

THE EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAMME FOR CRIMINALITY PREVENTION IN THE CZECH ARMED FORCES

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Abstract: *The aim of this article is to evaluate the Programme of Social Crime Prevention, a central government program funded in the Czech Republic since 1995, in the defence sector. Employing correlation analysis, author scrutinizes relationships among extent of military criminality in the All-Volunteer Force, qualities of military labour force, and amount of money spent on the programme after 2005 when compulsory military service was abolished. The evaluation proved that taxpayer money is allocated to the programme with no relationship to development of criminality. The extent of criminality is decreasing only as a consequence of ageing of military labour force. The programme met its aim when compulsory military service was in force. At that time, military power relied on immature young men rotating in one year cycle and not performing their duties willingly. However, this past situation is still supported by bodies of the Parliament responsible for the military.*

Keywords: *All-Volunteer Force, Criminality, Demographic Ageing, Public Expenditure Programme, Prevention*

JEL Classification: *F52, H59.*

Introduction

The Czech Republic experienced a vast transformation of the polity in the 1990s. In order to cope with negative social impact of such transformation, the Czech government adopted a policy of fighting against social pathology phenomena, such as alcohol abuse, gambling, streetwalking, teens delinquency, antisocial behaviour, etc. which emerged as consequences of post-communist transformation (Burinánek 1997, 2014; Katrňák-Tyrychtrová 2016). This policy is represented by the *Programme of Social Crime Prevention (Program socialni prevence a kriminality)* which has been funded by the state budget since the mid-1990s. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) took part in the programme from its beginning in order to tackle antisocial behaviour of young men drafted into the military. Due to a bad social background many of them, the antisocial behaviour used to spread over the military organization where conscripts formed a substantial majority. Hence, compulsory military service used to be considered as a powerful vehicle for additional education of such people. In addition, such educational activities were seen as a remedy mitigating anomia (Buriánek 1994, Rabušic-Mareš 1996), a troublesome consequence of the transition from communism to liberalism.

However, that paradigm has changed by the abandonment of conscription since the mid of 2000s. Despite the fact that the military recruitment and retention policy is merely based on volunteering since 2005, amount of money requested by the MOD and finally approved by the government for purpose of fighting social pathology phenomena in the military remains rather high. It is strange because an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is usually composed with soldiers who do not incline to criminal behaviour because they are selected more carefully than conscripts in order to retain in a long-time service. In

this view, the aim of the article is to assess the Programme of Social Crime Prevention (PSCP) which is a central programme funded across several ministries, and programmed and coordinated by the central government (see appendix A, and B).

1 Statement of a problem and sample selection

Both budgeting (Wildavsky 1978) and public policy (O'Toole-Meier 2004) sometimes suffer from inability to cut expenditures programmes losing their relevance and impact. Some programs are funded not for their necessity but for inflexibility of bureaucracy to recognise essential changes. Continuing such programmes secures jobs for bureaucracy (Parkinson 1962) instead of inducing outcomes which can justify the programme vis-a-vis budgetary authorities. Either a changed paradigm or an introduction of Zero-Base-Budgeting (Jones-McCAferry 2010) usually brings about an evaluation of such programmes and their reconstruction in accordance with the 3Es concept (Jääskeläinen-Lönnqvist 2011).

1.1 The Programme of Social Crime Prevention

Besides, the Programme of Antidrug policy and the PSCP are the oldest public expenditure programmes in the Czech Republic funded by the state budget in general. Although the PSCP was already established in the mid-1990s, it has not been described by any financial indicator in budget bills until 1998 (see appendix B). The PSCP was shaped (see appendix A) by the right-wing government already in 1993 (Ministerstvo vnitra 1993) for Fiscal Years (FY) 1993–1995. Its aim was expressed in response to an impact of the mass privatization in the era of Czechoslovakia on the national economy (Lorenz-Hraba-Pechačová 1999, Harper 2001) as well as on the society. As believed in this period, the society was experiencing social anomie, a condition in which unmoral behaviour of individuals is on raise because of an enervation of society to limit this behaviour by public and authorities (Buriánek 1994, Rabušic-Mareš 1996).

The PSCP is a bottom-up-programme spread over a set ministries (see appendix B) focussing on issues of education and re-education of target audience, such pupils, drug-addicted people, prison population, social deprived people, etc. Each ministry has been obligated to draft its internal programmatic documents which ought to operationalise the term of social prevention by definitions of pathologic behaviour in their particular environment (Ministerstvo obrany 2018). In the opinion of the agency dilemma, the principal in the PSCP is the Ministry of Finance. It is a member of the national body shaping the policy of criminality prevention (NKU 2008) although it has no responsibility in crime and anti-social behaviour prevention. It just holds the budget. The programme has been audited three times by the Supreme Audit Office so far (NKU 2001, 2008, 2018)

1.2 Sample selection

Despite the centralized approach in policy making, the budgeting was broadly decentralized (a bottom-up programme) and the volume of appropriations inflated. Appropriations for the PSCP authorised by the government were reduced significantly in 2008 and the government changed its policy of subsidies despite the fact that there

has not been a significant drop in quantity of prison population. Nonetheless, number of prosecutions was on decrease.

Analysing the appendix B carefully, it is difficult to find any clear pattern of budgeting. However, some ministries pegged the amount of appropriations on the same limit for a lot of FYs without any regards with real economy and results of PSCP. On the other hand, the PSCP may be a good example for studying the budgeting from the point of view of cultural theory as A. Wildavsky (2000) did (Swedlow 2000), because each ministry involved in the PSCP has its own strategy of budgeting. Just one ministry differs from others. Whilst a majority of ministries usually either keep the same appropriations for more FYs or try to maximise it (Keller 2010), the MOD usually requests for each FY a different amount of money although number of prosecution tends to decrease (see appendix C). By such behaviour, the MOD becomes a conspicuous example of rational budgeting and it may be considered as a good sample for an evaluation of the social crime prevention policy funded by the PSCP.


In addition, the need to evaluate the PSCP is driven not only by the fact that such a task may have a value from a scientific point of view, but there is an impact on real life. After 20 FYs of social prevention at the MOD, the media informed that 26% of military personnel saw corruption in the defence sector omnipresent in general and 5% of them have experienced corruption as daily routine. In addition, 5% of military personnel take part in mass demonstrations of extremists and one half of them would not hesitate to elect a political party which wants to resolve the Sinti-and-Roma question radically. (CTK, vel 2015) In that respect, it is questionable whether the PSCP is really effective, in particular, when pathologic behaviour such as clientelism, nepotism, patronage, and plagiarism have never been put on the list of objectionable behaviour within the defence sector (Ministerstvo obrany 2018).

1.3 Conscription, the All-Volunteer Force and prevention of crime

After the end of the Cold war, the Czech Republic experienced not only peace dividend (Rockoff 1998), a relief of resourced by their demilitarization, but it had to face to an influx of criminality (Buriánek 2014). As presented in Fig.1, the Czech military, established after the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1992, experienced a similar development like the civil society. Due to the fact that conscripts used to comprise a substantial part of the military power, most of the crime investigated by the Military Police (MP) was committed by conscripts. Also, being a sample of society, conscripts could hardly behave in a different way than they did in their civilian lives. This assumption is usually utilized in longitudinal studies of adolescent behaviour, as presented by Stenbacka et al (2011). As displayed in Fig. 1, a substantial turning point came up with the shift to the AVF announced by the government prior to parliamentary election in 2002 when the military criminality dropped down significantly.

Yet, the change from a model of organization of military power to completely different one has not been yet reflected in attitude towards to criminality prevention at the MOD. Adopting documents, such concepts, strategies, and ministerial orders for fighting against criminality and similar phenomena on multiyear basis and its approach to prevent the defence sector from criminality after shifting to the AVF is exactly the same as it was before organizational changes.

Fig. 1: Conscription ratio, the strength of military power, and number of criminal acts investigated by the Military Police in the Czech Republic, 1993–2017



Source: Ministerstvo obrany (2019), Vojenská policie (1993-2018)

1.4 The problem of quality of military labour force

It is a well-known fact that the extent of criminality is affected by structure of population. For instance, women are less delinquent than men; in particular, women are less violent than men (Carrington 2001, Taylor-Bragado-Jimenez 2009). Likewise, the level of education (the affiliation with social classes and values) and average age affect criminality rates (Powel-Wadihin 2008, Farrington 2017). Thus level of criminality linked to a specific population should reflect its evolution.

Because number of career soldiers is rather increasing since the shift to the AVF (see appendix C), the significant characteristics describing the military should be education and age. In this point, the AVF differs significantly from the conscription army. The university education is required by officers; however, other rank groups also intend to study at universities and colleges in order to get promotion. That is why the number of graduates among non-commissioned officers in the Czech AVF has been growing since 2005 (Ministerstvo obrany 2006-2017).

Additionally, the Czech AVF is an ageing one. When average age of a career soldiers was about 32 years in 2005, the average age exceed 35 years in 2017 (Ministerstvo obrany 2006-2017). It means that overwhelming majority of soldiers received their maturity and become established. Having their families and a prospect of an extension their first and any next term, they act with consideration and in a responsible manner in order not to jeopardize their living standard.

Finally, fluctuation of military personnel in AVF is minor in comparison with a conscription army where conscription ratio, a share of soldiers serving by military

coercion on the military power Haltiner (2003), is higher. Also, we can expect that seniority of military personnel and its career selection should contribute to reducing criminality in the military despite the reduction of appropriations on the PSCP programme at the MOD.

2 Analytical framework

According to Bovens, Hart, and Kuipers (2008), i.e., the evaluation always depends on the point of view of particular approaches employed in the evaluation process. The most common approach in the policy evaluation is the programmatic one due to the fact that funding of a particular public policy is funded by expenditure programmes (Bovens-Hart-Kuipers 2008). In that opinion, we expect rationality in defence spending. By 2000, such rationality ought to be ensured by the zero-base-budgeting as a part of the PPBS implemented as a vehicle of defence spending transparency (Ochrana 1993).

Fig. 2: The model for policy evaluation

multi-years programme (the Programme Social Crime Prevention)						
aim	Fiscal Year (allocation)		prevention (action)		response (impact)	
	planned	spent	activities	force	behaviour	criminal acts
→	CZK mil		→	quantity, structure, gender, age, education, etc.	→	MP statistics
min C, Cr	Mp	Ms	?	Q, Crat, Am, Erat	?	C, Cr
government (under Parliamentary supervision)			the military		a soldier	

Captions:
C... number of criminal acts
Cr... criminality ratio
Mp... amount of money approved by the Parliament
Ms... amount of money spent
→... causality/determination
Q... number of soldiers (Qc... number of soldiers in service by use of coercion, Qe... number of graduated soldiers)
Crat... conscription ratio
Am... average age
Erat... higher education ratio

Source: (own)

Taking into account institutional organization of the central government, budgetary cycle (Doležalová 2011, Brechler 2014), national polity, principles of public programmes evaluation (Vedung 2000), and available data (see appendix C), a model for the purpose of evaluation of policy of crime prevention in the Czech defence sector was developed as presented in Fig. 2. The model describes construction of the PSCP as a part of the central government policy as well as the link with the budgetary cycles. Significant indicators available for the evaluation are presented in Fig. 2.

As presented in Fig. 2, data can be applied either as primary data extracted from annual reports, such as human resource yearbooks (Ministerstvo obrany 2006–2017), ministerial books used by the Parliament as part of budgetary control, almanacs and statistics on crime in military issued by Military Police (Vojenská policie 1993–2017), or as relative data, i.e., ratios. Also, we developed three ratios as indicators applicable for the purpose of evaluation of budgetary program of social prevention and prevention of crime within the defence sector:

$$Cr_t = C_t/Q_t \quad (1)$$

$$Crat_t = Q_{c_t}/Q_t \quad (2)$$

$$Erat_t = Q_{e_t}/(Q_t - Q_{c_t}) \quad (3)$$

where $t = N$, $N \subset (0, \infty - 1)$.

Fig. 1 implies options for evaluating the program from both material (quantity and quality of military labour force versus criminality) and financial point of view (cost of programme versus criminality). We employ correlation analysis for evaluating the hypotheses:

- H1A: Amount of money spent by the MOD on prevention does not contribute to decline of criminality in a particular FY ($Ms_t \rightarrow \min C_t, Cr_t$);
- H1B: Amount of money spent by MOD on prevention in the previous FY does not contribute to decline of criminality in the next FY ($Ms_{t-1} \rightarrow \min C_t, Cr_t$);
- H2A: Force quality does not inflict criminality, in particular, the higher level of education the lower number of criminal acts ($\max Erat_t \rightarrow \min Cr_t$);
- H2B: Force quality does not inflict criminality, in particular, ageing of force contributes decreasing of criminality ($\max Am_t \rightarrow \min Cr_t$);
- H3: Allocation of money in a particular FY does not reflect the experience with fluctuation of crime in the past ($\min (Cr_t - Cr_{t-1}) \rightarrow \min Mp_t$); hence, the MOD follows principles of economical rationality – only the desired effect is covered by adequate amount of money.

Hypotheses H1 and H3 focus on economic rationality, i.e., public money ought to be spent only in such a case if it brings effect intended by the budgetary program. Otherwise, it might be considered as public money wasting. Hypothesis H1 reflects experience with criminality presented in the literature cited above.

In essence, the evaluation focuses on the period of the AVF (2005–2017, $N = 13$). Nonetheless, some financial data is related to 2018 and to the pre-AVF-period (see appendix A, B, C). Financial data was provided by the government through ARIS (MOF 1999-2008) and MONITOR (MOF 2009-2018), an information portal of Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic (Ministerstvo obrany 2019), and in ministerial books. Data employed in the analysis is to see in the appendix C.

3 Results

Processing data by software Statistica, version 13, we determined results of correlation analysis presented closer on Tab. 1.

Tab. 1: Results of correlation analysis, N = 13 (FY 2005–2017)

hyp.	x	y	$y = x + r$	R	σ
H1A	Ms_t	Cr_t	$y = -1E-07x + 0.0124$	0.04043	2,426.5889
H1B	Ms_{t-1}	Cr_t	$y = -5E-07x + 0.0154$	0.22510	2,386.1871
H2A	$Erat_t$	Cr_t	$y = -0.0087x + 0.0143$	0.02645	0.0176
H2B	Am_t	Cr_t	$y = -0,0016x + 0,0681$	0,62312*	1.7245
H3	$Cr_t - Cr_{t-1}$	Mp_t	$y = -85.023x + 5.9045$	0.28718	0.0063

*... significant at $\alpha = 0.05$

Source: (own)

As displayed on Tab. 1, only the hypothesis H2B is false. Thus the extent of military criminality appearing in the Czech defence sector is affected by ageing of population within the military organization largely. Positive trend is observed when ratio of graduates is higher, yet this impact is not significant from the statistical point of view. This result was to be expected because the longer career soldiers are in the military service, the longer they are exposed to social crime prevention within the PSCP.

In addition, there is no statistical significant relationship between crime occurrence and money planned/spent on the PSCP. Hence, the programme seems to be funded with no regard to extents of criminality in the past or future. The volume of appropriations of the programme is rather independent from quantifiable outcomes of the programme; in particular, when amount of money spent on the PSCP is usually less than appropriations authorised by the government. The crime is declining, however it is disputable, indeed, if this desirable course of crime ratio is an impact of activities funded by the state budget in fact.

4 Discussion

The amount of money either planned or spent on criminality prevention in the public sector is set as a specific indicator in the MOD's budget according to national budget law. Nonetheless, there is no link between appropriations authorized to the program by the Parliament and outcomes of the programs measured by indicators of military criminality. For all that, both budget bills (as ministerial books) and budget acts (as ministerial books) should be scrutinized by relevant bodies of the Parliament on annual basis in order to justify the spending on social crime prevention in the MOD in accordance with the 3Es-approach. Yet, analysing the ministerial books for the last ten FYs, we realized that there is similarity of 80% of the text related to justification of program expenditures in this period. Moreover, there are no programme objectives measurable by indicators. Furthermore, the PSCP is out of public control because money spent in the FY 2014 exceeded three times the amount of money authorised by the Parliament. – As an indicator approved by the Parliament in a particular national budget, the amount of appropriations marked as the indicator cannot exceed during a FY such a financial limit.

In addition, a lack financial integrity in the PSCP was apparent already in Fig. 1. – Although the criminality was slightly rising between 2010 and 2013 the cost of the program was cut back. However, neither the MOD nor Members of Parliament took this change into account. – What is the criterion for justifying the financial request

asked by the principal – a MOD's wish? Despite the fact that the PSCP is easy to analyse from point of view of transparency (Benito-Bastida 2009), its evaluation by authorities supervising the programme, e.g., the Ministry of Finance, the Committee on Defence in the Chamber of Deputies is rare. From the point of the volume of defence spending (CZK 40-60 billion) in a FY, the PSCP (CZK 4-8 million) is minute; yet, it must be of importance for national security due to the aim of the programme. Nevertheless, the evaluation proved significant drawbacks. Also, it remains questionable, whether the programme has accomplished its aimed purpose.

It seems that the PSCP is more beneficial to ministerial bureaucracy operating it than to the military. In accordance with theory of bureaucratic organization, Merton's (1940) goal displacement appeared. The PSCP facilitates jobs for bureaucrats instead of conclusive contribution to national security. Yet, administrative corruption (Caiden-Caiden 1977) might be hidden agenda in the programme as well when would take into account the leak into media (ČTK, vel 2015) and the MOD's statements (2017, 2018). The PSCP seems to be out of managerial and public control for many FYs and that situation affords a bulk of opportunities for internal privatization of public power within the bureaucrats. As a kind of corruption, such a goal displacement might be found harmful to the military organization. The evaluation of just one programme run by the MOD, supports observations done by Kriz (2010) and Young (2018a, 2018b). Kriz challenges quality of civil-military relations in the Czech Republic after 20 years of transformation. A significant part of it is the budgetary control conducting by an expert body of the Parliament responsible for the defence and military.

Young questions the transformation of new NATO countries from the Central and East Europe. He observes not only cultural differences in defence planning but he criticises the fact that those countries spend usually their defence spending on things not related directly to the defence, e.g., on the military welfare state (Mittelstadt 2015). Only the Czech MOD runs three military hospitals, one medical institute, and a chain of three-stars-hotels. In addition to this, one military university, one military high-school, and a sport centre are reported (ca CZK bn 1.5 in FY 2019) as defence spending in accordance with the NATO definition. Hence, the transition from communism to democracy is still continuing (Berend-Bugaric 2015) because of vivid differences in values as Young (2016, 2018a, 2018b) presents.

Conclusion

The evaluation of the PSCP in the defence sector during the AVF era proved that there is no relationship between the extent of the military criminality and the sum of money allocated to the purpose of criminality prevention. The crime ratio is rather decreasing due to aging of soldiers and their social maturity. Hence, the PSCP does not work in a sensible, defensible way. From that point of view, it is questionable who really benefits from the programme. Although the PSCP is minute in comparison with defence spending in a FY, it is beneficial to ministerial bureaucracy instead of taxpayers. Considering the evolution of PSCP as a test pit into culture of budgeting in a NATO country from Central and East European region, the results support observations presented by other scholars (Young 2018a, 2018b).

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Appendix A Management of the Programme of Social Crime Prevention and crime statistics, 1993-2019,

FY	Budgeting government	Authorisation of documents for justifying and evaluation of the PSCP		Number of prosecutions	Prison population	
		the span covered by a conception (strategy) ^{a)}	report ^{b)}		defendants	convicts
1993	-	-	-	398,505	7,810	8,757
1994	right-wing	1994-1996	(x)	365,265	8,828	9,925
1995	right-wing		x	368,624	8,000	11,508
1996	right-wing		x	387,374	7,887	12,973
1997	right-wing	1997-2000	x	397,845	7,736	13,824
1998	right-wing		x	425,930	7,125	14,942
1999	left-wing		x	426,626	6,934	16,126
2000	left-wing		x (A)	391,310	5,967	15,571
2001	left-wing	2001-2003	x	358,362	4,583	14,737
2002	left-wing		x	372,341	3,384	12,829
2003	liberal left-wing		x	357,740	3,409	13,868
2004	liberal left-wing	2004-2007	x	351,629	3,269	15,074
2005	liberal left-wing		x	344,060	2,860	16,077
2006	liberal left-wing		x	336,446	2,399	16,179
2007	liberal left-wing		x (A)	357,391	2,254	16,647
2008	right-wing		2008-2011	x	343,799	2,402
2009	right-wing	x		332,829	2,360	19,374
2010	right-wing	x		313,387	2,443	19,449
2011	right-wing	x		317,177	2,613	20,541
2012	right-wing	2012-2015		x	304,528	2,183
2013	right-wing		x	325,366	2,308	14,301
2014	right-wing		x	288,660	2,185	16,433
2015	liberal left-wing		x	247,628	1,960	18,850
2016	liberal left-wing		2016-2020	x	218,162	1,907
2017	liberal left-wing	x		203,303	N/A	N/A
2018	liberal left-wing	x (A)		N/A	N/A	N/A
2019	liberal left-wing	-		-	-	-
2020	liberal left-wing	-		-	-	-

Notes

x... the report noted

A... the start of an audit by the Supreme Audit Office

a)... documents usually authorized in the last quarter of a FY prior to the first FY covered by the authorized document

b)... reports are usually set as governmental agenda in April; by the end of 2015, they used to be set priorities for the upcoming FY; since 2016, there is an action plan

source: ČSÚ (2018), Government (1993–2019)

Appendix B Authorised Appropriations on the Programme of Social Crime Prevention, 1998-2019, CZK thousand, %

FY	Welfare state			Security sector				Total	Economic annual growth (%)
	Ministry of...								
	Education, Youth, and Sport	Public Health	Labour and Social Affairs	Interior	Justice	Finance	Defence		
1998	14 843	33,000	0	0	6,865	2,450	0	57,158	-0.3
1999	8,033	0	15,498	3,900	4,110	10,000	4,925	41,541	1.4
2000	7,712	0	15,498	3,900	4,816	0	12,000	31,926	4.3
2001	10,000	0	87,500	3,900	4,700	0	20,080	106,100	2.9
2002	9,810	0	140,200	3,900	11,290	0	15,000	165,200	1.7
2003	10,202	1,200	177,200	3,900	29,512	0	16,700	222,014	3.6
2004	10,202	1,140	168,340	3,900	29,894	0	6,500	213,476	4.9
2005	10,202	1,500	254,186	3,900	48,221	0	7,920	318,009	6.5
2006	10,202	1,500	228,767	3,900	15,115	0	7,920	259,484	6.9
2007	10,202	1,500	0	3,900	15,787	0	6,920	31,389	5.6
2008	10,202	50	0	83,491	11,350	0	6,321	105,093	2.7
2009	10,202	50	0	82,691	11,664	0	8,474	104,607	-4.8
2010	9,754	48	0	78,324	9,194	0	8,727	97,320	2.3
2011	8,778	40	0	56,256	4,460	0	6,003	69,534	1.8
2012	8,134	50	0	56,256	11,985	0	4,209	76,425	-0.8
2013	9,134	50	0	56,256	8,025	0	5,441	73,465	-0.5
2014	8,134	50	0	56,250	6,070	0	3,324	70,504	2.7
2015	8,134	400	0	56,250	6,605	0	4,777	71,389	5.3
2016	8,135	400	0	60,445	6,595	0	3,198	75,575	2.6
2017	8,132	400	0	60,000	11,595	0	6,671	80,127	4.3
2018	8,132	381	0	61,000	16,395	0	6,654	85,908	N/A
2019	8,132	305	0	61,000	11,795	0	6,583	81,232	N/A

source: *Sbirka* (1993–2019) *World Bank* (2018)

Appendix C Main data applied in analysis

FY	Career soldiers	Conscripts ^{a)}	Military personnel, total	Higher education ratio	Conscription ratio	Number of prosecutions	Number of prosecutions per a soldier	Money spent by the MOD ^{b)} on the PSCP, CZK thousand	Mean age of a career soldier, years
<i>t</i>	<i>Q_v</i>	<i>Q_c</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>E_{rat}</i>	<i>Cr_{at}</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>Cr</i>	<i>Ms</i>	<i>Am</i>
1993	33,282	68,630	101,912	N/A	0.67	4,008	0.0393	N/A	N/A
1994	30,413	54,326	84,739	N/A	0.64	9,492	0.1120	N/A	N/A
1995	27,654	43,178	70,832	N/A	0.61	5,685	0.0803	N/A	N/A
1996	26,340	36,797	63,137	N/A	0.58	7,020	0.1112	N/A	N/A
1997	23,759	32,174	55,933	N/A	0.58	6,271	0.1121	N/A	N/A
1998	22,966	32,942	55,908	N/A	0.59	6,179	0.1105	N/A	N/A
1999	23,721	33,281	57,002	N/A	0.58	5,837	0.1024	N/A	N/A
2000	23,184	31,185	54,369	N/A	0.57	5,064	0.0931	N/A	N/A
2001	20,627	24,955	45,582	N/A	0.55	4,635	0.1017	N/A	N/A
2002	21,249	21,235	42,484	N/A	0.50	3,636	0.0863	N/A	N/A
2003	21,055	19,783	40,838	N/A	0.48	2,677	0.0669	16,055	N/A
2004	22,145	6,359	28,504	N/A	0.22	1,233	0.0442	5,848	N/A
2005	23,110	0	23,110	N/A	0.00	608	0.0269	8,351	31.37
2006	24,229	0	24,229	0.312	0.00	318	0.0135	7,907	31.98
2007	24,334	0	24,334	0.288	0.00	283	0.0120	6,894	32.42
2008	24,103	0	24,103	0.277	0.00	280	0.0119	6,307	33.01
2009	23,136	0	23,136	0.263	0.00	174	0.0078	8,446	33.41
2010	22,261	0	22,261	0.272	0.00	219	0.0103	8,655	33.86
2011	21,751	0	21,751	0.280	0.00	226	0.0107	5,989	34.46
2012	21,733	0	21,733	0.285	0.00	302	0.0143	4,062	34.88
2013	21,011	0	21,011	0.294	0.00	324	0.0163	5,398	36.05
2014	20,864	0	20,864	0.304	0.00	174	0.0086	4,403	36.59
2015	21,970	0	21,970	0.313	0.00	143	0.0067	12,704	37.13
2016	23,184	0	23,184	0.310	0.00	140	0.0062	4,694	37.22
2017	24,251	0	24,251	0.311	0.00	171	0.0072	6,666	37.34

Notes:

a)... Length of compulsory military service: 18 months (1993–1994), 12 months (1995–2004)

b)... Ministry of Defence (MOD)

source: *Ministerstvo obrany* (2019), *Vojenská policie* (1993–2018), *MOF* (1999–2008), *MOF* (2009–2018); calculation based on data from *Ministerstvo obrany* (2006–2017)