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Faculty of Arts and Philosophy

**Mistakes of the United States before the Attack on Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941**

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Z á s a d y p r o v y p r a c o v á n í :

The paper should begin with a description of the geography and history of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, emphasizing American influence on the island and the geo-political importance to the United States. Next, a brief geo-political overview of the Empire of Japan during the first half of the 20th century should be included, stressing its changing relationship to the United States. A brief analysis of the Japanese and American intelligence-gathering structures (agencies, codes, etc.) should be featured. The Japanese air and naval attack plans ? strategic and tactical ? should be outlined. The defense plan of Pearl Harbor before the attack should be traced out. Specific events leading up to the Japanese attack, as well as the attack itself should be described, emphasizing possible reasons it was so successful in terms of surprise and effectiveness (loss of military equipment and personnel). Finally the long-term military results and propagandistic usage of the attack by both the United States and Japan should be characterized.

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
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Annotation

The bachelor thesis focuses on a description of the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and discusses the possible causes of the event. It also deals with the mistakes that were made by the United States Government and military prior to the air raid, as well as economic and strategic consequences after the attack.

Key Words

Attack on Pearl Harbor; World War II; Franklin D. Roosevelt; Japan; the United States of America

Anotace

Tato bakalářská práce pojednává o útoku na Pearl Harbor. Zaměření je převážně na možné příčiny, které vedly k útoku. Zmíněny budou chyby americké vlády a obrany. Dále pak práce popisuje možnou iniciativu Spojených států amerických vstoupit do druhé světové války z důvodů strategických a zároveň ekonomických.

Klíčová slova

Útok na Pearl Harbor; druhá světová válka; Franklin D. Roosevelt; Japonsko; Spojené státy americké

Abstract

The bachelor thesis *Mistakes of the United States before the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941* describes the relations between the United States and Japan before the air raid on Hawaii, the actual attack, and also the consequences of the attack. The main aim of this bachelor thesis is to discuss what were the major mistakes the American Government and military made and whether the mistakes could have been prevented. The main focus is on the American cryptography, whether the cryptanalysts had known about the plans for the attack before it happened. Another topic discussed is the attitude of the United States towards the warning messages from Japan, if the messages were paid enough attention to or not. And the last argument of this section will cover American overconfidence about the power of their military. Another goal for this thesis is to determine the actual cause of the American involvement in the Second World War. This thesis will cover areas such as the American cooperation with the United Kingdom being essential for the American entry into the war. Also the United States' intention to find a way out of the Great Depression by joining the war will be examined, as well as the field of war profiteering.

Abstrakt

Bakalářská práce "*Chyby Spojených států před útokem na Pearl Harbor dne 7. prosince 1941*" se zabývá popisem vztahů mezi Spojenými státy americkými a Japonskem před útokem na Havaj a zároveň nahlíží na vedení útoku a následky spojených s touto vojenskou akcí. Tato bakalářské práce dále rozebírá hlavní příčiny a chyby americké vlády a vojenských složek se snahou zjistit, zda se těmto chybám dalo předcházet. K zodpovězení této otázky se práce zaměřuje na oblasti kryptografie Spojených států, se snahou zjistit jestli lidé zodpovědní za dešifrování japonských kódů věděli o plánech útoku na Pearl Harbor před tím, než k tomuto ataku došlo. Dále tato práce pojednává o přístupu Spojených států k varovným zprávám japonského původu. Poslední část k zodpovězení otázky jaké byly hlavní příčiny úspěchu japonského útoku, se zaměří na přílišnou sebejistotu Spojených států o stavu vlastních vojenských řad. Další hypotéza v této bakalářské práci bude diskutovat o skutečnosti, zda Spojené státy chtěly vstoupit do druhé světové války. V této souvislosti se práce zaměří na americké spojení s Velkou Británií a dále pak na americkou potřebu dostat se z nelehké ekonomické situace po Velké hospodářské krizi. Závěrečným tématem je případný majetkový zisk soukromých firem zainteresovaných ve válečné výrobě pro Spojené státy americké.

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This bachelor thesis would not have been possible without the support of my supervisor, Daniel Paul Sampey, M.F.A, whose encouragement, guidance, and support from the initial to the final level enabled me to develop an understanding of the subject.

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1. Introduction

The aim of this thesis *Mistakes of the United States before the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941*, is to describe a moment that changed the history of the United States – the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This event is said to have led to the entry of the United States into the Second World War.

The focus of this thesis will be on revealing the mistakes made by the United States prior to the attack, and also on whether the attack could have been prevented or at least less damaging. The research on this topic was done in areas such as the American cryptography, to discover how the intelligence services understood messages and how the warnings were treated. Also the preparedness of the American military will be mentioned as well as the attitude of the officials towards the possibility of any foreign attack.

Further research will cover the impact of the Second World War on the economy of the United States. This part of the bachelor thesis will deal with a question if the American entry to the World War II could have been profitable for the United States and whether the attack might have been planned not only by the Japanese, but also by the American government. The position of privately owned businesses trying to make profit from the war, and thus possibly forcing the American government to enter the conflict will be also discussed.

This bachelor paper contains five main chapters. The first, American-Japanese Relations, aims to outline the views of both nations about the conflict in Europe and also discusses the relations between Japan and the United States before the war in Europe. The second chapter focuses on the geographic location of the Hawaiian Islands in comparison to Japan and the United States.

The third chapter, Attack on Pearl Harbor, features the plans that had been made before the air raid on Pearl Harbor. The main part of this chapter portrays the actual attack. It also deals with the results of the attack.

The next chapter characterizes the reactions and war declarations of Japan, Germany, and the United States of America, which followed the attack.

The fifth chapter focuses on a description of the mistakes that were made by the United States Army, Navy, and also the Government. This chapter covers areas of American cryptography, how warning messages received by the United States prior the attack on Pearl Harbor had been dealt with.

The chapter "Willingness to Enter the War" deals with the question as to if the attack was profitable for the United States and could have helped the American economy by forced military spending, thus giving employment to many Americans and finding an escape from the Great Depression that had wreaked havoc on the United States economy since 1929.

2. American-Japanese Political Relations

2.1 War in Europe

On September 1, 1939, Poland was invaded by Germany. The reaction from the Great Britain and France was an immediate ultimatum for Adolf Hitler, leader of Germany, to withdraw German forces from Poland. Two days later, when the ultimatum was not accepted and the military units not withdrawn, both France and Britain declared war on Germany. This was the moment when World War II began.

The reaction from the United States of America was to stay neutral. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the President of the United States of America, announced on September 3, 1939, that, "This Nation will remain a neutral nation." (GREAVES, 366-72) However, on September 11, Roosevelt initiated a secret correspondence with Winston Churchill, who was by then the First Lord of the Admiralty. This correspondence foreshadowed a future cooperation between the Great Britain, a member of the Allies, and the United States. (GREAVES, 366-72)

Japan saw the war in Europe as an opportunity to improve its strategic position and also increase its prosperity by establishing the Greater East Asia co-prosperity scheme "New Order". This scheme meant cooperation with Germany and later, the creation of the Axis of Alliance. (GREAVES, 471-77)

2.2 Relations between the United States and Japan

The roots of the war between Japan and the United States can be found after World War I. As a consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, Japan emerged from the First World War as the leading power in the Far East, obtaining domain over the Marshall Islands, the Marina Islands, and the Caroline Islands, all of which had been in German possession before the beginning of World War I. Japan was also awarded the former German leaseholds of Kiaochow and Shantung in China. Despite all of these gains, Japan still felt cheated by the Versailles Treaty. Also, the new possessions of Japan initiated protests from the United States, meaning a slight deterioration in relations between the two countries. (CARLISLE, 6431-37)

However, Japan and the United States had been trading partners since 1911, when the treaty permitting and encouraging trade between these two countries was signed. This treaty had been profitable for both sides. Japanese welcomed foreign trade and investments but it was also lacking natural resources. Japan had to import oil, iron, rubber, cotton, wood, wool, and minerals. Some foodstuffs also had to be brought to Japan, especially meat. (CARLISLE, 6508-15) The United States had the resources that would fulfill Japanese demand and also the money to invest into Japan's quickly industrializing economy.

This commercial treaty was in danger after Japan displayed accord with the German approach to the social and foreign policies. However, the treaty between the United States and Japan contained a clause featuring a six month notice prior to cancellation. United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull gave the Japanese ambassador notice on July 26, 1939. (GREAVES, 361-66)

This was a shocking moment for the Japanese economy and also to world trade. Although the Japanese were assured that trade between them and the United States

would continue, a significant deterioration in the relations had befallen, as the abrogation of the treaty meant that tariffs, quotas, or embargoes could be imposed at any time. (GREAVES, 424-30)

3. The Hawaiian Islands

3.1 Geographical Description

The Hawaiian archipelago is near the middle of the Pacific Ocean and consists of 137 islands, from which Hawaii, Oahu, Maui, Kauai, Lanai, Molokai, Niihau, and Kahoolawe are the eight biggest. (figure 3.1, appendices) Honolulu, the capital city of Hawaii and the largest city on the island of Oahu, is located approximately 3,850 kilometers to the west from San Francisco, California, and 6,500 kilometers east of Tokyo, Japan. The Australian coast is more than 7,000 kilometers to the southwest. (COUNTRYSTUDIES)

3.2 Importance of Pearl Harbor

The United States obtained exclusive rights to Pearl Harbor in 1876, when both the American Government and the Hawaiian Kingdom signed and ratified the Reciprocity Treaty. The treaty allowed Hawaiian sugar to enter the United States duty free in exchange for special economic privileges for the United States that were denied for other nations. However, the Spanish American War (1898) and the need for the United States to have a permanent naval base in the Pacific contributed to the decision to annex Hawaii. After the annexation, work such as dredging the channel to improve the harbor for the use of large navy ships began. In 1908 Congress of the United States authorized the creation of a naval base at Pearl Harbor. By 1914 other housing facilities for the army personnel were constructed in the area around Pearl Harbor. (FISCHER)

After the First World War Japan began to grow into a major industrial and military power. Hawaii's position almost in the centre of the Pacific Ocean and so nearly

directly between the coasts of Japan and the United States helped the American Congress to decide to increase the number of ships at Pearl Harbor. The ships were to protect other places of American interest in the Pacific. One of the areas of importance was Ford Island, an island which was used for the training of military aviators.

In 1940, the United States Fleet was reorganized, creating the Pacific and Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was to be permanently based at Pearl Harbor, forever changing the face of Hawaii. The civilian and military workforce increased rapidly, consisting of most of the Hawaii's American population.

4. Attack on Pearl Harbor

4.1 Planning of the Attack

For the attack to be such a surprise it had to have been planned months before it occurred. The plan was the handiwork of Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, chief of staff of the First Air Fleet. (CARLISLE, 857-63) Kusaka in fact wanted the pilots conducting the air raid on Pearl Harbor to be extremely well-trained. The Japanese used Kyushu Island, the southernmost of the four main Japanese islands, for their training. Ariake Bay, located on Kyushu, is said to bear a rather strong resemblance to Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese used a simple technique to create conditions as close as possible to Pearl Harbor. Valuable aerial overhead images of Pearl Harbor and military installations on the Oahu Island were obtained by simply using pictures taken by Japanese agents, living in Hawaii, who took private sightseeing plane rides. These activities were repeated hundreds of times in 1941 and provided the Japanese military with detailed information about almost every movement of the American military which took place at the time. (CARLISLE, 851-57)

4.2 A Date Which Will Live in Infamy

The attack on Pearl Harbor commenced in the early morning of December 7, 1941. At 6 o'clock and 10 minutes of Hawaii-Aleutian Standard Time, Japanese Admiral Chuichi Nagumo gave the order for 183 planes led by Commander Mitsuo

Fuchida to take off from six aircraft carriers the Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, Soryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku located 355 kilometers north of Oahu. (BENFORD, 1172) The fleet was accompanied by battleships, cruisers, and also a large number of destroyers. One hour and five minutes later, at 7:15, a second wave consisting of 168 Japanese planes was launched.

The first wave of Japanese aircraft made visual contact with the North Shore of Oahu and started preparations for the attack. At 7:49 Commander Fuchida gave the command "To, To, To!" to planes over Pearl Harbor. This command can be translated as "charge". Four minutes later, Fuchida, under the excitement of a total American surprise and reaching the target without being detected, commanded the fleet with another prearranged coded signal of "Tora, Tora, Tora!" (Tiger, Tiger, Tiger)

The attack on Ewa Field, the United States' Marine base on Oahu, begun almost immediately after the coded message was delivered. The parked aircraft were strafed and heavily bombed.

Pearl Harbor was struck by the Japanese fighters less than two minutes after the first bombs hit Ewa. At 7:55 strike bombers and torpedo planes commenced their runs at Battleship Row, including the largest American battleships USS Nevada, Arizona, California, Tennessee, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Maryland, and a repair ship Vestal. (figure 4.2, appendices) Other ships in Pearl Harbor were also under attack. (BENFORD, 571)

At 7:58, a message that has become historic and famous "AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL" (figure 4.2.2, appendices) was broadcast to the world. Shortly after this proclamation, the only functioning radio station in the morning on the Hawaiian Islands, KGMB, interrupted its regular Sunday morning music with an

announcement stating that "All Army, Navy, and Marine personnel report to duty." This announcement was broadcast three more times but during none of these times was the attack was mentioned whatsoever.

The information about Pearl Harbor being under Japanese attack was reported by telephone to the President of the United States Franklin Delano Roosevelt by the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, at 8:10 (13:30 in Washington, D. C.). The White House Press Secretary, Steve Early publically announced the attack on Pearl Harbor about a half an hour after Roosevelt had received the message, so Americans and the world would be informed that "The Japs have attacked Pearl Harbor, all military activities on Oahu Island. A second air-attack was reported on Manila air and naval bases." (BENFORD, 479)

While the press statement was being delivered, in a fighter above Oahu Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki gave the second wave of aircraft the order to attack Pearl Harbor. The Battle of Pearl Harbor continued for three more hours.

4.3 Results of the Japanese Attack

Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, after observing the damage done by the Japanese in Pearl Harbor, departed the area and returned to the aircraft carrier Kagi at 11:00. As the last planes cleared the Hawaiian sky, the Harbor revealed all the wounds it had suffered.

The Japanese raid on Hawaii caused the death of almost 2,400 people. The largest death toll was aboard the USS Arizona – almost one half of the total number.

The exceptionally effective sudden attack damaged five of the eight battleships so seriously that they were sunk. Out of 394 American aircraft present on the airfields, 188 had been destroyed and another 159 damaged. There also were 94 warships in harbor, out of which 18 were either sunk or seriously damaged.

Fortunately for the U.S. Navy, none of its aircraft carriers were at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The carriers were either in the Pacific delivering aircraft to other American bases or at sea or in port around the continental United States. (CARLISLE, 211)

5. Reactions to the Attack

5.1 Japanese Declaration of War after the Attack

In addition to the fact that Pearl Harbor underwent such aggression, on the same day other islands in the Pacific Ocean occupied by United States forces such as the Philippine Islands, Midway Islands, and Guam were also under open Japanese attack. Due to the distance of Hawaii and other above mentioned islands from Japan, it was obvious to United States officials that the attack had been well planned in advance. However, neither the Japanese Government, nor any of Japanese officials had delivered a formal Declaration of War on the United States of America before the actual attack, although Japanese leaders on December 1, 1941 had addressed the emperor with a statement "We declare war against the United States and Great Britain."

On Saturday, December 6, 1941 a final appeal for peace was made to the Japanese Emperor Hirohi by the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Emperor Hirohi never replied to this appeal, as the preparations for the attack were deeply in progress. (CARLISLE, 2925)

The Japanese delivered the declaration of war to United States' Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo almost exactly ten hours after the air raid in Pearl Harbor was over. The reason for such a long delay was the fact that the Japanese had been waiting for confirmation of their success. The two-line declaration was received as a telegram by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Shigenori Togo, stating: "Excellency I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that there has arisen a state of war between Your Excellency's country and Japan beginning today" (CARLISLE, 1813) (figure 5.1, appendices)

5.2 Reaction of Reichstag

On the night of December 7, 1941, having just been informed about the attack on Pearl Harbor, Adolf Hitler made a "unilateral decision about the declaration of war on the United States." (CARLISLE, 2042) This declaration, however, needed to be authorized by the Reichstag. On that very night Hitler informed his Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, about the attack and instructed him to summon the Reichstag for a meeting which was to be held on December 10, 1941. Before making a formal declaration of war, Hitler concluded a pact with Italy and Japan, which ensured that Japan would not withdraw from the war before victory had been won in Europe. The German Declaration of War on the United States was signed by Adolf Hitler on December 11, 1941.

5.3 Roosevelt's Speech

The United States were shocked by the sudden Japanese attack. Eight hours after Roosevelt had received the message about the attack, he met with the congressional leadership in the White House. The President and the congressional leaders agreed that Roosevelt would ask for a formal declaration of war on Japan the next afternoon.

Roosevelt, during his historical speech (figure 5.3, audio 5.3.2, appendices) informing Congress of the United States about the attack, received applause even from most Republicans. This was the first time he had received such support from the opposition party since he had taken office. (CARLISLE, 1512) The speech, however, was mostly to call on the American people to come to the defense of the country, as Roosevelt was sure of Congressional unity. (GREAVES, 4047)

At the end of Roosevelt's historical speech, the President asked the Congress to declare that "since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on December 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire." (GREAVES, 4052) With Congress's December 8 resolution, the United States was at war with Japan.

Despite being at war with the Japanese Empire, the United States did not declare war on Germany, although Franklin D. Roosevelt had considered Germany as the prime target. However, on the morning of December 11, Germany and Italy both declared war on the United States. The Congress of the United States promptly issued two joint resolutions resolving that the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy had been formally declared. (GREAVES, 4063)

6. Mistakes Preceding the Attack

6.1 American Cryptography

It is significant in every modern war that the communication between the intelligence services, the government, and military officers is coded. Many questions about American cryptography arose after the attack on Pearl Harbor, investigating whether the code system had been working properly or not, and the possibility that the attack could have been avoided.

The Japanese did not use very sophisticated cryptography. Due to their isolation, the Japanese language was very complex and not understood by many Westerners. The method of Japanese encryption was very common for that period. Individual words and syllables were given a numerical value. Such a message, consisting of only numbers, was then given a second layer of encryption by a code clerk. This second layer used a book of additives. These additives would, in theory, hide the real words transmitted.

The most common code used by the Japanese to pass informational messages between the Japanese government and its embassies was called PURPLE. However, PURPLE carried mainly diplomatic traffic. The Japanese military, and especially the Imperial Navy, used a code named JN-25.

Americans cryptanalysts understood the principles of such encryption, but it was still difficult to decipher the code. To accelerate the encryption, in the beginning of 1940, both the army and navy cryptography departments started using a new technology – the IBM computer. The computer increased the ability to analyze the patterns of the Japanese codes.

In September 1940, the code PURPLE was uncovered, when the United States Army Signal Intelligence Service (SIS), led by Colonel William F. Friedman, built a device based on a similar design as the Japanese code breaking devices. The American machine was nicknamed MAGIC. (figure 6.1, appendices) By 1941, the American cryptanalysts became so proficient in using MAGIC and breaking the code, that they were able to decipher the messages faster than the Japanese embassy staff. (CARLISLE, 1418)

The breaking of the Japanese military code JN-25 was given to the OP-20-G¹ of the United States Navy and the task was handed to Captain Joseph J. Rochefort and his team, including cryptanalysts, linguists, and technical experts. However, the decoding of JN-25 was not as successful as decoding PURPLE. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Joseph Rochefort was devastated, as he felt he had failed the task, stating that, "An intelligence officer has one job, one task, one mission - to tell his commander, his superior, today what the Japanese are going to do tomorrow." (CARLISLE, 1446)

After the Second World War, many investigations were launched to discover whether cryptanalysts had had the information before the air raid on Pearl Harbor, and had not passed on such warnings to their supervisors. These investigations showed that the failure of communication intelligence was very complex, but the results of investigation showed that people of SIS and OP-20-G did a remarkable job under tremendous pressure, and the failure of cryptography was not the key that had led to the success of the surprising Japanese attack.

¹ Office of Chief of Naval Operation, 20th Division of the Office of Naval Communications, G Section / Communications Security

6.2 Warning Messages

When the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred, the Government of the United States was questioned on how such a destructive surprise could happen without anybody noticing the Japanese plans. As the post war investigations revealed, one of the mistakes made by the officials of the United States Army was paying very little or no attention to received messages.

Due to so many false alarms of a Japanese attack in weeks and months prior to the air raid, the alertness of the American Army and Navy had been almost completely lost. The only active surveillance on the Hawaii Islands on December 7, 1941, was by a radar station located in the north of Oahu. This station, called the Opana Radar Site, (figure 6.2, appendices) was staffed on Saturday afternoon by United States Army privates, Joseph L. Lockhard and George E. Elliot. (STINNET, 4844) The privates were due to go off duty at 7 A.M. Sunday morning. However, an unusual blip that had appeared some 136 miles from the Hawaiian coast, made them stay at the station and report the situation.

After announcing the incoming planes to headquarters at Pearl Harbor, the operators were told that the signal that had been received was probably from the incoming American B-17s and to close Opana as scheduled. Nonetheless, Elliot and Lockhard continued to observe and plot the incoming flight, as they felt this was good practice. Unfortunately for the United States, the detected radar blip was the Japanese aircraft approaching the island of Oahu. (BENFORD, 947)

The Japanese plans about the attack on Pearl Harbor should have been rather obvious on December 3, 1941, when SIS cryptanalysts decoded a message telling the Japanese embassy staff to burn their codebooks and destroy one of their precious cipher

machines. This message made no sense to the American cryptanalysts as they were questioning themselves on how would the Japanese government communicate with their ambassadors if they had no codebooks and decoding machines? After a long discussion, Colonel Otis Sadtler said to Frank Rowlett, a senior cryptanalyst, "It means Japan is about to go to war with the United States!" (CARLISLE 1374) Sadtler then immediately notified his supervisors, Admirals Husband Kimmel and Claude C. Bloch of the United States Navy. However, no move was made to place military personnel at Pearl Harbor on emergency alert. (CARLISLE, 1045)

On December 4, 1941, a Tokyo news broadcast contained a coded message "east wind rain." This irrelevantly inserted message was a signal for Japanese ambassadors to destroy all the materials that had carried any communication between the Japanese government and the embassies. The message was decoded and American authorities notified. Despite this fact, no action was taken. (CARLISLE, 2610)

Another warning that could have signaled the Japanese intentions to attack, had happened a day before the air raid on Pearl Harbor. On December 6, 1941, President Roosevelt made a final appeal to Japanese Emperor Hirohi for peace. Hirohi did not reply to this appeal. Later on the same day, SIS started intercepting a 14-part Japanese message. This message was passed on to the American President and Secretary of the State, Cordell Hull. The analysis revealed that an attack was imminent, probably in Southeast Asia. Historian Charles Tansill maintains that President Roosevelt, although being aware of the information that an attack would take place the following morning, went to bed on the night of December 7, without notifying officials at American military bases in the Pacific. (CARLISLE, 2923)

6.3 *Lack of Men on Duty*

That the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor happened at all was not only a surprise, it also exposed the unpreparedness and indiscipline of the American Army. Some of the soldiers that were supposed to be on duty on the morning of December 7, 1941, as a historian Robert P. Carlisle mentions, "had trouble stumbling out of their bunks even though they had been allowed to sleep late, until 6:30 A. M." (CARLISLE, 238)

Even as war threatened, finding entertainment in Hawaii was not difficult for the American military. Soldiers on regular bases visited bars, honkytonks, dances and shows at the United Service Organizations. (figure 6.3, appendices) One Pearl Harbor survivor stated that on December 6, 1941 a tavern owned by a retired commander of the Japanese Navy provided free drinks to anyone in uniform. The commander also invited all the pilots in the American Armed Forces to attend a luau (*a Hawaiian feast*) at Wahiawa, Hawaii. For the entertainment of the pilots, plenty of food, music, girls and alcohol were provided far into early hours of the morning. The survivor insisted that "most of the pilots were still drunk (on December 7), and not capable of flying their planes if they could have gotten them off the ground." (CLARKE, 47)

The fact about such indiscipline of the American soldiers was well-known to the Japanese officers. Japanese reconnaissance described the military situation in Hawaii as "poorly organized" and "downright bad." Sunday was thus identified as the day when most ships were in harbor and their crews most relaxed. (CLARKE, 15)

6.4 Overconfidence of the United States

One of the greatest problems and failings that enabled such a successful attack by the Japanese was that the United States did not even imagine that anything like the air raid on Pearl Harbor could happen at all. The United States' officers were overly confident about the power of the American military and felt invulnerable. One day before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Vice Admiral William Satterlee Pye, the second-highest-ranking United States Navy officer at Pearl Harbor said: "The Japanese will not go to war with the United States. We are too big, too powerful, and too strong." (BENFORD, 221)

Historian Thurston Clarke mentions that after examining the attitude of the civilians and military on both Hawaii and the mainland United States, calling this state of mind "overconfidence" is a kindness, and it would be better described as "deluded or arrogant." (CLARKE, 64) This attitude towards the possibility of war in the Pacific can be found in the words of many other officers and politicians. For instance, a congressman from Minnesota, Melvin Mass, told his colleagues in Washington, D.C. that "Japan is deathly afraid of the American fleet, and American sea and air forces in Hawaii could defend themselves against any combination of forces that may challenge our (American) interest." (CLARKE, 65)

Even on the islands of Hawaii, the certainty of the American military about the powerfulness and invulnerability of Pearl Harbor was very naive. Major General Charles Herron, commander of the Hawaiian Department, had announced that, "Oahu will never be exposed to a blitzkrieg attack." As the reasons for such words Herron stated, "We (Pearl Harbor) are more than two thousand miles away from land whichever way you look, which is a long way for an enemy force to steam. And besides, it would have to smash through our Navy." (CLARKE, 67)

Because of this overconfidence of the United States, the Army and Navy officials neither feared nor even admitted the possibility of a Japanese attack. This unawareness of the American services is assumed to be the key to such strategic mistakes such as having the strongest battleships lined up next to each other in two rows, and thus making easy targets for the Japanese fighters. A further example of American unpreparedness was the command to strip many of the United States planes of weaponry to conserve fuel. (BENFORD, 232-33)

7. Willingness to Enter the War

7.1 Roosevelt's Awareness of the Attack

When the circumstances leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor were revealed, interrogations arose. It was difficult to believe the American government and the President had been totally unaware of an imminent attack.

Many historians believe and describe how the air raid was planned not only by the Japanese government and officials but it was also arranged by the American government. The officers of the United States Army and Navy also blame government officials and especially President Franklin D. Roosevelt. This blame, as many conspiracy theorists suggest, was mainly based on the fact that the attack provided the United States with a "back door to war." (CARLISLE, 288-94)

President Roosevelt is mentioned most often in connection with planning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It is believed that the evidence of plot to motivate the American entry into the Second World War lie in a secret commitment to Winston Churchill, prime minister of the United Kingdom. The commitment was based on support from the United States to the United Kingdom in case of war against Germany. The main reason Roosevelt wanted to join the war in Europe and to help Britain was the fear that if unopposed Hitler would conquer all of Europe and so potentially plunge the world into a fascist nightmare. This intention can be seen in the policy called "Germany First." This policy was signed in 1941 (after Pearl Harbor) by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill as a part of the Atlantic Charter, meaning the Allied powers would concentrate their greatest efforts on defeating Germany before turning their resources against Japan. This was much to the chagrin of the United States Navy, which wanted to quickly settle its score with Japan. (BENFORD, 1254)

However, the American public was very pacifistic and did not want to be involved in what had seemed as a distant war in Europe. This attitude did not provide Roosevelt with the opportunity to involve the United States into the war and so he promised to stay neutral.

Roosevelt's chances to enter the war and so to help the United Kingdom were accelerated after Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Tripartite Treaty. While the distance between the United States and Europe did not allow a direct attack, Japan was closer to the American borders. And due to the Tripartite Treaty, declaring war on any of the three nations automatically meant that the other nations were in the war as well.

After the Tripartite Treaty was signed, Roosevelt and the government began to prepare for the American entry to the war. Certain decisions were made by Roosevelt administration such as the military buildup in the Pacific Ocean, and the exchange of fifty World War I British destroyers for unveiling the location of American military bases in British territory to Japan. Admiral Robert A. Theobald, who was serving as a Commander of Destroyer Flotilla One on the day of the attack, said that such an exchange “provided positive proof that the government was orchestrating rather than preparing for American entry into the war.” (CARLISLE, 2581-87)

Roosevelt also needed to convince the American public that involvement in the war was necessary. He used the press to help him create a very strong anti-Hitler bias. Such news and pictures changed the environment and made the entry of the United States into World War II inevitable. And another eventuality Roosevelt had been aware of was that in the case of any attack on the American territory, the United States public and leaders would feel justified in waging a war for victory. (CARLISLE, 299-301) This would be a war without mercy, with a demand of unconditional surrender.

It is also believed that Roosevelt had received the decoded message about the attack on Pearl Harbor at least a day before it occurred. As the historian and professor of history at Georgetown university Charles C. Tansill states, although Roosevelt had been aware of the inappropriately inserted message into the Tokyo weather broadcast (East Wind Rain) indicating that an air raid was to take place he did not notify any officials of the American military bases in the Pacific Ocean. (CARLISLE, 2610-13)

7.2 Finding a Way Out of the Great Depression

The entry of the United States of America into the Second World War is often mentioned as a way of escaping the consequences of the Great Depression that had continued in America since 1929. American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was behind the construction of a plan, called the New Deal, to revive the American economy. This strategy was introduced in 1933 and was to increase government spending in order to lower the unemployment rate in the United States. (RAUCHWAY, 1) In connection with the increased state expenditures, the New Deal was designed to encourage individual Americans to spend their money.

Between the years 1933 and 1935 the New Deal focused primarily on the stabilization of American banks and the initiation of programs that were to provide work for unemployed men mainly between the ages of 18 and 35. (RAUCHWAY, 64) These initiatives achieved significant increases in production and prices; however, even after the stabilization of the American banks and increasing government spending on relief programs, the depression had not ended.

New demands arose as the sense of immediate crisis eased. The first phase of New Deal was focusing on allocating federal money through state and local governments, which then hired workers. This was in Roosevelt's view inefficient and so a new plan was introduced in the spring of 1935. This plan brought a new Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, which Roosevelt used for establishing the Works Progress Administration (WPA). (RAUCHWAY, 67)

The WPA program, also called the Second New Deal, provided work for millions of Americans, rather than giving them welfare and state subsidies. The WPA appropriates nearly 5 billion dollars for relief projects, including highways, conservation, irrigation, electrification, housing, sanitation, flood control, reforestation, and indeed any conceivable public good. (RAUCHWAY, 67)

Employment rates can be seen as the measure of success of the New Deal. While in the year of 1932, approximately 11.5 million Americans were jobless, by 1940 the number had dropped to about 5.3 million. (TASSAVA) Despite lowering the rate almost by half from 1932 to 1940, a significant pool of unused potential labor remained.

In contrast to the economic situation of 1940, in the following year unemployment almost ceased to exist. This change was the result of the strengthening of the private sector as well as the increase in government spending. This boost in spending could only be accomplished by repealing some parts of the initial New Deal. Entering the Second World War provided a justification for doing so. The federal government of the United States became the largest employer in the nation. The number of civilians employed by the federal government had quadrupled, from one million in 1940 to almost four million in 1945. Governmental spending during the same five years went from nine billion dollars in 1940 to 98.4 billion dollars in 1945. (SCHULTZ)

After the extremely rapid recovery of the American economy in 1941, some industries were short of labor. These shortages resulted in women applying for jobs and entering positions that had been previously reserved for men. American propaganda strongly supported the idea that women should become a part of the workforce. Propaganda posters with images like "Rosie the Riveter" (figure 7.2, appendices) promoted the idea of patriotism and it not being unfeminine to work in non-traditional jobs. This propaganda can be seen as a sign that the United States fully expected to join the ongoing war, which would then be followed by the lack of men able to work in American companies. By 1941 almost seven million women entered the workforce, two million of them in heavy industry.

Supporting women in the labor force also meant the ignoring of laws regulating the employment of children and women. Many factories introduced longer shifts, which led to a huge boost in industrial output. Also, the antitrust legislation known as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act from 1890 (OUR DOCUMENTS), prohibiting the anti-competitive behavior of private business, was not enforced. Small businesses almost entirely disappeared. On the other hand, two-thirds of government spending went to the hundred largest companies in the United States. Social expenditures plummeted due to the deepening of the federal deficit, which in turn affected many Americans by leading to an increase in the poverty rate. The Congress of the United States during the Second World War often ignored such social issues and favored the military instead.

The federal government also enforced Americans to limit their purchase of consumer goods and groceries during war time. Ration cards were introduced when buying daily products such as coffee, meat, or gasoline. This caused dissatisfaction for many Americans, as they had money but not many goods that could be bought. After the Second World War was over, Americans started buying items in unprecedented amounts. This can be seen as the point when the output gap closed. As Megan McArdle said, "The Great Depression indisputably ended during World War II." (THEATLANTIC)

7.3 War Profiteering

The involvement of the United States in the war also meant large amounts of equipment, weaponry, and other necessary items that needed to be provided to the military. The American government was dependent on thousands of businesses to manage the production of war materials. This meant that government contracts worth millions of dollars were offered almost daily.

Between the years 1940 and 1944, the government signed contracts worth more than 175 billion dollars. The average daily expenses geared toward the American military were totaled about 250 million dollars. This money inflated the American industrial capacity, as the funding went to privately owned businesses. (SCHULTZ) In 1940, seventy percent of the manufacturing output was managed by approximately 175 thousand companies. The other thirty percent was controlled by some one hundred companies. In only three years, this position had changed, with seventy percent of government spending going to the top one hundred companies. (PAGERANKSTUDIO)

Involving such businesses also meant increasing the number of companies which would want to profit from the government money. President Roosevelt was determined to introduce anti-profiteering policies and in fact, wanted war profiteering to be recognized as treason. President Roosevelt once uttered, "I don't want to see a single war millionaire created in the United States as a result of this world disaster!" (THENATION)

Generally when Roosevelt asked the government for increased military spending, he usually accompanied such a legislation proposal with another, preventing profiteering and equally distributing the burdens of a possible war and for this reason the Office of Price Administration (OPA) was created. The responsibilities of OPA

were to prevent speculation, price manipulations, profiteering, and also hoarding. This meant price controls of wages, rents, and overseeing the quality of materials that were put toward war production.

In his fight against war profiteers, Roosevelt found a new supporter. Senator Harry S. Truman, who had visited many corporate offices and worksites, chaired a Senate committee that started aggressive investigation into wartime businesses. This committee found the practices of many companies as "waste, inefficiency, mismanagement, and profiteering." (NATION) When Roosevelt received this information, he supported raising the excess-profits tax to 90 percent, and also increased the corporate income tax.

Despite the tax laws and the OPA, most companies at the end of the Second World War reported earnings from 20 to 40 times higher than they had had before the war.

8. Conclusion

The paper *Mistakes of the United States before the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941*, focused on the description of the actual air raid on Pearl Harbor, the mistakes leading to such a devastating moment, and on the involvement of the Government of the United States in the situation.

The first main question of the bachelor paper tried to detect what were the mistakes before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and whether such failures could have been discovered and eliminated.

From the research it is obvious that the attack on Pearl Harbor was well prepared by the Japanese. The distance between the capital city of Japan, Tokyo, and the Islands of Hawaii, as well as the espionage in Pearl Harbor proved that Japanese fleets and aircraft had been well aware of the plan and so they left their territory more than a week before the air raid.

Evidence of a plan had been detected by the American cryptanalysts days before the attack happened. It could be then concluded that the cryptanalysts failed at their jobs, as they did not inform their supervisors and warn them. However, further research showed that the American cryptography was one of several well-organized and properly working espionage services. The coded communication between the Government of Japan and Japanese embassies in the United States was quickly decoded and the messages containing important information about any possible attack were immediately given to higher instances. American cryptography should not be blamed for making any mistake as it has been revealed that this intelligence service had done remarkable work.

However, the leading American politicians and military officers did not deal with such warnings as if they were of any importance. Warning messages were usually not forwarded to those institutions in which some action could have been taken. This can be marked as one of the greatest factors that could have prevented the air raid on Pearl Harbor and saved many lives.

Giving low priority to warning messages can be explained by the American feeling of total invulnerability. The impression of many Americans and politicians was that the force and strength of the fortification and personnel not only in Pearl Harbor but in American bases across the Pacific would convince other nations that any possible attack would be easily diverted and punished.

Without sufficient information, the supervising American officers on Pearl Harbor were not expecting any threat from the Japanese and so allowed their subordinates to go to bars, be relaxed, and remain unprepared for any attack.

The answer to the question as to whether the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been prevented is yes. The United States had enough information and warnings about the plans of Japan to strike in Pearl Harbor. However, the American officers and government personnel did not take any action to eliminate the chance of any attack. Underestimating the importance of warning messages and American overconfidence could be marked as the main mistakes prior to the attack.

The second hypothesis was to discuss the question as to whether or not the promise of dramatically increased profits motivated the United States the entry into the Second World War, and this being in fact the reason the American Government would be willing to join the Allied forces.

Not paying enough attention to warning messages and handing them over to responsible personnel could be understood as being a plan to bring the United States Government into the Second World War. The fact that Franklin Roosevelt had known about the preparations of the attack on Pearl Harbor, is a significant sign of such willingness to join the fight.

One of the reasons for the American entry to the war was the cooperation between the United States and the Great Britain. The American President Roosevelt had promised to Winston Churchill that support could be expected from the United States in the case of a German declaration of war on Britain. Despite the promises, bringing Americans into the war was not easy, as the majority of Americans had been mostly pacifists and isolationists.

Another reason for joining the war, and perhaps the most important one, was the notion that joining the war would end the era known as Great Depression. Opportunities such as increasing government spending, giving work to unemployed people, and encouraging economic growth arose with the vision of being a part of the war. The American government led by President Roosevelt was aware of the fact that American involvement in the conflict would create a great need to build weaponry for the military. Such a process of arming would create many new jobs not only in the public sector, but also in the private sector by creating so many new government business contracts to be fulfilled.

The stimulation of corporate profit is often mentioned when discussing United States involvement in World War II. It can be indisputably proven that some companies saw increased revenues from the war, but generally war profiteering was strongly discouraged and this was more likely not part of the reason why the United States displayed the willingness to enter the war.

Overall, joining the Second World War was profitable and also strategically favorable for the United States. Not only did Americans confirm their cooperation with Great Britain, but it was also relief from the drastic economic situation in the United States. The attack on Pearl Harbor had been a known plan for the United States Government before it took place, but instead of foregoing the attack, the American Government rather encouraged it as it would eventually serve as a back door to war.

9. Resume

Cílem této bakalářské práce *Chyby Spojených států před útokem na Pearl Harbor dne 7. prosince 1941* bylo popsat japonský útok na americkou námořní základnu na havajském ostrově Oahu, který změnil historii Spojených států amerických. Spojené státy tímto okamžikem vstoupily do druhé světové války.

Záměrem této práce bylo popsat diplomatické vztahy mezi Japonskem a Spojenými státy, jejich postavení ve světě. Dále pak objasnit geografickou polohu Pearl Harboru a jeho strategickou důležitost pro americké námořnictvo, a následně samotný popis japonského útoku na Pearl Harbor. Hlavní dvě hypotézy měly potvrdit, že bylo možné útok předejít a že mohl být tento překvapivý útok ekonomicky a strategicky prospěšný pro Spojené státy americké.

U první hypotézy, že bylo možné útok předejít, nebo alespoň zmírnit jeho následky, se tato bakalářská práce zaměřila na prozkoumání oblastí, jako byla americká kryptografie, zda informační služby rozuměly šifrovaným zprávám přicházejícím z Japonska a jestli tyto zprávy byly předávány vyšším instancím. Dalším tématem k hypotéze, zda se útok dalo předejít, se práce zaměřila na dostatečnou připravenost vojáků a vojenských jednotek na Pearl Harboru a také na jejich informovanost o tehdy aktuálním diplomatickém dění. Posledním zkoumaným úsekem k této hypotéze byla skutečnost přecenění americké síly a na druhou stranu naopak podcenění síly japonských jednotek.

Ze zkoumání k první hypotéze vyšlo najevo, že útok na Pearl Harbor byl Japonskem více než dobře a mnoho dní dopředu připraven. Vzhledem ke vzdálenosti Havajských ostrovů a japonských břehů musely japonské jednotky opustit svá přístaviště již někdy v průběhu listopadu 1941. Další pomocí pro Japonsko byla špionáž

právě v Pearl Harboru. Tato činnost byla prováděna systematicky, s jasným zaměřením na detaily typu obsazenosti lodí, postavení lodí, či počtu vojáků v zálivu.

Po bližším prozkoumání americké kryptografie vyšlo najevo, že ačkoliv byla tato složka velmi malá co do počtu úředníků v ní pracujících, tak výsledky dekodování japonských šifrovaných zpráv byly více než vynikající. Americké kryptografii se poměrně brzy podařilo prolomit šifrovací systém Japonska, a tak bylo přijímání a pochopení zpráv pro vyšší instance zásadně ulehčeno.

Jedním z hlavních problémů však bylo nakládání s těmito rozšifrovanými zprávami. Jak američtí politici, tak i osoby zodpovědné za válečnou strategii nepřikládali mnohdy této komunikaci valný význam. Bylo prokázáno, že častým úkazem bylo nepředávání zpráv do rukou těch, kterým byly tyto informace určeny.

Důvodek k nedostatečnému předávání informací se zdá být přemíra sebevědomí na straně Spojených států amerických. Američtí politici a vojenské osobnosti tehdejší doby se domnívali, že by bylo nemožné a strategicky naprosto nedomyšlené napadnout Spojené státy. Tyto osobnosti věřili v obrovskou sílu vojenských jednotek patřících ke Spojeným státům. Tyto domněnky se však ukázaly jako naprosto liché a bylo prokázáno, že podcenění hrozby z japonské strany stálo mnoho životů.

Odpověď na hypotézu, zda se dalo útoku na Pearl Harbor předejít je ano. Útok byl dlouho plánován a znám i Spojeným státům americkým. Avšak kvůli podcenění situace a přehnanému sebevědomí o stavu sil se proti útoku na Havaj neudělalo nic.

Druhá hypotéza byla založena na faktu, že vstup Spojených států do druhé světové války mohl být výhodný pro americké politiky, stejně tak i obyvatele a to převážně z ekonomických důvodů.

K objasnění této hypotézy se práce zabývala americkou kooperací s Velkou Británií, následně profitováním z válečného zbrojení a podnikání a také možnými finančními dopady na Spojené státy v případě jejich vstupu do války.

Přijímání, avšak nereflexování varovných zpráv z japonského území může být přičteno jednak přehnanému sebevědomí, jak již bylo popsáno dříve, ale také to mohla být známka pro fakt, že v pozadí americké vlády byli lidé, kteří si přáli právě vstup Spojených států do války.

Hlavní příčinou proč by například prezident Spojených států amerických Franklin Delano Roosevelt chtěl vstoupit do druhé světové války, je vzájemná kooperace s Velkou Británií, jmenovitě tehdejším premiérem, Winstonem Churchillem. Prezident Roosevelt viděl největší hrozbu v možném obsazení celé Evropy fašistickým Německem. Spojené státy americké byly ekonomicky závislé na exportu věcí do Evropy a při případném obsazení by tento vývoz byl zastaven. Avšak nejenom ekonomické důvody hrály roli v kooperaci s Velkou Británií. Americká agenda věděla, že při případném obsazení Británie Německem by byly Spojené státy další v pořadí.

Vstup Spojených států amerických do války však nebyl úplně možný bez cizího útoku na americkém území. Ve třicátých letech dvacátého století byly Spojené státy extrémně izolované od okolního světa a Američané vyznávali politiku pacifizmu a přáli si, aby americká vláda zůstala neutrální v postavení ke konfliktu, který probíhal v Evropě.

Tato potřeba cizího útoku na americkém území mohla být jednou z hlavních příčin, proč se proti plánovanému útoku na Pearl Harbor nic zásadního nedělalo. Z historických pramenů vyplývá, že Roosevelt spíše útok na vlastní, to jest americké, území podporoval, než aby se mu snažil zabránit.

Další z možných příčin této "podpory" útoku na Pearl Harbor byla ekonomická situace Spojených států. Ve třicátých letech dvacátého století se americká ekonomika potácela v těžké situaci. Po pádu burzy v New Yorku v roce 1929 rapidně vzrostl počet nezaměstnaných, a tím pádem se zmenšila kupní síla. Toto mělo za následek prohlubování tíživé ekonomické situace.

Prezident Roosevelt se snažil z této ekonomické krize dostat za podpory ekonomického balíku, známého jako New Deal (občas překládán jako Nový úděl). Tento balík měl za účel nejdříve restrukturalizovat americký bankovní systém, a pak stimulovat privátní sektor zvýšením státních útrat. Bankovní systém se zachránit podařilo, ale ekonomický úspěch Rooseveltova programu nebyl nijak veliký.

Rooseveltova agenda přišla s druhým návrhem Nového údělu v roce 1935. Po schválení tohoto návrhu a jeho plném využití se nezaměstnanost výrazně snížila (téměř o polovinu), avšak stále zůstávala na vysokých číslech. Roosevelt viděl ve válce možný potenciál jak vyvést Spojené státy z ekonomické krize. Vstup do války totiž znamenal snížení nezaměstnanosti téměř na nulové hodnoty a extrémní zvýšení produktivity amerického průmyslu díky nucené výrobě zbraní a ostatního vojenského materiálu pro americkou armádu. Tato skutečnost může být tedy považována za určité Rooseveltovo přání vstoupit do druhé světové války.

Poslední možnou příčinou, která mohla stát za americkým plánováním útoku na Pearl Harbor, mohl být tlak velkých amerických firem. Avšak propojení privátního

sektoru a vlády Spojených států za účelem obohacování nebylo nikdy prokázáno, ba naopak bylo za vlády Roosevelta silně potlačováno, a tudíž by nemělo být bráno v potaz jako příčina vstupu do války.

Druhá hypotéza, zda mohl být útok na Havaj naplánován i ze strany Spojených států amerických z ekonomických a strategických důvodů, je pozitivní. Útok, který se odehrál 7. prosince 1941, měl příliš mnoho příznaků zapojení americké vlády v tomto útoku, aby byl náhodný. Pro Spojené státy byl vstup do války nejen ekonomicky, ale i strategicky velice výhodný.

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11. Appendices

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Figure 3.1 – Map of Hawaii



Source:

<http://www.outdoor.com/places/hawaii/>

Figure 4.2 – Battleship Row



Source:

<http://my.execpc.com/~dschaaf/bshiprow2.html>

Figure 4.2.2 - THIS IS NOT DRILL - Original Message

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
U. S. S. WASP

Norfolk Navy Yard—12-17-40—50,000
7 DEC 1941 JR

NSS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

U R G E N T

AIRRAID ON PEARLHARBOR X THIS IS NOT DRILL

**INCOMING RADIO

TOR: 1936/TW/17.8
TOR: 1536 SHIPS TIME.

CAPT NOTIFIED

STATION FILE

From: EXEC NOTIFIED	Action To:	Info. To:	Release			
COM PACIFIC FLT	COMATLANTIC FLT COMASIATIC FLT OPNAV					
Capt.	Air.	1st Lt.	Sup.	CWO	Chap.	Duty Cdr.
XO	Gun.	Nav.	Med.	OOD	AXO	
Comm.	Eng.	Radio	Marine	Ship Sr.	Ship Sec.	

Source:

http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=6418

Figure 5.1 – Japanese Declaration of War on the United States



Source:

http://www.museumofworldwarII.com/Images2007/044_032.JPG

Figure 5.3 Roosevelt's speech about the Date Which Will Live in Infamy

DRAFT No. 1
December 7, 1941.

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS

Yesterday, December 7, 1941, a date which will live in ~~world history~~ ^{infamy} the United States of America was ~~suddenly~~ ^{suddenly} and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan, ~~with out warning~~.

The United States was at the moment at peace with that nation and was ~~continuing the conversation~~ ^{still in} with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in ~~Hawaii and the Philippines~~ ^{Oahu} the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a ~~former~~ ^{recent American} message, ~~from the~~ ^{secretary}. While ~~stated~~ ^{stated} it seemed ~~useless~~ ^{useless} ~~to continue the~~ ^{to continue the} ~~negotiations~~ ^{negotiations} must be considered at an end, ~~it~~ ^{it} contained no threat ~~and~~ ^{or} hint of ~~an~~ ^{war or} armed attack.


It will be recorded that the distance ~~of Hawaii, and especially~~ ^{of} Hawaii from Japan make ~~it~~ ^{it} obvious that the ~~attack~~ ^{was} ~~was~~ ^{deliberately} planned many days ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

at the solicitation of Japan
to continue the negotiations

Source:

<http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/images/decwarp1.jpg>

Figure 6.1 Decoding machine MAGIC



Source:

<http://www.internmentarchives.com/specialreports/bainbridge/bainbridge3.php>

Figure 6.2 Opana Radar Station



Source:

<http://2ndshot.blogspot.com/2010/12/first-air-raid-in-singapore-8-dec-1941.html>

Figure 6.3 United Service Organizations Logo



Until Every One Comes Home.®

Source:

<http://www.uso.org/the-organization.aspx>

Figure 7.2 Poster of "Rosie the Riveter"



Source:

http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion/its_a_womans_war_too/images_html/we_can_do_it.html