the platform here that the melting of the polar caps that have forced polar bears to migrate to human villages in search of food have anthropogenic causes and while it is impossible to rescue all affected animals under the effects of climate change, there exists some expertise and technology to help these animals. From the perspective of rectificatory justice, an approach may be to establish a polar bear sanctuary to ensure the conservation of this species and eliminate the threat of impending extinction. But it may clash with the beneficence perspective when seen in the long-term view of domestication: the

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

disability to release these animals in the wild because they have lost the natural ability to hunt and defend, thus, giving rise to a species of human-induced pathogenic vulnerability.

5.2.2.2 Habitat Restoration.

Palmer uses again the example of Hurricane Harvey which had salinized the freshwater in the feeding marshlands of the Aransas Wildlife Refuge that is being used as a habitat of endangered whooping cranes. Rectificatory justice may be implemented in terms of repairing freshwater wells or extending coastal marshland for these birds.⁴⁹⁷ But from the beneficence perspective, taking into consideration that these whooping cranes have a selective diet and their increase in numbers may bring massive deaths to selected prey species, what is thought as compensation would actually turn out to increase suffering on a massive scale not only for prey animals but also to the predators who will run out of prey, which eventually subjects both predator and prey to general vulnerability of starvation and disease.

As of this writing, I have not known any bold project to restore the sea ice for the polar bears but Ian Johnston wrote in *The Independent* about the idea of a very ideal and enormously expensive project:

Wind turbines could be used to create more sea ice in the Arctic in a massive geoengineering scheme on the scale of the Manhattan Project, scientists have said. . . They said this could be done by using wind power to pump water from below the existing sea ice to the surface, where it would freeze more readily.⁴⁹⁸

The above pertains to the enormously-funded and politically-supported Manhattan project that enabled the US to produce the first nuclear bomb. In terms of concept, it is do-able, but financing is another question. This project, would, of course, be encouraged by the rectificatory perspective but possible reservations from the environmentalists taking the

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁹⁸ JOHNSTON, Ian. Manhattan project-sized effort is needed to create artificial arctic ice to prevent climate catastrophe. *The Independent*. [online] 20 December 2016. [viewed 27 November 2022]. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/manhattan-project-make-arctic-ice-artificial-stop-climate-change-global-warming-geoengineering-arizona-state-university-a7486796.html>

beneficence perspective may consider looking into the undue disturbance of the installation and the pumping operation of the turbines to the marine animals.

5.2.2.3 Assisted-Migration.

Palmer uses the example of the American pika who lives on the elevated heights of the talus rock slopes of the American west. Climate change made these pikas suffer from chronic heat and hyperthermia. These animals have limited abilities to self-relocate. The rectificatory plan is to move them to other cooler rocky ridges. But beneficence concerns would point to the fact that pikas are very sensitive to human handling and a great number may die from it. Those who survive, nevertheless, still have to withstand the challenge of biologically re-adjusting in a social life against other animals who presently thrive in the new habitat, since pikas, though not carnivorous, are greatly territorial animals.⁴⁹⁹

Imagining a similar scenario for the polar bears, David Cox writes that a team of scientists led by Andre Derocher from the University of Alberta proposes migrating the arctic bears to the Norwegian bay region. Derocher says:

The Norwegian bay polar bears are genetically unique. If they're the only bears to survive in the wild, they may lack the genetic diversity needed to stay healthy over the long term. "If you don't have a diverse population, you run the risk of animals not having the adaptability to deal with a disease, for example."⁵⁰⁰

To address this problem, Derocher and his fellow scientists think it might be necessary to relocate polar bears from other parts of the Arctic to the Norwegian bay region. The animals would be shot with tranquilizer darts and then transported north by aircraft for release.

Derocher advises the transport of juvenile bears instead of adults because the latter are more attached to the former habitat. If ever this would be carried out, predictably, the beneficence

⁴⁹⁹ PALMER, Claire. Assisting wild animals vulnerable to climate change: why ethical strategies diverge. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 38 (2021) nr. 2, p. 11. [online]. Available at: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14685930/2021/38/2>

⁵⁰⁰ COX, D. Scientists hatch bold plan to save polar bears. *Mach*. [online] 26 February 2018. [viewed date: 28 November 2022]. Available from: <https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/scientists-hatch-bold-plan-save-polar-bears-ncna851356>

perspective would have its critical eye on the social impact of introducing a new set of bears to the already existing bear populations at the Norwegian bay region. A possible conflict would also be the increased predation on the whales in the bay, considering that whales are also diminishing in number.

The ensuing section will identify the ambiguities within the discussion of the ethics of wild animals in climate change which Levinasian ethics may address.

5.3 THE RED LIGHTS FOR MORAL CONSIDERATION

Having discussed the above approaches on wild animal ethics in climate change and their application on the case of the polar bears, I would like to point out three significant aspects that have been overlooked which Levinas's concept of filiation may be able to enlighten.

5.3.1 'These Bears' or 'The Bears'?

First, is clear from the concept of rectificatory justice that humans who are the moral agents that caused climate change owe the polar bears some recompense for their starvation. The recompense must be to save all of the bears affected but granted that this is an impossible task, then what could be done should be to save at least, some polar bears, such as the ones who invaded the village dumpsites of Novaja Zemlya. The recompense is that, being unable to save all the bears who are doomed to perish under climate change, one at least, saves the species line by conserving a number of bears. In other words, the continuing line of future individual bears, could at least be (however shortchanged) compensated for the lives of the individual number of bears who had died of starvation.

Palmer articulates the problem of the moral status of 'saving a species:' "I want to focus on a different reason that's sometimes given for protecting the polar bear species, independently of its cultural or ecosystemic importance: that the polar bear species has some kind of a moral

status in itself.”⁵⁰¹ I presume that this question surges against the background of evolutionary theory that as ecosystems change to adapt to climactic disturbances, some species die and new species emerge. If some species naturally survive the climate change (as the cockroach did in the past), they (and their progeny will) evolve to adapt to the mainstream climactic conditions. In short, nature simply takes its course whatever damage the human race does to the environment. So what is the sense of saving a particular species such as the polar bear? Why not just let the species die (which need not be interpreted that humanity does not regret the climate change) and let new species emerge in their place? Why make the effort to do interventions which may possibly turn out, anyway, to be experimental and detrimental later on to the rescued animals?

But the way Palmer explains her question emerges from the need for a logic if a species has any claim for rights as a group right. It has already been clarified from the animal ethics discourse why animals have rights and interests (as individuals) but what is not clear to Palmer is how animals can have group rights ‘as a species’ in the same way that people as a group could have women’s rights or LGBT rights.

Could endangering a species, or rendering it extinct, be thought of as destroying something of moral importance, irrespective of its usefulness to ecosystems or to human beings? Can we make sense of the idea of a “species harm,” and if so, what would this mean?⁵⁰²

The idea is that ‘species’ is abstract. Only individuals in a group have interest when they are in *terra firma*. It cannot be said that future animals that are not yet born have interest, and so they have rights. Palmer, for example, imagines scenarios such as the following:

So for instance: suppose we knew of a species that had only one hundred remaining sentient individuals, and that for a species to avoid extinction, we would need to carry out distressing hormonal treatment, invasive surgery, egg development, fetal transplantation, and so on, on all of them. As a result, all of them would suffer, and some might never fully recover. We can still, it seems, make sense of saying that this would be “in the interests of the species,” even though it is not in the interests of any single existing individual (each of these existing individuals, indeed, has been harmed). For, if a species has any interests at all, surely one of them must be in continuing to exist over time.

⁵⁰¹ PALMER, Claire. Harm to species –species, ethics, and climate change: The case of the polar bear. *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy*, vol. 23 (2014) nr. 2, pp. 588.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 589.

[. . .] Would a species be really doing better by being composed solely from organisms with miserable lives, rather than by becoming extinct? Is there any situation in which it would be better for a species to become extinct than to continue to exist? We generally accept that a living sentient organism can be in such terrible unrelenting pain that it would be better off dead; but since a species qua “individual” can’t experience anything, it’s not obvious how the pain of all the individuals that compose it could count as an argument against its continued existence.⁵⁰³

To conclude the above, Palmer states that the notion of ‘species harm’ is already obscure in itself and much more obscure to say that ‘the species have a moral claim’ for continued propagation. Perhaps, it had been understood within the human claims as a group in the same way as children have rights against abuse or that the Jews have rights against genocide. So Palmer analyzes it in the subjective and objective sense to see how different it is from non-human animals, if the latter make that claim:

Two distinct clusters of argument have been made. The first cluster I’ll call subjectivist arguments. On this account, harms can only be inflicted on groups whose members have an appropriate subjective relationship to one another, to the group, or to both, in particular when its members in some sense subjectively identify with the group and derive meaning from their relationship with the group.

[. . .]

The second cluster of arguments is what I call objectivist. Those who adopt one of this cluster of arguments, while not necessarily denying that appropriate subjective relations can constitute a group vulnerable to harm, maintain that this is not necessary; group harms can be inflicted from outside without the requirement that such subjective relations must hold within the group. It is sufficient if (i) the group is readily “picked” out by those outside the group and (ii) individual group members are regarded or treated in particular ways by non-members because of their group-membership, so that the group can be said to have an “identifiable status.”⁵⁰⁴

The above questions if animals at all (or what species of animals) feel that ‘bondedness as a species’ when harmed by other species, or that even if they do not feel that ‘species bond,’ they feel or understand that if they are harmed as individuals within a group by an external group or individuals, the attack is aimed at their ‘identity as a species.’ In short, do animals or certain species of animals feel or understand ‘species bond’ or ‘species identity’ in any way that humans do? And, going back to the main point for this part, if animals do not have a

⁵⁰³ Ibid., pp. 591-592.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 596-597.

grasp of ‘species bond’ or ‘species identity’ or the ‘interest of a propagation of their species,’ then what is the moral sense of rescuing the species of polar bears from extinction?

5.3.2 Do They Need to be Wild?

Second, it runs implicitly in all the strategies discussed for the rescue of wild animals that the guiding value that tests the success of the rescue is to be able to help animals in such a way that does not affect their wildness. For example, rehabilitation centers for the breeding of polar bears could only be deemed successful if the progeny could be released back to the wild. Habitat restoration most especially those requiring installations of technology should be done in such a way that the rescued wild animals and their relations to other animals within the ecosystem should be able to maintain their wild ways of living as much as possible, to the degree and characteristic in which they were formerly found before the rescue. Similarly, in assisted migration, the care for the predator-prey balance of the new ecosystem in which the rescued wild animal is transported should not effectuate into one species becoming a pest and wiping out all the others because this would eventually lead to extinction of the weaker species. If this happens, for example, to the polar bears, when their prey goes extinct, then the need for assisted migration repeats, and that the bears will migrate elsewhere again by themselves toward human-occupied territories in search for food, winding up in a vicious circle. For this matter, Palmer asks why the environmental value standard should maintain wildness of wild animals. She comments:

Animals themselves can have no conception of their own wildness, however wildness is understood; and loss of their own or others’ wildness is not something animals themselves directly regret. But many people value the wildness of wild animals, and would regard any reduction in animal wildness caused by climate change as a loss of value in the world. So two key questions here are whether climate change is likely to reduce, or to compromise, the wildness of wild animals; and if so, whether we should be ethically concerned about it.⁵⁰⁵

To define the concept of wildness in question, Palmer does not pose the sense of wildness here in terms of dispositional wildness, that is understood within the wild-tame matrix or the

⁵⁰⁵ PALMER, Claire. Climate change, ethics, and the wildness of wild animals. In: Bernice BOVENKERK and Josef KEULARTZ eds. *Animal Ethics in the age of humans: Blurring boundaries in human- animal relationships* Cham: Switzerland. 2016, pp. 136-137.

animal's attitude of amiability toward the human. She characterizes wildness in terms of the wild animal's independence from the human, the ability to forage, find shelter, and defend the self against predators without human aid nor interference. This means that the 'sin' of anthropogenic climate change on animals is that it removed their independence from human aid, which may be interpreted as a loss of their personal dignity or, that depending upon the artificial props installed by humans within their habitat for them to survive, some of their natural ways have been modified, i.e., adjusting to new diet that they may not find favorable, being threatened by a new species around them that they may not have learned ways to protect themselves from. Palmer works out her question using two definitions of wildness: constitutive and self-willed wildness:

Constitutive wildness, then, can refer to (at least!) three different things: (a) not being selectively bred, (b) not being adapted to live alongside humans, or (c) not being adapted for human use or purpose.

[. . .]

However, in the case of animals, self-willed wildness can be related to an idea of animal agency—specifically animal agency in the context of freedom from human constraints. More specifically, for an animal to be self-willed is for it to be free from human or “civilizational” constraints in expressing or fulfilling essential capacities, behaviors (often species-specific ones) and, in species where this applies, purposes and desires. So, for instance, wolves hunt and live in family groups; being free to do this is part of what it is to live as a wolf. Wolves in zoos that are unable to hunt and don't live in family groups aren't able to express these essential capacities and behaviors, and to that extent aren't wild in a self-willed way; their behavioral options are limited.⁵⁰⁶

Returning to the earlier question: why should wildness be valued? Palmer replies that it is to acknowledge that there should be limits to human mastery and domination. But she argues that such concept is objectionable, and that there must be greater reasons for this that are pertinent to the nh animal. She considers, for example, the reasons that lie within the discourse of animal welfare. The loss of wildness should be valuable pertinent to the nh animal's welfare, and not only for reasons of curtailing the scientific ego or for guarding the integrity of the animal which is interpreted as freedom from human tampering.⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 140-141.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 145.

Much work on animal welfare argues that what matters is how animals subjectively experience the world, not whether they are free to perform natural behaviors. If animals' natural behaviors are constrained, but this constraint doesn't negatively impact on how the animals concerned actually feel, then these constraints don't matter [. . .]⁵⁰⁸

From this view, Palmer claims that there should not be any worry about the effects of self-willed animal wildness effectuated by climate change because the higher value of animal welfare within a newfound wildness had not been lost. In short, the self-willed wildness of the wild animal need not be lost either under climate change or under humanly-managed rescue conditions as long as the animal has well-being. But then, she also acknowledges that a perfectionist account of animal welfare is also not clear.⁵⁰⁹ For example, when a rescued animal had been introduced to new conditions, isn't the adjustment to a new habitat or diet discomforting in itself? What if only some animals could be able to adjust and some could not, or struggle miserably to? Could the overall survival of the animal be an indicator of the welfare (if compared with death) but under stressed conditions, could this still be considered 'for the welfare of that animal?'

In the event that the above could not also be resolved, Palmer simply accepts that wildness is a generally accepted value that should be preserved and so moves on to articulate two ethical approaches to this cause: the broadly consequentialist and the broadly deontological approaches. She states:

The consequentialist understands wildness -value as something we should try to promote or maximize, and accepts that it's permissible or even required to sacrifice wildness in one place or time if by doing so we can get as much more wildness elsewhere or in the future. A deontological approach to wildness value on the other hand, respects and protects what wildness there is, and attempts to prevent its reduction and loss; on this view, it's not permissible to sacrifice wildness in one place or time in order to increase wildness elsewhere or in the future.⁵¹⁰

Palmer employs certain examples to demonstrate the above approaches. An example she gives in the consequentialist approach in constitutive wildness is a situation wherein one less wild population replaces a wilder population, i. e., feral cats replacing wild shrews. If climate change diminishes the food resources of feral cats and induces them to advance toward

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 146.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 146.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

regions where shrews thrive so that these feral cats could prey on them, should there be an initiative to prevent them from doing so in order to save the population of the much wilder shrews? Another example would be the captive breeding of shrews that are becoming extinct. If captive breeding would not diminish constitutive wildness, then would that kind of rescue be rendered effective?⁵¹¹

An example of the deontological approach in constitutive wildness would be to protect the existing wildness value of currently existing particular animals rather than placing value in maximizing wildness of other animals in other places or in another time. In this sense, for example, a Coloradan hiker who values wildness in American pika cannot be persuaded to lose them if promised that in their exchange, some project could be worked upon the increase of wild red foxes somewhere the numbers of which could be greater than the pikas.⁵¹²

An example of the consequentialist approach in preserving self-willed wildness is the captive breeding of certain animals to implement facilitated adaptation which refers to genetically modifying animals to become biologically less affected by climate change. This would mean that the confinement of a certain number of presently existing animals would have their self-willed wildness sacrificed for the sake of a future progeny. This progeny would survive climate change with more comfort than their ancestors who had been confined and thus suffered for genetic modification.

The best way in the deontological approach in conserving self-willed wildness is to stop the harms caused by anthropogenic climate change. But given that reversing climate change on the level of national policy is a tall order, then the most practical approach is to explore ways to lift the constraints caused by climate change on the natural behaviors of animals, i.e., teaching geese how to migrate.

Summing up, the specific aspect of ambiguity opened up for discussion here is why wildness is a value and what is missed out when the approach to wildness is analyzed in the dual matrix of the consequentialist and deontological approaches.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., pp. 146-147.

⁵¹² Ibid., p. 148.

5.3.3 How Much Knowhow is Required to Help?

Third, what needs sorting out is the underlying reservation of the beneficence perspective that inasmuch as rectificatory justice requires that there should be help extended, in view of the fact that the strategies for intervention to help animal wildlife cope with climate change are all experimental, how much knowledge and expertise would justify the implementation of a robust action and what amount of lack of knowledge would necessitate the *laissez-faire* option, that is, to leave the wild to its own evolutionary course? The nagging issue is that the strategies conceived may lead to consequences that may be fatal and so it may turn out we are actually worsening the situation of animals than if they had been left alone in the first place. We return to the issue that we didn't know any better when we invented our machines, that centuries later, the world would eventually land in climate change, so what makes us claim the right to intervene now with the fate of animals, even if it had originated from our wrongdoing?

Palmer explains that utilitarians had been criticized for demanding too much knowledge in order to justify an action: “[...] an agent must both project into the future a variety of different possible consequences and then become a utility calculator to work out which of these various possible consequences is likely to produce greatest utility.”⁵¹³ In the realm of the relational approach, a similar problem also occurs with communitarianism. She gives the example of Jeremy Waldron's case of the story about the Good Samaritan. There were three people in that scene who saw an injured man lying across the road. The first two were the priest and the Levite who “would not immediately pass by on the other side, but his approach would be to stop and try to figure out his relation to the man who had fallen among thieves.”⁵¹⁴ This does not mean that the first two did an unjust act but that instead of attending to the immediacy of confrontation with a victimized human being, they shifted toward the abstraction of

⁵¹³ PALMER, Claire. *Animal ethics in context*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 138.

⁵¹⁴ WALDRON, Jeremy. Who is my neighbor? Humanity and proximity. *Monist*, vol. 86 (2003) nr. 3, pp. 341-342.

calibrations of community values which for Palmer is a moral consideration, albeit a misplaced one.⁵¹⁵

The question of how much knowledge would require an informed ethical decision is an ambiguous one and may be difficult to work out in terms of a universal formula considering the variety of harmful climactic conditions that affect biological physiologies of different species of animals. The beneficence perspective in the context of non-anthropogenic harms on animals may not require this calculative attitude because the ethical exigence is a subjective matter depending on the helper's expertise and courage to help. But assistance in the context of climate change which originates from anthropogenic harm would normally require much feasibility studies and plans of rescue are usually drafted by a group instead of a singular individual. And some information may be difficult to acquire which requires time for inquiry and this collides with the necessity of immediate action in many emergency cases of harmed animals.

Sinclair explains the obscure profession of the wildlife manager when he compares it with that of a civil engineer. Supposedly, wildlife aid operations should proceed as scientifically as possible, like constructing a bridge, but this is not how it happens. Anthony Sinclair, John Fryxell, and Graeme Caughley, in their book *Wildlife Ecology, Conservation & Management*, explain that a civil engineer who plans to construct a bridge can operate in a highly mathematical and systemic procedure and the results of which are highly predictable. The task of the wildlife manager is not this case. Consider, for example, the following hypotheses:

1. The provision of nest boxes for wood ducks will increase the size of the population.
2. The provision of nest boxes for waterfowl will benefit their overall ecology.⁵¹⁶

The *first* one could be handled within the orientation of a civil engineer. The *second* is vague, and this is the work orientation of the wildlife manager. The loopholes there are: what is exactly the 'overall ecology?' What are the aspects involved and how do you exactly measure benefits? These are all not clear.

⁵¹⁵ PALMER, Claire. *Animal ethics in context*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 138.

⁵¹⁶ SINCLAIR, Antony; John FRYWELL and Graeme CAUGHLEY *Wildlife ecology, conservation, and management*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006, pp. 268-269.

A similar case applies to the polar bears. The question that arrives to the wildlife manager is: how do you help the starving polar bears? This is a widely-mapped question stretched in all directions. The subsequent queries are: how to make the bears go away from the village and keep the human inhabitants safe; how to feed or transport them to a habitat where they could find food; to ensure that their entry into the new habitat will not affect adversely the existing ecological balance, and; to know how this ecological balance is defined.

The ambiguity of the working situation of wildlife rescue and aid would be susceptible to the other end temptation of the *Laissez Faire* Intuition which suggests fatalism and that it lodges itself between the nature-human dichotomy: that all nature is sanctified and all human activity that interferes with nature sullies it. Stephen Budiansky, who defends animal domestication as not being downright colonization but being in collusion also with the animal says:

The challenge for society carried ever further from personal acquaintance with nature is to retain a grasp on its place in nature. Yet the tendency of both those who would conquer nature and those who would save it is to draw a line and declare human society ever apart from nature. . . The environmental movement's view of nature has become the predominant one in America today- nature as a pristine world, spoiled only by modern man, the klutz in heavy boots trampling the flowers.⁵¹⁷

As Budiansky points out, the fear of intervening further with nature after climate change has to do with the guilt that human presence and activity is the 'mortal sin' that pillaged the environment when, in fact, humans as organic beings also belong to the natural environment. It may help to recall that the strategies for wild animal aid in climate change are experiments that are also in keeping with the same spirit that cradled the birth of technology. Technology spawned the industrial revolution but it has a moral intention which is to help improve the quality of the lives of people. The people during that epoch knew but little of what would come out of these technological machinations centuries later.

The most currently formulated argument against this kind of fatalism is that of Kyle Johannsen, most acclaimed for his book *Wild Animal Ethics*. Johannsen calls his argument

In light of their growing appreciation for the extent of wild animal suffering (WAS), a number of animal rights theorists, myself included, have adopted a qualified commitment to humanitarian

⁵¹⁷ BUDIANSKY, Stephen. *The covenant of the wild: why animals chose domestication*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992, p. 4.

intervention in the wild. More specifically, we've adopted a view I call 'fallibility-constrained interventionism.' According to this view, preventing WAS is desirable and thus, we should intervene in nature, but we should proceed very cautiously in light of our limited understanding of ecosystems and the resulting ecological risks intervention poses.⁵¹⁸

In the light of the fallibility constrained interventionism, Johannsen supports a conservative stance of gene editing CRISPR or Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats as one solution to animal suffering under climate change. This, in simpler terms, refer to a gene modification of animal species which are r-strategists (those who reproduce in plenitude but leave their offspring unattended) to become k-strategists (those who reproduce in few numbers but attend to the survival of their offspring and protect them from hazards). He defends the argument of fallibility-constrained interventionism from two objections:

According to the *first* objection advanced by Nicolas Delon and Duncan Purves, cautious intervention is unjustified because fallibility is allegedly intractable. The complexity of ecosystems entail “not only that large-scale interventions are at risk of causing unintended negative consequences, but that we're unable to reliably assess the extent of that risk.”⁵¹⁹ This would imply that interventions on a large-scale would be deemed to be ever ecologically dangerous and only small-scale interventions are acceptable, i. e., helping beached whales to get back to the waters. The fallibility-constrained intervention only makes sense if it is possible, at least, to predict outcomes. Even if this cannot be done perfectly, the threshold of possibility in plotting degrees of acceptable and unacceptable risks should still be reached. Delon and Purves, however, hold the view of contemporary ecology that ecosystems are more complex and highly unpredictable that ecologists used to think. Significant changes in an ecosystem prods a new regime that presents the wildlife manager a tall order of tasks that determines direct effects, indirect effects, and making comparative studies both on human and animal welfare. On top of this, the present state of climate change makes predictability even more difficult.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁸ JOHANNSEN, Kyle. *Wild animal ethics. The moral and political problem of wild animal suffering*. New York: Routledge, 2021, p. 53.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., p. 54.

⁵²⁰ Ibid., p. 59; DELON, Nicolas and PURVES, Duncan. Wild animal suffering is intractable. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, vol. 31 (2018), pp. 257.

Johannsen accepts the claim that fallibility is, indeed, not only intractable but unforeseeable. But he also asserts the claim that some forms of habitat destruction could have positive effects. Using the deontological perspective, Johannsen defends by saying that unintended and unforeseeable harms are excusable if some positive consequences are projected, as long as there is an exercise of caution, and that this action is morally preferable than extreme paralysis on the premiss of epistemic intractability.⁵²¹

The *second* objection contrasts the first in that “adopting a cautious attitude reflects a failure to appreciate the moral implications of WAS. From what we can tell about wild animal reproduction and the conditions wild animals face, most wild animals experience more suffering than enjoyment in their lives, that is, their lives contain net suffering.” This is to be understood in the context that most wild animals (specifically, the innumerable offspring of the r-strategists) are already suffering, anyway, so even the cautious (or wanton) action in the intervention does not make sense. These innumerable sentient animals have been better off not even being born at all. Johannsen mentions the proposal of Brian Tomasik that the intervention that should be used is habitat destruction. The idea is to drive to extinction the r-strategist species so that they do not even have to be born and thus, live miserable lives.⁵²²

It is seen that Tomasik’s proposal operates on the utilitarian value of net suffering. Johannsen defends cautious intervention against utilitarian claims on two grounds. The *first* is that if habitat destruction favors the exclusive existence of the happier k-strategist species which would increase net suffering, this would not be plausible given the principle of interdependence because k-strategist species (which includes the homo sapiens) depend both on the existence of r-strategists and their habitats in order to survive.⁵²³ Wiping the r-strategist species and their habitats would be tantamount to threatening the survival of all species.

The *second* defense has to do with the somewhat vague justification of why in Tomasik, there seems to be an asymmetry between suffering and enjoyment; that an ounce of suffering has

⁵²¹ JOHANNSEN, Kyle. *Wild animal ethics. The moral and political problem of wild animal suffering*. New York: Routledge, 2021, p. 54.

⁵²² Ibid., p. 55; TOMASIK, Brian Habitat loss, not preservation, Generally reduces wild animal suffering. [online]. *Essays on reducing suffering*. 7 February 2016 [viewed on 28 November 2022]. Available at: www.reducing-suffering.org/habitat-loss-not-preservation-generally-reduces-wild-animal-suffering

⁵²³ JOHANNSEN, Kyle. *Wild animal ethics. The moral and political problem of wild animal suffering*. New York: Routledge, 2021, p. 56-57.

more negative value than the positive value of an ounce of enjoyment.⁵²⁴ This has repercussions on the sense of why it is not favorable to preserve “struggling organisms but thriving anyway,” nor to save a small number of happy organisms if it entails the misery of hordes of others. Johannsen claims that a pretty terrible life is not exactly equivalent to a life not worth living, as many poor people who struggle with poverty claim. Another point that Johannsen makes is that there are values that are beyond the utilitarian plane. For example, following the general rule in ethics (considering some exceptions) that negative duties trump positive duties, the benefits reaped from eliminating the misery of r-strategists through habitat destruction cannot be heavier than the weight of respecting the interests of the existing k-strategists if they happen to share the same habitat. Johannsen does agree that nature does contain net suffering, but in any case, he disagrees with Tomasik that the intervention of habitat destruction will yield positive consequences in the overall. But in the view that there are some forms of habitat destruction that decrease the number of specific r-strategists within a habitat that is, anyway, highly inhospitable to many wild animals, i.e., desertification, it is in this view that caution makes value sense in his argument of fallibility constrained intervention.⁵²⁵

To summarize this part, the discourse on the ethics of wild animal intervention has come up with three areas of ambiguity. The *first* is the question of the subject that has moral claim. Whom are we obliged to save: just some animals or a species? This concern surges from a background of the notion of human group rights against a persecution such as racial or gender discrimination. Considering that animals do not exactly feel a bond with their species (kin, yes) or that when attacked, they do not feel that attack as a harm towards their group identity, or that they could have an interest in propagation of species (which is different from birthing their young), could we say that there is really such a thing as species rights – which includes even those animals that are not yet born?

The *second* concerns the obscurity of why wildness is at all a value, since the benevolence perspective takes caution to preserve wildness of wild animals. There are two forms of wildness concerned: constitutive wildness that makes animals independent and self-willed

⁵²⁴ Ibid., p. 55.

⁵²⁵ Ibid., p. 57.

wildness in which animals are free to do what they are used to do as animals. This question surges against a background that the welfare of animals (or not all animals) need not always be significantly affected when their wildness has been modified but the question is also open as to how to define “welfare” in this context? In addition, what ethical rule determines the value of wildness that should be preserved: the utilitarian calculus of overall wildness, or the deontological preservation of wildness of actually existing animals?

The *third* locates itself on the lacuna if it makes sense at all to help wild animals given the unpredictability of ecosystems when modifying the nature and mix of fauna biodiversity in a given habitat. Is the motion for LFI wiser, given the fact that in the past, we introduced technology without having predicted that it would escalate to the mammoth problem of climate change? Or that, if cautious intervention is extended at all, what is the basis for justifying it given the epistemic intractability of outcomes?

It remains to see if Levinas’s ethics could blaze alternative ways of unraveling the aforementioned problems.

5.4 FILIATION AND THE ETHICAL CONDUCT OF FAITH

The concept of filiation appears in the context of Levinas’s discussion of the time dimension within the framework of ethical relations. The most popular concept of time in philosophy is mounted within the existential discourse of project-accomplishing and meaning-making in view of an impending death. In Levinas, however, a more inspiring concept of death beyond the dreaded cessation of life is the ethical question: what am I doing for the other? The death that matters is not death as a loss of existence but death of the ego, or the struggle to get out of the preoccupation with oneself for the concerns of the other.

It is important to note that the discussion of the concept of filiation logically proceeds from the previous chapter, the ethics of eros and the significant relationship with an animal. The other referred to in the previous chapter is the significant-other. This chapter teases out the relationship with the animal, not merely as a companion or friend but ‘like one’s child.’ This significant relationship culminates in filiation, the begetting of the animal-child. The

significant relationship with the beloved other generates yet, a further horizon of otherness, with the filiation of the child which opens the gateway toward infinity. While the paragon of the filial relationship is the family set-up of the parent-child relationship, Levinas's notion of filiality (the term used in *Totality and Infinity* is fecundity) is not limited to this.

The job of this part is to examine how Levinas's ethical concept of filiation may enlighten the three aspects of obscurity that spring from the ethics of wild animal intervention: what matters in the rescue – the species line or specific ailing animals; what concept of wildness matters; and, what justifies helping wild animals at all and if at all, how to define the basis of moral caution given the epistemic intractability of ecosystems? My task is to address these ambiguities by articulating aspects of Levinas's concept of filiation.

5.4.1 The Human-Pawparent

Here, I would like to establish that any ethical act contains a parental attitude since the notion of care has its origin in the parent-child relationship. Parental care is an experience of care as already there, preceding birth. Filiality is not limited to biological kinship. Levinas, for example, identifies this in religious set-ups between the master and disciple wherein the mentor taken on a parenting role in taking care of a student or disciple. He says:

It is not necessary that those who have no children see in this fact any depreciation whatever; biological filiality only the first shape filiality takes; but one can very well conceive filiality as a relationship between human beings without the tie of biological kinship. One can have a paternal attitude with regard to the Other. To consider the Other as a son is precisely to establish with him those relations I call "beyond the possible."⁵²⁶

In Levinas, filiation proceeds from the erotic relationship which seeks not to ravish the beloved unto oneself, not to succumb to the temptation of the 'touch,' but to participate in the unfolding of the beloved's infinite future. When both lovers cooperate in stimulating each other's future, it becomes what Levinas calls the trans-substantiation, or the engendering of the child:

⁵²⁶ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Quezon City: Claretian Publications. Librairie Artheme Fayard et Radio France, 1985, p. 71.

Love and friendship are not only felt differently; their correlative differs: friendship goes unto the Other; love seeks what does not have the structure of the existent, the infinitely future, what is to be engendered. I love fully if the Other loves me, not because I need the recognition of the Other, but because my voluptuosity delights in his voluptuosity, and because in this unparalleled conjecture of identification, in this trans-substantiation, the same and the other are not united but precisely-beyond every possible project, beyond every meaningful and intelligent power-engender the child.⁵²⁷

This concept of lovers who struggle against narcissistic love, to turn away from an obsession with each other and to focus on the engendering of the future which is the child, could be a powerful metaphor of humans who struggle against anthropocentrism to beget the future of the environment. This turning away from the between-humans-only toward a worldview that considers the multi-species environment, most specifically, the other-sentient nh animal, is the subject of my application of Levinas's concept of filiation.

The human filiation of the animal has its beginnings in the inclusion of the companion animal in the definition of 'family.' In the human erotic relationship, what breaches the ego circle of the 'you and me against the world' is the begetting of the child. When a child is born, both parents cannot focus on each other entirely and begin weaving their future around the child's future: the *egoisme en deux* is broken by a third party. Similarly, I am imagining that the engendering of the critical anthropocentric stance begins in the homes of those who have companion animals. I would like to make a bold assumption here that the awakening to the issues of animal rights and welfare is an experience of those specific persons who have loved and have been loved by animals within the warmth of their family circles. Nh animal companions demand time, care, attention, and funds from their human family for their maintenance, not mentioning provisions for transport when a family moves or goes on vacation. In today's times, the terms 'dog parent' and 'cat parent' are already in use in online shops and care guide websites involving companion animals. There evolved a popular terms for human caregivers of companion animals, i.e., furparents or pawparents, i.e., for those who have cats, 'meowmy' and 'deowdy' are amusingly employed.

The human feeling of care for animals is a psychological transfer in the similarities between the features of children and animals. The physiology of smallness and the clumsy and needy

⁵²⁷ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. London: Martinus Nijhoff. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1969, p.266.

behavior of children that evoke the parental instincts. The ability of infants to elicit caregiving and affective responses from adults had already been seen in Charles Darwin.⁵²⁸ Lorenz called it the baby schema or *Kindschenschema*.⁵²⁹ The physical features of baby cuteness is described as having: a big face with protruding forehead and cheeks, large eyes, roundish, plumpish shapes, and a clumsiness in movement. These features are not only present in the human species but also in many species of animals when young and even when they are not young anymore.

The experiments of Marta Borgi, Irene Cogliati-Dezza, Victoria Brelsfort et. al., show that children as young as 3 to 6 years show a preferential attention to the baby schema and a generalized extension of it to pet animals, namely dogs and cats.⁵³⁰ In the research of Nickie Charles, the post-humanist world considers companion animals as members of the family because of: a marked memory of childhood filled with abiding animal presence and a mourning for their loss, a recognition that animals are like humans who have individualities and personalities, a recognition of animals as social actors who make choices about their lives and have their own life narratives to speak of, and the presence of humanlike affective bond ties.⁵³¹

We recall that in the story of the polar bears that attacked Novaja Zemlya, some villagers called them 'babies' and took video footages of them despite their size and reputable ferocity. The significance of this filiality in the discourse of whether to consider the singular or plural identity of species is that Levinas points out there is a moment of encounter, indeed, the face, wherein this concern is null. The question of whether the moral consideration is really particular animals or species is a scientific rumination on the expert level. At the moment of encounter, the feeling of care toward the needy animal dictates the ethics. Someone should help and relieve the animal immediately. Levinasian ethics is ambulatory. What is seen is a

⁵²⁸ DARWIN, Charles. *The expression of the emotions in man and animals*. London: Murray, 1872.

⁵²⁹ LORENZ, Konrad. *Studies in animal and human behaviour*, vol. 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

⁵³⁰ BORGI, Marta; COGLIATTI-DEZZA, Irene; BRELSFORD, Victoria, et. al. Baby schema in human and animal faces induces cuteness perception and gaze allocation in children. [online]. *Frontiers in Psychology*, vol. 5 (2014) nr. 411, p. 1. [viewed date: 28 November 2022]. Available at: <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00411/full>

⁵³¹ CHARLES, Nickie. 'Animals just love you as you are': Experiencing kinship across the species barrier. *Sociology*, vol. 48 (2014) nr. 4, pp. 718-719.

suffering embodied being and the urge is to provide immediate relief while the case is being studied by experts as an environmental or city problem.

For example, a product of this ambulatory ethics is the development of a community-based system for giving first aid to troubled wild animals which could be interpreted as a frontliner system that connects to the wider, more expert-based groups, like a kind of a refugee camp in which the animals could be cared for while waiting for decisions in the upper courts. Surely, something more humane could be done for these polar bears that would, at least, give them immediate relief from hunger, rather than just driving them away with loud sounds and torches to protect the villagers. This ethics of encounter is the scion of wild animal ethics in which what only exists is the positive duty to help.

Developed communities have built-in ambulatory systems such as fire departments, police stations, child and woman abuse centers. I do not see why every community could not build wildlife rescue and care centers. Street animal shelters and nature sanctuaries could serve as the immediate deployment area that has a similar function as the emergency unit of a hospital. The task of the wildlife rescue and care center is to systematize ambulatory aid for occurrent wild animal casualties, to develop systems of first aid, and to educate the local folk on their role as individuals in living with and helping care for these animals. Part of the education is to teach people that choosing to live in a particular place means also to commit to the tolerance of a particular set of neighboring wild animals, to accept the responsibility of helping them when they need help. And this goes for occasional dangerously wild animals like the polar bears. For example, in every community, the real estate agents could serve as orientation officers for prospective inhabitants to inform them of neighboring animals in such a way that if a prospective buyer or renter does not like the prospect of helping out with occasional wild animals lurking around, then it may be wise for them to live somewhere else. This educates people a forthright guard against the anthropocentric attitude to accept that inhabitation is communally shared with other species. This wildlife care system could be more reinforced on a national scale by providing academic courses and labor positions for the increase in wildlife service now that climate change looms over us. The local wildlife centers could serve also as 'parent naggers' for government environment policies and groups to move toward decisive action. The community wildlife frontliners could also serve as the basis of intelligibility so

that future interrogations, negotiations, and decisions for animal welfare and the environment is not made on the abstract level of scientific experts but starts from the animal-human encounters on the level of the local folk.

This is not a new idea. What is new is to establish this as a necessary system for every community like waste segregation. A good example is the *Wires* organization in Australia (see link in the reference) which is a wildlife rescue network.⁵³² It has a webpage that calls for volunteers as well as donations. The volunteers are the Australian citizens themselves who are given a course training and a set of rescue equipment. The *Wires* organization rescues not only Australian native favorites like kangaroos, koalas, and wombats. They also rescue bats, ducks, turkeys, magpies, plovers, lizards, snakes, turtles, possums, etc. A more assertive move that could be done is to include the know-how of animal rescue in the educational system so that practically, all citizens would know how to spot animals in distress by understanding the body signals in different species, to have a handy list of the community veterinarians who could handle whichever species, and to keep within local villages, pockets of nature sanctuaries which could take in ailing animals temporarily before they are again released into the wild. It is easier to assemble a network like this for, basically, less dangerous animals but not for really dangerous wild animals like the polar bear.

There is, however, an existing organization named the Leatherdale Polar Bear Conservation Centre, named after Doug and Louise Leatherdale, who supported the construction of the award-winning 'Journey to Churchill Exhibit' of Northern wildlife species, the highlight of which is the 'Gateway to the Arctic', a viewing tunnel in which visitors could see real polar bears swimming overhead. The Leatherdale Conservation Centre, however, could only take in a few orphaned bears:

Polar bears can only be brought from the wild into our Zoo under very special circumstances and this decision is made by wildlife conservation officers and the Government of Manitoba. Although the policy has changed over time, currently, only polar bears who are orphaned because their mother was killed during conflict with humans will be rescued. If the bear is deemed to be a candidate, Zoo staff work with wildlife officials to safely transport it to the Assiniboine Park Zoo.

⁵³² WIRES. [online] *Wildlife Rescue*. [viewed on: 28 November 2022]. Available at: <https://www.wires.org.au> Available at:

All new animals coming to the Zoo undergo a 30-day quarantine period and polar bears spend that time at the IPBCC.⁵³³

So this is what I wish to emphasize: that the upper scale organizations make a decision for the bears that selected *some* bears but that there is no action for *these* bears who have particularly ambushed a human community for help. It is understood that it is beyond human capacity to locate every single one of the bears to help them. Levinas, however, stresses the importance of the face-to-face ethical encounter which is the origin of all ethics as well as the infinity of the ‘little goodness’ that goes a long way. I am referring to the inherent attitude in many people to help in handy ways. For example, the way the local folk who reside on coastal areas receive war refugees who land by boat. They are dying of hunger and thirst while there are thousands still who are marooned at sea, and still more who are locked in the war-torn country itself. The most practical aid there is to set up, at least, a temporary relief camp, while the local government negotiates on the state level where they could go. In Levinasian ethics, the experience of the moral exigence is that it is always ‘I’ who is called and never ‘them,’ stressing the uniqueness of the personal contribution that one could give in helping. What I appeal for here is the significance of some positive action for animals who come personally to humans for help, that in view that one cannot help all the bears on a macro-scale, at least, one could start with *these* bears which may hopefully have a ripple effect on as many animals as there could be who have become refugees of climate change. Parental care, is after all, the frontliner care, and the one that connects to institutional care.

5.4.2 The Otherness of the Begotten Animal

Palmer asks why (constitutive) wildness is at all a value and she surmises that it springs from the desire of the human race to curtail the power to colonize other living beings. The practical reason there is that we could hardly cope with the responsibility of salvaging the entire human species from the effects of climate change, i.e., natural calamities, much less to salvage other animal species. If help to other animals could be extended in such a way that their ability to

⁵³³ ASSINIBOINE PARK CONSERVANCY. [online] *Polar Bear Care. Leatherdale International Polar Bear Conservation*. [viewed date: 22 November 2022]. Available at: <https://www.assiniboinepark.ca/conservation-research-sustainability/polar-bear-care>

survive independently could be preserved, then this lessens the moral burden on us for continuous intervention.

What needs to be enlightened is how the wildness of wild animals would be defined within Levinas's idea of otherness of the face of the animal in the third chapter. Levinas would not define 'wildness' in the sense of the pristine nature, i.e., free from influence, as his ethical universe always presupposes relations. What would be significant in Levinas is wildness that is determined by the freedom from colonization, if colonization is defined as an intent to appropriate the other for egoistic agenda, to eliminate otherness for the immanent peace and domestic comfort of the selfsame. In short, Levinas would be supportive of wild animal relations as the basis of freedom from colonization, if implemented critically, and not a puritannical freedom from human influence. In the era of the anthropocene, it is useless to still assert that animals should be free from human influence or even from their presence. Moreover, proceeding from the story of Andre, even within human-nh animal significant relationships, Levinas has shown the ethics of the caress as preferred over touch; there is such a thing as letting the animal explore and discover novel forms of wildness even within the ambit of their close relations with human. In the life of Andre, this newfound wildness is oscillating between the human world and his marine habitat instead of having to choose only one way of life.

The filial relation is an instance in the spectrum of significant relationships. The term 'begotten animal' refers to wild animals significantly fostered by human care and whose constitutive and self-willed wildness had been affected, i.e., adjusting to a new habitat or diet. At this point, it is important to present Levinas's concept of the 'wildness' of the begotten child in the transgenerational framework.

Levinas presents a description on what good parenting should be like. Parents should influence children in their training during formative years, but going out into the world should be their own shot. Parents are said to succeed in their parenting when the child is able to become an individual in the world who makes her own responsible decisions. The child, in this sense, retains wildness because she resists the ego-identity of parents.

Levinas says:

Filiality is still more mysterious: it is a relationship with the Other where the Other is radically other, and where nevertheless it is in some way me; the father's ego has to do with an alterity which is his, without being a possession or a property. . . The son in fact is not simply my work, like a poem or manufactured object, neither is he my property. Neither the categories of power nor those of having can indicate the relationship with a child. Neither the notion of cause nor the notion of ownership permit grasping the fact of fecundity. I do not have my child, I am in some way my child. . . the son is not an event whatsoever that happens to me, as for example my sadness, my trial or my suffering. It is an ego, a person.⁵³⁴

The engenderment is not an act of power because it is not ownership. 'Being my own child' cannot also be understood as mirroring or repetition of self since Levinas is very much against the selfsame ego. The engenderment is not in view of incarceration or domestication but releasing out into the world. That I am 'my own child in my child' should be understood more in the sense of hospitality, of sharing the best things about my life with the child; for example, imparting the best values and practices whereby one has lived, including correcting the mistakes in life that one has made. A common invocation among parents is that they want the best for their child, all those things which they never had but which they desired and which their parents were unable to provide. In short, parenting is correctional and reparative. The child is the parents's relation to their alterity, their seed sowed on the possible roads that they had not taken, although, still, beyond the sense of alter-ego. Applying Johanssen's concept of fallibility constrained interventionism in wild animal ethics, the caution that Levinas would focus on is a review of the past history (individual, historical, ecological) of suffering for the animal being fostered and to correct this in view of a projected lifeworld under climate change. In this sense, the quality of the life of the begotten animal would, at least, be liberated from an oppressed past, whether as individual or as a species. The element of disruption of identity is the property of fecundity. Fecundity is the child of the future; it never returns to cater to the self-same but moves forward into the unknown.

The relation with such a future, irreducible to the power over possibles, we shall call fecundity. . . Fecundity encloses a duality of the Identical. It does not denote all that I can grasp-my possibilities; it denotes my future, which is not the future of the same-not a new avatar; not a history and events that can occur to a residue of identity; an identity holding on by a thread, an I

⁵³⁴ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard COHEN. Quezon City: Claretian Publications. Librairie Artheme Fayard et Radio France, 1985, pp. 69-72.

that would ensure the continuity of the avatars, And yet, it is my adventure still, and consequently my future in a very new sense, despite the discontinuity.⁵³⁵

This element of surprise that fecundity contains is something that could enlighten the issue of destroying the ‘balance of nature’ which implies a return to the initially-found perfect state. It may help to unpack first what this notion of ‘balance of nature’ may actually hold. From the point of view of Nibedita Priyadarshini Jena, the concept of the ‘balance of nature’ is mythical, a product of human imagination. There is no scientific basis for demonstrating that a particular ecosystem is actually balanced or a mathematical framework by which it could be measured that a particular ecosystem is more balanced than it was before or that this specific ecosystem is more balanced than another similar ecosystem. The notion of the ‘balance of nature’ is an abstract deduction that proceeds from the naked observation of predator-prey food chain and that a particular ecosystem flourishes (multiplies in both flora and fauna) in comparison to another ecosystem that ‘dies’ or diminishes in the biodiversity count of flora and fauna.⁵³⁶

It developed as a theory from the Greek worldview of the cosmos with all beings as interrelated, from St. Thomas Aquinas’s notion of the glory of God as more manifest in a multiplicity of species rather than one, and in some theologies such as that of the English theologian William Paley, that argues that the existence of God, his good will and omnipresence is seen in how all ecosystems have their own check and balance. Jena also mentions the early conservationist view of George Perkins Marsh who says that it is the human who has thrown off the balance in nature by introducing inorganic matter into the organic.⁵³⁷

In the second half of the 20th century, Jena claims that it became more clear to scientists that the notion of the balance of nature is a myth. Eugene Odum, for example, theorizes that ecological courses are not linear, meaning, that in case of perturbation in an ecosystem, there

⁵³⁵ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. London: Martinus Nijhoff. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1969, pp. 267-268.

⁵³⁶ JENA, Nibedita Priyadarshini. Balance of nature and animal rights. *Journal of Indian Council Philosophical Research*, vol. 32 (2015) nr. 3, p. 405. [online] 29 January 2015 [viewed 28 November 2022]. Available at: <https://philpapers.org/rec/JENAWA-3>

⁵³⁷ Ibid., pp. 406-407; Paley, William. *Natural theology or Evidence of the existence and attributes of the deity as collected from appearances of nature*. Matthew EDDY and David KNIGHT, eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

is no previous balance to revert to but change from one range of scale to another. Rather, the individual species act in a chaotic relation to mix, divide, or coalesce in a disorganized manner, redesigning a new blend of a state. Ecologists now see that ecosystems are thermodynamically open, dynamic, with no predictable equilibrium.⁵³⁸ From this, Jena states:

Thus, it is now obvious that nature functions in chaotic manner rather than linear. The stance that has been discussed in the last paragraph seems more convincing. In other words, nature is not balanced. It would be superfluous to believe that nature takes care of itself, regardless of what disturbances take place, such as those created by human beings, like global climate change and extensive deforestation. Given the current scenario of the world, nature shows the dire consequences of human intervention in nature. If there were indeed a balance of nature, then scientists would not have been struggling to find out the way to save nature from going to a ruin.⁵³⁹

This does not, of course, imply supporting an irresponsible attitude that the vulnerable species may just be migrated anywhere. It still makes moral sense for ecologists to conduct feasibility studies on the impact of introducing a foreign species to a new environment, only that there is no model of maintaining an existing ‘balance of nature’ to use as basis. The scientific eye there should focus, instead, on the prediction of a newly-evolved balance, although this, Delon and Purves have stressed, is highly intractable. Yet, on the other hand, in as far as the development of science goes, it could be held that a science for this area can be developed to be able to predict short and long-term evolutionary reactions in managed ecosystems.

Levinas would not look much into the utilitarian calculus of transgenerational and trans-spatial animal suffering that underlines its conflict with the deontological perspective. In fact, inasmuch as Levinas is very much a philosopher of the face-to-face encounter that should be the basis of the third-party (organizational and systems-based) ethics, I could safely say that he would lean more on the deontological perspective. Levinas would not be vigilant toward measurements of success in predicted outcomes as science would value it; he would pay more attention to the moral intent. What Levinas would scrutinize is the value of self-sacrifice in humans that would relieve the suffering in animals; in short, substitution or substituting with human suffering the suffering of the animal if that would alleviate his misery. This means that

⁵³⁸ ODUM, Eugene Great ideas in ecology for the 1990s. *Bioscience*, vol. 42, (1992), pp. 78–85.

⁵³⁹ JENA, Nibedita Priyadarshini. Balance of nature and animal rights. *Journal of Indian Council Philosophical Research*, vol. 32 (2015) nr. 3, pp. 407-408. [online] 29 January 2015 [viewed 28 November 2022]. Available at: <https://philpapers.org/rec/JENAWA-3>

intervention in wild animal suffering is morally measured in the degree that humans could give up their idiosyncratic comfort and privileges (useful suffering) to relieve (useless) animal suffering. This calls for the subject of the ensuing part.

5.4.3 Filiation as Responsible Hope

This part will respond to the moral issue of implementing environmental strategies with the risk of repeating the same mistakes as climate change. I would like to start with the notion of the term ‘rectificatory justice’ which originates from human rights. There are things in human affairs that could be compensated such as property debts or offenses that could have monetary equivalents. In this sense, rectification has a backward movement that looks back to the victim for compensation. But there are some moral injuries on a massive scale such as that which we call ‘crimes against humanity’ to which even the idea of rectification in the sense of compensation is appalling. For example, in Levinas’s case as a victim under the Nazi regime, there is no compensation for the atrocities done to the Jewish race during the holocaust. Climate change could be considered a ‘crime’ since it was not premeditated but definitely, it has done massive damage to the environment and its casualties involve many sentient species. The damage to animals by climate change is considered a moral injury.

What I propose is to rehabilitate the term rectificatory justice within Levinas’s idea of pardon in the context of time as fecundity:

The discontinuous time of fecundity makes possible an absolute youth and recommencement, while leaving the recommencement a relation with the recommenced past in a free return to that past (free with a freedom other than that of memory), and in free interpretation and free choice, in an existence as entirely pardoned. This recommencement of the instant, this triumph of the time of fecundity over the becoming of the mortal and aging being, is a pardon, the very work of time.⁵⁴⁰

What Levinas is saying in the above is that a big part of parenting a child is making compensations both for one’s mistakes in one’s life (sometimes it includes also the faults of parents and ancestors). The child then, becomes the process in which the parent ‘pays’ for the faults of the past. But recompense has a dual time dimensions. One is to restore the past as

⁵⁴⁰ LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso LINGIS. London: Martinus Nijhoff. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1969, p. 282.

past; the idea of restoring original ecological balance takes this frame. The other dimension that Levinas supports is the dynamic representation of time as pardon is retroactive. It remembers the past but makes a break from it. It pays the faults forward and not backward.

“ [. . .] time adds something new to being, something absolutely new. But the newness of springtimes that flower in the instant (which in good logic, is like the prior one) is already heavy with all the springtimes lived through. The profound work of time delivers from this past, in a subject that breaks with his father. Time is the non-definitiveness of the definitive, and ever recommencing alterity of the accomplished-the “ever” of this recommencement. ⁵⁴¹

Levinas breaks from the idea of time as mathematical in which time is a whole. He does not also approve of the Bergsonian time as continuous duration. His idea of time is like a series of snapshots from a moving subject, with each frame discontinuous and containing something new. Time as pardon in Levinas always starts anew; time is always a child. The child performs two functions in ethical time. The *first* is to be the bearer of all aspects of heritage from parents. In this sense, the (biological) child is the trans-substantiation of the parents. It is also in this sense that the child ‘repeats’ or mirrors the parents. It is said that the child resembles the parents but also eventually becomes (or should become) a product of her own decisions and her time. The *second* ethical function of the child, thus, is to detach from the heritage of her parents (who will eventually pass away) and to create an ideal future which she and her offspring will inherit.⁵⁴² Thus, in an ever-recommencing present, the fault is pardoned and cleansed when the child, engendered by the goodness of parents, gathers the most intelligible projects to throw as a robust bet for an insecure future.

The above could serve as an inspiration and pattern of the ethical attitude that supports the ethicality of acting on the best environmental strategies for animals affected by climate change regardless of future fatalities over the attitude of abandoning the nh animals to nature and letting them evolve through natural causes. There is always sense in fighting the possible natural fatalistic reaction of nature toward extinction by putting the human will within the natural forces of nature to labor and reverse the process. The scientific intent may never conserve the past species and interventions may generate new species but as long as other nh animal species could be preserved, there is hope for regeneration of innumerable animal

⁵⁴¹ Ibid., p. 283.

⁵⁴² Ibid., p. 279.

lifeforms to emerge in the future. I argue that the way the present human generation pardons its ancestors over *nh* animals who have died due to climate change, i.e., the present generation could only see the dodo bird from pictures, is to try to conserve as many animal species for the future in the hope that these animals may beget their offspring to further their species kind but also to participate in interspecies regeneration. In short, the retributive justice for past *nh* animals and species which have died and turned extinct from climate change is executed in a pay-it-forward orientation. There is also a poetic component to this justice and pardon.

Inasmuch as the past generations have been 'mindless' in not being able to predict the long-term effects of climate change, that mindlessness will now be reversed by 'mindfulness' not only in proceeding with caution but also to put an ethical 'mind' in the *il y a* of nature, that is, to fight the anonymous wildness of nature that may possibly dwindle toward extinction and direct its forces by investing it with the moral scientific intent that works for the regeneration of innumerable organic lives in the future.

I argue that while nature does have evolutionary processes, it does not have the (personal) intent of keeping the sentient species whom we have harmed, the human contribution in the strategies for wildlife assistance is precisely the intention of working with nature to shepherd these *nh* animals through climate change. There will surely be oversights in the future but the attitude of the parent as child is to let the future take care of itself because the hunger of polar bears will not wait. By the time these oversights manifest in another period or epoch, a new constellation of moral values will also determine the hermeneutics of conceiving the new strategies to address the new problems. The idea is that moral values and perspectives emerge as life is lived, navigating from one labyrinthine toward another in view of a desired liberation, but each moment is met with its own set of problems which founds its own tables of morality.

Hope is the fundamental attitude of ethics because it is the way humans confront the facticity of the moral clutter. There is no universal moral system (nor any environmental ethics) that could assure, anyway, that actions taken now will turn out to be right in the long run. One could only view things in as far as the horizon extends. William James, for example, explains that it necessitates a Buddha-istic mind, which contemplates conflicting moral claims in one harmonious whole, and this is not possible. Agnostic thinkers, when searching for

fundamental truths outside religion, thinking that they are making a difference, are still influenced by the same religious strain. There is no one moral theory which could be applied to all moral cases because there could be no moral genius in any century that could form this universal *a priori* truths.⁵⁴³ Similarly, in the moral theory of John Dewey, when social conditions change, i.e., scientific attitudes, systems of production and corporate set-ups, travel and migration, national and international policies, educational trends, etc., the moral concepts of ‘obligation’ and ‘duty,’ ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ ‘purposes’ and ‘ends’ likewise change and are deconstructed.⁵⁴⁴ And since the agenda of filiation is to beget generations of multiple animal species ahead, it could not be possible to take action without a radical investment of hope which is defined as a personal and societal commitment to a sustained shepherding of nh animals not only in terms of taking a personal responsibility in helping many species and ecosystems to survive but also in terms of being vigilant in promoting the restructuring of cultural and political systems to become hospitable to emerging values of the evolutionary life of animals and animal ethics.

I call this a radical investment of hope and it is a peculiar attitude. The radical attitude takes the form of a personal defiance toward compassion fatigue in the view that ‘it is hopeless.’ For example, I know of a spirited person, Laureen Velasco, who has founded a stray-cat feeding program in a leading university in Manila called DLSU-PUSA (De La Salle University-Professors for the Upliftment of Society’s Animals; *pusa* is a Filipino word also for cat).⁵⁴⁵ During the pandemic, Laureen was left all alone (for practically two years) to do the daily feeding and care for all the stray cats in the De La Salle campus because the university had been closed down. This is a mammoth task because Laureen does not only feed (which involves cooking), but also looks after the health of each cat (DLSU-PUSA looks after more or less 60 cats) which includes neutering, campaigning for their adoption, raising funds for her animal charity work, while being vigilant for emergent stray cats who are new inhabitants, who may be trapped or are in danger in and around the campus. Everyone also

⁵⁴³ JAMES, William. The moral philosopher and the moral life. *Pragmatism and other writings*. London: Penguin Books, 2000, pp. 213-218.

⁵⁴⁴ DEWEY, John. Ethics. In: Jo Ann BOYDSTON, ed. *Dewey, The Later Works 1925-1953, Vol. 7, 1932*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985, pp. 190-194.

⁵⁴⁵ DLSU-PUSA (De La Salle University-Manila Professors for the Upliftment of Society’s Animals). [Facebook]. [viewed date: 28 November 2022]. Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/218603798624055/about>

knows that her whole salary as assistant professor in philosophy goes to this cause. In addition, she looks after around 60 cats in her own home. One wonders, of course, what makes her go on, knowing that stray cats will forever be there, but this attitude is Levinasian. It is a radical defiance and belief in the little goodness of an act against a world of apathy and the count of utilitarian success. It parallels the moral edict of Mother Teresa; the value is not to be successful but to be faithful in the radical hope that ‘it is I first who is called so that others may follow and unless I start it, then no one will follow.’

There is also a germ of radicality in the hopeful defiance against fatalism or letting nature run its own course. There is an aspect of the unsaid there which needs articulation. What comes to my mind is that any scientific intervention does not only pose a risk on the part of nh animal lives but also human lives. In a sense, there always exists a risk to accidentally wipe out the human species although other tougher species may still survive. This is hardly considered but it exists as a real possibility. So I acknowledge the Levinasian ethic of selflessness there: the spirited attitude that we (all animal species) will be in this Noah’s ark for better or for worse. If other species survive and we do not, it is still better. There is hope that the human species (or another of its kind, maybe even better) may still evolve as it did before, even if it takes a zillion years. But the reverse may not be scientifically viable.

If experimental moves may accidentally wipe out a significant number of other animal species but not the human, it is not likely that the *homo sapiens* will survive this apocalypse. The kernel of the whole idea is: the logic of the ethic of intervention is that there is more risk on the *homo sapiens* than on other nh animals in the case of an intractable apocalypse. It may be said that the anthropocentric ego will always place the survival of the human species first than other nh animals. Even if we do favor our species strategically, it may not work according to plan in view of the intractable effects of nature and our learned cultural dependence on other species for survival. While we are the most intelligent among the animal kingdom, we are also the most fragile in the final count on the scene of the apocalypse.

In view of the above, all the more, Johannsen’s norm of caution is of utmost value. One way to responsibly handle uncertainties in experimental strategies is ‘not putting all the eggs in one basket.’ Palmer suggests, for example, in the case of the American pikas, it may be better to relocate an estimable number of pikas that would have a projected communal territorial

cooperation and who, in terms of behavior, seem to tolerate best human handling. A good number of pikas, however, may be left in the old habitat. In this way, one could have two possibilities working out for the same vision of conserving the species.⁵⁴⁶ In case both flocks die out eventually, this does not liberate the human race from accountability but at least, there is always comfort in the thought that there had been positive action laboriously done with the best of intentions.

In the case of the polar bears, the project of a nature sanctuary that engages in artificially-assisted reproduction parallel to that of panda bears runs the risk of either failing or reproducing too many to feed and being unable to return them to the arctic wild (and so farming them out with diplomatic ties to other countries becomes an option). Community efforts of raising funds and dropping bear chows from helicopters may have oscillating behaviors of dependence on given food and gradual adaptation to meat alternatives in the terrestrial regions. For example, the research of Karyn Rode, Charles Robbins, Steven Armstrong, et. al. has cites records of observations of polar bears eating eider eggs, geese eggs, and snow geese.⁵⁴⁷ They, however, conclude that such does not provide the proper nutrition for these bears. Yet, there is always an evolutionary possibility that their digestive systems may still adapt which will mean a change in their biological construction and physiological features, such as the dogs that have descended from the wolves. This scenario may also be the long-term effect of assisted migration when the polar bears's natural prey in the new habitat ultimately runs out. And, finally, all of these strategies have a common ultimate risk: frequent exposure of polar bears to humans will change dispositional wildness. In one period of history, taming bears may be creating a 'pathogenic vulnerability' to environmental and animal ethics, but in another epoch, when it cannot be helped because we helped them make it through, who cares about cuddly snowbears living off from the duck river park and occasionally straying to one's house and knocking for some chows when they don't harm anyone?

⁵⁴⁶ PALMER, Claire. Assisting wild animals vulnerable to climate change: why ethical strategies diverge. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 38 (2021) nr. 2, p. 12. [viewed 28 November 2022]. Available at: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14689530/2021/38/2>

⁵⁴⁷ RODE, Karen; CHARLES ROBBINS, Lynne NELSON, Steven ARMSTRUP. Can polar bears use terrestrial foods to offset lost ice-based hunting opportunities? *Ecology and the Environment*, vol. 13 (2015) nr. 3, p. 141.

We finally arrive at the last word on the merits of Levinas's concept of filiation in the entire discussion of the ethics of wild animal suffering. Levinas presents three characteristics of filiation to which I will peg its contributions to the wild animal ethics discourse.

The *first* is that if the ethical relation underscores all kinds of human relations, then he characterizes ethics as imbued primarily with the instinct of care, which has its origin in the filial relation. I endeavored to point out that Levinas's idea of filiation is not limited to biological filiation but is also present in other relationships such as the student-teacher and master-disciple relationship. But it could also be seen in the practice of keeping companion animals because they are considered part of the family. The challenge is where to see it in wild animal management. I have endeavored to point out that filiation is present in the micro-level of the ethics of the animal-human encounter. The discourse of the ethics of wild animal management keeps its eye on the macro-level by debating on what matters more: the weight of particular animals versus species; the conservation of wildness in some animals versus the sacrifice of some wildness for more wildness trans-spatially and trans-generationally, and; the suffering of individual animals versus net suffering of wild animals. With Levinas's idea of filiation, proximate ethics has to be addressed first before the abstract ethics that happens on the level of systems. The experience of seeing a bear ransacking the community garbage is a different experience from the way environmental managers handle the problem on the government levels. I endeavored to point out that the significance of the micro-level ethics and it is actually the springboard behind the formation of systems of animal rescue on the community level which provides ambulatory aid while issues of how to proceed with the animal on the systemic level are being discussed.

The *second* characteristic of filiation is that it emphasizes the importance of keeping distance in order to respect the otherness of the significant other or the filial other, and this refers to wildness, if applied to wild animals. Levinas contributes to the debate about why wildness matters at all in wild animals. It does matter because otherness is the reason why ethics exists. Without the other and the otherness of the other, there is no ethics, not even the self exists, as seen in the chapter on *il y a*. The challenge is to define within the Levinasian framework what is wildness that is a value in wild animal management. I pointed out that inasmuch as ethics is a relation, then there is no such thing as puritanical wildness, or a wildness in animals

untouched by humans. What would matter for Levinas is wildness that is translated as freedom from appropriation or colonization. Inasmuch as the face of the other is spoken of concretely in Levinas, he favors the deontological conservation of wildness as inherent in the non-animal subject instead of discussions of wildness in calculative utility. Levinas would exhort the ethic of wild animal assistance but he also points out that part of the wildness of the wild animal is the element of surprise, that the animal handled by humans could never be the same, and that the check against colonization is to focus on the future of the animal in the ever-evolving environment of climate change and the shepherding of emergent forms of constitutive and self-willed wildness, whatever they would be.

The *third* merit of Levinas's concept of filiation is placed on the discourse of responsible hope that is inherent in ethics. I featured Levinas's element of pardon within the idea of fecundity: that the child is brought up within the moral pedagogy that corrects the mistakes of the ancestors but that the child is, at the same time, the testimony of the pardon of the past as past by her ability to critically separate from parental pedagogy when grown up and to seize the freedom to recreate the world of her generation. The transgenerational pardon for the abuse and the suffering of non-human animals who have died and have become extinct by climate change is effected when the present generation agrees to take the courage to risk the implementation of Johannsen's fallibility constrained interventionism. The logic of taking the risk to intervene in wild animal suffering instead of abandoning the affair to anonymous nature or succumbing to the LFI takes its inspiration in the Levinasian attitude of hope. It defies the excuse of compassion fatigue and acknowledges that responsibility is infinite. It invests hope in the rationale that 'it is I who is called first, and if others may follow, that is their own affair.' Hope, indeed, is not a sentimental awakening but is a labor worked out when there is at least one who makes the first step. This hope also defies fatalism and the anthropocentric motive by the willingness to risk even the sacrifice of one's own species in the extreme possibility of an intractable apocalypse brought on by a fallible intervention. The kernel of that hope is the faith that it is still better 'as long as some others survive and that it does not even have to be always our species.'

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion: Levinas Face-to-Face with the Animal

The conclusive part is an exercise of sewing the loose ends together. To do this, it is necessary to recall objectives 2 and 4 in the introductory part of this thesis. Objective 2 involves the task of drawing some guidelines in establishing if the employment of Levinas's concepts are still in fidelity with his ethical project. In the introduction, the guidelines were drawn from Levinas's concept of trace which is defined as the event of the face's passing and which had been identified as the 'otherwise of being,' Levinas's main polemic in the history of philosophy. The trace of the face's passing incorporates the philosophical concepts from which I have plotted two corresponding guiding questions that test the employment of Levinasian concepts to animal problems if they exhibit fidelity to the grain of his philosophy. The interpretation of the main ethical concepts should show:

1. That the ethical interrogation of the animal springs from the point of view of embodiment and visitation. From this, it launches an upheaval of a traditional truth knowledge about the animal that had been transfixed by culture. The guiding question for this is: *how do actions and behaviors of animals that had been observed directly from living human relations with them uproot pre-existing notions of the animal in society?*
2. That the ethical interrogation of the animal incorporates a movement of the ego outside itself without return. The guiding question for this is: *how does the animal protest and disrupt human pre-occupation for self-maintenance and what new animal-human relations in the larger scope of society does this ethically impel?*

The answers to the above questions will not only to show that this thesis follows the interest of Levinas's ethics but will also serve as my way of summarizing the most significant ideas in each chapter.

Objective 4 has to do with stating how each Levinasian ethical concept contributes to the enlightenment of the specifically given problematization of the animal. To encapsulate, this conclusive part stands to state how in each chapter, the interpretation of concepts still serve Levinas's aims and to identify how they contribute to the classical normative animal ethics discourse.

6.1 *IL YA* AND NAUSEA: FEARING FOR THE LIFE OF THE OTHER ANIMAL

The discussion of Levinas's concepts of *il ya* and nausea superimposes the aspects of embodiment and movement without return on the following points:

- That normative classical animal ethics interrogated the ethics of meat on the strife between maintaining the body of the animal and maintaining the adequate nourishment of the human body that demands the expense of the animal's body. It has been established by the medical societies of first world countries that the vegan alternative, if properly managed, could provide sufficient nourishment. Environmental scientists have affirmed that the major contributor of global warming and climate change is meat agriculture. These claims demand a societal turn away from its self-serving aims of maintaining its cultural comfort of the gustatory delight of eating meat and undergoing the uncomfortable transition toward the vegan alternative which also demands the extra labor from the agricultural force to install the infrastructure that encourages organic and permaculture methods as legitimate agricultural means of food production that is earthly sustainable.
- That Levinas responds to Derrida's criticism that the former did not take into consideration that human ethics operates on sharing food that sacrifices the life of the animal whereas humans are never willing to sacrifice their indulgences and even lives for animals. Levinas does offer an ontology of eating that if applied to the animal, it states that it goes against ethics if one colonizes the body of the other animal for self-maintenance, given that it had been established that meat-eating is an indulgence and not a necessary source of nutrition for human health. This means that there can be no human ethics that does not include nh

animal life and welfare within the circle of moral concern, as Levinas himself affirmed, even if he has not ramified what this demands in the details of everyday nh animal-human relations. This is tantamount to the forestalling of the *egoisme-en-deux* of human charity by introducing the ethical cry of the body of the animal: it would mean that the sharing of food, clothing, and other provisions between humans cannot be considered benevolence if their material resources colonize and disintegrate the nh animal's body, most especially in the brutal ways of the CAFO. This invokes the common ethic that the end must not justify the means. The nh animal's body must not be the means by which human ethics operates.

- That the concepts of *il y a* and nausea posed the questioning if the culture of meat-cuisine and dining is none other than a terror management of one's own death. *Il y a* and nausea proffered the idea of a more frightening death which is not simply the loss of one's somatic body but the loss of a relation with the other and its compounded alternative region of otherness. This establishes that the notion of human subjectivity demands a relation with the other. The ethical interrogation of the nh animal's body is posed in the link between taste as a moral emotion, being that there is a nauseous disgust of eating the raw viscera and flesh from the nh animal's body and this is masked by the human culture of cuisine and dining. Thus, the culture of cuisine and manners of dining turns out to be the egoistic way of denial of one's relation to the nh animal. The reality is that the human fears for the nh animal's life, not only because of the empathic connection between the pains of co-embodied beings, but also because of the metaphysical notion of one's death which is pure objectification, alienation, and anonymity without the other, a death more frightening than physical mortality because it is the fear of not-existing. But this fear, is again, ironically psychologically sublimated by the terror management of killing the other animal, of fetishist dining on the flesh of the other animal as a magical way of saying 'I do not die; only the other species does.'
- This suggests a more fundamental turn-around from anthropocentrism: that the proper interrogation of the ethics of meat should not be posed from the point of view of the politics of species - or which species gets to eat whom and which species is more superior. The proper exit from anthropocentrism in Levinas is the recognition of the *a priori* relation

of one with the other, which includes the other species. The acceptance of this relation with the other, the embodied presence of the other and its compounded alternative regions of otherness are necessary for a peaceful living acceptance and negotiation of one's own mortality.

Considering the aforementioned points of adhering to Levinasian ethics in formulating an animal ethics, it turns out that the main contribution of Levinas's concepts of *il y a* and nausea to the normative classical animal ethics discourse is the idea that there exists an *a priori* relation between the human and the non-human animal for which the human fears for the life of the animal. Normative classical animal ethics negotiates the ethics of meat from the questioning if the human species could survive without the nutrition of animal meat, and culturally, if the agricultural labor force could manage the transition toward organic and permaculture farming which would require much effort. What I see here is that the classical animal ethics discourse on meat remains on the anthropocentric plane because its concern is still the assurance of the maintenance of the human species and its train of cultural amenities from non-human animal body exploitation. It is still based on the peace pact to appease the war between species. What I observe is that the exit from the anthropocentric concern is more dramatic and fundamental if the ethics of meat departs from the practical necessities of life to an examination to what makes the notion of one's life possible - which is beyond survival of the fittest. The 'I' is not possible without the other. It is necessary as a starting point for ethics to recognize the essential relation between species: that one species mean nothing to oneself without the other, that there is no life that could ever be meaningful and flourishing without the other species, and this idea is not limited to biological existence. This perspective invokes a notion that there is a notion of death that is more frightening than losing one's biological body, and this is the loss of relation. That relation with the other is what makes one surge into existence. The ethical interdiction to evade meat becomes a deeper argument and more comprehensively negotiated if forged from this point of view rather than just being concerned over the practical standard living operations.

6.2 THE FACE OF THE OTHER ANIMAL

In the third chapter which took up the subject of face, the hermeneutical objective of fidelity to Levinas's philosophy of face on its application on the animal followed the identified guiding aspects of embodiment and externalization from ego on the following points:

- To begin with, the problematic about Keiko is representative of the cause of all nh animals who are 'almost' like humans in terms of intelligence and social behavioral skills. Keiko was special because he was a marine circus animal, capable of learned skills that we may say, would qualify for the performing arts. Classical normative ethics questioned the status of the subjectivity of the animal based upon agential qualities, which are based upon biological organic composition and its manifest behaviors interpreted phenomenologically. The debating idea is: to what extent some talented nh animals are like 'persons' because if then, they should automatically be invested with rights and protection by law. There are three thematic discourses presented: *equality*, discussed along the lines of capacity for sentient suffering which presuppose an interest to keep their own lives and affairs; *rights*, discussed along the lines of the capacity either to be a moral agent who participates in the exchange of moral respect for each other's rights or to be a moral patient who is not mentally capable of an exchange of moral respect for others but have enough mental sensibilities to understand, pertinent to their bodies, like children, what it means to be treated 'kindly' or not; and, the legal, moral, and metaphysical sense of being a *person* who exhibits mental agencies for elevated consciousness levels which include cognitive representation of ideas, self, and others.
- That the alternative of a Levinasian ethics of face is *first*, physical, and *second*, metaphysical. In Levinas, otherness is based upon an embodiment that is not mine. The face is a privileged venue of the subjectivity of an other because among persons, the facial features: the eyes, ears, nose, mouth, are the primary windows of what is revealed by the 'soul' or internal meaning formed and conveyed in language and reason. The debate on what Levinas conceived of as 'human' face is whether or not it could be applied to the nh animal since not all animals have facial features that correspond to human faces. But the

contention had been put down by Levinas's statement that any part of the body that could be representative of mortality and suffering could be considered 'face.' The metaphysical aspect of the face refers to an 'invisible' power that it has to resist representations imputed on it. Levinas says that face is transcendent and alter, this means that it has a persona all its own that cannot be evaluated under universal or common *qualia*. It had been argued that, of course, embodiment is enrobed in cultural and historical meanings, and in that sense, cannot escape representation. Levinas argues this out by saying that once the face is judged according to cultural meaning, i. e., 'beautiful' or 'ugly,' then the face in its metaphysical sense is not sighted and the metaphysical aspect is the source of power of the ethical command 'Thou shalt not kill!' Another contention is the ambiguity about Levinas saying that animals cannot be faces because they cannot escape the Darwinistic struggle for life; in short, they are not capable of altruism. It had been clarified in the introduction that Levinas misinterpreted Darwin in this because the latter actually emphasized that different species of nh animals are capable of altruism. My contention on this is that in the framework of Levinas, the face is 'face' because it has the power for the ethical command and not because it is capable of ethics, held in check by Levinas's insistence that ethics is not an exchange of goodness but is non-reciprocal. The face is 'face' because it demands an ethical response, and not because it could also respond to others's needs. For example, a completely narcissistic person would still be considered a face, as long as it could invoke an ethical response from others. This leads to the next item regarding the movement against ego.

- Since the power of the ethical invocation of the face is not seen in the face but upon one's response for the face, I have endeavored to show a way of proving the subjective value of the animal not by behaviors shown by the animal but upon the sacrifices performed by humans for his cause which I consider movements against the ego, and thus, ethics. In the case of Keiko, I demonstrated this overturning of ego in three aspects: the overcoming of Keiko's showbiz image, the economic sacrifices that people have performed to transport him back to Icelandic waters, and the ethical testimony of Mark Simmons, one of Keiko's handlers in the Keiko-Release project. The proof that people really served the cause of Keiko against their ego is that if they support the Keiko-release project, they would not

have the personal happiness of seeing Keiko anymore as a showbiz performer; in short, they let him go, knowing he would be happier romping in the wild freely than performing for humans in an aqua park. Another movement against ego could be seen in the tall funds spent for the release of Keiko. My point in the economic expense is that it is a very strong indicator of a movement away from ego since Levinas's treatment of capitalism indicates the totalitarian pull of money. In Keiko's case, people from all walks of life, donated money amounting to millions not only for his release but for the cause of what it stands for. I would like to point out that the economic expense on Keiko is not only about him but that he also raised awareness on the ethics of whaling in Iceland and that the swimming pool constructed for him in Oregon was not intended only for him but would serve as rescue and rehabilitation sanctuary for all injured marine animals. On an individual subjective level, I have also proven the power of the face to move away from ego using Levinas's philosophy of testimony when his handler and animal behaviorist, Mark Simmons, testified publicly, that the scientific team who were trusted to use the funds well for Keiko's transition toward the wild actually mishandled him and have caused his early death. My presupposition there is that for the love of Keiko and his cause, his testifier could have chosen to keep quiet but have risked his reputation and his profession to publicly expose that certain people behind the anomalous Keiko-Release operation.

I define the novel contribution of Levinas in the concept of the nh animal's face in terms of the methodology of proving the personhood and subjectivity of the nh animal in order to qualify for moral consideration. In classical normative ethics, the method is finding qualities within the subject in question - which is the nh animal. In Levinas's case, the analysis is not made on the subject in question but the ones addressing the subject and who relate to that subject. The method of analysis which proves that the face is indeed a face is not made on qualities of the subjective face but on the others's demeanor toward it, if it has the power to invoke them toward goodness. I deem that this method is valuable in the field of animal ethics not only because too much examination and evaluation had been made on the nh animal agential qualities, but it fails to measure the 'emotional' toll on the relational aspect. This not only proves the moral value of the nh animal as subject that erases and skips the need for gradations of consciousness but also proves (and measures) the capacity of humans for an

emotional relationship with the nh animal. One way to give value to the nh animal is to see what is *in* it that it has to offer us; the way Levinas shows is how much we are *already* involved with the animal that could be measured to the point of how much we could sacrifice some personal goods we hold on for our comfortable maintenance.

6.3 SEAL-ED WITH SIGNIFICANT LOVE

In the fourth chapter which applied Levinas's concept of eros and the animal, the following are the key ideas that shepherded the discussion along the guiding concepts of embodiment and rebellion against ego.

- To begin, the theme of eros was conscripted because it had to do with touch, since touching and caressing the nh animal is the way by which the human tames the latter to accept a personal relationship. This chapter takes up the theme of 'taming' the nh animal which includes not only companion and domesticated farm animals, but also those animals abducted from the wild that had been intended for pet-keeping, such as the case of Andre the seal. Classical normative ethics interrogated the ethics of taming the animal with two contending argumentations: Francione's abolitionism and the Citizenship theory of Donaldson and Kymlicka. The points of contention had been: on the side of Francione, total abolitionism is the ethical answer to the ideology of animal domestication because of its parallelism to the evils of slavery wherein the human owns the body of the enslaved animal, that as long as this is the status of the nh animal, the relation could never be free of colonization. Total abolitionism demands the resolute edict of 'unbreed-unto-extinction' which is rationalised upon the argument that if the nh animal were forever to be dependent upon the human in order to live, then he would be better off not having been born into existence.

On the side of Donaldson and Kymlicka's Citizenship theory, the 'unbreed unto extinction' is untenable and impossible because nh animals would forever be crossing human territories and forming relationships with them cannot be controlled. Climate change has

even exacerbated this possibility since humans now have positive duties to intervene when wild animals suffer from anthropogenic causes. Moreover, the interpretation that ‘dependence’ or ‘vulnerability’ in relationships is something colonizing and pathological, from Gilligan’s feminist point of view, is coming from a masculine standard of human development such as that of Kohlberg and Piaget which extolls independence as the main basis of maturity. According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, if what is at issue is only the protection of animals who are entangled within human relationships in various degrees of significance, then the answer is to establish laws that would grant nh animals the status of citizen.

- I endeavored to explain that nh animals that allow humans to touch them and behave as if they actually ‘enjoy’ the petting is a mark of significant relationship. I tried to establish that there is such a thing as a sexual attraction to the animal, which could be rightfully called *eros*, since the relationship involves a lot of touching, but non-coital, as in parents who love to cuddle and kiss their children even if they do not engage sexually with them, strictly speaking. I established that the desire to touch the other is sexual, though not always coital, and that this is a mark of significant relationship. My thesis in this part is that there is such a thing as a significant relationship with the nh animal, such as that of the love between Andre the seal who is a significant member of the Goodridge family. My thesis is that having a ‘pet’ is not or should not be a ‘petty’ affair and should actually be elevated as one among the taxonomy of human loves. I made use of Levinas’s phenomenology of the difference between ‘touch’ and ‘caress.’ There is a way of handling the animal which is characterized as colonization. An example of this is CAFO. But caressing the nh animal, the way that all humans who have animal companions know, is non-colonizing. The proof that the animal accepts the relationship is by consenting to the fondling and actually asking for it, since many animals are very ‘touchy’ about others touching them. Included in the caress is the element of play, in which I pointed out that animals only play with humans and other nh animals whom they trust. It is within that play that they sense and negotiate the limits and allowances in the physical relationship. In Levinas’s phenomenology of *eros*, caress is a kind of touch that allows the animal to be, as we have seen in the way that Harry treated Andre in which the seal was free to oscillate between wild and domestic spaces. Caress has

the same features as the face: it has a physiological component but also the invisible. Caress holds the animal in the sense of belongingness but not possession; it is a touch that rebels against ego and this brings us to the next item.

- That touch becomes caress when it rebels against ego. The love affair with a nh animal could be judged as a ‘caress’ and an ethical significant relationship when the human is willing to endure all kinds of inconveniences in her life, indeed, reform her lifestyle, i.e., sometimes even her house, just to accommodate a nh animal who should live comfortably. Caress is also characterized by feelings of profound respect for the animal that is very similar to religious feeling, such as that which Timothy Treadwell felt for the Alaskan bears. It was written in his diary that Treadwell’s wayward life had a conversion experience prompted by so much admiration for the beauty of the bears to the point that he was willing to lose his life for their cause. That there are a lot of humans willing to risk their lives to ensure the safety of their beloved animals are a proof that this significant relationship is not at all petty. I have also labored to show this kind of selfless concern of Harry for Andre in the many ways that he was prepared to accept if Andre would never go back to him, in the many times he took him to his winter aquarium in Boston to protect him from the harassment of people, in the way that he fought to keep him as pet when the authorities rapped on him which the townspeople and the town mayor supported by giving the both of them awards and the funds to install a statue of Andre for posterity even while he was still alive, which to this day, the people honor by maintaining it.

In this chapter, I would like to point out that the unique niche, the lacuna that Levinas has patched up in the animal ethics discourse presented by the polemic between the Abolitionist-Citizenship stances is that these perspectives both skipped the reality that the animal consents to the relationship. The discussion has been one sided: the Abolitionist stance swears that humans cannot be trusted in any relationship with the nh animal and so the puritanical *noli-me-tangere* ethic is applied; the Citizenship stance swears that humans could be trusted if certain laws in protection for the nh animal could be fixed in place. Both sides approved and negated the human capacity for a significant relationship but none ever took up the experience of the in-between, that process of the human being attracted physically to the animal, the act

of wooing the animal by touch and by acts of selfless regard and the animal giving his consent which is exhibited in the phenomenology of caress. It must be remembered that while there is always the political in the personal, that personal relationship with the animal in terms of his emotional acceptance is rarely recognized as real and as one which begs for an ethics. The ethics that discusses the theme of domestication is usually downplayed immediately to the tune of the political. Even the term 'domestication' is already politically-charged and the discussion that proceeds is to prove whether colonization is there or not. No one attempts to prove that a human could genuinely fall in love with the animal and vice versa; it is always considered a pet-ty affair.

6.4 WHEN BEARS KNOCK ON DOORS: FILIATION OF A NEW ORDER

The application of Levinas's concept of filiation on the problems in animal ethics suffering under climate change revolve around the theme of embodiment and exodus from ego in the following points:

- In the current animal ethics discourse, it had been a question if humans have duties to wild animals. Palmer clarified that humans do not have positive duties to wild animals when they are suffering within the normal processes of the wild, i. e., predation. But in the context of anthropogenic climate change which have brought upon suffering in the lives of countless species of animals, it is only justified that humans should assist wild animals. This duty also exists when there exists an expertise in doing so and when there is a well-ruminated plan that is projected to most likely succeed in helping wild animals.

In short, the focus of succor and determinant in the success of rescue and aid operations is the welfare of the embodiment of the suffering animal. The debate of normative ethics have to do with the conflict between the rectificatory and beneficence approaches. The rectificatory approach has to do with helping a suffering wild animal either directly, by bringing the body to veterinary hospitals, or indirectly, by removing or addressing the sources of suffering, i. e., providing water during drought. The beneficence approach has to

do with the duty to help the non-human animal when the cause of suffering is not the doing of humans but in which situation, the expertise for human aid is possible and will likely succeed. The clash in these approaches have to do with the context of the situation of the aided animal and its aftermath in the natural processes of wildlife.

Three climate change aid strategies are given. The *first* is rescue and rehabilitation. From the rectificatory approach, humans should rescue bobcats from hurricane floodwater but in rescuing them and but from the beneficence approach, these animals may become an aggressive species in their new habitat. The *second* is habitat restoration. Wind turbines could be installed in the polar areas in order to make more ice platforms for the polar bears as an act of rectificatory justice but this may conflict later with the beneficence perspective when these machines may disturb fish ecosystems underneath the waters. The *third* is assisted-migration. Animals like American pikas may be migrated to higher areas in order to survive the heat as an act of rectificatory justice but it may conflict with the beneficence approach when later on, these rescued animals threaten the other existing animals living in the migrated habitat. In the clashes between the rectificatory and beneficence approaches, it has also been pointed out that there is an offshoot of further ethical conflicts: the need to thresh out if the ethical concern should focus on particular animals or its species; if keeping the wildness of the wild animals is at all a value given that rescue interventions would definitely disturb the wildness disposition of wild animals; and, how much knowledge is necessary to establish if the rescue expertise is sufficient to justify that it could be projected to succeed, whether or not it actually does.

- The application of Levinas's concept of filiation brought out a phenomenology of the ethics of care that precedes the obligation of justice that had been rationalized in climate change ethics. Levinas's concept of filiation point out that the instinct to care is actually parental and parental care is always sustained or long term; this explains why the rectificatory justice oversees the rescue operations long after a particular animal had been helped. In effect, the exodus from ego is demonstrated by pointing in the discussion the exigence, not only of developing expertise in the rescue of wild animals but installing and developing community systems of helping all wild animals in the communal attitude that all humans

should become paw-parents to all animals who live proximately to their urban settlements. Some motions in the creation of this infrastructure is the installing of wildlife sanctuaries and systems of rescue and aid in all human communities and this includes the education of all inhabitants, the inculcation of the attitude that it is part of their community service to help out wild animals whenever they can even if it is simply providing winter shelters for stray animals or bird houses and baths in orchards and park forests. The exodus from ego is precisely the redefinition of what urban settlement means, which provides structures of spatial hospitality to neighboring wild animals. In this sense, filiation is the birthing of the new world order in which, in a sense, there is no division anymore between wild/non-wild spaces. This does not, of course, mean, an outright taming of all wild animals but it will definitely change the constitutional disposition of all wild animals. The filiation will engender a new order and species of wild and new meanings of 'wildness.' The exit from ego points to the existential hope inherent in filiation (to counteract existential anxiety inherent in the environmental despair that prevails).

The contribution of Levinas to the discourse of classical normative animal ethics is the articulation of the emotional care content behind what simply appears as cold objective and scientific approaches in the discussion of climate change ethics. I think that the idea of the human as parent of all nh animals is an original idea within the Levinasian framework. Theologians or environmentalists within the spiritual tradition used the word 'shepherding the environment.' I think 'parenting' is a more intimate term and emphasizes a stronger sense of responsibility toward all nh animal species. As it has been emphasized in the chapter, parenting should not be limited to biological kinship but should refer to something larger, from the human species, a new ecological order would be reborn but its order cannot be controlled nor predicted because the human mind is not omniscient to be able to represent it. The human could only foster this world in an attitude of radical hope that includes a risk to her own species, and in this sense, it necessarily cradled beyond anthropocentrism.

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