

The Czech Defence and Security Industry: Taking the Pulse to an Ailing Man

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Covering the period of 1990–2020, the paper summarises the evolution of the iron triangle of the mutual relationships amongst the Ministry of defence, defence industry, and political elite, in the post-communist Czech Republic. In essence, the essay stresses the oddness of this relationship. On the one hand, the government is bound by a partnership to the Defence and Security Industry Association of the Czech Republic (DSIA), a lobbying group of more than 100 organisations that conduct business in defence and security sector in the Czech Republic. Yet, since its creation in 2000, this assemblage of industries within DSIA's market position is falling, in fact. Neither political parties in power, nor the governments have been able to support the national defence industry through the military. Although some subsidiaries of multinational armament concerns are DSIA members, the transnational military-industrial complex utilises DSIA only as a proxy for distribution their products in the Czech Republic with the assistance of national military elite. Just a few DSIA national members are able to compete internationally with their cutting edge products. Others have evolved into middlemen trading in Soviet and Czechoslovak equipment retired from the Czech Armed Forces in effect.

Keywords: Czech Republic; defence industry; lobbying; military procurement

Introduction

The end of the Cold War in Czechoslovakia entailed not only the definite collapse of the Soviet plans for an expansion of communism towards the West,¹ but it implied the end of large, conscripted armed forces. The armed forces of Warsaw Pact, previously subordinated to Moscow,² started shrinking almost immediately and lost their privileged

omnipresent social and economic positions from societal and economic institutions.³ In their place, new conceptual models were adopted that stressed volunteer/professional forces, with the new objective of deploying under the flag of the UN or NATO to out-of-area operations in case of regional crises that had to be sustainable for months, or even years.⁴ The radical change to the polity and economic system in the Czech Republic, as well as the systematic change in the aim, model, and size of the military transfigured not only civil-military relations⁵, but caused an evolution of the paradigm of relations amongst the military, the defense ministry's bureaucracy, the country's political elite, as well as with a large defence industry still built-up in the Soviet style.

The aim of this paper is to summarise this 30-year-evolution of Czech defense industry from a state of autarky to one that is now a mutual vendor in regional military-industrial complex. This evolution will show, in effect, that the military is the feeblest side in the iron triangle as G. Adams⁶ named the knot of mutual relations amongst the stakeholders shaping the U.S. defence and security policy. The ambition of this diachronic case study is to address three research questions:

1. What are the connections and nature of Czech defence industry to the Ministry of Defence and armed forces like?
2. Can Czech defence industry meet the requirements of the Czech Armed Forces (CAF)?
- 2.3. How difficult is it for officials to procure equipment and services for the CAF?

De/militarisation, conversion, and peace-dividend

Czechoslovak defence industry originated in the early 1950s by A. Čepička, the defence minister in K. Gottwald's government and his son-in-law, in response to a J. Stalin's wish during a secret meeting in Moscow.⁷ The Soviet plan on an establishing of

a military-industrial complex (MIC) according to Soviet patterns in Czechoslovakia was revealed only after the dismissal of Čepička from his office in 1956. If defence spending in 1950 accounted for 6% of national income, this amount grew to 18% of national income by 1953. The Čepička secret military *imperio in imperium* placed considerable strains on the national economy and endangered the popularity of communism as the production of consumer goods, had to be sacrificed for military kit.⁸ In time, this imbalance in manufacturing was addressed in favour consumer goods in the 1960s.⁹

The only advantage of Čepička's defence plan was the reinforcement of military autarky which produced for Czechoslovakia no small degree of soft power. Due to the fact, that the Soviets were willing to transfer production of Soviet tanks, armoured vehicles, and jet aircraft to Czechoslovakia in order to increased modernisation of Warsaw Pact forces, small Czechoslovakia become a significant military equipment exporter. According to L. Štrougal, a Czechoslovak prime minister of many years standing, defence industry generated at least 3% of GDP.¹⁰ The Soviets not only allowed the production of Soviet-designed military equipment in Czechoslovak factories¹¹, but also they permitted R&D and indigenous modernisation. In particular, upgrades of T-55 tanks and their conversion to field support vehicles were requested by customers.¹² Importantly, Czechoslovakia was the first country where MiGs were manufactured.¹³

Later on, the Soviets consented to the development of training jet aircraft which became the standard in the second world for pre-training before the airman's shift to interceptors or supersonic bombers. In 1962, the Soviets announced that it would procure 1,600 L-29 aircraft by 1965.¹⁴ In response to specialisation plans within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), Czechoslovakia could develop, produce, and sell artillery systems (e.g., self-propelled artillery ShKH model

77 “DANA”), self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (e.g., PLDvK Model 53/59 – 1 “Lizard”), sensors (e.g., the “TAMARA” passive radar), small passenger aircraft (e.g., L-410), explosives, small-arms ammunition, light weapons (e.g., Semtex, 9mm handguns, 7.62mm assault rifle model 58, Czechoslovak machine pistol model 61 “Skorpion”), and heavy lorries (e.g., Tatra). The Tatra chassis was hugely successful and became a standard within Warsaw pact inventory. For instance, the chassis became the basis for the amphibious, armoured personnel carrier (8x8) OT-64 SKOT, and multiple rocket launcher RM-70. As defence industry was so important for Czechoslovakia, that Czechoslovak delegates to the COMECON regularly championed this specialisation.¹⁵

In 1993, the Czech Republic was assessed by SIPRI as the number seven within the top ten of arms exporting countries. Despite this fact, neither Czech nor Slovak defence industry manufacturing was listed within the hundreds of the outstanding defence and security producers.¹⁶ Nonetheless, this state of military autarky of Czechoslovakia’s defence industry was probably a virtue of necessity. The COMECON was a vehicle of post-war reconstruction directed by the Soviet Union. As war reparations, hundreds of factories in Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany were sequestered and their machinery transferred to the Soviet Union.¹⁷ From the point of view of Soviets, the only excess industrial capacity for the rearmament of the Warsaw Pact was located in Czechoslovakia whose industry was not affected by the WWII. This industrial capacity was considerable after being its expansion during WWII and Soviets happily employed it in support of their imperial policy during the Cold War.

The production of heavy weaponry was shifted from the Czech Republic to Slovakia during the communism period.¹⁸ However, this industrial capacity vanished as a consequence of the implementation of the Treaty of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).¹⁹ Conversely, the Czech Republic decided to specialise in

defence R&D in order protect some unique production. These industries were concentrated in state-owned enterprises and were designed to provide all aspects of maintenance logistic support, as well as modernization.²⁰ Thus, these state-owned enterprises enjoyed a high-level of monopolistic position vis-à-vis their client armed forces. After the Velvet Divorce and as a consequence of the CFE treaty, the Czech government determined that this industry should be privatized due to the retirement of this Cold War military equipment. The privatization was planned to be completed by the end of 1995.²¹

The road to the vest-pocket military-industrial complex

The Czech defence and security industry coalesced in 1992 following the break-up of Czechoslovakia. As a group of both privatised and state-owned enterprises located on Czech territory (see **Table 1**), they were considered to be an essential element of mobilisation planning of the CAF.

[Table 1 SOMEWHERE HERE]

The mid-1990s was a milestone in the evolution of the relations within the iron triangle. The Czech Republic had fulfilled its commitments agreed under the CFE treaty when reduced the size of the CAF to the CFE ceilings. A substantial portion of the surplus of the CFE equipment was sold to arms dealers as scrap in order to compensate the staggering reduction of the national military demand. This equipment was often upgraded in private defence industry and re-sold with a significant private profit to Africa and Asia.²² To that extent that privatised enterprises weathered the conversion in the early 1990s, these now private companies were expecting the CAF to modernised in

consequence of its new peacekeeping deployments in the former-Yugoslavia and in anticipation of NATO enlargement sooner or later.²³ In order to show good faith the MOD developed its first post-Cold War armament plan. The document was sold to the public as a crucial result of the newly adopted American planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS).²⁴

Although the classified armament plan, a component of the Concept of the CAF's Modernisation, was discussed in the Parliament on March 23, 1995, this 1,200-page document was shredded by January 31, 1997!²⁵ The MOD provided an unclassified extract as a MOD Bulletin for Czech Defence Industry.²⁶ The only issue reflecting experience gained in the out-of-area operations in the Bosnia and Hercegovina was a request for the procurement of wheeled armoured vehicles. The new vehicles should be delivered to the CAF by 1997 at the latest and should cost ca 2.4 CZK billion. In general, the armament plan of 1995 expected that the CAF would spend on the modernization some 120 CZK billion between 1995 and 2005. On the weaponry and other military needed matériel only 63.4% of the needed amount was allocated. In particular, the MOD stressed the need of issues of conventional warfare. More than 12% of the armament budget for the next 10 fiscal years was intended to be spent on aerial bombs, anti-tank missiles, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, APFSDS munition, etc.

This plan on the further development of the CAF was based still on former communist military planning assumptions and yet it attracted the attention of industrial giants, such as ČKD, RDG Group, and Přerovské strojírny, which were privatised on credit to their top management, but those holdings were facing the loss of markets. They believed that NATO enlargement will offer the same opportunity for national manufacturers than the Warsaw Pact did in the 1990s. At the same time, the retirement of generals, and higher commanders with Soviet background continued in the CAF.

Being retired from the General Staff of the CAF, the post-communist military elite searched for a civilian career. Enjoying an ill-founded reputation for being military experts in defence planning, some of them were hired by democratic political parties and assigned as advisers to defence ministers to provide them with advice on how to shape the CAF, e.g., general L. Jura, the former commander of the Military Circle “WEST”.²⁷ Other generals, as insiders, took advantage of the upcoming military matériel modernisation. Passing through the revolving door, they wanted to become lobbyists.

The most influential person was K. Kuba, a son of a communist colonel and the first supreme inspector of the ground forces²⁸, who landed the post of secretary general of the Defence Industry Association (DIA), one of two advocacy groups established in the Czech Republic in 1997 in order to lobby for specific armament projects. DIA was established by R. Háva, a proprietor of Omnipol, a former state-owned enterprise trading in defence and security matériel, and supported by former deputy defence minister M. Kalousek.²⁹ The rivalry lobbying organisation also named DIA too, was established by J. Maroušek, the owner of ČKD holding and RDP Group, a holding company, which in 1993, employed some 200,000 people in 40 companies.³⁰ Moreover, K. Kuba was employed as an adviser to M. Lobkowitz, a pro-Atlantic defence minister in M. Tošovský’s interim government, with the task of drafting a strategic concept for the CAF during this six-month period.³¹ Whilst this document was eventually suspended by Lobkowitz’s successor, V. Vetchý in 1998³², the high industrial circles and the high political circles³³ merged into harmony.

M. Zeman, prime minister in minority left-wing government, tasked his defence minister, V. Vetchý, to establish a partnership with DIA in order to defend the interests of the country’s defence industry. The partnership was legalised one year after NATO

enlargement by governmental resolution No 259, *On Principles of Collaboration with the National Defence Industry*. According to this document, the MOD should forge an agreement with Hava's DIA until June 30, 2000. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to support DIA diplomatically until September 30, 2000 and the Ministry of Industry and Trade to launch a programme of providing soft loans for DIA members in 2001. The agreement was envisaged to last for ten years.

As this policy was broadly similar to that enjoyed by U.S. [defense](#) industry,³⁴ members of the Parliament came to accept it. In particular, the social democrats, who ruled the country in 1998–2002, fostered the new relationship with DIA. Some of these parliamentarians (e.g., M. Titz) was listed by DIA as an honorary member of the editorial board of the *Czech Defence Industry and Security Review*, a P.R. magazine issued by the Defence and Security Industry Association (DSIA), a successor of DIA. Taking into account the 1995 armament plan, Zeman's government boosted its support to defence industry by the adoption of resolution No 560D in June 9, 1999. According to which, the MOD's budget should not fall under 2.2 per cent of GDP from 2000. The 2 per cent target was defended by the government's plan to create a professional force and end conscription by 2006 as well as by a radical modernization of the CAF by 2010.³⁵ The plan was initiated in 1991, and was known as Plan 2005.³⁶

That said, military expenditures have never reached the 2 per cent target³⁷ and, as presented in the Appendix A, the shift to a professional force has had a deleterious effect on DIA's members. As such, DIA was renamed DSIA in order to gain a wider market, i.e., the Ministry of the Interior which is in charge of police and fire brigades became a new partner. In consequence, the political-military ambition of 1997 and the armament plan of 1995 have proven to be illusionary. Currently, DSIA consists of 126 entities as presented in the Figure 1.

[Figure 1 SOMEWHERE HERE]

The majority of DSIA's members are out of the public ownership, but are not sufficiently large to be listed of a stock exchange. The only opportunity to assess their financial viability is to access whichever information is reported in the Public Register administered by the Ministry of Justice. Yet, a lot of entities do not publish timely information. What is known about DSIA's members is that they capital-starved, thereby making it risky to trade with them. In general, many of them have no organic industrial capacity and their main business is not in the security, or defence sectors. For instance, GORDIC spol. s r.o., a limited liability software company conducting business with accounting software for public sector, is a DSIA member because the MOD is using its software since 1994 and this supplier relation is a vendor lock-in.

Surprisingly, but in accordance with the president Eisenhower's definition of the military-industrial complex³⁸, a DSIA member is the city of Brno, the second largest municipality in the Czech Republic. Brno holds the majority share ownership in Veletrhy Brno, a.s., the main organiser of trade fairs in the Czech Republic. Veletrhy Brno, a.s. organises the IDET – International Defence and Security Technologies Fair – every other year. More than a half of IDET budget is covered by taxpayers' money. With the budget of 60 CZK million, IDET is considered as the second most profitable entity of Veletrhy Brno, a.s.

[Table 2 SOMEWHERE HERE]

In spite of the public support presented during the IDET, the fair has been organised since the early 1990s as a shop window of Czech defence industry. Yet, defence industry's markets and its products are fading as presented in the Table 2. Notwithstanding this clear financial reality, the MOD revalidated its partnership in 2010 for the next ten year with tacit blessing of the right-wing government.³⁹ Surprisingly, the MOD supports DSIA membership of the University of Defence, a part of the MOD organization, and the membership of four state-owned enterprises sub-ordinated to the MOD. Thus, those elements of the defence institution may find themselves in the position of lobby against the MOD. Thus, contrary to its 1993 objectives and intentions presented, DSIA is not providing value to the Czech taxpayer or furthering Czech governments' policies and objectives.

In order to demonstrate public support to defence and security industry, all patriotic political parties (communists, socialists, civic and Christian democrats) established within the Parliamentary Chamber Body responsible for defence policy (Committee on Defence) a specific sub-committee to address the issue of military modernisation. Despite the general concern of all political parties, the procurement by the CAF of domestic products has not gone well. Procurements have all been behind schedule. For example, wheeled transporters should be delivered in 1997 according to the armament plan of 1995; however, the last Pandur 8x8 vehicle was finally delivered in 2009. Also tenders have suffered from corruption, e.g., the procurement of Gripen JAS-39 interceptors in the 2000s.⁴⁰

In general, the MOD is usually not able to undertake procurements in accordance with endorsed plans. Sometimes military equipment is delivered for more than seven, ten, fifteen fiscal years behind schedule due to consistently poor defence planning, frequent changes in the government, and lobbying of military suppliers

through both political parties and with military leadership. In response to lobbying through political parties, political parties apply a patronage to particular project. This corruption slows down the procurement because political parties strive to manipulate strategic documents, such as strategic concepts, in order to legitimize the MOD policy before funding is secured and agreed. The military is seen as a vehicle for maximisation of the political profit. So, the military elite is permitted to ask for unfeasible political-military ambition because the number of uniforms, guns, etc. put to public procurement is determined by the end-state planned by the military. With tacit consent among political parties, an accomplishment of the goals justified by governmental policy is delayed, to be addressed by a future government. So, the military feels free to exaggerate its political-military ambition in order to accommodate the demands of ruling political parties.

But lobbying through the military produces impractical defence plans as presented in Appendix A as well as it supports the conceptual spaghetti⁴¹ established in the 1990s. A shining example is the idea to build-up the third infantry brigade scheduled for completion in 2025. The brigade was disestablished in 2002 due to lack of money,⁴² but the political parties accepted the MOD's strategic concept of 2015 to make an attempt of re-building it up in the next ten years. How this plan can be considered to be feasible in light of basic demographic conditions and projections⁴³ of the Czech Republic must be judged problematic.

Conclusion

Although the political elite shows a continuous concern for defence industry and the military, the iron triangle experiences a break-down: the military keeps failing in meeting the goals and objectives set by endorsed defence plans, corrupted political elite benefit little from the patronage of specific projects due to an incapability of ministerial

bureaucracy to produce costed and executable defence plans, all the while Czech defence and security industry shrinks. Clearly, successive governments' strategic thinking remains based on a nostalgia for elements and concepts of the communist period, which undermines the ability of the CAF to field modern capabilities, under an opaque layer of incompetence of governance and corruption.

Notes

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

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political-military ambition, 1993–2019.⁴⁴

on tactical-military ambition, 1993-2019.						
1993	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
ceilings	957	1,367	2,262	230	50	93,333
1997	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	952	1,367	767	143	36	61,647
until the NATO enlargement: GF: two brigades; the Rapid Response Brigade is able to taking part in any kind of NATO ops under the UN mandate); AF: two helicopter squadrons (after the NATO enlargement: GF: the Rapid Response Brigade; AF: one squadron of MRCA + one helicopter squadron)						
1999	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	938	1,219	754	114	34	61,948
since 2000: GF: one infantry brigade plus (the Rapid Response Brigade) able to be deployed within NATO territory by use of strategic lift provided by allies + 1,000 soldiers deployable as one mechanized battalion and one specialized company; AF: -						
2002	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	622	1,241	585	112	34	49,491
since 2006: GF: EITHER 5,000 soldiers as one (rapid response) brigade + 1,000 soldiers rotated as one battalion + 250 soldiers deployable only for six months; AF: OR an air force equivalent (a brigade) deployable (from 2007) for six months without any rotation + air force equivalent (a battalion)						
2003	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	541	1,235	528	125	34	54,615
since 2010: GF: EITHER 3,000 soldiers as a core of a mechanized brigade deployable (from 2007) for six months without any rotation OR 1,000 soldiers deployable as a battalion for six months without any rotation AND 250 soldiers deployable with rotation/a Role3 Field Hospital; AF: OR air force equivalent (a brigade) deployable (from 2010) for three months without any rotation						
2007	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	181	580	321	38	38	40,124
since 2008: GF: EITHER a brigade task force (article V NATO Treaty) deployable for six months without any rotation OR a battalion task force deployable for six months with any rotation + a brigade command for 12 months without any rotation + SMEs with rotation + NRF; AF: OR air force (article V NATO Treaty) equivalent (a brigade) deployable for six months without any rotation						
2008	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	179	515	317	42	38	38,805
since 2010: GF: a brigade task force (article V NATO Treaty) deployable for six months without any rotation AND a battalion task force deployable for six months with rotation AND a brigade command for 12 months without any rotation OR only SMEs with rotation whenever the Czech Republic is taking part in NRF and the brigade task force was deployed; AF -						
2011	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	166	494	244	38	25	38,805
since 2015: a confirmation of ambition of 2007 by civilian experts in defence and security policy, but a warning was expressed on honesty of contribution						
2012	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	164	528	194	38	24	33,546
since 2015: GF: a brigade task force (article V NATO Treaty) deployable for six						

months without any rotation AND a battalion task force deployable for six months with rotation AND company task force with rotation AND a battalion (NRF) AND SMEs; AF: OR air force equivalent (a battalion) deployable for six months without any rotation						
2017	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	120	439	179	35	17	36,131
since 2020: GF: in case of war, the Czech Armed Forces; a brigade task force (article V NATO Treaty) deployable for six months without any rotation OR battalion task force deployable for six months with rotation AND a company task force with rotation AND one battalion (NRF); AF: AND air force (article V NATO Treaty) equivalent (a brigade) deployable for six months without any rotation						
2019	tanks	ACVs	APs	CAC	AHs	manpower
	116	437	179	36	17	36,729
Since 2025: a confirmation of ambition of 2017, a confession of a shipwreck of defence planning						

Notes:

GF... ground forces, AF... air forces, ACVs... armoured combat vehicles,

Aps...artillery pieces, CAC... combat aircraft, AHs... attack helicopters, manpower...

the number of personnel reported by the MOD (due to the fact, that the Czech Republic reports as manpower civilians since 2005, the number of soldiers is much more smaller and differs significantly from figures presented by the Military Balance publications).

Table 1. The Czech Republic: privatized and the state-owned enterprises as a base of the Czech Armed Forces' mobilization capabilities in 1993.⁴⁵

Privatized enterprises	Government's owned enterprises
1. Zeveta Bojkovice, a.s.	1. Letecké opravny Kbely, Praha
2. Poličské strojírny Polička	2. Letecké opravny Malešice, Praha
3. Selier & Bellot Vlašim, a.s.	3. Naše vojsko, Tiskárna Praha
4. Tesla Pardubice	4. Vojenské lesy a statky Praha
5. Avia, a.s. Praha	5. Vojenské stavby Praha
6. Transporta Chrudim	6. VOP 011 Mostkovice
7. Česká zbrojovka Uherský Brod, a.s.	7. VOP 012 Nový Jičín – Bludovice
8. Česká zbrojovka Vsetín	8. VOP 013 Horka na Moravě
9. Zbrojovka Brno, a.s.	9. VOP 014 Uherský Brod
10. Meopta Přerov	10. VOP 025 Nový Jičín
11. BSS Mataco, a.s. Brandýs n. Labem	11. VOP 026 Sternberk
12. Tesla Strašnice, a.s.	12. VOP 042 Dolní Bousov
13. Lites, a.s. Liberec	13. VOP 042 Olomouc
14. Rotter, s. s r.o. Vír na Moravě	14. VOP 064 Hradec Králové
15. Sigma Hranice, a.s.	15. VOP 065 Český Těšín
16. Elektrosignál Praha	16. VOP 081 Přelouč
17. Gumárny Zubří	17. VOP 082 Kutná Hora
18. A. G. U.-Int. Přelouč	18. VOP 083 Český Dub
19. AQC, s. s r.o. Praha	19. VOP 084 Olomouc
20. Chirana OTS, a.s. Praha	20. Vojenský projektový ústav Praha
21. KPS Moravské Budějovice	
22. Tesla Praha	
23. ZMA Ostrov nad Ohří	

Notes:

VOP... *Vojenský opravárenský podnik (the military central repair shop)*

Table 2. The IDET (International Defence and Security Technologies Fair), 1999–2019.⁴⁶

Year	exhibition space, m2			number of exhibitors		number of visitors	
	total	incl. display	incl. foreign exhibitors	total	incl. the Czech Republic	total	
1999	12,476	N/A	N/A	269		118	10,076
2001	26,784	16,000	N/A	237	N/A		15,784
2003	29,500	17,243	2,745	272		133	17,340
2005	48,804	32,000	2,073	270		133	27,419
2007	41,770	26,555	1,650	278		102	27,564
2009	38,753	26,446	1,831	310		99	24,779
2011^{a)}	29,947	20,307	1,195	131		42	30,935
2013^{a)}	12,935	530	1,367	157		66	26,056
2015^{a)}	21,887	9,379	1,496	159		72	27,184
2017^{b)}	14,023	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		32,828
2019^{b)}	N/A	N/A	N/A	423	N/A		26,389

Notes:

a) ... figures inclusive Pyros fair, a fair focusing on fire brigades

b) ... figures inclusive Pyros and ISET fairs (ISET is a fair focusing security agencies)

Figure 1. The Defence and Security Industry Association, 2020.⁴⁷

sector		legal entity		provenance	
private	119	joint-stock company	39	foreign countries	8
		limited liability company	77		
		limited partnership	1		
		association/club	2		
public	1	institute	1	the Czech Republic	118
public – state ownership	6	state university	1		
		state-owned enterprise	4		
		joint-stock company	1		
TOTAL	126	TOTAL	126	TOTAL	126

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⁷ Ibid., 1: 81.

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- ¹⁴ Ibid., 9: 139.
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